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Showing posts with label Law And Legislation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Law And Legislation. Show all posts

1942: Law And Legislation

In our first year of war the statutes passed by Congress and the administrative regulations emanating from Washington touched the ordinary citizen in more ways than ever before in our history. The most vital need of the country was for an expanded military establishment to meet the grave threat that confronted us.

A long step toward securing the necessary men for our armed forces had been made by the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, which laid the foundations for a great army. The operation of this Act, however, revealed a number of deficiencies which had to be remedied in 1942. In the first place, it did not provide for the induction of men 18 and 19 years of age who, because of their youth, vigor and lack of family responsibilities, make excellent soldiers. This deficiency was corrected by an amendment to the Selective Service and Training Act of Nov. 13, 1942, which reduced the age limit of persons liable for training and service in the land and naval forces of the United States from 20 years of age to 18 years at the time fixed for registration. The Army found, moreover, that men over 38 years of age, because of their age, physical condition and family responsibilities, would be more valuable in civilian life, particularly in defense plants or other phases of the war effort. The induction of men over 38 into the armed forces was therefore suspended by Presidential order. Provision was also made whereby men over that age could be released from the armed forces, if they had already been inducted, upon proof that they would be employed on release in an industry essential to the war effort or in agriculture.

The dual system of obtaining men for the armed forces by enlistment and induction also did not work satisfactorily. It fostered competition between the various branches of the armed forces for the best manpower. Moreover, certain branches of the service needed men to such an extent that enlistment could not be relied on to obtain them. It was desirable for all branches of the service to share equally, according to their need, in the total manpower available. This could be made possible only through the Selective Service System. Thus the President prohibited the voluntary enlistment of men between the ages of 18 and 38 years of age. Such men would thereafter be inducted into the armed forces through the Selective Service System. An Executive Order of Dec. 5, 1942, directed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to consult with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and to determine the number of men required by their services each month. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was charged with the duty of furnishing the required number of men through the Selective Service System.

Formation of Non-Combatant Units for Women.

The manpower needs of the armed forces are so great that it has been necessary to use women for non-combat duties so as to make more men available for combat. Specific statutory authority from Congress brought the WAACS, the WAVES, and the SPARS into being to serve the Army, the Navy and the Coast Guard respectively. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps Act of May 14, 1942, authorized the enrollment of 150,000 women citizens between the ages of 21 and 45 for non-combatant service. The Women's Naval Reserve Act and the act creating the Women's Coast Guard Reserve specifically provide that the service of the enlisted women 'shall be restricted to the performance of shore duty within the continental United States only,' so that male officers and enlisted men may be released for duty at sea. These statutes recognized that certain types of non-combatant duties could be performed by women just as well as, or perhaps even better than by men and that thousands of women are eager and willing to perform these duties. However, they cannot be employed with a maximum benefit to national defense without proper organization, training and control under military supervision. The three statutes above mentioned provided the means whereby the necessary organization, training and control could be perfected and exercised.

Financial Legislation for Servicemen.

The morale of the armed forces would be undermined if the men in the ranks felt that their wives, children or other dependents were left to shift for themselves because the Government for which they were fighting and dying was uninterested in their comfort and support. In order to counteract this feeling and make provision for the dependents of men in the service, Congress passed the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act which provided family allowances of varying amounts for the dependents of enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The allowances were made up in part from a contribution by the Government and in part from an allotment of pay by the enlisted man. Congress also took steps to increase the pay of the men in the service by the Pay Re-Adjustment Act, which provided a 20 per cent increase in the base pay of enlisted men in the military and naval forces of the United States. In addition, Congress took steps so that men in the service would not be harassed by lawsuits for debts incurred prior to their induction. The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 was amended so as to give men in the armed forces a widespread protection from liability on debts and obligations incurred prior to induction. This statute also reduces the interest rate on obligations of men in the service to 6 per cent. The same statute also provided that the Government would guarantee the payment of private insurance premiums of men in the service up to $10,000 instead of $5,000 as heretofore, thus making it possible for thousands of men to keep their life insurance in force.

War Manpower Commission.

The problem of obtaining men for the armed forces could not be divorced from the problem of securing men for defense industries, agriculture and other phases of civilian life which contributed directly to the war effort. The available manpower of the country, in other words, had to be apportioned between essential military and civilian needs. This could not be done efficiently by different governmental agencies. The President therefore entrusted this task to the War Manpower Commission headed by Chairman Paul V. McNutt. The Selective Service System was transferred to the War Manpower Commission and the various local and appeal boards were made subject to the Chairman's supervision. The Chairman was also directed to take all lawful and appropriate steps 'to assure that (a) all hiring, rehiring, solicitation and recruitment of workers in or for work in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation or area designated by the Chairman ... shall be conducted solely through the U. S. Employment Service or in accordance with such arrangements as the Chairman shall approve, and (b) no employer shall retain in his employ any worker whose services are more urgently needed in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation or area, designated as more essential by the Chairman.'

Even before this sweeping Presidential order had been handed down, the War Manpower Commission, which had originally been set up by the President to 'formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war,' had taken far-reaching steps to apportion civil workers to essential war industries. Manufacturers of war materials bid against each other for trained workers. Thus, there was considerable pirating of employees in centers of defense industry and considerable migration of workers in search of better jobs. The Commission sought to meet this evil through the designation of certain areas as 'critical labor areas' and certain occupations as 'critical occupations.' Twelve western states, for example, were declared critical labor areas and all non-ferrous metal mining, mill, smelting and refining and all logging and lumbering activities within such area were declared essential war production activities and all occupations in these industries were declared critical occupations. After Sept. 7, no worker engaged in one of these essential war production activities could accept another job without first securing a certificate of separation from the U. S. Employment Service. Such certificate would be granted only when it was in the best interest of the war effort. An employer was prohibited by the order of the War Manpower Commission from hiring a worker without such a certificate. One industry, gold mining, was deemed unessential to the war effort by the War Production Board, which ordered operations at gold mines suspended. The War Manpower Commission sought to divert the unemployed gold miners to non-ferrous metal industries where a shortage of labor existed and prohibited the employ of these miners unless they were referred by the U. S. Employment Service, which was to do so only to the non-ferrous metal industries.

National War Labor Board.

Under the pressure of our re-armament and war production more and more jobs have become available. Disputes between workers and employers concerning wages, hours and conditions of employment became inevitable. The usual weapons of industrial disputes in peacetime — strikes and lockouts — could not be employed in wartime without endangering the safety of the country. This fact was recognized by a conference of the representatives of labor and industry, which was called by the President. The conference agreed that there shall be no strikes and lockouts for the duration of the war and that all labor disputes should be settled by peaceful means. The conference also recommended that a National War Labor Board be established for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The President acted on this recommendation and established the National War Labor Board, to be composed of twelve commissioners appointed by the President. Four commissioners were to represent the employers; four, the employees; and four, the public. The Board was given power to adjust labor disputes certified to it by the Secretary of Labor or disputes in which it intervened on its own account.

War Production Board.

The most difficult problem which the country encountered during 1942 was the conversion of its industry and economy from a peacetime to a wartime basis so as to provide the Army, Navy and Air Force with the instruments and implements of war. The results which have been achieved during 1942 indicate that industrial miracles are still possible in this country. Much of the credit for the tremendous industrial achievement during the past year must go to the War Production Board established by the President during the early part of the year and headed by Donald Nelson.

Some dissatisfaction in war production has resulted from the fact that, in general, war orders have tended to go to the large industrial corporations of this country. But, there is a considerable industrial capacity in the small businesses of the country which could be used to turn out implements of war. In order to facilitate the use of small business in war production, Congress passed a statute directing the Chairman of the War Production Board to appoint a deputy 'to mobilize aggressively the productive capacity of all small business concerns and to determine the means by which such concerns can be most efficiently and effectively utilized to augment war production.' Congress also created the Smaller War Plants Corporation with a capital stock of $150,000,000 subscribed through the United States Treasury. This corporation is empowered to make loans or advances to enable smaller business concerns to finance plant construction, conversion or expansion, or to finance the acquisition of equipment, machinery, materials, supplies, etc., to be used in the manufacture of materials of war or materials for essential civilian purposes.

Housing Problem.

As defense plants expanded and required more and more workers, the problem of housing became acute. There simply were not enough housing facilities to accommodate the large number of workers who flocked into centers of defense industry. Congress has sought to meet this difficulty by appropriating huge sums to provide housing for defense workers. The appropriation for the defense housing program was first raised from $300,000,000 to $600,000,000 and was later increased to $1,200,000,000. The President also took steps to coordinate and make more efficient the work of various Federal agencies engaged in different aspects of the housing problem. The following agencies, among others, were consolidated into a National Housing Agency headed by an Administrator: (1) The Federal Housing Administration, (2) The Federal Home Loan Bank, (3) The Home Owners Loan Corporation, (4) The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, (5) The United States Housing Authority, (6) The Defense Homes Corporation.

Financing Prosecution of War.

It was increasingly brought home to people in this country during the past year that the prosecution of a war costs money. The largest appropriation bills in our history were passed by the 77th Congress to provide the expanded military establishment necessary for a vigorous and effective prosecution of the war. The funds for these appropriations must come in the main from two sources: (1) governmental borrowing, and (2) taxation. Congress made it possible for the Treasury Department to borrow huge sums for the prosecution of the war by increasing the debt limit of the United States from $45,000,000,000 to $125,000,000,000. The Revenue Act of 1942 made it possible to raise money by additional taxation. This statute is very comprehensive in scope and touches the pocketbook of every American. The Treasury experts estimated that approximately $7,000,000,000 in new revenue would be raised by this enactment. The Revenue Act of 1942 increased normal taxes on net income from four to six per cent. The new surtaxes now start at thirteen per cent instead of six per cent, and increase sharply over present rates. Personal exemptions of single men are reduced from $750 to $500 and for married men from $1,500 to $1,200. The $400 credit for each dependent is reduced to $350. For the first time the United States Government levies a tax on gross income to be collected at the source. This is the 5 per cent victory tax which is deductible from pay checks of those receiving a wage or salary of over $12 per week. Surtax rates on corporation income are also increased. Excise tax rates on distilled spirits, wine, beer, tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes are increased. The tax on distilled spirits, for example, is increased from $4 to $6 per gallon, on beer from $6 per barrel to $7 per barrel. Telephone and telegraph rates are likewise increased. There is now a 20 per cent tax on toll charges of more than twenty-four cents; telegraph, radio and cable messages pay a 15 per cent tax and local telephone service is to pay a 10 per cent tax. These are but a few of many provisions for increased taxation in the Revenue Act.

Office of Price Administration.

Increasing concentration of the productive capacity of the country on the implements of war and on the matériel necessary to supply our armed forces inevitably brought in its train a smaller supply of civilian goods. When supply is small and demand is great, prices must inevitably go up. Goods then become available only to those who can pay the price. Unless measures were taken to regulate prices, the greater the scarcity, the higher the prices would go, and the smaller the possibility that those in the low income groups of our population would share equitably in whatever stock of consumer goods was available. An increase in the price of consumer goods and a rising cost of living was also threatened by the fact that high wages and salaries, largely resulting from war contracts, put more money in the hands of large numbers of people, thereby making more purchasing power available. Unless some means were taken to control this purchasing power, there would be a spending spree on the limited supply of goods available such as this country had never seen. In order to meet the threat of runaway prices and a runaway inflation, Congress passed two statutes which have had a profound effect on American economy. The first statute was the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. This statute created the Office of Price Administration under the direction of a Price Administrator appointed by the President. He was given the power to establish generally fair and equitable maximum prices whenever, in his judgment, they have risen or threatened to rise unduly. The prices prevailing between Oct. 1 and Oct. 15, 1941, were to be taken as a criterion in the establishment of maximum prices. The Price Administrator was also given power to regulate or prohibit speculative or manipulative practices, such as hoarding, etc. He may also, where he finds that the maximum necessary production of any commodity is not being obtained, buy, sell, store or use such commodity in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as he believes necessary to obtain the maximum production required to supply the demand. The Price Administrator can also under the statute stabilize or reduce rents in defense rental areas. In fixing rentals for defense areas, the rents prevailing on or about Apr. 1, 1941, were to be taken as a criterion.

Although attacked in the courts during the year, the Price Control Act has been upheld as a valid exercise of the war powers of the Federal Government. Under this Act, prices were fixed for an increasing variety of goods and services throughout the year. By Nov. 1, moreover, the rentals in 287 areas with a total population of approximately 70,000,000 were also stabilized by the Office of Price Administration.

Anti-Inflation Act.

The second statute which sought to bring stability in the economic picture of wartime is popularly known as the Anti-Inflation Act (an act to amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to aid in preventing inflation and for other purposes). This statute directed the President on or before Nov. 1 to issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages and salaries affecting the cost of living, such stabilization so far as practicable to be on the levels existing on Sept. 15, 1942. The President was also given the power to provide for making adjustments of prices, wages and salaries to correct gross inequities or to aid in the effective prosecution of the war. There are limitations in the Act as to the maximum prices that can be fixed for farm commodities. The Act also directed that no action with respect to salaries and wages be taken for the purpose of reducing such salaries or wages below the highest amount paid between Jan. 1, 1942 and Sept. 15, 1942. Salaries paid by private employers in excess of $5,000 per annum could, however, be reduced without regard to the provisions of this statute.

Office of Economic Stabilization.

The President under this statute established the Office of Economic Stabilization headed by a Director. Justice Byrnes resigned his position on the Supreme Court to accept the post of Director of Economic Stabilization. He was given power, with the approval of the President, to formulate a comprehensive national economic policy relating to the control of civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing subsidies and all related matters for the purpose of preventing avoidable increases in the cost of living and preventing the unnecessary migration of labor and facilitating the prosecution of the war. The order directed that no increase or decrease in wages shall be authorized unless approved by the War Labor Board, and the latter agency was directed not to give such approval to any increase from wage rates prevailing on Sept. 15, 1942 unless this increase was necessary to correct maladjustments and inequities, eliminate substandard living conditions or to aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

Rubber Shortage.

As 1942 progressed, and our enemies cut off our normal sources of supply, one product, rubber, became particularly vital to our war effort. Congress took cognizance of this fact by authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to plant or contract for the planting of 500,000 acres of guayule in areas of the Western Hemisphere where the best growths and yields may be expected to serve as a domestic source of crude rubber. The President, acting on the recommendations of the Rubber Survey Committee, directed the Chairman of the War Production Board to assume full responsibility and control over research, development, importation, purchase, sale, acquisition, conservation, etc., of rubber. The President also directed the War Production Board Chairman to appoint a 'Rubber Director' who was to be responsible for the development of the nation's rubber program. It was under the authority of this order that William M. Jeffers was appointed Rubber Director by the Chairman of the War Production Board. It was also under this authority that the Rubber Director requested the Office of Price Administration to institute national gas rationing as a rubber conservation measure. The Office of Defense Transportation, cooperating in this rubber conservation program, set a 35 mile per hour speed limit for all rubber-tired vehicles in the United States. It also directed that all commercial vehicles carry certificates of war necessity, without which they cannot obtain gas, oil, tires and spare parts.

Food Rationing.

As 1942 progressed, the food situation in this country became progressively more difficult. This was brought home to American house-wives by the institution of rationing for such staple articles as coffee and sugar and the proposed rationing of canned goods. The necessity of apportioning the limited supply of food equitably among the armed forces, the civilian population, our allies, and the territories which we had freed from the enemy, caused the President to give a wide authority over the food supply to Secretary of Agriculture Wickard. The President authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to determine (a) the military, governmental, civilian and foreign food requirements, and (b) to formulate and carry out a program designed to furnish a supply of food necessary to meet these requirements. The Secretary of Agriculture was also directed to take whatever steps were necessary to insure a proper distribution of the available food supply and, through the Office of Price Administration, to direct the civilian rationing of food.

International Relations.

In the field of international relations, the outstanding event of 1942 was the Congressional declaration of war on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, which were already at war with our ally Russia. However, Congress did not declare war on Finland, which was fighting Russia, nor did the latter country declare war on Japan, which was our enemy. Congress also recognized the valiant struggle that China has made against the forces of Japanese aggression and, through a Joint Resolution, authorized the President to loan or extend credit to China in an amount not to exceed $500,000,000. In pursuance of the Good Neighbor Policy, Congress passed the 'Settlement of Mexican Claims Act.' Claims by American citizens against the Government of Mexico for loss or damage to property have always been the factor militating against the maintenance of good relations between the United States and Mexico. The statute sets up a Commission of three members to examine and render final decisions in certain categories of claims against the Government of Mexico by American nationals. It also sets up a Special Mexican Claims Fund, out of which the awards made by the Commission can be paid.

Mention should be made of the amendment to the Foreign Registration Act of 1938, which was designed to make more effective the legal barriers against enemy propagandists. Under this amendment, public relations counsel, public agents, information service employees, propagandists, servants, attorneys or representatives of foreign principals or foreign governments must register with the Attorney General and must file copies of political propaganda material with the Library of Congress and with the Attorney General. Exempted are agents of governments whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. The administration of the Act is transferred from the State Department to the Attorney General.

Review of Legislation and Administrative Regulations.

Our review of legislation and administrative regulations indicates that the life of the ordinary citizen is touched in more and more ways by action taken in Congress or in administrative agencies of the Federal Government. This is a manifestation of a long-standing trend in American government, namely, to centralize governmental activities in the Federal Government. The necessities of total war have given this trend added impetus. This tendency to centralize governmental activities in Washington has come about despite the fact that we live under a written Constitution. The Federal Government has no powers except those granted to it by the Constitution. All powers not granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the states. Yet, one of the most interesting aspects of our constitutional history is the way in which our written Constitution has lent itself to a flexible interpretation which sanctions ever-growing powers to the Federal Government.

Many significant decisions in the field of civil liberties were handed down by the Supreme Court in 1942. In Hill v. Texas (316 US 400) the Court held that the continuous omission of Negroes from grand jury lists for over sixteen years was a denial to a Negro defendant charged with rape of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ward v. Texas (316 US 547) the Court reiterated its lack of tolerance with third degree methods used to secure confessions in criminal cases and reversed a conviction in a murder case based on the confession of the defendant. In Betts v. Brady, however, the Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the state court to furnish an indigent defendant with counsel in a criminal case, even though the assistance of counsel had been requested by the defendant and the charge was a serious one. A statesman-like dissent of Justice Black, however, took exception to the majority view.

'No man shall be deprived of counsel because of his poverty,' stated Justice Black. 'Any other practice seems to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under the law.'

In Jones v. Opelika (316 US 584) the Court decided that city ordinances which required booksellers to obtain a license were not unconstitutional and an infringement of freedom of the press and freedom of religion when applied to adherents of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses, who distributed and sold printed matter in various towns without obtaining the necessary license therefor. The Court was, however, sharply divided in this case, one of the dissenting opinions stating, 'The opinion of the court sanctions a device which, in our opinion, suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group.' In Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe (315 US 722) the Court refused to hold that a Texas court violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech by issuing an injunction restraining a carpenters' union from picketing a restaurant because its owner had contracted for the construction of a building not connected with the restaurant and the contractor employed non-union labor.

The case which attracted most popular attention during the year was that of O. B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix v. North Carolina (October Term, 1942, No. 29). Williams had been married and lived in North Carolina for twenty-five years and had four children. Mrs. Hendrix had also been married in North Carolina and had lived there for twenty years. Both Williams and Mrs. Hendrix left their respective spouses and went to Nevada where they stayed for six weeks. They then filed suits for divorce against their spouses in North Carolina. No personal service was made upon the absent spouses. Both Williams and Mrs. Hendrix obtained divorce decrees in Nevada and were subsequently married there. They then returned to North Carolina and set up housekeeping as man and wife. North Carolina, however, refused to recognize the Nevada decree of divorce. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation and sentenced to state prison. A majority of the Supreme Court held that it was error for the North Carolina court to refuse to give the decree of the Nevada court the 'full faith and credit' required by the Constitution of the United States. In reaching this decision, the Court had to overrule its earlier decision in the case of Haddock v. Haddock (201 US 562) a landmark of divorce law, which had held that a divorce decree obtained under circumstances similar to the Hendrix case need not be given full faith and credit in the state of the matrimonial domicile. The action taken by the Court was severely criticized by Justice Jackson in a dissenting opinion.

'I cannot join in exerting the judicial power of the Federal Government to compel the state of North Carolina to subordinate its own law to the Nevada divorce decrees. The court's decision to do so reaches far beyond the immediate case. It subjects matrimonial laws of each state to important limitations and exceptions that it must recognize within its own borders and as to its own permanent population. It nullifies the power of each state to protect its own citizens against dissolutions of their marriages by the courts of other states which have an easier system of divorce. It subjects every marriage to a new infirmity in that one dissatisfied spouse may choose a state of easy divorce in which neither party has ever lived and there commence proceedings without personal service of process.... It is not an exaggeration to say that this decision repeals the divorce laws of all the states and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all marriages, one of the parties to which can afford a short trip there.'

1941: Law And Legislation

After Attack on Pearl Harbor.

War and preparation for war characterized the legislative activity of Congress and the administrative activity of the Federal Government during 1941. Before the treacherous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, each major step in foreign policy and war preparation, such as, the revision of the Neutrality Act, the extension of military service for draftees and National Guardsmen, the Lease-Lend Act, was sharply debated. After Dec. 7, the American people closed their ranks. Doubts and hesitations vanished. The illusion of isolationism in a world at war disappeared under a rain of Japanese bombs. The comfortable notion that we were safe behind our ocean barriers went up with the smoke from Hickam Field. Now at last the American people clearly realized that it could not exist free and independent in a world dominated by aggressor nations. The response through its elected representatives in Congress was immediate and conclusive. The declaration of war against Japan was voted with only a single dissenting voice and against Germany and Italy without any dissent. All restrictions on the use of American soldiers on foreign shores were lifted, permitting the American Army to fight the enemy wherever he was encountered. A drastic mobilization of American manpower was made possible by the law requiring every male individual between the ages of 18 and 65 to register and making men between 20 and 45 eligible for combat duty. The period of enlistment of all men in the military service was frozen to cover the entire period of the war emergency and an additional six months thereafter. Broad war powers were given to the President. He was authorized to redistribute the functions of governmental agencies so that the war could be prosecuted more vigorously. He was given authority to speed up the procurement of war materials by empowering governmental agencies to enter into contracts without competitive bidding. Congress also re-enacted the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and gave the President the right to censor all forms of communication, direct and indirect.

Proclamation of Unlimited National Emergency.

This flurry of legislative activity after Pearl Harbor had been preceded by many momentous decisions by the President and Congress, which gradually prepared the country for war. On May 27, 1941, the President proclaimed an unlimited national emergency to supplant the limited national emergency which had been proclaimed at the outbreak of the War in 1939. The President's proclamation of May 27, 1941, stated that 'an unlimited national emergency confronts this country which requires that its military, naval, air and civilian defenses be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts of aggression.' Evidently this warning of the President was not heeded at Pearl Harbor.

Lease-Lend Act.

Prior to the proclamation of the national emergency, Congress had taken a notable step forward in insuring the defeat of the Axis powers in the passage of the Lease-Lend Act. This Act made it possible for the President to authorize the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy or the head of any other government department (1) to manufacture or otherwise procure defense articles for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States; (2) to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of to such government any defense article; (3) to test, inspect, approve, repair, etc., any defense article for any such government; and (4) to communicate any defense information to such a government. The realities of the American position in a world at war were, however, still obscure to many Congressmen, for the Lease-Lend Act contained the provision that 'nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the convoying of vessels by naval vessels of the United States.'

The problem of bringing war materials and munitions of war to the countries fighting the Axis, was complicated by the Neutrality Act, which forbade the entry of American ships into combat areas. An opinion of the Attorney General interpreting the Neutrality Act made it possible to restrict its operations to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, thus making American ships available for the transportation of war supplies to the crucial war fronts of the Middle and Far East. On Nov. 17, however, after considerable debate, those clauses of the Neutrality Act prohibiting American vessels from entering combat areas were repealed. The new statute also authorized the arming of U.S. merchant vessels. Thus our entire shipping could be mobilized in the attempt to keep our potential Allies supplied with the needed implements of war.

Since ships were vital in the war against the Axis, the President was granted power to 'purchase, requisition or charter' any foreign merchant vessel lying idle in the territorial waters of the United States, which is deemed necessary for national defense. Under this authority all of the Axis shipping lying in our harbors was taken over by the United States. Congress also voted $350,000,000 for an emergency ship construction fund, for the construction of seagoing cargo vessels, for the U.S. Maritime Commission. Provision was also made for a more effective use of existing vessels. The President was given authority to empower the Maritime Commission to issue warrants to U.S. vessels which would have the effect of granting them priorities in 'loading, discharging, lighterage, storage of cargoes, drydocking, overhauling and repair.' Thus the utilization of vessels for national defense activities could be facilitated over vessels engaged in ordinary commercial pursuits.

Ships require a navy to protect them and appropriations in ever increasing amounts were forthcoming for the two-ocean navy which we need for our security. On May 24, for example, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to construct 550,000 tons of auxiliary vessels of such size, style and design as he may consider best suited for purpose of national defense. More ships for the Navy requires more officers and men to man them. The need for officers was met in some degree by the law authorizing the President to cut the course of study at the Naval Academy from four to three years and to graduate classes which have finished this course of study. The need for men was met in part by a modification of the terms of naval enlistment.

Selective Service Act.

The Selective Service Act of 1940 provided the basic machinery for obtaining manpower for the Army. This statute was supplemented by the Presidential Proclamation of May 27, 1941, requiring all who had attained their twenty-first birthday between Oct. 16, 1940, and July 1, 1941, to register for military service. While requiring the younger men to register, Congress, apparently under the impression that the emergency was not too serious, deferred from military service all men who on July 1, 1941, became 28 years of age and who had not been inducted into the service. The Secretary of War was directed to take appropriate measures to release men over 28 who had been inducted through the operation of the Selective Service Act.

While permitting the release of older men in the service and their deferment from induction, Congress nevertheless, after considerable debate, authorized the extension of the period of training or service of National Guardsmen, selectees, etc., for another eighteen months. It also lifted all restrictions on the number of men who might be given a course of training at any one time.

Congress also made it possible to revitalize the leadership of the Army. It provided that during the time of national emergency the Secretary of War, may remove any officer from the active list of the regular Army. This removal must be recommended by a board of five general officers after the officer to be removed has had an opportunity to be heard. The objective of the Act was to enable the Secretary of War to increase the efficiency of the active list of Army officers by removing from such list those who were unable to endure the strain of military combat.

Production of War Supplies.

Congress has not only made it possible to mobilize the manpower of the nation but also its productive capacity, in the form of stocks of machinery, goods, equipment and materials. In a limited way this had already been accomplished by the Selective Service Act of 1940 and the Priorities Act of May 1941. But with the act to authorize the President 'to requisition property required for the defense of the United States,' the President was given a plenary power to commandeer any manufacturing facility or any stock of goods and materials needed for defense. This he may do when all other means of obtaining this property upon reasonable terms have been exhausted. Such property may be requisitioned upon payment of a fair and just compensation.

The most difficult problem before the country in 1941 was the change from a peacetime economy to an economy geared for the production of the engines and materials of war. The latter had to be turned out in such vast quantities that the United States would become the 'arsenal of democracy.' In order to harness the productive capacities of the country to this task, the President delegated all his powers over production for national defense to a new organization, the Office of Production Management, consisting of four members, a Director General, an Associate Director General, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. The OPM was assigned the following functions:

(a) Increase, accelerate and regulate the production and supply of materials and the provision and extension of plants for defense;

(b) Survey the requirements of the War and Navy Departments and foreign governments for materials, articles and equipment for defense;

(c) Advise with respect to plans and schedules of various departments and agencies for the purchase of equipment needed for defense;

(d) Plan and take all necessary steps to insure an adequate supply of raw materials essential to defense;

(e) Formulate plans for the mobilization of the productive facilities of the nation;

(f) Determine the adequacy of existing production facilities and plan the creation of new ones; and

(g) Determine priorities in the delivery of materials.

Priorities and Allocations.

It soon became evident that the factories of the nation and the supply of raw materials, could not satisfy both the normal civilian requirements for consumers' goods as well as the tremendous demands for the materiel of war. It became clear that in girding for war and in supplying our potential allies under the Lease-Lend Act, we could not go on with the policy of business as usual in civilian life. A brake upon civilian production and an apportionment and allocation of raw materials to the demands which were most pressing became necessary. Soon orders came through from the OPM and from its successor in this field, the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB) to restrict the production of a wide variety of articles, such as, automobiles, mechanical refrigerators, washing machines, ironers, etc. Building projects were also restricted unless they were necessary for national defense or for the health and safety of the civilian population. The use of certain strategic raw materials, such as, rubber and raw silk, were prohibited entirely. In general the policy was laid down that 'defense orders for any material must be accepted and fulfilled in preference to any other contract or purchase orders.' They must be accepted even if they make impossible the fulfillment of non-defense orders.

As the supply of consumers goods became more and more restricted and prices naturally began to rise, a clamor arose for a price control bill. No such bill passed during 1941, although it was considered by Congress. However, without waiting for legislation the President established the office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply by executive order. By the end of the year over sixty regulations were issued by the Price Control Administrator setting ceiling prices on specific commodities.

Installment Credits on Consumer Goods.

While businessmen were struggling with priorities control and the allocation of raw materials, the President took another important step to cut the consumption of consumer goods. Realizing that a large volume of consumer goods is bought on installments and that the production of these goods requires materials, skills and equipment needed for national defense, the President gave the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the right to prescribe regulations with respect to extension of installment credit for the purchase of consumer goods. The regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors required the registration of all persons engaged in the business of extending installment credit. It also prescribed certain specific limitations on installment credit with respect to the amount of the loan, amount of installment payments, minimum monthly payments, etc.

Economic Defense Board.

Modern warfare is waged not only with military weapons but also with the weapons of economics and business. This was recognized by the President when he created an Economic Defense Board, with the Vice-President as Chairman. The major function of this Board is to advise the President as to what defense measures must be taken in the field of economics and international economic activity. Realizing that the currency stabilization fund was a potent weapon of defense for the protection of the American dollar in a time of crisis, Congress extended the powers of the President over the Stabilization Fund and the gold content of the dollar for two years till June 30, 1943. A major economic step was taken against the Axis and its nationals when all their funds and credits on deposit in this country were frozen. All transfers of credit, money, gold or foreign exchange were prohibited to a large list of Axis countries, countries overrun by the Axis and the nationals of these countries. Since Axis stooges and Axis dominated corporations had been planted throughout South America, a blacklist was proclaimed against them. This had the effect of cutting off our exports to these individuals and corporations. Their funds and credits were also frozen. On the first blacklist there were 1,800 names. The Secretary of State was given power to add additional names to this list.

Strategic Materials.

Many of the vital raw materials from which war equipment is fashioned are not to be had within our borders. Stock piles of critical and strategic materials had therefore to be built up, if we were not to be caught short in our war effort. In order to facilitate the acquisition of these materials, Congress authorized the Federal Loan Administrator 'to create or organize a corporation with power to produce, acquire, carry, sell or otherwise deal in' critical or strategic materials as defined by the President. The Federal Loan Administrator was also given power to purchase and lease, lend, build and expand plants, purchase and produce equipment and supplies for the manufacture of strategic war materials.

War Appropriations.

As the crisis deepened and the country drifted closer to war, Congress appropriated money in ever increasing amounts to prepare our armed forces for the struggle, to furnish lease-lend aid to our potential allies and to provide the necessary facilities for the production of arms, airplanes, tanks and other military equipment. A rise in taxes to raise this money was inevitable, and it came with the Revenue Act of 1941. This Act brought a wide variety of increases in excise taxes, corporate and excess profits taxes, in surtaxes, gift and estate taxes, etc. New excise taxes were placed on such things as luggage, sporting goods, business machines, rubber articles, photographic apparatus, optical equipment, jewelry and furs. For the first time the Federal Government adopted a use tax on the use of automobiles. Income tax exemptions for both single and married people were drastically reduced. The Federal Revenue Act will bring the cost of the emergency and the war into every American home.

Other Congressional Legislation.

Preoccupation with the emergency and the war was not the sole legislative activity of Congress. Congress as usual passed a wide variety of legislation on matters that had nothing to do with the international crisis. Outstanding among such bills and indicative of the fact that Congress was not losing sight of the general welfare in the preoccupation with grave problems of foreign policy and preparation for war is the bill enlarging the activities of the Federal Bureau of Mines. This bill authorized the Federal Bureau of Mines to make inspections of coal mines throughout the country at periodic intervals, in conjunction with state authorities, to make recommendations concerning specific conditions found in these mines and to publicize its findings. The report accompanying the bill pointed out that there had been 1,420 fatalities in 1940 in connection with the mining of coal, that there were no common safety standards among the various states for the mines and that the Federal Bureau lacked authority to make inspections and publicize its findings. The new law, by giving the inspectional staff of the Federal Bureau of Mines the right to enter mines, make inspections and formulate uniform standards of safety and occupational conditions and publicize findings will undoubtedly help to control the incidence of accidents and occupational disease in the very hazardous industry of coal mining.

Bankruptcy Laws.

Considerable progress was made in 1941 by two committees appointed by the Attorney General in preparing the way for legislation of far-reaching importance. The first of these is the Attorney General's Committee on Bankruptcy Administration, whose report recommended significant changes in the administration of the bankruptcy laws. The report pointed to the almost complete lack of supervision over the work of the 450 predominantly part time bankruptcy referees who are paid through fees, the failure to check their reports adequately, the marked variations in bankruptcy practice between the various district courts and the improper fiscal practices which have added to the expense of bankruptcy administration. The Committee therefore recommended the creation in the administrative offices of the U.S. Courts of a Division of Bankruptcy headed by a chief, with a general supervising and co-ordinating function in the field of bankruptcy administration. This recommendation was approved at a meeting of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges and steps have already been taken to set up this agency. The Committee also recommended the appointment of a number of full time referees who were to be paid specific salaries instead of being reimbursed by fees and who would have a specific tenure. Legislation to effectuate this recommendation is presently before Congress.

Federal Administrative Agencies.

The second report concerned itself with the procedures and procedural practices of the large number of Federal administrative agencies that have grown up in recent years and the general methods provided for the judicial review of their decisions. In making its report the Committee examined the organization, procedure and practices of a wide variety of Federal agencies. Its report is directed in the main at three phases of the administrative process: (1) the exercise of the power by the agency to adjudicate in individual cases, (2) the scope of review of administrative action by the courts, (3) the exercise by the agencies of the delegated power to legislate through the formulation of rules and regulations. In general, the Committee found room for improvement in each one of these stages of the administrative process. In an effort to effectuate improvements the Committee drafted a bill which had four major objectives: (1) to create an office of Federal Administrative Procedure whose function is to study and co-ordinate administrative procedures and stimulate practical improvements, (2) improve the rule-making process by emphasizing the importance of outside participation prior to the issuance of rules and by permitting outside persons to petition for rules and amendments, (3) improve the process of formal adjudication by providing a better quality of 'hearing commissioner' who will be assured tenure, an adequate salary and full power to control and conduct hearings, (4) in order to impart certainty to the administrative process and to aid citizens who are seeking an authoritative statement of their rights and duties, the bill proposes to authorize agencies to issue binding declarations. The importance of this whole problem of the organization, practice and procedure of administrative agencies is attested to by the fact that Congress has before it three bills covering the above subject matter. In view of the importance of the problem and the great public interest which it has aroused, it is likely that some legislation directed toward the reform of administrative methods and procedures may be forthcoming in 1942.

Outstanding Supreme Court Decisions.

Some far reaching decisions in the field of labor relations were handed down by the Supreme Court in 1941. The case of U.S. v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co. (61 Sup. Ct. 451) raised the question of the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This statute set up a comprehensive legislative scheme for preventing the shipment in interstate commerce of products produced in the United States under labor conditions as respects wages and hours which failed to conform to standards set up by the Act. The Darby Lumber Co. was charged with shipping lumber in interstate commerce and paying its workmen less than the prescribed minimum wages set forth in the act (25 cents per hour) and working them more than the prescribed number of hours without payment of overtime. The Federal District Court quashed the indictment and denied the power of Congress to prohibit shipment in interstate commerce of lumber produced under the proscribed sub-standard labor conditions. In favor of the District Court's position denying the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act was the leading case of Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U.S. 251) decided by the Supreme Court in 1918 and which held that Congress had no power to prohibit a shipment in interstate commerce of articles made by child labor. If Congress could not prevent the products of child labor from entering the stream of interstate commerce then it certainly could not bar from interstate commerce the products of adult labor manufactured under sub-standard conditions. The Supreme Court however overruled the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart and upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 'We conclude,' stated the Court, 'that the prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden sub-standard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority of Congress.'*

* Another attack on the right of Congress to prescribe standards of wages and hours for manufacturers making articles for sale in interstate commerce was made in the case of Opp Cotton Mills Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (61 Sup. Ct. 528). It was claimed there that the Fair Labor Act was unconstitutional because it is 'an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of Congress.' This contention was overruled by the Sup. Ct.

One of the acute problems in the field of labor relations is the extent of the right of labor to picket employers and bring its grievances to the attention of the general public. Legislation to contain or curb picketing and requests for judicial intervention in labor disputes to bar picketing through injunction are continually before the courts. In Thornhill v. Alabama (310 U.S. 88) decided last year, the Supreme Court took the position that peaceful picketing per se could not be prohibited because it was a violation of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of the press. The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in A.F. of L. v. Swing (312 U.S. 321). There an Illinois Court had entered a permanent injunction restraining picketing in a labor dispute and recited in its decree, 'under the law of this state, peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion are unlawful when conducted by strangers to the employer (i.e., where there is not a proximate relation of employees and employer).' Such a bar upon free communication, stated the Court, 'is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech.'

In the case of Milk Wagon Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies (312 U.S. 287) however, more than peaceful picketing was involved. Windows of dairies were smashed, stench bombs were thrown and trucks were wrecked. An injunction restraining all picketing and not merely violent acts of picketing was upheld by the highest court of Illinois. Did this type of an injunction violate the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, was the question before the Supreme Court. Since the picketing in this case was, as the Court put it, 'enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct,' the Supreme Court upheld this injunction and found that it did not violate the constitutional guarantees. A strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black concluded, however, that neither the findings nor the evidence showed such an imminent, clear and present danger as to justify an abridgement of the rights of freedom of speech and of the press.

The case of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB (313 U.S. 177) raised the question as to whether an employer subject to the National Labor Relations Act could refuse to hire employees solely because of their affiliations with a labor union. The controversy in this case rose out of a strike at the corporation's mine. When the strike was concluded, the corporation refused employment to a number of men, most of whom had been strikers, because of their affiliations with the labor union. The Supreme Court held that the corporation could not do this. It pointed out that workers can no longer be dismissed from their employment because of union affiliations. The national interest in industrial peace would be just as much affected by discrimination against union activity, when men are hired. The Court also decided that where the miner had been wrongfully refused employment and had not obtained substantially equivalent employment, the NLRB could require the corporation to re-employ him. Even if substantially equivalent employment had been obtained by men who had suffered from discrimination, the Board could order employment by the corporation 'if it finds that to do so would effectuate the policies of the [National Labor Relations] Act.'

In the case of U.S. v. Hatcheson (312 U.S. 219) two unions had a dispute as to which should do the work in connection with the installation of certain machinery of a manufacturer who shipped his goods in interstate commerce. As a result of the dispute, one of the unions called a strike against the manufacturer and distributed a request through circular letters and otherwise that members of the union and their friends refrain from buying the manufacturer's products. These activities on behalf of the union caused the indictment of four officials of the union for a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The court decided that this indictment could not be sustained. The Sherman Act read together with the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act made legal the conduct which was sought to be restrained by the criminal prosecution in this case. Mr. Justice Roberts in a strong dissenting opinion, however, pointed out that what was involved was a secondary boycott affecting interstate commerce and that such boycotts had been held to be illegal by the Supreme Court for many years.

A number of very important cases were decided by the Supreme Court in the domain of civil rights. Edwards v. People (62 Sup. Ct. 164) raised the question of whether a state (in this case, California) could prohibit the entry within its borders of indigent citizens of other states. The court was unanimous in its opinion that this could not be done. However, the various justices differed among themselves as to the reasons for this prohibition. Certain justices took the position that the California statute was an undue interference with interstate commerce. Others based their decision on the ground that the right of free movement across state boundaries is a right of national citizenship. Mr. Justice Jackson rested his decision on the ground that the right of free movement is one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship stating in his opinion:

'It is a privilege of citizenship of the United States protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.'

Mitchell v. U.S.

(313 U.S. 80) raised the question as to whether an interstate railroad could lawfully discriminate between whites and negroes in furnishing pullman accommodations. The plaintiff in this case, a colored congressman, had been removed from a pullman car in Arkansas and compelled to move into the car provided for colored passengers although he had bought a pullman ticket to his destination. This action was in purported compliance with an Arkansas statute requiring segregation of colored from white persons in railroad cars. This discrimination was held to be unlawful and was not justified even by the comparatively small demand for first class accommodations for colored people.

Bridges v. California and Times-Mirror v. California.

(62 Sup. Ct. 190) brought before the Supreme Court the extent of the right of a state court to punish as contempt comments in the newspapers on pending cases. The Bridges case arose out of publication by Bridges of a telegram to the Secretary of Labor regarding a judicial decision while a motion for a new trial was pending. The case involved a dispute between an A.F. of L. and a C.I.O. union. The telegram referred to the judge's decision as 'outrageous' and stated that its attempted enforcement would tie up the port of Los Angeles. The most serious charge against the Times-Mirror was that it had before sentence printed an editorial against 'probation for gorillas,' after two members of a labor union had been found guilty of assault. Punishment of these utterances as contempt by the Superior Court of California was based on the notion that they had an inherent tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice. Mr. Justice Black speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, however, failed to find contempt in these utterances of Bridges or of the Times-Mirror. He failed to find in these statements the clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils complained of, namely; the interference with the due course of justice. The action of the Superior Court of California was therefore contrary to constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. This view of the majority of the court was severely criticized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the following terms:

'Our whole history repels the view that it is an exercise of one of the civil liberties secured by the Bill of Rights for a leader of a large following or for a powerful metropolitan newspaper to attempt to overawe a judge in a matter immediately pending before him. The view of the majority deprives California of means for securing to its citizens justice according to law, means, which, since the Union was founded, have been the possession, hitherto unchallenged, of all the states. This sudden break with the uninterrupted course of constitutional history has no constitutional warrant. To find justification for such deprivation of the historic powers of the states is to misconceive the idea of freedom of thought and speech as guaranteed by the Constitution.'

Two other civil rights cases are worthy of notice. In Cox v. New Hampshire (312 U.S. 569), five Jehovah's Witnesses contended that a New Hampshire statute under which they had been convicted, prohibiting a parade or procession upon a public street without a license was unconstitutional because it deprived them of the rights of freedom of speech, press, worship and assembly. This contention was denied by the Supreme Court which stated:

'The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways had never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.'

In Hines v. Davidovitz (312 U.S. 52) a Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens over 18 to register once each year was declared invalid because of the fact that Congress had in 1940 passed its own Alien Registration Act. By doing so, Congress provided a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all embracing system in order to obtain the information deemed to be desirable in connection with aliens.

During the year 1941, there was considerable activity by the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice and other Federal agencies, against combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Outstanding among this activity was the loss by the government of its suit against the Aluminum Co. of America after two years of trial. Of great significance to the defense effort was the active prosecution by the Anti Trust Division of an investigation into restrictions on defense materials. One branch of this investigation resulting in indictments, namely, the investigation of the magnesium industry, showed startling evidence of German influence in domestic industries, essential to national defense and an illegal attempt to restrict the production of magnesium by a combination of German and American corporations. Other attempts to restrain and restrict trade and commerce also received the attention of the Federal authorities, ranging from the prosecution of ASCAP for unlawfully restricting the sale of copyrighted music to indictments against labor unions for interfering with the sale and distribution of plumbing supplies.

Two interesting cases of combinations in restraint of trade and unfair methods of competition tending to monopoly came before the Supreme Court in Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission (312 U.S. 457) and Millinery Creators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission (312 U.S. 469). The Fashion Originators Guild was a combination of designers and manufacturers of women's dresses and textiles. They claimed that they made distinctive dresses and textiles. After their designs enter into the channels of trade, other manufacturers systematically make and copy them and sell them at lower prices than the originals. This is called by the members of the guild 'style' piracy,' although the original creations were not copyrighted. In the attempt to destroy these competitors and prevent 'style piracy,' the members of the guild boycotted retailers who sold garments copied from designs put out by guild members. Twelve thousand retailers signed agreements to co-operate with the guild boycott program. The Millinery Guild in the second case operated a plan similar to the Fashion Guild in the domain of women's hats.

Both plans and combinations were declared illegal by a unanimous court since they conflicted with the principles of the Clayton Act and the inhibitions of the Sherman Act. The court stated that the illegal combination could not be justified as an attempt to stop 'style piracy.' Even if this were a tort under the laws of the state in which it occurred, it would not justify a combination that sought to restrain interstate commerce in violation of Federal law.

New deal legislation and the revision by the Supreme Court of earlier interpretations of the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause has made possible a considerable extension of the area of commercial, industrial, and economic activity regulated by agencies of the Federal Government. The case of Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros. (312 U.S. 349), however, takes a restrictive view of the Federal Trade Commission's powers to prevent unfair methods of competition. In that case the Federal Trade Commission sued to prohibit the unfair business practices of a manufacturer of candy who sold his products intra-state because these practices gave him an unfair advantage in competition with competitors from outside the state who attempted to obtain local business. The Federal Trade Commission had prohibited the interstate manufacturers from engaging in the same practices. The court thru Justice Frankfurter took the view that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which proscribes 'unfair methods of competition in commerce' can not be construed to mean 'Unfair methods of competition in any way affecting interstate commerce.' Thus it denied the power of the Federal Trade Commission to act in this situation. The majority opinion, however, was criticized by Justice Douglas who stated:

'Under this decision respondent may continue to use this same unfair method of competition to increase its business at the expense of those who sell in interstate commerce and who are not free to employ the same methods in self-defense. I think the Act, an exercise by Congress of its commerce power, should be interpreted to protect interstate commerce not to permit discrimination against it.'

While the court in the Bunte case interfered with the effort of a Federal agency to control intra-state activity, the case of Olsen v. Nebraska (313 U.S. 236) indicates that the court would go a long way to sustain state action seeking to regulate commercial and industrial activity within its own borders. In that case a Nebraska statute limited the amount of fee which an employment agency could charge to 10 per cent of the first month's salary. In 1928 a similar statute in New Jersey had been declared unconstitutional (Ribnik v. McBride 277 U.S. 350). The Court in Olsen v. Nebraska, however, stated that the drift away from the Ribnik v. McBride case 'has been so great that it can no longer be deemed a controlling authority.' It, therefore, upheld the validity of the Nebraska statute.

While the Court was ready to go a long way to sustain the exercise by a state of regulatory powers over local activities, it frowned on state attempts to interfere with the exercise of powers by the Federal Government intrusted to it by the Constitution. This was evident in the case of Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co. (313 U.S. 508). There the state of Oklahoma sought to declare unconstitutional a Federal statute authorizing the construction of the Denison Reservoir and Dam on the Red River. Oklahoma complained that the dam would inundate 100,000 acres of its land, deprive it and its local communities of tax revenues, destroy its highways and bridges and create a serious social and economic problem because of the removal of its citizens from the inundated land. The Supreme Court held, however, that the Denison Dam and Reservoir Project is a valid exercise by Congress of the commerce power. The project is part of a comprehensive flood control plan to control the watershed of one of the principal tributaries of the Mississippi, the Red River. The project also aims to protect and improve the navigation of the Red River itself and its navigable stretches which lie below the state of Oklahoma. Congress may control the non-navigable parts of the stream in order to protect commerce on the navigable parts. Nor did the inclusion into the project of means of developing water power which necessitated an increase in the height of the dam and the consequent increase in the area of land to be inundated, invalidate the project. The dam was being built essentially for flood control and the waterpower features helped carry the cost of the flood control. See also GERMANY: Nazi Legal System; UNITED STATES.

1940: Law And Legislation

Congressional Legislation.

Congressional legislation in the United States during 1940 was shaped in the main by events in Europe. With each new conquest the Nazi menace came nearer to its shores. It was necessary to mobilize the man power and the resources of the country to meet this threat to its security. Congress responded with a series of the most drastic and far reaching defense measures in our peace-time history.

Selective Service Act.

The mobilization of the nation's man power to meet the emergency was begun by the Joint Resolution to Strengthen the Common Defense, which authorized the President to call into active military service for twelve months any units of the Army Reserve, the National Guard or the retired personnel of the Army which he felt to be necessary for the strengthening of the national defense. To replace the military vacuum in the states caused by the induction of the National Guard into Federal Service, Congress provided that 'home guards' units may be organized by the various states 'while any part of the National Guard is in active Federal service.' This was followed by the Selective Training and Service Act, which provided for the first peace-time conscription of man power for military service in United States history. Under this Act every male citizen between the ages of 21 and 36 and male alien of the same ages who has declared his intention of becoming a citizen was required to register and was declared liable to 'training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States.' The Act limited the number of men who could be inducted into military service at any one time to 900,000, except in time of war. Training and service is to continue for one year unless Congress declares the national interests to be imperiled in which case the President can extend the period of training and service. Following the year's training the conscripts are to be transferred to the reserve components of their services for a ten-year period or until they attain the age of 45, whichever happens first.

The Act excepts certain classes of men from its provisions, such as men who had already served three years in the army and provides that college and university students can defer their service till July 1, 1941. 'Conscientious objectors' to military service were not to be subjected to 'combatant training and service,' but were to be assigned to noncombatant services or to 'work of national importance under civilian direction.' The Act attempts to safeguard the jobs of inducted men by providing that employers must restore drafted men to their jobs or to positions 'of like seniority status and pay' unless the employers circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so. The rights of soldiers and sailors are safeguarded further by the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, which provided protection to men in military service against judgments, evictions of dependents for nonpayment of rent, loss of property due to nonpayment of taxes, assessments, installments, etc., and lapse of insurance policies because of nonpayment of premiums.

The mobilization of man power was only one step in the program of national defense worked out by Congress. Materials, weapons, equipment must be provided for these men. The industrial resources of the country had to be put into motion to supply the tremendous number of tanks, guns, airplanes and munitions, required by methods of totalitarian warfare. Money for defense was the first essential and this was appropriated in ever increasing amounts. New taxes were enacted so that the money appropriated would be available in the treasury when needed. The Second Revenue Act of 1940, for example, has provisions for the taxation of excess corporate profits at rates varying from 25 to 50 per cent.

National Defense Acts.

A number of statutes provide for the expansion of existing plants and the creation of new facilities for the production of war materials and equipment. For example, the Act 'to expedite the strengthening of the national defense' authorizes the Secretary of War to provide for the necessary construction, rehabilitation, conversion and installation at military posts, depots, stations or other localities of plants, of buildings, facilities, utilities and appurtenances for the development, manufacture, maintenance and storage of military equipment, munitions and supplies. The new facilities may be operated by government personnel or by qualified private manufacturers. Similar powers in the creation, development and operation of plants and facilities are also given to the Secretary of the Navy. Government owned facilities may even be created at privately owned plants where necessary for the national defense. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized to make loans or purchase the stock of any corporation 'for plant construction, expansion and equipment . . . used by the corporation in the manufacture of equipment and supplies necessary to the national defense'. Private industry is further encouraged to build new plants and expand facilities for defense purposes by provisions authorizing direct governmental reimbursement of construction costs and authorizing amortization deductions to the amount of 20 per cent from tax returns to cover the cost of emergency plants.

Not only has the creation of new facilities been authorized for the production of vital war materials, Congress has also made it possible to harness the existing industrial plants to the grim task of turning out implements of war. Compliance with government orders for materials necessary to national defense is made obligatory on manufacturers. Plants of recalcitrant manufacturers may be seized and operated by the Government. As an aid in providing the necessary speed and despatch in the making of contracts and the procurement of war materials, Congress has made it possible to waive the usual provisions which regulate the letting of government contracts. Contracts may be let with or without competitive bidding or advertising 'upon a determination that the price is fair.'

Congress has also provided against a shortage of raw materials vital to the national defense. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation may make loans or purchase the stock of corporations for the purpose of procuring and storing strategical raw materials. The President is also authorized to spend $66,000,000 for this purpose. Control of the export of military equipment and munitions or machinery and tools necessary for their manufacture has been authorized and power given to the President to prohibit or curtail the export of these items.

In the interest of hemisphere defense and Anglo-American solidarity, however, the President may authorize the Secretary of War and of the Navy to manufacture or procure coast defense guns, anti-aircraft material, ammunition, war vessels, etc., for sale to any American Republic. But no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft, munitions, supplies or equipment to which the United States has title shall be transferred, exchanged, sold or otherwise disposed of 'unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of naval material and the Chief of Staff of the Army in the case of military material shall first certify that such material is not essential to the defense of the United States.'

A measure of Congressional determination to provide the country with adequate national defense is shown by a comparison of two navy bills approved five weeks apart. On June 14, 1940, before the full effects of the Blitzkrieg were apparent, the President approved a bill to increase the United States Navy by 167,000 tons and to provide 4,500 naval airplanes. On July 19, 1940, the President approved a bill to increase the Navy by 1,325,000 tons and authorized the acquisition and maintenance of 15,000 naval airplanes.

Internal Enemies.

While Congress was making it possible for the military, naval and air force to prepare to meet external enemies, it did not overlook the fact that aid to such enemies might come from within our borders. Steps to control Fifth Column activities are found in the Act 'to require the Registration of Certain Organizations,' and the Alien Registration Act 1940. The first Act requires various types of subversive organizations to register with the Attorney-General. Subversive organizations are those organizations which accept contributions from a foreign government (or whose policies are determined by a foreign government or a foreign political party or international political organization), which engage in 'political activity' whose purpose is to control by force or to overthrow the government of the United States; such organizations often engage in 'civilian military activity.'

The Alien Registration Act requires every alien over the age of fourteen who remains in the United States more than thirty days to register and be fingerprinted. This Act also widens the class of aliens that may be deported. In addition the Act made it a felony, punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years, for any person to knowingly or willfully advocate or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, etc., of overthrowing or destroying any government of the United States, to print or to distribute any printed matter having this end in view, or to organize or become a member of subversive groups seeking to overthrow the government of the United States by force.

A greater degree of control over aliens requires the exercise of greater care in conferring rights of citizenship upon them. Thus, Congress passed the Nationality Act of 1940, which is 'an Act to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code.' The Act grants the right to become naturalized citizens only to white persons or to persons of African nativity or descent and to descendants of races 'indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.' These persons must speak English, be 'of good moral character' and cannot believe in, advocate or teach the overthrow of the government by force, unlawful damage to property, sabotage, etc., or be members of subversive organizations. Five years' residence in the United States is required as a prerequisite of naturalization. The Commissioner of Naturalization is required to keep a registry of each person arriving in the United States after the effective date of the Act and no person can declare his intention to become a citizen 'until such person's lawful entry for permanent residence shall have been established.'

Curbs on Pernicious Political Activities.

Congress has taken cognizance of the fact that democracy may perish as a result of the corruption of the democratic process as well as through the attack of internal and external enemies. It therefore extended the scope of the Hatch Act, passed in 1939, 'to prevent pernicious political activities.' The 1940 amendments made unlawful the receipt by any person of contributions in excess of $5,000 to a campaign for an elective Federal office or the contribution or expenditure of more than $3,000,000 by any political committee during any one calendar year. The Act also made it unlawful for any state or local official whose principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed by loans or grants made by the United States to use his official authority for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination for office or to coerce or advise any other employee to contribute any part of his salary for political purposes. Persons or firms entering into contracts with the United States are also prohibited from making contributions to any political party, committee or candidate for public office or to any person or for any political purpose or use during the period of negotiation or performance under the contract.

Governmental Reorganization Plans.

The reorganization of the governmental structure which was begun last year was continued in 1940 with the submission by the President of Reorganization Plans III and IV. The major feature of Plan III is the creation of a fiscal service in the Department of the Treasury in which are consolidated various bureaus and divisions of the government that have something to do with finance and fiscal control. Plan IV, among other things, authorized the transfer of the Civil Aeronautics Authority to the Department of Commerce, the transfer of the Weather Bureau from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Commerce, the transfer of the Food and Drug Administration from the Department of Agriculture to the Federal Security Agency, and the transfer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.

Safeguards for Investors and Consumers.

In its preoccupation with defense problems and problems of governmental reorganization, Congress did not entirely lose sight of the interests of two classes of the public, the investor and the consumer. The interests of the investors of this country are safeguarded by the Investment Company Act, which declares investment companies to be affected with a public interest and investment advisers to be 'of national concern.' The Act declares that the public interest is adversely affected when, among other things, investment companies are operated in the interest of directors, officers, brokers, etc., 'rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security holders.' The Act provides for a comprehensive regulation of the different types of investment companies and of investment advisers. It also requires their registration with the Securities Exchange Commission and the supervision of their activities by the Commission. The Act forbids unregistered companies or investment advisers the use of the mails or of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

The interest of the consumer is protected by the Wool Products Labeling Act, whose purpose is 'to protect producers, manufacturers, distributors and consumers from the unrevealed presence of substitutes and mixtures in spun, woven, knitted, felted or otherwise manufactured wool products.' The Act provides for the proper tagging and branding of wool products and makes the manufacture and distribution of misbranded wool products in interstate commerce 'an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice' subject to action by the Federal Trade Commission. The latter is charged with the general enforcement of the Act. (See also UNITED STATES: Seventy-sixth Congress.)

Supreme Court Decisions.

Civil Rights Cases.

The Supreme Court's decisions in 1940 showed clearly that the Court is still fulfilling its traditional role of guardian of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which prohibited the solicitation of money for religious or charitable purposes 'unless such cause shall have been approved by the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council.' The Court stated that the 'general regulation in the public interest of solicitation which does not involve any religious test. . . . is not open to any constitutional objection.' However, the statute in this case permitted 'a censorship of religion' since the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council could withhold his approval of solicitation if he determined that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion is a denial of the exercise of religious liberty protected by the Constitution. The Court also ordered the conviction of the defendant for inciting a breach of the peace to be set aside. In the presence of two men who were Catholics, he had played a phonograph record which contained attacks upon religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular. The Court stated in the course of its opinion: 'In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.'

Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech were successfully invoked in two cases, Thornhill v. Alabama and Carlson v. California, in which the State of Alabama and a California County sought to prohibit peaceful picketing. These prohibitions were declared invalid by the Court. 'In the circumstances of our time,' stated the Court, in the Thornhill case, 'the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.' The Court was not impressed with the argument that it was necessary to prohibit peaceful picketing because of the dangers of breaches of the peace. 'No clear and present danger of destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.'

The Supreme Court severely condemned two convictions in criminal cases obtained through the use of third degree methods: Chambers v. Florida; White v. Texas. In the latter case, the defendant, an illiterate farm hand, was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. The conviction was obtained largely upon the basis of a confession obtained as the result of the defendant's being whipped on several nights, when he was taken out of jail. 'Due process of law,' stated the Court in reversing this conviction, 'commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death.' In the Chambers' case the Court stated that it was not impressed by the argument that third degree methods are necessary to uphold our laws. 'The Constitution proscribes such lawless means irrespective of the end.'

Not only does the Supreme Court object to third degree methods in criminal cases, it also objects to racial discrimination in the selection of grand juries. In Smith v. Texas, the Court reversed the conviction of a Negro where the evidence showed that in the selection of grand juries for many years Negroes had been discriminated against.

The desire of the Supreme Court to protect religious freedom does not go so far as to require its interference with the action of a Board of Education in expelling students, who because of religious convictions refuse to salute the flag (Minersville School District v. Gobitis). The majority opinion in this case, however, brought forth a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Stone, who pointed out that while such expressions of loyalty as the salute to the flag 'when voluntarily given, may promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say that their compulsory expression by children in violation of their own and their parents' religious convictions can be regarded as playing so important a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. The very terms of the Bill of Rights preclude, it seems to me, any reconciliation of such compulsions with the constitutional guaranties by a legislative declaration that they are more important to the public welfare than the Bill of Rights.'

Anti-Trust and Price-Fixing Cases.

A number of decisions of the utmost importance in the administration of the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws were handed down by the Supreme Court in 1940. In U. S. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Company, the Court applied the basic proposition that price fixing agreements are unlawful per se, to an attempt by midwestern oil companies to stabilize prices and avoid ruinous competition in the sale of gasoline. 'Agreements for price maintenance, of articles moving in Interstate Commerce are without more unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they eliminate competition,' stated the Court. 'No showing of so-called competitive abuses which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense' to a prosecution under the Sherman Act. In justification of this position the Court pointed out that 'Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended.'

A similar attitude of refusing to sanction price-fixing agreement also determined the Court's decision in the case of Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. U. S.. In that case the defendant held the exclusive patent on tetraethyl lead, which, when added to gasoline increased its motor efficiency. It manufactured this fluid and sold it to most of the major refineries of the country under a license. It also purported to license the jobbers in ethyl gasoline and prohibited the refiners from selling to unlicensed jobbers. The defendant reserved to itself the right to cancel licenses at will. It made a practice of ascertaining which jobbers failed to comply with the market prices of the major oil companies. Through its rejection of applications for licenses and in other ways it created the belief that refiners and jobbers must maintain prices. The defendant patentee therefore built up a combination which was actually used to suppress competition among jobbers and control their prices. The Court stated that such a combination was unlawful even though a patented article was involved.

While the Court has no hesitancy in applying the prohibitions of the Sherman Act to restraints upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods, in the case of Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, it refused to sanction the application of the Act to a sit-down strike called by a labor union. Although the Court stated that the Sherman Act could be made to apply to certain activities of labor unions, the sit-down strike did not bring about such 'a suppression of competition in the market' which warranted its invocation.

The Court has also upheld price-fixing and stabilization of the bituminous coal industry by government commission, although, as we have seen, price-fixing by business men came to grief (Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins). In that case the Court passed upon the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. The Act provided for the organization of coal producers under a bituminous coal code and a 19½ per cent tax on the sale price or market value of the coal of non-members. The Act provided for the fixation by the Commission of minimum and maximum prices on coal in accordance with certain standards. Although a similar attempt to regulate the bituminous coal industry came to grief in 1936 (Carter v. Carter Coal Company) when the Supreme Court declared the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional, the Court stated in the Adkins case: 'The fixing of prices, the proscription of unfair trade practices, the establishment of marketing rules respecting such sales of bituminous coal constitute regulations within the competence of Congress under the commerce clause. . . . It was the judgment of Congress that price-fixing and the elimination of unfair competitive practices were appropriate methods for prevention of the financial ruin, low wages, poor working conditions, strikes, and disruption of the channels of trade which followed in the wake of the demoralized price structures in this industry. If the strategic character of this industry in our economy and the chaotic conditions which have prevailed in it do not justify legislation, it is difficult to imagine what would. To invalidate this Act we would have to deny the existence of power on the part of Congress under the commerce clause to deal directly and specifically with those forces which in its judgment should not be permitted to dislocate an important segment of our economy and to disrupt and burden interstate channels of trade.'

National Labor Relations Board Cases.

The exclusive and far-reaching power of the NLRB to deal with violations of the National Labor Relations Act was emphasized by the Court in a number of decisions. In Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., the Supreme Court refused to permit a labor union to bring an action before the Circuit Court of Appeals to punish the defendant employer for contempt because of his failure to obey a decree of the NLRB. The exclusive authority to enforce its orders rested with the NLRB and the Act gave no private person or group any standing in the courts to secure the enforcement of its decrees.

In National Licorice Company v. NLRB, the authority of the NLRB to order an employer not to enforce contracts with its employees in violation of the National Labor Relations Act was upheld although the employees affected were not parties to the proceeding. The right asserted by the Board, stated the Court, is not one arising from contracts between the employer and the employees. The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body charged with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices. Obviously employers cannot set at naught the National Labor Relations Act by inducing the workmen to agree not to demand performance of the duties which it imposes.

In International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, the Court decided that the Board could direct an employer to cease giving effect to a closed shop contract with an A.F. of L. union and deal with a C.I.O. union where the A.F. of L. union had been assisted in its organization of employees by unfair labor practices on the part of the employer.

In NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Company, the Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which refused to enforce an order of the NLRB requiring the defendant to refrain from discriminating against sailors belonging to the C.I.O. in favor of sailors belonging to the A.F. of L. The Circuit Court had felt that the Board's order was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court however pointed out that the Circuit Court could not substitute its judgment on disputed facts for that of the Board. So long as the Board's findings of fact was supported by evidence it was conclusive on the Courts.

The NLRB did not have things all its own way in the Supreme Court. In the case of Republic Steel Company v. NLRB, the Court decided that the Board did not have the authority to compel an employer to pay over to the Federal Government money which the latter had expended in maintaining unlawfully discharged employees on work relief projects.

Tax Decisions.

As government expenditures rise the states cast about frantically for new sources of revenue to meet their needs. There is a temptation to tax all forms of property coming into the state even though by so doing a burden may be laid upon interstate commerce. A number of cases raise the question of how far the states may go in taxing property moving in interstate commerce. In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, the Court held that New York City could impose a 2 per cent sales tax paid by the purchaser on sales of coal made by the defendant corporation from its sales office in New York, although the coal sold came from its mines in Pennsylvania. A different result was reached in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corporation. There the Comptroller of New York City attempted to impose a sales tax on fuel oil manufactured in New York from petroleum imported from a foreign country, stored in bond under United States customs supervision. The fuel oil was sold only to vessels engaged in foreign commerce. The tax was held to be an infringement of the Congressional regulation of interstate commerce.

In McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, the Court likewise declared an Arkansas statute invalid which prohibited the entry into the state of autos carrying more than 20 gallons of gas until the state tax of 6½ cents per gallon was paid. The state sought to apply this statute to a bus company, whose buses ordinarily carried 77 gallons of gas in their tanks and used only 16 in their passage through Arkansas. The Court held that Arkansas could not constitutionally tax the gasoline not used in the state.

Court's Relation to Administrative Agencies.

As economic life becomes more complex, the regulation of certain phases of economic activity tends to be turned over to specialized governmental administrative agencies. This is being done despite the politically inspired cry of 'hands-off business.' That business itself recognizes the need for governmental regulation is aptly demonstrated by the case of United States v. American Trucking Associations. The petitioner, an association of truckmen, sought to compel the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish qualifications and hours of service for all employees of motor vehicle common carriers. The I.C.C. refused to act because of a lack of jurisdiction. The position of the Commission was sustained by the Supreme Court.

The increasing activity of governmental administrative agencies, however, raises troublesome problems of their relations to the Courts and the right of Courts to interfere with their rulings. The Walter-Logan Bill sponsored by the American Bar Association and vetoed by the President offered one solution to these problems. We have already noted that in the Waterman case before mentioned, the Supreme Court declared that findings of fact by the NLRB were conclusive so long as they were supported by some evidence even though the Court itself might not make a similar finding if it had to pass upon the matter in the first instance. In a number of other cases the Supreme Court indicated a reluctance to substitute its judgment as to the wisdom of a particular action for that of the administrative agency. In United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Company, for example, the I.C.C. canceled the tariffs of 41 interstate common carriers on the ground that they were discriminatory. The truckmen obtained an injunction in the District Court to restrain the Commission from enforcing its order. The Supreme Court however reversed the judgment of the District Court stating in the course of its opinion: 'It is not disputable that from the beginning the very purpose for which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which, from its peculiar character, would be most fitted to primarily decide whether from facts disputed or undisputed, in a given case, preference or discrimination existed. And where a Court substituted its judgment as to the existence of preference for that of the Commission, on the ground that where there was no dispute as to the facts it had a right to do so, [the Court] obviously exerted an authority not conferred upon it by statute.''

In the case of Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Company, the Court considered the question of the interference of a Federal District Court with the decision of a state administrative body. The State of Texas in that case had devised a regulatory scheme to conserve its oil resources and placed its administration in the hands of the Railroad Commission. The Rowan & Nichols Oil Company complained that the method of regulation employed by the Commission disregarded its right to the oil on its lands and that an entirely different formula had to be used by the Commission, if the oil company's property was not to be taken without due process of law. Both the Federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this contention. The Supreme Court however upheld the Commission's action. It pointed out that 'A controversy like this always calls for fresh reminder that Courts must not substitute their notions of expediency and fairness for those which have guided the agencies to whom the formulation and execution of policy have been entrusted.' According to the Court it is not for the Federal Courts to supplant the Commission's judgment even in the face of convincing proof that a different result would have been better.

It is evident from the above decisions that the Supreme Court will serve as a brake upon the interference by the Lower Courts with the work of administrative agencies. The weight of the Supreme Court's authority is cast in the direction of letting bona fide administrative decisions stand without fear of judicial nullification. See also UNITED STATES: Supreme Court Decisions.