Campaign in Egypt and Libya.
The year 1942 was undoubtedly the most unhappy experienced by the Italian people in many decades. And by the end of the year the indications were that 1943 would be even more unhappy. Having been drawn into the war on the side of Hitler in the expectation of an easy victory over England, Italy found herself in 1942 tied to the chariot of the German war lord, in whose ultimate victory she had less and less reason to believe. The Italian people now began to feel that whichever side won, Italy would lose. Or, as the saying went in Italy, 'If the English win, we are losers; if the Germans win, we are lost.'
Among the various reasons why the Italians could not look back upon 1942 with any rejoicing was the adverse outcome of the campaign in Egypt and Libya. Having lost her East African Empire during the preceding year, Italy was by the end of 1942 on the point of losing her remaining North African possessions. Already over 250,000 Italian soldiers were in Allied captivity, with many others destined to be taken in 1943. (See LIBYA AND EGYPT, CAMPAIGN IN.)
Following the landing of American forces in Morocco and Algeria, Nov. 7 (New York time, Nov. 8 North Africa time), 1942, the center of attention in the Mediterranean naturally shifted to French North Africa. The British offensive in Egypt and Libya and the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa were accompanied by very destructive raids on a number of Italian cities — notably Genoa, Turin, and Milan. Italian morale began to sag, and even in authoritative quarters there was talk of making no stand in Tunisia. When one recalls the importance of the naval base at Bizerte and of the proximity of Tunisian airfields to Sardinia and Sicily, one can appreciate the panic which must have seized government circles in Rome.
However, by Nov. 20 the Government seems to have pulled itself together, no doubt due to stern prodding from Berlin, and troops were being rushed south to protect Sicily from any invasion threat. The Germans also poured in troops and were reported to be feverishly engaged in building fortifications along the southern Italian coasts. During December the Axis forces in Tunisia increased in size and in armament, and it became clear that before the Allies could take Bizerte and Tunis and other important ports in eastern Tunisia, they were going to have a real fight on their hands.
Operations in the Mediterranean.
Naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea during 1942 were marked by a continuous war of attrition waged by each side against the other. After their defeats of the previous year, the larger units of the Italian Navy showed themselves very infrequently outside their bases. Nevertheless, Britain's erstwhile lifeline from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal remained virtually closed to merchant shipping, except for infrequent convoys jammed through to Malta at considerable loss. With not only Italy and Libya but also Greece and Crete under Axis control, the Luftwaffe and the Italian air force were able fairly effectively to deny the use of the Central Mediterranean to British shipping. Also during the opening weeks of the year there was evidence that the Germans had been able to place a number of their U-boats in Mediterranean waters.
The British, too, were able — from bases in Egypt, Malta, and Gibraltar — to imperil Axis communications from Italy and Libya. Hence the repeated large-scale aerial assaults upon Malta that were launched at various times during the year. On several occasions it looked as though the Axis were preparing for an attempt to invade and destroy this 'permanently moored aircraft carrier,' but due to the heroic resistance of the armed forces and inhabitants of the island and to the fact that the British managed to push several convoys of supplies through to the island, Malta succeeded in staving off every assault. When the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa took place in November, Malta was of the utmost value in rendering support.
The following chronology of important naval events in the Mediterranean will give an idea of the constant seesaw in that arena. On March 9 R.A.F. planes set fire to an Italian cruiser, a destroyer, and a cargo vessel in the central Mediterranean. Six days later light British naval forces and planes inflicted a surprise bombardment on the island of Rhodes. The British announced on March 23 that their submarines had sunk two Italian submarines, a motor ship and six schooners. On the following day the Admiralty reported that a convoy had got through to Malta from Alexandria with the loss of one British merchant ship sunk and four British warships damaged. Three times the British convoying warships drove off superior Italian naval forces, inflicting damage on an Italian battleship and two cruisers. On April 9 the Admiralty claimed the destruction of a 10,000-ton Italian cruiser in the Central Mediterranean. The following day four more Axis supply ships were reported sunk by British submarine action, with four more meeting the same fate later in the month.
On the other hand, in the early part of May Nazi bombers sank three out of four British destroyers in a group attacked in the Eastern Mediterranean. On June 16 it was officially announced that convoys for Tobruk and Malta had gone through from Alexandria and Gibraltar respectively, but only after real fights in the course of which one Italian cruiser and two destroyers were sunk and two battleships damaged. American ships participated in the convoy for Malta which the British admitted reached its destination only after suffering considerable losses. The British admitted in August that they lost the aircraft carrier Eagle, two cruisers and a destroyer on convoy duty to Malta.
According to an Italian broadcast of July 12, the ships which had been damaged by the famous British torpedo-plane raid on Taranto in 1941 had been repaired. From Berlin came reports that the 35,000-ton Impero and its sister ship the Roma were in service. However, these large units apparently feared to put to sea, perhaps because of a shortage of fuel and lack of target practice. Journalists coming out of Italy reported that during the year increasing numbers of German sailors were seen in that country; this raised the question as to whether Hitler intended to take over at least part of the Italian Navy.
As the year wore on, American bombers took an ever-growing part in the war against the Navy and merchant shipping of Italy. On Aug. 10 they hit three out of four Italian cruisers lying in Navarino Bay. On Sept. 7 and 11 they delivered heavy blows against Suda Bay on Crete. The R.A.F. revealed in Cairo on September 25 that British and American bombers had sunk 40 Axis cargo ships (totaling 60,000 tons) since June, and had damaged 40 others. Another American raid on Navarino caused two large supply ships to explode on Oct. 3.
Aug. 13 was marked by another British bombardment of Italian-held Rhodes, an obvious jumping-off place for any Axis invasion of Asia Minor and the Levant. According to Admiralty reports, issued from time to time during the last four months of the year, British submarines were responsible for sinking some two dozen Axis ships and disabling a number of others. One of the stratagems employed by the Italians to get supplies to Libya was to use Tunisian ports. They were thus able to send supplies across at the narrowest point in the Mediterranean, where British air and sea power would naturally be least effective. One of the objectives of the Allied invasion of French North Africa was doubtless to deprive the Italians of this relatively safe route. As the year closed American and British bombers operating from Cyrenaica, Malta and Algeria were gradually putting the ports of Tunisia and Tripolitania out of commission.
The Balkans.
The occupation of Albania and Greece and of the coastal areas of Yugoslavia continued to drain Italian strength from the main theaters of war. Upon several occasions the Italian Government reported losses in the Balkans exceeding those for either the Libyan or Russian fronts. In Serbia General Mikhailovitch continued to wage his guerrilla warfare against the combined forces of the Axis and its Hungarian and Bulgarian satellites. In addition, partisans, apparently under Russian inspiration, organized bands that roamed through Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slovenia, making life miserable for the Italian occupying forces. The newly created Kingdom of Croatia was torn by conflicts among the Croatians themselves, and consequently the recently chosen King of Tomislav II, formerly the Duke of Spoleto, found it prudent to remain in Italy.
Nor was all the rivalry between the various bands of Yugoslavs, or between the Yugoslavs and the Axis; for between Berlin and Rome difficulties were reported as arising over the disposition of the conquered territories. In spite of the thanklessness of the task of trying to pacify Yugoslavia, the Italians preferred to do this rather than send their troops to the steppes of Russia. Also, it was rather clear that the Italian Government hoped by political maneuvers in the Balkans to recoup some of the prestige it had lost on the field of battle. This naturally annoyed the Nazis, who felt that to the victors belonged the spoils. The intra-Axis conflict was at its sharpest in Greece, where the Germans had turned over much of the dirty work of garrisoning the country to the Italians, after having stripped it of most of its food and valuables. The Italians, though less inhumane masters than the Germans, were more inefficient, and thus earned the contempt of the Greek people.
The Albanians likewise lost few opportunities to annoy their Italian rulers. From time to time attacks would be made on isolated Italian posts or supply trains, and even in Tirana life was not safe for the occupying forces. With their long tradition of guerrilla fighting, the Albanians were — in their small way — able to tie up considerable Italian forces. The same was true in the mountainous area of Montenegro, where no less than five Italian divisions were reported under arms in March. Upon several occasions the Italian Navy and Air Force bombarded Montenegrin and Dalmatian towns. Even in Italy itself the Yugoslav bands made their pressure felt, for several raids in Istria and on Trieste were reported by neutral sources.
Things apparently got so bad early in August that Mussolini had to visit Gorizia in order to organize resistance to these Yugoslav depredations. Well-substantiated reports indicated that British help was reaching Mikhailovitch in small quantities by plane and submarine.
On May 15 an Italo-Bulgar pact was signed by which the Fascist Government hoped to obtain more food from Bulgaria. However, on October 7 another accord was reached which provided for a road from Durazzo (in Albania) to Sofia, but which apparently failed to promise the Italians the foodstuffs they were so anxious to obtain.
As the year closed a new offensive was being launched by the Yugoslav 'rebels' who were no doubt encouraged by the Allied victories in Egypt, North Africa, and Russia. Albanian resistance was likewise given new impetus when on Dec. 10 Secretary of State Hull published a statement in favor of a free and independent Albania as one of the Allies' peace aims — a statement concurred in by Soviet Russia.
Air Raids on Italy.
During 1940 and 1941 Allied air raids on Italy had been few and not particularly destructive. The year 1942, however, saw the beginning of real aerial warfare waged against Italy, doubtless in the hope of softening up the peninsula for an actual invasion. By the end of the year some of Italy's most important industrial and shipping centers had been badly damaged.
One part of Italy had been undergoing intermittent raids ever since the beginning of the war — Sicily. The Luftwaffe had taken over a number of airfields and bases on this island, and from them had ferried supplies and men to Rommel in Libya, as well as harassed British shipping in the Central Mediterranean. The conduct of the Luftwaffe in Sicily was such that it thoroughly alienated the good will of the Sicilians. British air raids on that island were almost welcomed by the inhabitants.
On April 13 the British raided Genoa and Turin, giving those cities a foretaste of what was to come in the autumn. On Oct. 22, simultaneously with the beginning of General Montgomery's offensive in Egypt, a heavy raid was made on Genoa, causing extensive damage. Thereafter raids were made not only on Genoa but on Turin, Milan, and other North Italian cities. Lacking adequate air raid protection and anti-aircraft artillery, the Italians were unable to put up much of a defense or to inflict serious losses on the British raiders. Not only were the huge British 'Block-buster' bombs highly destructive, but the Italians themselves added to the loss of life by becoming panicky. This seems to have been especially true in Genoa. In order to calm the population of this port city, King Victor Emmanuel made a special visit there, where he is reported to have been greeted by cries of 'Peace, Peace!' The situation became so bad that Mussolini himself felt called upon to instruct the inhabitants of large cities to leave them for the open country. This increased the feeling of panic which manifested itself, inter alia, by runs on banks. In general, the British raids exposed once again the inefficiency of the Fascist régime.
On Nov. 6 and 7, coincident with the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, further large raids were made on Genoa, followed by an even larger one on the 8th. On the 13th and 15th this much-battered city was again visited by large forces of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. On November 18 a heavy raid was made on Turin, and on November 20 the worst raid so far made over Italy hit the Piedmontese capital. From then on, raids on northern Italian towns became more or less a matter of course.
The raids on Genoa, Turin, and Milan were made primarily for the purpose of destroying the manufacturing establishments and communications systems of those cities. In Genoa the particular targets were the port facilities, shipbuilding yards, artillery factories, etc. In Turin the attackers repeatedly bombed such points as the Royal Arsenal, the Fiat works and other large factories turning out war material. The same was true for Milan, which is also the greatest railroad center of Italy. Even when the factories were not destroyed, their operations were brought to a standstill by the exodus of workers from the bombed cities. British officials estimated that by Dec. 1 the 1,500 tons of bombs dropped on North Italy had damaged three-tenths of that country's war industries.
Next came the turn of Naples, which on Dec. 4 was attacked by American bombers flying from Egypt. This event has an historical importance all its own, since it represents the first blow ever struck directly at Italy by the armed forces of the United States. Other raids on Naples were reported to have destroyed a number of the communications and port facilities in that great city. The question naturally arose as to whether attacks would also be made on Rome, since that city contained numerous military installations, not to mention the seat of the government of Italy itself. Presumably the Allies would be very reluctant to bomb Rome as long as it was the residence of the Pope. Nevertheless towards the end of the year there was considerable talk in Fascist circles about the desirability of declaring Rome an open city and removing its military installations.
Relations with Germany.
The entry of the United States into the war and the forebodings of increased pressure against the two Axis partners in Europe inevitably entailed an increasing control over Italian affairs by the Nazis. Mussolini had led the Italian people to believe that the war would be short; when war was declared upon the United States they realized once again, and more forcibly than ever before, that the war would not only be long but very likely would result in an Axis defeat. In order to keep the Italians in line the Germans were compelled to send more and more 'experts,' Gestapo agents, and troops to Italy. This became especially noticeable late in the year after the Allied invasion of French North Africa and the disastrous bombings of Genoa, Turin, and other Italian cities.
On Jan. 18 the three Axis partners — Germany, Italy, and Japan — signed a new military pact providing for 'common operations' and 'close cooperation.' The exact details of this accord were not revealed, but the general assumption was that it provided for some sort of a synchronized military and political program to be executed in both the Pacific and the European theatres of war.
Late in January Marshal Goering went to Italy and stayed for several days, conferring with high Fascist officials and inspecting the installations of the Luftwaffe in Sicily. Neutral reports indicated that he also sought to increase the number of Italian laborers in Germany, perhaps by as much as 300,000. On Mar. 16 the Italians announced that they had just concluded a new trade pact with Germany under which the Rome Government was committed to a 'considerable increase' in the number of Italian workers to be sent north of the Alps. This agreement, signed by Count Ciano and the German trade expert, Dr. Clodius, provided for an anticipated trade volume between the two countries of a value of one billion marks a year. Italy was reported to be short on her trade balance vis-à-vis Germany by some 10% or 15%. However, this discrepancy could be balanced if one included the 300,000,000 marks a year which Germany paid for the Italian labor sent to her by the Fascist Government. Though it was not stated by any Fascist source, outside experts concluded that this agreement helped fasten German control over Italian industry and economic life in general. In particular, Italian heavy industry and communications had by now come pretty completely under the supervision, if not outright control, of German officials. This fact helped explain why Italy, though its people were suffering from malnutrition, was obliged to send Germany considerable amounts of food, especially fruits and vegetables. On the other hand, it seems clear that Germany did make a sincere effort to provide Italy with the monthly delivery of 1,000,000 tons of coal which had been promised in a previous agreement.
As German military, political and economic control spread throughout Europe — in both Axis-occupied and neutral countries — Italy found herself at a growing disadvantage in her efforts to provide for her wants from sources outside her own territory. Whenever the Italians bid against the Germans for the products of such places as Spain and Portugal, they found that Germany very definitely had the inside track. For one thing, Italy, having no credit, was obliged by these producers to pay cash — something that was next to impossible for her to do.
On April 26 Hitler made his famous speech in which he dwelt at length on internal conditions in Germany, making it clear that things were not going well in the Reich. The Italians had evidently expected another bloodthirsty, sword-rattling harangue, and were consequently stunned by Hitler's tacit admission of growing opposition and defeatism in his own country.
Hitler and Mussolini had another of their periodic meetings on April 29 and 30 — this time at Salzburg. Each of the leaders was accompanied by high military and diplomatic functionaries, which made it rather evident that the whole world situation was canvassed by the two dictators. Again, our knowledge of what transpired is extremely meagre, but the general assumption in neutral quarters — substantiated by later events — was that Hitler told Mussolini that the war would not be over in the near future and that the Italians must therefore contribute more men to the Russian campaign. Hitler is also believed to have confronted Mussolini with proof of growing disaffection in Italy and to have insisted that more Gestapo agents be sent south of the Alps. The Führer seems likewise to have urged upon his colleague the necessity for a thorough purge in the Fascist Party so as to rid it of elements lukewarm toward the Axis connection.
When the American correspondents came out of Italy in mid-May along with the American diplomatic officials repatriated at that time, they reported circumstantially concerning the constantly increasing German control over Italian economic and political affairs. It was estimated by them that there were at least 200,000 Germans in Italy at that time, with the prospect of more to come. Certain parts of the country had, they declared, been taken over by the Germans and were, to all intents and purposes, governed as if they were an integral part of Germany itself.
Meanwhile the number of Italian troops in Russia was constantly augmented by the arrival of new divisions. It is unnecessary to say that the Italian people were anything but enthusiastic about having their sons and husbands sent off to freeze to death on the eastern front. On May 30 Ciano declared before a committee of the Italian Senate that the idea of the war against Russia had in fact originated with Il Duce — which must have been news to Hitler! Ciano's claim may well have been made in order to increase the enthusiasm of the Italian people for the Russian campaign. However, service on the eastern front continued to be unpopular. Nevertheless by the end of the year over twenty Italian divisions were reported to be in Russia. The lack of fighting zeal among them was indicated when the Russians plowed through a sector held by Italian troops in their Christmas campaign to relieve Stalingrad.
In mid-October the King, at Mussolini's suggestion, amnestied around 51,000 persons charged with, or convicted of, political offenses, in order that they might go to Germany to work. Some 22,000 of this number were reported to be in prison at the time. This measure speaks volumes concerning the popularity of labor service in Germany among the working classes of Italy!
With Rommel's retreat from Egypt and the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa early in November, Nazis began flowing into Italy at a greatly stepped-up tempo. Some of them were merely in transit, bound for Tunisia; but others were destined for Italy itself, where the untoward events in North Africa, coupled with the devastating raids on northern Italian cities, had shattered public morale. Late in November there were well-authenticated reports that no less than 60,000 Elite Guards and Gestapo agents had been rushed to Italy, where they had already made numerous arrests.
In the middle of December the Germans were said to be taking over Italian railways, port facilities, airfields, etc. By the end of the year there could no longer be any doubt that Italy was a German-occupied country with a status only slightly more tolerable than that of France. More and more, Mussolini was drawing into his own shell and leaving the administration of his country to Nazi officials. His health was also reported to be poor. Heart trouble, ulcers, cancer and various other ailments were ascribed to him — naturally no official information was forthcoming from Fascist sources. A photograph of him taken late in the year showed him much thinner than he had been for several years.
On Dec. 18 and 19 another two-day politico-military conference was held at Hitler's headquarters, with Ciano and Marshal Cavallero representing Italy. Laval was also present at one of the meetings — which must have annoyed the Italian delegates. The object of the conference was obviously to give Hitler a chance to explain the next stages of the war and to issue orders to his satellites.
Relations with France and Spain.
Ever since the fall of France, Mussolini had been obsessed with the fear that he would be supplanted by Pétain, Laval, or some other Frenchman as the Number 2 man in Hitler's scheme of things. The reasons for this fear are obvious. The industrial apparatus, the natural resources, and the military and naval establishments (particularly the fleet) of France were far more impressive than those of poverty-stricken Italy. Even though France had been but lately an enemy of the Third Reich, the Fascists suspected that Hitler would welcome a pro-Nazi French régime as his foremost collaborator in the construction of the 'New Order' in Europe. That this did not eventuate, at least during 1942, was due more to the resistance of the French people than lack of willingness on the part of Laval and his stooges, or to Mussolini and his objections.
One of the tactics pursued by the Fascists to impress upon Hitler their importance and to insure that Italy should not go entirely unrewarded for her sacrifices in the war was to make repeated demands for the annexation of Savoy, Nice, Corsica, and Tunisia. For example, at the end of May, Il Duce was reported to be putting considerable pressure upon Vichy in regard to these French-owned territories. In order to reinforce this pressure Mussolini caused 300,000 Italian troops to be concentrated in Piedmont, where they were reviewed by the King.
Early in November the armistice with France was declared invalid by Hitler as a result of the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa on Nov. 7. On Nov. 11 German troops entered the previously Unoccupied France and within a few hours even cities on the Mediterranean coast such as Marseilles were patrolled by German forces. At the same time Italian troops entered the French Riviera, Savoy, and Corsica. The Fascist press naturally sought to play up these occupations as representing the final achievement of Italy's irredentist ambitions. The Italian people were then being harassed by the heavy raids of the R.A.F. and by the incubus of the American army in Algeria and Tunisia, and they were therefore not impressed.
It will be recalled that Mussolini had already, before 1942, publicly presented Spain with a bill for the extensive assistance in men and material Italy had rendered Franco during the Civil War. On February 5 the official bulletin of Spain stated that General Franco had ordered Spanish bonds to a value of 5,000,000,000 lire transferred to Rome in payment of this debt. In June Franco's brother-in-law and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramon Serrano Suñer, visited Rome, but for what purpose was not officially divulged.
Relations with United States.
The negotiations between the American and Italian Governments for the repatriation of their diplomatic and journalistic representatives in each other's country trailed on through the early months of 1942. In fact, it was not until May 16 that all of the American contingents from Italy finally reached safety in Lisbon, where they passed the Italians coming from America. With the arrival of the American journalists on neutral soil it became possible for them for the first time in many months to give a candid picture of conditions in Italy.
On Oct. 12, which is celebrated in many American states as Columbus Day, Attorney General Biddle announced that after Oct. 19 the approximately 600,000 Italian aliens in the United States would be freed from the stigma and disabilities of enemy aliens. It was revealed at this time that during the ten months the United States had been at war with Italy, only 228 nationals of the latter country had had to be interned.
Meanwhile there grew up in both the United States and the Latin American countries a movement for a Free Italy, under the general leadership of Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Foreign Minister. On August 14 a Free Italy convention opened in Montevideo, capital of Uruguay, at which were assembled some 1,500 delegates from all parts of the Western Hemisphere. At this convention an organization was set up and a program adopted. The principal aim of this movement was, of course, the establishment of a democratic régime in Italy, and to this end it pledged full support to the war effort of the United Nations.
Internal Problems.
As the year wore on the Italian Government had to contend more and more with the problem of diminishing supplies of food and other consumption goods, and with the resultant rise in prices and the ever-present threat of inflation. In a country like Italy, where the great mass of the population lives close to the margin of subsistence, any rise in prices could not fail to have serious social consequences. On March 15 the bread ration for Italians (except those doing heavy manual labor) was reduced from 200 to 150 grams (5½ ounces) a day. The seriousness of this reduction in the bread ration was all the greater since the poorer classes in Italy rely upon bread as the veritable staff of their life. After this cut had been put into effect Italy's food ration was lower than that of any country in Europe except Belgium and Greece — being only half that of Germany.
The increasing lack of popular confidence in Italian currency and the growing fear of inflation obliged Mussolini to declare on March 26 that he intended to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the savings of the common people.
At the end of March the Italian people were asked to subscribe to a new loan, the third one of the war.
By summer the lack of balance between wages and prices had become even more alarming. The black market operations of Fascist officials became a public scandal, and in August the Government was obliged to announce that 66,000 party members had been stricken off the rolls. However, none of those thrown out were important hierarchs. One of the reasons given for depriving men of their party membership was their growing lukewarmness towards the alliance with Germany. By the end of the year neutral observers in Italy reported that unrest was becoming widespread, that in some places riots and uprisings had had to be put down with troops, and that in general the people clearly showed their weariness of the war and their antagonism to the Germans.
On December 2 Mussolini broke a silence of several months, when he made a speech to the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations which was broadcast throughout the world. In general the speech conveyed a very distinct impression that Il Duce was tired and disillusioned. In this he certainly reflected the feeling of his people.
