1942: Negroes, American

During 1942, the so-called race problem became to many Americans for the first time, a world question instead of a national or sectional question. The attitude of the people of Burma, India, Malaya, and other Pacific areas in insisting that they share the democracy for which the war is being fought had profound repercussions on the Negro question in the United States.

The struggle for justice and opportunity within the United States became more evident. Over and over again leaders of Negro opinion voiced the aspiration of 13,000,000 Negro Americans not only to be permitted to share in winning the war, but also to make democracy more of a reality in the United States by the abolition of lynching, disfranchisement by means of poll taxes and 'Democratic white primaries,' discrimination in employment and education, and the whole caste system based on color. This spirit was manifested in the phenomenal growth in size and activity of agencies like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. But this was more than a racial aspiration. The pronouncements of leaders of world opinion like President Roosevelt, Vice-President Henry Wallace, Wendell Willkie, Sumner Welles, and Chiang Kai-shek that World War II is a struggle for freedom of all men everywhere helped to give hope and direction to the struggle of Negroes for freedom.

Here are some of the high points of that struggle. On Oct. 13 the House of Representatives passed the Geyer bill to abolish the poll tax in eight Southern states by an overwhelming vote of 252-84. When the bill reached the Senate, a determined filibuster was waged by Southern Democratic Senators aided behind the scenes by some Northern Republicans. The filibuster was successful in temporarily postponing action on the bill. But there was widespread indignation throughout the country at the stoppage of the Senate's work by the filibuster. Labor, civic, church and other groups which supported the movement to abolish the poll tax immediately planned to renew the fight in the 78th Congress not only to abolish the poll tax, but also to support legislation to reduce representation as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of those states which improperly restrict exercise of the right to vote.

In courts of law numerous cases involving the differential in salaries paid to Negroes and white teachers doing the same work were successfully argued in courts in Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana and Virginia. Disfranchisement by means of the white primary was also attacked in the courts. In a case arising in Texas, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided against Lonnie E. Smith, a Negro who was barred from participation in the primaries, but appeal of that decision was immediately taken to the United States Supreme Court where it was expected to be argued early in 1943.

One of the most fundamental and difficult of problems — denial of employment to minorities, particularly Negroes — was attacked relentlessly throughout 1942. Modest gains were made chiefly through the instrumentality of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice. The necessity for such an agency was demonstrated by Fortune magazine through its poll of employers which showed that 56.3 per cent of these employers hired no Negroes during peacetime, while 47.5 per cent still refused despite the urgent need for skilled labor. The Fortune poll also revealed that less than 10 per cent of the employes were Negroes in 29.8 per cent of these plants, and most of these Negroes were employed in custodial or unskilled, poorly-paid jobs. But even the FEPC was threatened with destruction when at the end of the year Paul McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, suddenly ordered the 'indefinite postponement' of hearings scheduled to begin in January on discrimination by railroad unions and railroads. A storm of protest arose, coming not only from Negroes but other minorities, church groups, the CIO and AF of L, and other organizations and individuals.

The bright spot of the condition of the Negro in the armed forces continued to be the success of training white and Negro officers even in the South in the same Officer Candidate schools. Despite this success, however, announcement was made late in December that renewal of the pattern of segregation was to be inaugurated at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., by training Negro officers for ground duty with the Army Air Forces. This step, together with other instances of refusal of the Army Air Corps to permit the proper training of Negroes as fliers caused the resignation of Judge William H. Hastie, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War.

Negro women successfully completed training as WAACS and began service as Third Officers. The records of a number of them were so excellent that they were promoted to First Officers at the year's end. Opportunities for enlistment and training for ratings higher than messman were inaugurated in the Navy, although Negroes were still barred from training as officers, and Negro women were barred from the WAVES. Despite these handicaps, some Negroes demonstrated valor which brought nationwide praise. Dorie Miller, 22-year-old Negro messman, was commended by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on Apr. 1 for 'distinguished devotion to duty, extraordinary courage and disregard for his own personal safety' at Pearl Harbor. After the Captain had been killed on the bridge of his ship, Miller manned and operated a machine gun against Japanese planes. Charles Jackson French, a Negro messman from Newark, N. J., towed a raft on which were a group of exhausted fellow seamen and officers for six miles through shark-infested waters following the torpedoing of a United States destroyer.

Serious difficulties arose in England, Australia, India and other countries when some American white soldiers sought to transplant racial prejudices to these countries. Recommendations were made to the War Department that it give special instruction to all American soldiers in an effort to acquaint them with the history and the contributions to civilization of the peoples of these countries as an antidote to racial prejudice.

Numerous conferences were held in Hollywood between leaders of the motion picture industry, Wendell Willkie, and Walter White, of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, regarding the effect of the limitation of Negroes in motion pictures to comic or menial roles. All of the leading Hollywood producers agreed to broaden the treatment and to picture the Negro hereafter as a normal human being and as an integral part of the life of America and of the world.

Famed Negro singers like Marian Anderson and Paul Robeson continued to fill the largest concert halls in all parts of the country. A brilliant young Negro orchestra conductor, Dean Dixon, served as guest conductor of the New York Philharmonic at Lewisohn Stadium. In other cultural fields, a number of notable books by and about Negroes was published during 1942, including Angel Mo' and Her Son Roland Hayes, a biography of the distinguished tenor; For My People, by Mildred Walker, a young Negro woman whose volume won the annual Yale University young poets' award; J. Saunders Redding's No Day of Triumph, and Zora Neale Hurston's Dust Tracks on a Road.

The most notable and gratifying trend during the year was the increasing attention and the sound treatment given the Negro in magazines of wide circulation.

1942: Naval Science, American

Naval Strategy of the United States.

Prior to 1940, little thought had been given to the possibility of a war of such magnitude that the United States might be simultaneously involved in both oceans. The alignment of the great maritime nations seemed to preclude such a contingency. However, with the fall of France, the question mark over the French Fleet and the damage sustained by the British navy made a two-ocean fleet for the United States a live issue that fortunately was readily accepted by the nation following the courageous lead of the Chief Executive.

In December 1941 the situation in the Pacific had become critical. Much naval force had been diverted to the Atlantic to maintain the neutrality patrol. But there remained a fleet in being in the Pacific that was superior to the Japanese strength and sufficient to hold Japanese aggression in check.

Pearl Harbor had its influence on the balance of naval power in the Pacific. It precipitated the United States into a two-ocean war with unexpected suddenness. The nation was caught unprepared for war on such a scale, but fortunately the naval building program was under way and capable of great acceleration.

From a strategic point of view, it was soon evident that Hitler had to be handled in the Atlantic before the crushing blows were delivered to Japan. In other words, the Allies had to take the offensive in the Atlantic and a more or less defensive role in the Pacific, holding the line, Alaska, Midway, Samoa, New Zealand, and Australia.

This strategy appeared to be sound in the early part of 1942. Then the enemy really struck with devastating force in the Atlantic. The Nazis had been successful in more than trebling the number of submarines they had at the start of the war. They turned them loose in packs against the North Atlantic convoys off the East coast of the United States; in the Caribbean, a hot-bed of submarines; in the Gulf of Mexico, and on down into the deep South Atlantic.

This phase of the war in the Atlantic caught the American coast sadly in need of defensive weapons, with the result that a disastrous toll of valuable ships and cargoes was taken. Herculean efforts were made to turn out destroyers, subchasers, patrol boats, and the necessary gear for submarine hunting which included the development of sound gear, depth charges, and naval armament. Blimps, planes, convoy escorts, and coastal reorganization were thrown in to combat this grave menace.

At about this time the Japanese, flushed with success on the Asiatic mainland, Philippines, and Dutch East Indies, projected their operations into the southwest Pacific Islands preliminary to a frontal attack on Australia and New Zealand. It was excellent strategy on their part to sever the direct lines of communication with the United States and the Antipodes. This threat had to be met. In the meantime, the Japanese over extended by an invasion of Alaska and an expedition against Midway. The Coral Sea and Midway defeats were unexpected, and a bitter blow to Japanese prestige. They served as a deterrent to further aggressive action to the eastward, although the threat against Australia was still imminent.

To protect the vital lines of communications to Australia, the United States resorted to a daring amphibious raid on the Japanese-held Solomon Islands.

The United States was at last on the offensive, and the end of the year found Japanese air power being depleted gradually in the Pacific and the United States gaining strength.

On the Atlantic, the huge task of getting convoys with war materials through to England, to Murmansk, Russia, and to the Near East has taxed the ingenuity of the American Navy. From a low ebb in midsummer, the means to combat the submarines have been accumulated in sufficient strength to reduce the sinkings and get convoys through with minimum losses. By the end of the year the situation was in hand.

The African Campaign was launched on Nov. 7 by the most powerful amphibious force that ever crossed the seas, as a unit, in all history. Convoyed by the American and British navies, this expedition was well conceived, well timed, and beautifully executed.

Influence of Air Power.

Even prior to the war, the U. S. Navy was proud of its well-organized and efficient air force, made up of a magnificent personnel, in fact, the pick of the Navy. The first year of the war has depleted this crack force greatly, but a heavy toll of the enemy has been taken in the Pacific. A very noticeable loss of efficiency has been noted in Japanese pilots which indicates that American flyers — Navy, Marine and Army — have worked them over very well. The Japanese have lost a tremendous number of planes and trained pilots. Their replacement of both has been inferior in quality and it is believed that this condition will be magnified as the war goes on. On the other hand, American planes are getting better and better and decidedly more numerous, while the quality of pilots remains at a high standard.

The main lesson the Navy has learned is the effect of the number of shore-based aircraft. Quantity production keyed to maximum capacity in all the war countries has produced an unheralded number of planes that have and will continue to play an unheard-of role of importance on the conduct of the war both at sea and ashore. This mighty air arm will not supercede either Armies or Navies, but it will have a tremendous influence on both land and sea tactics.

However, it took actual warfare to demonstrate that superiority in number of planes in the theater of operations would not necessarily mean air superiority in that area unless the numbers in excess were overwhelming. For instance, while Germany had a ten-to-one superiority over England in the all-out 'blitz,' she never attained control of the air over England and, as a result, the 'blitz' ended in an aerial defeat for Germany. On the other hand, Germany had such a marked superiority in aircraft over Crete, that she was able to crush the Allied air force and would have been successful in destroying the British Mediterranean Fleet had it not hauled out.

Plane carriers are very vulnerable to massed plane attacks from either shore based planes or other carrier based planes. The war in the Pacific has clearly demonstrated this. At the same time the modern battleship has stood up remarkably well in all encounters far removed from home bases. It has been the backbone of the American Naval Task Forces carrying on amphibious operations so successfully in far-flung reaches of the Pacific. Added protection and increased anti-aircraft fire control have enabled this class of vessel to score heavily against both Japanese surface and air forces. They have also taken hits from submarines and carried on their operations at undiminished speeds.

Airplanes and Surface Ships.

Ever since the advent of the military airplane, the controversy concerning the relative merits of that medium of warfare and that of the surface ship has been the subject of enumerable articles and many debates.

Much has been learned from actual combat in the past year about the relative merits of planes and surface ships. On the whole, this information is strictly confidential. Suffice it to say though that although many war ships have been bombed and sunk by aircraft, many aircraft have likewise been shot down by surface craft. The plain fact is that the airplane has added to the complicated art of warfare. Neither the surface ship nor the plane can ignore each other. The airplane has not eliminated any type of surface craft nor is it likely to do so.

The primary purposes and uses of surface ships and airplanes are not by any means identical. Their characteristics are so utterly different that each possesses few of the primary characteristics of the other. It happens then that neither can be evaluated in terms of the other. Both are necessary military weapons in due proportion depending on the objective.

Design of Air and Sea Craft.

There are three elementary military characteristics embodied in all mechanical apparatus utilized in the prosecution of war. These are armament, protection, and mobility. Armament is exemplified by guns, bombs, torpedoes, and depth charges; the protective element by armor plating, artillery shields, and the pilot's armor in planes; and mobility by power plants. Of the elements the protective element is entirely defensive, while the other two are mainly offensive in character except that mobility may be, and, indeed quite often, is used as a defensive measure. All of the elements require detailed preparation prior to their incorporation into any weapon of war. However, their combination in the mechanical apparatus must be predetermined in order to fit that apparatus for its destined use. Compromises and sacrifices must be accepted in all the apparatus. This is particularly true of any mechanical device for use in the air or on the sea.

In building a warship all three elements must be limited, and one or two of the characters may be enhanced but only at the expense of the remainder. Thus a destroyer gains mobility at the expense of protection and a battleship gains protection and armor at the expense of its mobility and speed. However, the larger the ship, the higher the degree of all the three elements that may be combined in her. This fact is the reason for the increase in size of battleships from 35,000 tons to 45,000 tons and the destroyers from the World War I tonnage of 1,200 tons to the present tonnage of 1,850.

In building an airplane, it is found that on more and more drastic limitations must be accepted and more extensive compromises made, as it has been found that only one of three important elements can be incorporated to a high degree. This accounts for the high speed, the relative weak armor, and limited weight-carrying capacity of airplanes. The mobility of the plane, however, has two characteristics not shared by the ship, one is its ability to climb and the other its inability to stop in the air. The ability of the plane to climb gives it the advantage of position from which it may be used either in diving or bombing. The inability of the plane to stop or hold an advantageous position for longer than an instant requires that some other mechanical apparatus must be used to consolidate its gains.

As in a ship, the larger the plane the higher the degree of adaptability of the three essential elements, thus we see the creation of monsters such as the 'Mars,' and the prospective air battleships envisioned for the future. These larger planes, while incorporating more armor and protection, however, must still sacrifice some mobility to gain these increases. Thus we see that every device utilized in war must be a compromise based on judgment as to what its ultimate use is to be and what it is to accomplish during its lifetime. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the materials and skill of fabrication are available for all mechanical apparatus and thus all weapons eventually arrive at a balance of potentiality when combined in proportion and when put to their proper use.

There is a vast difference in degrees of stamina and immunity from damage of the different types of planes and ships, although none of the types of ships or planes is indestructible. Each of the types has its weakness which the designer and the manufacturer hope to minimize by their skill, and the tactician endeavors to minimize by the use of supplementary craft to supply the deficiencies and by the proper handling of the entire combatant force. Depending entirely upon the problems to be met, all types of planes and ships are necessary to a naval campaign. The specific operation to be undertaken dictates the choice of the types, as each can be dispensed with under some circumstances and each of them is necessary under other circumstances. The surface ship, when used against the bomber and torpedo plane, attains its maximum power of survival by being given a reasonable immunity from probable mines, torpedo, bomb, or projectile hits, provided it is properly employed tactically and provided it is used in conjunction with suitable supplementary types of warship.

Each type of plane and each type of ship is designed and built to counter or overcome the military characteristics of one or more other types under certain circumstances or when used in combination with other types of plane or ship. A submarine, for example, is designed so that it may hit a carrier with a torpedo unobserved. The destroyer hopes to kill the submarine while the cruiser hopes to bag the destroyer. The battleship, in turn, hopes to eliminate the cruiser, while the torpedo planes and bomber from the carrier hope to sink the battleship, and the fighter plane hopes to down the bombers and torpedo planes. The designer strives ever to provide a type which will create the maximum damage with the least jeopardy in attacking, but will suffer the least damage when hit itself.

As previously stated, national policy affects the fundamental design of all military mechanisms. For example, if it is known in advance that ships of the Navy will never be required to fight more than a few hundred miles from a well-protected home base, weight saved from fuel can be built into guns or armament. Similarly, if it is known in advance that a fighter need carry gasoline for but a short time in the air, then its maneuverability and armament can be improved.

In every ship and plane built by the Navy one or more of its outstanding characteristics is emphasized so that it may have an advantage in specific particulars. This is done deliberately, and only after all the occasions of its prospective use are examined thoroughly by experts.

Sea Craft.

The outstanding quality of a submarine is its ability to submerge. However, a submarine when submerged too deeply becomes helpless in the face of proper counter weapons. Its design depends upon considerations of buoyancy and mobility. It is physically impossible to build a submarine which will withstand pressures encountered at great depths, or to provide the submarines with any appreciable amount of protective armor. In addition, the limitations of power plants operating under water are so critical that design becomes a matter of extreme compromise. Every round of ammunition, every ton of fuel, every torpedo put into a submarine becomes a matter of detailed consideration. A submarine, however, because of its peculiar properties, has a usefulness in modern warfare which is not shared by any other type.

The outstanding characteristics of a destroyer are its speed, its maneuverability, its ability to carry depth charges over submarines, and its torpedo armament.

The cruiser with its increased tonnage carries still greater power than the destroyer. The volume of gunfire, greater stamina due to increased compartmentation and thickness of plating, as well as increased radius of operation and greater sea worthiness combine to make the cruiser a weapon of greater potentiality than the destroyer. However, the cruiser with no great amount of armor for the protection of sides and decks, is still a compromise.

An increase in size of the vessels gives us the battleship, with its outstanding characteristics of crushing gunfire against all types of surface craft, increased protection against damage by any naval weapon permitted by increased tonnage and relative lower speeds and maneuverability than possessed by the cruiser or destroyer. The outstanding characteristic of the battleship is gunpower. However, she is expected to demonstrate the maximum power of survival against all naval weapons and ability to keep the sea.

The newest type of combatant ship is the aircraft carrier, designed specifically to carry planes of the types that have been determined on. Carriers must possess speed to make them of maximum usefulness to their planes. They must have size to provide a large landing deck and a stable platform at sea for plane landing and take-off, and capacity both on decks and in hangars for the accommodation of planes. No carrier can have complete armor to protect its planes, gasoline and ammunition. Nor can its flight deck, located high in the ship, be heavy enough to resist bombs or gunfire to the most desirable degree or to the degree possible in a battleship. Every gun, every ton of fuel oil or gasoline, and every knot of speed put into a carrier reduces the number of planes that can be carried. Here too, compromise has played an important part in design.

Air Craft.

Our naval weapons of the air include several types of planes, each of them, like the several types of ships, useful to each other and to the ships beneath them for certain purposes. All military planes are alike in one particular; they possess speed, engine power, and limited weight to enable them to attain the advantageous positions of height with rapidity and with practicable limitations to enable them to land at landing fields or on ships. The high speed and high power that are so essential for the successful operation of the military plane are inherently uneconomical.

Increasing the radius of action of the plane by the addition of increased fuel capacity reduces the number of guns, the amount of ammunition or bombs, and the personnel which can be carried, as well as restricting its maneuverability. All others must be limited if any one character is pushed to its limit, hence the design of a plane is a critical matter. Planes require a suitable landing place and frequent servicings. They require ample space in which to maneuver, for collision is fatal. It is necessary that they reach exact positions in the air in order to create the maximum damage with their limited load. They cannot stop in the air nor can they hold any position for more than an instant. A considerable number of planes are necessary for effectiveness, but vital needs such as maneuvering space and fuel are opposed to numbers. It is also an important fact that while at times planes may accomplish significant destruction or damage, they cannot remain to conquer.

There was a time when the airplane was considered a cheap weapon. However, that is not the case, for not only are great numbers required, but any light mechanism that operates at high speed and possesses high power is not cheap. In addition to the planes themselves, accessories such as landing fields, hangars, repair shops, barracks, supplies, carriers, transportation, highly specialized personnel, and training add immensely to the cost of air power.

Carrier planes, on the whole, should be less capable than land planes because of the limitations placed on their size and weight by the strength and capacity of their landing decks. Sea planes are still less tactically capable than carrier planes, due to their physical characteristics. However, the carrier planes, by taking their landing fields with them and thus affording opportunity for upkeep, relaxation of personnel, and assistance in time of need, in addition to increasing their radius of action, tend to approach the land planes in tactical capability.

Each type of plane, as in each type of ship, has its peculiar characteristic incorporated in its design to the highest degree, making that particular type superior to some other type, and constituting the reasons for the type itself.

The bomber enjoys the advantage of position when achieved, but in order to take advantage of it, it must come to that position at precisely the correct time. The gasoline load and the bomb load of a bomber are limited so that a compromise must be reached between these and the elements. The inherent range of a bomber may be considerable but before it starts on its mission it is irrevocably committed to a certain ratio between its bomb and gasoline load. When that choice has been made, it cannot be changed, at least not until the limited load has been expended or until the bomber has returned to its base.

The torpedo plane's principal advantage is its speed. Like the bomber, it can attack in numbers provided it is not intercepted at a distance. Like all planes, it is much hampered by low visibility and bad weather, and similarly it is useless and vulnerable when down.

Fighters are essential for covering and defeating bombers and torpedo planes. A fighter is fast but essentially vulnerable, possessing great speed and maneuverability, gained at the sacrifice of fuel and protection. It is, however, necessary in the tasks which it is designed to perform.

Weapons on Ships and Planes.

The weapons of each of the types of ships and planes mentioned above are more or less peculiar to the machine itself and are the results of the great skill of the designers and manufacturers. The object of each is, of course, the fatal destruction or damage necessary to produce victory for the owner, or defensively to prevent such destruction and deny victory to the enemy.

The primary naval weapon is the gun which shoots projectiles. As satisfactory guns are limited in size by the skill of the manufacturer, so too is the muzzle velocity and the size of the shell, and the resulting energy directly proportioned to mass times the square of the velocity is limited. The projectile may carry a large amount of high explosive in which case it must of a necessity have thin walls which rupture easily on impact, or it may carry a small amount of explosives with the resultant reduced explosive force. If the shell bursts upon impact it loses the advantage of bursting in a confined space. Hence, the designer must choose between a thick-walled and a thin-walled shell and an impact or delayed action fuse. Other considerations ordnance designers must take into consideration are the life of the guns and the weight and stowage space of ammunition.

Similarly, in a submarine the principal weapon of which is the torpedo, only a limited number of tubes can be built and only a limited number of torpedoes can be carried on board. Torpedo tubes and torpedoes must be designed to fit accurately. The explosive charge (war head) of the torpedo, together with its speed and range, must all be determined in advance, for a torpedo may be designed to run a short distance at high speed and a heavy war head, or to run a long range at slow speed with a light explosive charge. The torpedo war head bursting on the side of a ship possesses a destructive force proportional to the head of water above it and the amount and character of its explosive charge. Its destructive effect is countered in ships by the compartmentation proved by experience to be the most effective. The shell of the torpedo is of such limited strength that the height above water and the speed at which it is launched must be relatively small in order to avoid damage and consequent erratic run.

The destructive effect of a mine, like that of a torpedo, depends entirely upon the size of its explosive charge and the depth of water. The mine in some respects is the most destructive of naval weapons. Its large explosive charge and favorable position make it one of the most deadly implements of war, except in cases where its lack of controllability may seriously hamper its effectiveness.

The aircraft bomb, like the projectile, can be either an armor-piercing bomb with thick walls and a small explosive charge or a thin-walled high capacity demolition bomb. Those explosives which burst in the open air on impact, generally speaking, have a comparatively smaller disruptive effect on structures than those which first penetrate and then explode. In order to make an effective flight, a bomb must be released from one point in space exactly or it will miss. In addition, due to natural laws, that is, gravity and its effect on the maximum terminal velocity of a bomb, the striking velocity that can be achieved by a bomb is considerably less than that of a projectile. It is possible, therefore, to build shore establishments or ships which will usually defeat bombs of the size which can be carried in planes in any significant numbers. On any particular occasion choice must be made as to the size of the bomb to be carried by the plane, for a plane that is able to carry ten 100 pound bombs can carry but two 500 pounders or but one 1,000 pound bomb. Bombers cannot dive when carrying a heavy bomb load. Therefore, anti-aircraft weapons are used to keep them at great heights in order to minimize the percentages of hits, as well as to allow maneuvering time for the ships below.

Innumerable weapons incorporating great ingenuity of design have been invented and placed on test. However, the salient point is that compromise has been necessary in each and every one in order to endow it with its salient characteristic.

Principles of Strategy.

The various types of ships and planes are suitable for one type of campaign or even for various phases of the same campaign depending upon the types and location of the opposing forces. The High Command is charged with the duty of combining the various available types in such a manner that they will supplement each other and obtain the best results on any particular occasion.

In general, light forces, that is, planes, cruisers, submarines, carriers, and destroyers, are used for striking forces, for raiding, for reconnaissance, for screening purposes, or for attrition attacks. When used against more or less equal opposing forces, light forces tend to neutralize or greatly reduce each other as the campaign progresses. This naturally requires considerable replacements as well as growing support from heavier units. They may or may not be supported by heavier forces of cruisers and battleships as strength members, and they may or may not be followed by expeditionary forces comprising infantry, tanks, artillery, and air forces to hold territory. However, it is certain that if the sea lanes are to be held and used freely while denying their use to the enemy, they must be occupied in sufficient force to control them. It is equally true that the greater the distance of the area of control from the base of supplies and replenishment, the more difficult and costly becomes the problem of the belligerent on the offensive. An overseas venture involves control of the seas and the air and finally the land. Control in this sense does not mean the total liquidation of all opposing forces but rather only that they be sufficiently reduced for the feasible use of the desired areas.

Personal courage has a great effect upon the employment of ships and planes in action. The collective performance of a light force which knows that it is adequately supported by a heavy force is better than that of a light force which is without that support. Similarly the collective performance of a bomber or torpedo plane attack adequately supported by fighters and dive bombers is much more effective than one without such support. Such unsupported attacks have been readily dispelled or broken up by being met with adequate fighters or even anti-aircraft gunfire and have jettisoned their bombs or dropped their loads in the sea and gone home without accomplishing anything.

Naval weapons may be selected properly or improperly for any particular occasion or operation. Their proper selection, while at times dependent upon luck, requires the deep study of all available information by the responsible commander. Any military commander who depends entirely upon luck will eventually meet disaster. All types of ships and planes, as has been remarked before, may be used alone on some occasions and each may be dispensed with on others. Therefore, it is the duty of the High Command to select wisely and well from the units available those best suited to the particular task at hand. If the proper units are not available the result may be a national calamity through a failure to prepare properly.

Next in importance to the employment of the proper types of ships and planes is the Commander's selection of suitable objectives for attack. The expenditure of lives and materials on useless objectives can be regarded only as criminal negligence on the part of the responsible authority. Under existing conditions no major fleet or task force is complete without all types of ships and planes, including the many types of auxiliary ships for fleet maintenance and supply. This is particularly true in the prosecution of an overseas campaign.

Ships and planes are mobile, and maneuverability is one of their primary characteristics. It is, therefore, no more appropriate that ships be caught unprepared, stopped at sea, or anchored in a roadstead, than it is that planes be caught on the ground. During the necessary servicing periods required by both planes and ships, it is vitally necessary that they be guarded by other means than their own. In this connection common sense dictates that, unless there are compelling reasons, and benefits to be gained proportionate to the risks run, there is no more good judgment in sending capital ships into submarine-infested waters than there is in sending any valuable military force into an uncertain area or critical situation without reconnaissance or information on which to base an estimate of the forces to be met.

The effectiveness of all weapons is influenced to a decided degree by weather conditions. Bad weather disturbs all functions of all military weapons to a greater or lesser extent. Weather may be a friend or enemy, but normally bad weather tends to increase the inherent weaknesses of all types of military mechanisms. Some weapons, however, may be used in all kinds of weather and others only in some kinds. Heat, cold, ice, fog, rain, snow all have a tremendous effect. Daylight, darkness, sunlight, moonlight, twilight, and clouds exert an enormous influence. They may impose limitations and on occasion offer opportunities. The range of visibility too has a profound effect on and at times limits operations at sea and still more so in the air.

Under certain conditions a composite force of battleships, cruisers, carriers, destroyers, submarines, torpedo planes, bombers, and fighters must operate under reduced efficiency. This is because some of the types cannot operate at all or perform only at less than their designed efficiency. During rough weather the smaller ships being less seaworthy, must slow down, with a consequent reduction in speed of the larger units. Similarly, planes must be kept aboard or grounded during inclement weather.

To be of the maximum effectiveness an adequate force must attain its desired position at the desired time. This principle has been stated in more pungent words by General Jeb Stuart: 'Git thar fustest with the mostest.' To 'git thar' depends upon the speed, the distance to be covered, and the endurance of the units involved. Both the sea and the air are very large, but owing to the speed of the airplane for short air distances they may be assumed to be reasonably comparable. The endurance and speed of planes and surface craft are matters of a designer's choice.

Distance has a great effect upon the auxiliaries used in an overseas expedition. It is one thing when supply ships are based at an established Navy Yard or port close to their source of supplies, and quite another when they are located at an outlying spot to which everything must be transported.

Distance and weather are allies. They have at times brought grief and disaster to many military commanders.

As has been pointed out above, all military weapons have been designed to produce the maximum destructive effect of which they are capable. The majority of them are complicated to some degree. Therefore, in spite of the fact that a balance is necessarily established to some extent between the types of weapons by their designers, their effective use depends entirely upon the training and ability of the personnel who are to put them to their use. If it is granted that all designers are of equal skill and that manufacturers are all equal in the reproductions of the designers' ideas, then the superior training of the operating personnel will cause that particular weapon to prevail in the long run.

There is no substitute for an adequate number of well-trained personnel and there is no training which supplants experience and practice. Trained personnel has an influence on design as well as on operation in that, given the opportunity, it will suggest and cause to be effected, up-to-date changes in design. It will too, without hesitation condemn or abandon any inadequate weapon, including ships or planes, which has little merit or which does not have a good chance for survival.

Expansion of the U. S. Navy.

The rapid expansion of the United States Navy during the war surpassed any year in the history of the Navy. As production swung into stride, shipbuilding accelerated to such an extent that ships were finished with remarkable speed. As a consequence, ships of all categories are flowing into the Fleet months ahead of schedule.

Anti-submarine vessels are even being built on the Great Lakes and inland rivers. The production, arming, equipping, and training of this type of ship is the answer to the submarine menace. As these vessels are completed and take station along the American coasts, the submarine will move to less dangerous waters.

This year many vessels of the active Fleet were remodernized. Practical lessons learned from actions afloat were applied in making the ships less vulnerable to bombs and torpedoes and their anti-aircraft batteries materially strengthened with the latest guns and mounts. Ships damaged in action returned to Navy Yards and were repaired with great speed and sent back to the Fleet.

The sound detection gear used in hunting submerged submarines came in for much attention. The field of science has exploited this system of acoustic sound gear until each month finds a better type of sound gear being put into production and furnished to the Forces afloat. Loops were devised to detect the approach of submarines into vital areas and laid to give advance warning and the location of submarines.

Mining operations by the enemy along our coasts diverted attention to the protection of ships from this menace. The British had made great strides in this direction and the cooperation from our Allies saved much time in putting gear aboard our ships that gave protection from the latest types of enemy mines.

The new secret installations to detect the approach of planes or ships at great distances were installed on board ships and at strategic shore stations to warn of the approach of the enemy. Great strides have been made along these lines. This system has contributed a great deal in the running down of enemy surface vessels and warns of the approach of planes in ample time to afford our own planes the opportunity to get up into intercepting positions.

1942: Military Science, American

Strength and Organization of United States Forces.

As one of the United Nations faced with war by Germany, Japan, Italy, and their allies, several determinations had to be made by the United States, among them these: What should be the strength and composition of the United States Army? Of the Navy? Where should the greatest strength be used?

Owing to the losses in naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, in the opinion of this author, it seemed necessary at first to take a somewhat defensive attitude in the Pacific and to concentrate on knocking out Germany and Italy; that accomplished, to throw the full strength of the Allies against Japan. Thus the strength and composition of the German army must determine, in a large measure, the strength and composition of the United States Army.

The supplies for the Army are planned at least a year ahead, so its prospective strength must be estimated.

The Germans have 40 divisions in Western Europe and the occupied countries, 200 divisions on the Russian Front and with her allies have all told 500 divisions. The Japanese have some 85 divisions.

The Army Planned for the United States.

It was decided, after considering the help we should be able to render our allies — shipping supplies, equipment, and manpower — to set 7,500,000 as the target for the Army by the end of 1943. Of these 3,300,000 would be in the Ground Forces, 2,000,000 in Training and Supply Service, and 2,200,000 in the Air Forces.

The kinds of forces depend on the kind of warfare they will be engaged in and the part of the world for which they will be trained, as well as the kind of arms the enemy uses, and his methods of using them.

Considering the number of German armored divisions, it has been decided (Stimson) to expand the armored divisions from 10 to 14, also to create a Third Armored Corps and a Twelfth Corps of Infantry troops (increased from 9).

A corps is composed of two or more divisions. This will give a total strength of some 71 organized divisions, 59 of them infantry (some motorized), 2 cavalry, and 10 armored. In addition there will be a great number of separate regiments and smaller units available for service, attached to division or corps units or independent. But only a fraction of the 71-division total will be trained, equipped, and ready for combat at the end of the year.

Our present training schedule calls for about ten months' basic training for each newly formed division, then about eight weeks in coordination with air forces and tanks. Divisions now being formed will not normally be ready for active service for at least a year from date of activation. For many months the rate of activation and training will exceed our ability to transport and supply them overseas.

Specialized Training.

Much attention is being paid to specialized training. Mountain and ski troops are trained in the winter. Tank divisions, with attached units, practice desert warfare in the Southwest. Air borne troops and parachute troops are being trained.

Officer Leadership.

Officer Candidate Schools are expanded so that 90,000 or more a year may be trained. These new officers, selected from the ranks for their leadership and other qualifications, are already proving themselves well-fitted in service.

General Officers.

Battles are not settled merely by the quality of material and the courage of the troops. Much depends on the quality of the command. General George C. Marshall (himself most carefully selected by the President as Chief-of-Staff of the Army) stated in a letter to a senator in response to a question as to the policy followed in selecting generals: 'There are few matters more highly important or to which I devote more personal attention than recommendations for general officers. The success of military campaigns and the safety of thousands of lives are dependent on a general officer in combat. I feel that my responsibility to the soldier and his family and the necessity for maintaining maximum efficiency in our armed forces takes full precedence over any interest in the individual officer whose efficiency is in doubt.

'The critical nature of this period makes it imperative that all personal considerations be ruthlessly ignored in the selection of general officers. The criterion for a general officer must be demonstrated ability to meet his great responsibilities. No compromise is possible. Highly efficient and energetic leadership is essential to success. No considerations other than evident ability to produce results can be the yardstick for my recommendations. Any officer who is professionally equipped to cope with the terrific pressures of modern warfare, and who gives evidence of outstanding qualities of leadership will be recommended for promotion. Consequently, I propose to continue recommending only those officers who in my estimation have measured up to the highest standards of military skill, who have demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of modern methods of warfare, and who possess the physical stamina, the moral courage, the strength of character, and flexibility of mind necessary to withstand the burdens which modern combat conditions will impose. These attributes necessarily rise above, and have no relation to quotas for various branches or components, political considerations, or geographical allocations.

'I have had searching examinations and reports made before each promotion list was approved.'

Shortly after this letter was produced the Senate confirmed the nominations of 24 brigadier generals for promotion to major general, and of 81 colonels for temporary promotion to brigadier general.

Besides the annual efficiency reports, the officer's success in handling men in maneuvers under very adverse circumstances (the nearest one can get to battle) is considered. When actual combat with the enemy occurs, the actions of officers, good or bad, cause promotion or relief or change of duties. Our school system is very thorough. Officers are selected with great care for attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth. From the graduates of this school, officers are selected for attendance at the War College — it is almost entirely from such graduates, considering all their service that officers are recommended for general officers.

General-Staff Officers.

To even the best of commanders the General Staff Officers are of greatest importance in assisting general officers in their duties. Most of the higher General Staff Officers are graduates of the Command and General Staff School and many of the War College.

Invasion of North Africa.

The first real test of our Commanding General and General Staff was the invasion of North Africa. After the Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt, was convinced of its practicability and Mr. Churchill had agreed, generals and staff officers were sent to London and the details worked out. Questions of transportation, of supply, and of command of land, sea, and air forces were efficiently solved.

The plans were formulated in exact detail — the gathering of the troops to ports of embarkation, their supply, their convoy across the submarine-infested Atlantic and in the Mediterranean to the ports of attack. The operations against those ports included the details of landing, the plane and surface ship-protection, the use of the ships' guns to assist landing, the seizure of railroads and highways, the getting of supplies to hungry men, and the moving of columns toward Bizerte and Tunis, thence toward Tripoli. It was a great planning operation: the loading of tanks, planes, and supplies so that what was wanted first came off first; the fine service of the Navy in herding the ships in the convoy, protecting them against submarine attack, and possible surface and air fire; and the secrecy which enabled surprise. Even propaganda was ready and showered over France and North Africa. We had followed the German plan of 'Tourists,' who for months had arranged for cooperation with friends in North Africa for guides.

Superb Planning and Cooperation.

The bugaboo of combined operations among allies was beaten by superb planning and cooperation. The question of command of the whole enterprise, of subordination of naval and air forces to the supreme commander, was so well worked out and impressed by the highest authority that there was no quibbling as to whose orders governed and no protest to governments concerned. Even when the question was raised in the House of Commons as to using Admiral Darlan the answer was that that was 'a question for the American Commander.'

The combined Chiefs-of-Staff, and the General Staff planned so well that over 100,000 men in a convoy of 850 ships crossed thousands of miles of sea without the loss of a man. Only one ship was struck by a submarine torpedo, and the troops in that vessel, over 100 miles from shore, took to their landing boats and reached their destination without loss. This great and successful surprise was against the most efficient enemy the world has produced. It was a United States task and to the Chief-of-Staff and his assistants belongs the credit; to the British Navy and British 1st Army for assistance and loyal cooperation great credit is due.

Unity of Command; Organization.

The tragedy of Pearl Harbor may eventually prove to have disclosed lack of unity of command, although General Marshall, Chief-of-Staff of the Army and Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, cooperate to the highest degree. The appointment of Admiral Leahy as Chief-of-Staff of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States assures unity of command regardless of the personality of the other Chiefs-of-Staff. The ability of a Commander or Chief-of-Staff is shown more by his selection of assistants and subordinate commanders than in any other way.

The Army has been streamlined. Instead of the cumbersome organization it had up to this war it has been reorganized into: (1) The Ground Force, headed by Lieut. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who has the biggest direct command in the Service; (2) The Army Air Forces, headed by Lieut. Gen. Henry H. Arnold; and (3) The Services of Supply, headed by Lieut. Gen. Brehon Burke Somervell. These heads are under the Chief-of-Staff but are most carefully picked and in their provinces are given great latitude and allowed great initiative. Representatives of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the components of the British Armed Forces are stationed in Washington for conference and decision in global affairs. Final decision involving Great Britain and the United States is made by this Combined Chiefs-of-Staff Committee. This is a global war. Detachments and task forces of the United States armed forces are located all over the world. The commanders of these forces have been most carefully chosen and given the latitude and initiative due their responsibilities and semi-independent commands.

Lieut. Gen. George H. Brett commands an area from the Canal Zone to Trinidad, Brazil, and Ecuador. His chief activity is antisubmarine warfare, mostly by air. He also commands anti-aircraft, infantry, engineers, and scores of jungle bases.

General Dwight Eisenhower commanded United States troops in Britain and Europe. He was selected to command the invading forces of the United States and Britain into North Africa. The selection proved very happy as have practically all the selections made or recommended by General Marshall.

In Central Africa as commander is Brig. Gen. Shipler FitzGerald, an air man. His air transport forces are punching bases through interior Africa, creating military airline facilities which could serve a combat army. Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews now commands all U. S. Army forces in Great Britain.

The Middle East, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Commander, includes United States airmen, a great supply base depot in Eritrea and the Basra supply line to Russia.

In Hawaii is Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, an air officer. His post is the keystone of any coordinated offensive striking downward from the Aleutians or upward from the Southwest Pacific.

In Alaska Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner commands his strengthened ground and air forces which have counter-moved into the outer Aleutians. He is under Naval Command.

In China battle-tried Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell commands. He speaks Chinese fluently and has the absolute confidence of the Chinese Commander.

In Australia is Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Australian soldiers and MacArthur's air force, later reinforced by U. S. troops, have harried the Japanese in New Guinea and bombed their bases to the North.

Thus can be seen the global area over which the United States Army operates — nearly 1,000,000 American soldiers are already serving outside the boundaries of continental United States.

Quality of Men in the Ranks.

After the higher leadership is thus provided and the best our experience can devise, consider the quality of the men in the ranks. This war will be won not so much by the best equipment as by the best brains — brains all the way through from the general down to the latest recruit. Not necessarily formal education, or book learning, but the individual initiative, individual enterprise, individual ability to size up a situation and determine the best course to follow.

Soldiers are no longer herded into battle but go in with the knowledge that at any moment they may be called upon to make decision on which may depend the whole battle. The 4,250,000 soldiers in this army today have higher educational qualifications than those of any other army. On entrance some are 'soft,' but a rigid course of training soon cures that; after joining a division they must be able to march 27 miles with heavy pack and be ready for combat at the march's end, to surmount all kinds of obstacles.

Younger Recruits.

It has just been decided to bring in youths of 18 and 19. These make the best soldiers — easy to teach, energetic, resourceful. The recruits are given 11 to 13 weeks in training centers and then sent to their final organizations. At training center they learn the duties of the individual soldier, rifle firing, machine-gun firing, marching, taking care of selves in the field, and so forth.

After joining the division they learn the higher duties. The division training from the time a division is activated to the time it is fit for battle is about ten months, and no divisions with less training are to be sent into battle except in great and unforeseen emergency.

Selecting and Training Officers.

In organizing a new division the commanding general is selected and sent to a Refresher School for 60 days to refresh him in his command duties and in the most modern methods as brought from the various battlefields of the world by our very carefully selected observers. The General's Staff is detailed and given a refresher course; then a cadre of 1,200 of more experienced men selected from the old division and sent as a nucleus of the new division. The balance of the troops are taking their course at a training center, learning how to be individual soldiers.

Candidate schools for officers are conducted to procure 90,000 a year. These candidates are selected from soldiers who have served three months and appear to have the best qualifications, as shown especially by leadership in maneuvers and by their entire records. They take a three months' course, and those who are graduated become commissioned lieutenants.

Training for Special Conditions.

These division and separate troops may be sent anywhere, so many are specialized for various possible fields of action. Training centers are set up which duplicate the climate, terrain, and operating conditions under which our troops may fight on foreign fronts. A Libya or North Africa was found in California, a Western Europe in the Carolinas, a Norway in Colorado, tropical jungles in Florida.

Desert Warfare Practiced.

Last spring Col. Riley Ennis came back to the United States after ten months in African desert. Immediately, he and his superiors staked out a training area 180 miles long by 90 miles wide in the California desert. Eight thousand men from every unit of service went to work there building and rehearsing our Desert Warfare Command. Men were taught to fight under a temperature of 110 degrees. They learned to make a gallon of water a day do for all purposes. Special uniforms were tested and adopted. A diet was developed and special refrigeration was perfected to keep it fresh. Army doctors are specially trained to care for injuries and illness peculiar to desert fighting. Army Ordnance set up a special section to figure out how best to protect equipment from desert sand and weather. Special camouflage was developed for them.

The toughened, sun-blackened men of the Desert Command under Maj. Gen. George Patton, then Corps Commander, did in fact go to North Africa, landed near Casablanca, and many with tanks and all paraphernalia are now near Tunis.

Mountain Training.

Other thousands are trying to keep warm in the snows of the Colorado Rockies. The nucleus was taken from expert skiers, mountain climbers, prospectors, guides, and so forth. Men are trained to deliver supplies by pack or parachute. Special uniforms for the mountain troops were tested and adopted. The Ordnance Department furnished special lubricants for guns and machines. The Quartermaster Department went to work on the most suitable food.

Preparation for Jungle Fighting.

Down in the swamps of the Deep South and the jungles of North Florida, jungle troops were trained. These troops are taught infiltration in the jungle. On 48-hour maneuvers in the swamps these men live on two-days' emergency rations and learn to cope with snakes and chiggers. New kinds of land mines are developed. Live camouflage is utilized. Mental training is given. Teachers who have lived with our enemies, watched them fight, studied their tricks, and know their languages and peculiarities are now in every camp. Colored pictures show our soldiers the Japanese and Nazi soldiers in actual combat.

Training of Special Commands.

We have anti-tank commands, anti-aircraft commands, air-troop-carrier commands, paratrooper commands, and ranger commands specially prepared to act with the Navy. They handle boats, embark and disembark through the surf, and seize beach heads, communications, and so forth. These also have just been used in North Africa and disembarked near Casablanca when the waves were six to twelve feet high.

Army Organization.

The division is the Army's real token of strength. It is the smallest complete force ready for large scale combat, and the new American Infantry Division is a fine example of the modern streamlining process. The outstanding feature of the new division is the infantry-artillery combat team. Each of the three regiments in the division has its own battalion of artillery, and these 'combat teams,' training together, attain the highest degree of cooperation. The division commander thus has under him one great fighting force, or three well-integrated separate striking arms. The fire power of an American division is greater than that of a division in any other army. Its mobility also is greater than that of any enemy division. One-third of the manpower of the new American Army will be in the Air Force.

Arms and Equipment.

After leadership, quality of personnel, and efficient training, much depends on arms and equipment. The Ordnance Department has the responsibility of manufacturing, supplying, and maintaining the weapons with which our soldiers fight. A short time ago the President announced that May production of tanks totaled 1,500; of artillery and anti-tank guns, 2,000; of machine guns, 50,000, not including sub-machine guns which would bring the total above 100,000.

America's colossal war production effort, excelling as it does in quantity and quality the output of our enemies, is turning out 'the finest fighting tools ever placed in the hands of fighting men.' (Maj. Gen. L. H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Ordnance, U.S.A.)

Our ordnance laboratories and engineers are among the world's finest. They have samples, by purchase or capture, of practically all the latest developments of both the Allies and the Axis forces. These are analyzed and tested to discover strength and weakness so as to embody the results of such information in our later types. Such improvements are constantly being made without stopping production.

Effectiveness of the Garand Rifle.

Our M-1 rifle, (the Garand) has increased rifle fire power by 2.5 times. Our machine guns fire at a higher cyclic rate than those of our enemies. They out-function any enemy gun under the most adverse service conditions.

Tank Gun Equipment.

Our tanks are superior to anything the enemy has. Type for type our tanks have heavier guns, heavier armament, and greater speed. We have captured enemy tanks, German and Japanese — we have conducted every conceivable engineering test upon them. These tests, incidentally, are quite aside from the pounding our tanks have given the enemy. The best proof is that in battle our tanks have more than met the trials of combat. Our high velocity 75-mm. guns in our M-3 and M-4 tanks far outrange the best the Germans have. We know by actual tests what our high velocity 75-mm. shells can do to German medium tanks. We blast big holes in them at ranges beyond those their guns can reach. We can fire effectively while the tank is in motion, which the enemy cannot do. We have double-purpose weapons (anti-tank and anti-air) with higher muzzle velocity and greater explosive charges than the German 88-mm. gun.

Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Guns.

Our 105-mm. howitzer is equal or superior to any enemy gun of similar purpose. It is in mass production and replacing the 75-mm. Many of these 105-mm. are on self-propelled armored mounts. The 90-mm. anti-aircraft gun is also now in mass production.

For low-flying aircraft, in addition to machine guns, the improved Bofors 40-mm. quick fire (Swedish design) is adopted and in mass production. The Bofors has a muzzle velocity of 2,850 feet per second and fires up to 140 rounds per minute. Chrysler is making the Bofors for both Army and Navy in the same factories. The Navy uses water-cooled jackets, and the Army, air-cooled.

Tanks and Their Functions.

Tanks are losing their personality. Their chief function used to be to knock out other tanks; now they are becoming a ferry service for infantry and anti-tank guns. Behind the infantry come tanks with their own supporting anti-tank guns, which are a greater menace than the tanks themselves as the latest types are very effective. The German anti-tank gun has a tapered barrel permitting concentration of force, resulting in great muzzle velocity and striking power. The British have developed their own types. Their trend is toward lightly armored powerful weapons operated by small crews.

Maj. Gen. C. L. Scott, U. S. Army armored force veteran states, 'The best way to knock out tanks is with high velocity anti-tank guns with field artillery firing over open sights, or with infantry raiders operating at night with bombs.' These are the primary lessons of the African campaign after four months of service as senior military observer in the Middle East.

When a tank force goes forward it should always be accompanied by a generous complement of infantry, anti-tank guns, and mobile field artillery. President Roosevelt recently disclosed that the attainment of his numerical goal of 45,000 tanks and 60,000 airplanes for 1942 had been sacrificed to obtain weapons with longer range, more fire power and greater armor protection. He emphasized that the output in terms of weight and materials fabricated would be at least equal to the production which would have been obtained had the original schedules been met.

Spares for Tanks and Aircraft.

Combat experience has required a major upward revision in the percentage of spares required for tanks and aircraft. The aircraft requirement of spares has been increased from 15 to 50 per cent; in tanks from 15 to 35 per cent. Some material heretofore marked for tanks will be diverted to the construction of highly mobile speedy artillery as tank killers. Tank destroyers have great maneuverability. They can roll into position and begin firing without unlimbering or facing around. They can outrace their 30-m.p.h. foe, take a devastating crack at close range, or lob shells from five miles away with help of small, low-flying planes to direct fire. Once enemy's tanks are disposed of destroyers are simply mobile field artillery.

Engine Power.

American tanks get the better of their opponents very largely because of their great engine power. Compared with European 'opposite numbers' our tanks have twice the horsepower per ton of weight. (Gen. G. M. Barnes, Army Ordnance.) This gives them greater speed and maneuverability, enabling them to get into positions where their favorable gun power can be used to greatest advantage and making them targets difficult to hit.

Airplanes.

The weapon which, with the tank, has seen most changes in construction and use in 1942 is the airplane. Domination of the air has seemed almost a prerequisite to success on both land and sea. Tank warfare and air warfare are highly skilled trades and their personnel must be of the country's elite. They must be tough, young, intelligent, supple, alert, and full of initiative. They are selected in our own military forces from a youth best educated and probably the richest in the world in initiative and independent thinking.

Although air power has reached highest importance, the decision of land battles is still made mainly on land and the orders which win or lose land battles come from the ground commander. The bombers, the ground strafing planes, the observation planes, and all other aircraft which can help the ground forces to win are still auxiliary to the ground forces. Modern warfare calls for tanks, artillery, motorized infantry, and at times naval support which should be all integrated and employed with the fine, fast coordination of a champion football team.

Air-Forces during Battle.

Prime Minister Churchill, in his Egyptian visit before Gen. Montgomery's successful attack on Rommel, emphasized and directed that during combat, air forces must comply with requirements of the ground commander. Air command must not be independent during battle — one commander must have control of all components. This was most carefully and definitely provided for in the North African Expedition, as Gen. Eisenhower seems to have had none of the troubles generally connected with inter-allied forces, and ground, sea, and air forces acting under one definite commander.

Quality of American Aircraft.

Criticism of certain of our aircraft caused a report, after careful investigation, 'without fear, favor, or affection.' The Office of War Information issues the report, 'The people of the United States have a right to know, within those limits made necessary by military secrecy, the strengths and weaknesses of their fighting men and fighting machines'! The test of battle is the only valid one for any Army or Navy plane, whatever its type.

The best the public can expect, and the best it will get, is that on the average the equipment of the land air forces shall be superior to the equipment of the enemy. The Navy went into the War with considerable quantities of aircraft not of the latest type and unquestionably suffered losses that could have been avoided had the latest equipment been available. But secret battle reports show that the latest floating-base aircraft of the Navy are superior in all types. In the Pacific, as in China, the overall battlescore of Army aircraft has been much better than the enemy's. In the vital European theater our newest fighters have not been tried up to now. Appraisal of our older fighting types, Bell P-39 and Curtiss P-40, compels the conclusion that they are not right for operation under today's high-altitude tactics in Britain. Both are outclassed in the high-altitude field by the British Spitfire and the German Messerschmitt 109 and Focke Wulf 190. But it is one of the paradoxes of aircraft performance that the P-39 has proved a splendid weapon on the Russian and Aleutian fronts (where lower altitudes are the rule) and the P-40 is a first line fighter in Egypt.

Two newer fighting types, the twin-engined Lockheed P-38 (Lightning) and the single-engined Republic P-47 (Thunderbolt) are in production and show great promise of high altitude pursuit planes. Neither has been adequately tested in battle.

The Army four-motored bombers have proved superior in their categories in all theaters. Actual employment of the Boeing B-17 (Flying Fortress) over Europe has exceeded even the fondest expectations of its American proponents. The same kind of record has been made by the Consolidated B-24 in Egypt and in other areas.

M. O. Medium and Light Bombers (B-25 and B-26) are the best in the world. They have been tested in all theaters. U. S. scout bombers, product of the Navy's long-time development of this destructive art, also are without peer among single-engine dive bombers. The firepower and protection of U. S. fighting aircraft (guns, armor, leakproof fuel tanks) are equal in all cases to the best our allies and the enemy have in the air, and in some cases we are decidedly superior.

Fighters.

North American P-51 (Mustang) single-engined, liquid cooled. Newest of Allison-powered U. S. pursuits. Has some of the same limitations of P-40 and P-39. Improvements in the power plant and other technical changes promise a sensational improvement in altitude performance. Lockheed P-38 (Lightning) a two-seated, liquid cooled pursuit plane, has so far only limited tests in action, notably in the Aleutians. Its performance has been brilliant. At its best altitude it is one of the world's fastest fighting aircraft. Constant improvements are being made. Grumman F4F (Wildcat) today's Navy standard fighter, is unquestionably the best carrier fighter in battle service.

Heavy Bombers.

Boeing B-17 (Flying Fortress) a tried and thoroughly tested model with an unequaled combat record (four-engine, air-cooled, turbosuper-charged) has indicated by its work in the Pacific and over Europe that it can carry out high altitude day bombing missions under the protection of its own guns, without fighter escort. Consolidated B-24 (Liberator) four-motored, air cooled. In the Pacific, North Africa, Europe and the Aleutians it has shown itself a top flight performer.

Medium and Light Bombers.

North American B-25 (Mitchell) a battle tested (two-engine air cooled) aircraft of speed, long range, good load carrying characteristics (made the raid on Tokio). No airplane of same class, friendly or enemy, is known to equal it. Martin B-26, battle-tested, comparable to B-25. None but the United States has so efficient a plane in its class. Douglas SBD (Dauntless) Navy carrier-based standard dive bomber (single-engine, air-cooled). This craft is the best in the world in its category. Grumman TBF (Avenger) single-engine, air-cooled, made its debut at Midway. Bigger, more powerful airplane than Douglas Devastator, it is the best carrier-based torpedo plane.

The Japanese Zero captured in the Aleutians is well built, flies beautifully but has no armor, less power (900 h.p.), less speed (about 300 m.p.h), less fire power (2 cannon, 2 machine guns) than the best United States fighters.

Airplane Bombs.

The new Flying Fortresses and British Lancasters now can carry 4,000 pound 'block buster' bombs. More powerful explosive and more of it crammed into a lighter casing make the block buster burst with increased lateral force.

American Fliers.

Lieut. Gen. George H. Brett, reporting on the basis of his experience as commander of the United Nations Air Force in the Southwest Pacific, said that, expanding toward 2,000,000 men, the Army Air Force's accident rate was lowest of any in the world and the percentage of planes returning from battle was highest.

1942: Merchant Marine, American

War Zone Operation.

The American Merchant Marine took a decisive part in the struggle against the Axis Powers during the first twelve months after Pearl Harbor. Construction and operation of supply ships for the unprecedented demands of global transportation became one of the most vital factors for success not only of the United States but of every nation aiding the Allied cause.

Hundreds of thousands of fresh troops had to be transported to theaters of war in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, Alaska. From six to fifteen tons of equipment were shipped with every fighting man, depending upon his type of service. Forces already in the field had to be supplied with food and with armaments that were beginning to roll with increasing volume from America's gigantic war industries. Raw materials, such as nitrates, magnesium, jute, and bauxite, had to be imported to supply these industries. It was necessary, meanwhile, to maintain trade with the republics of Latin America, in spite of the encroachment of war upon our very shoreline.

Every ship capable of deep-sea service was shifted from normal to war zone operation. Construction of new vessels was expanded and speeded. Close surveillance of cargo movements was instituted so that every cubic foot of valuable shipping space would be utilized to the best possible advantage. As the demands of the armed forces were intensified, a sharp reduction became necessary in the movement of goods and articles for civilian use. American homes began to go on a war footing when these shortages resulted in the rationing of oil, sugar, and coffee.

With a vast army being transported to military bases all over the world, with civilians adjusting themselves to new conditions, and industry being fully converted to war production, the future of all three depended, as never before in our history, upon the men and ships of the Merchant Marine.

Shipbuilding Program.

Five years ago, after a long period of neglect, the United States had the poorest merchant fleet of the six leading maritime nations. The rebuilding of this fleet was begun with the establishment of the U. S. Maritime Commission by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

A shipbuilding program calling for 50 vessels a year for 10 years, to replace over-age vessels, was initiated by the Commission. Delivery of the first ships began in 1939, but as the tremors of war reached America from across two oceans, the shipbuilding program was doubled time and time again until, by the end of 1941, orders had been placed for more than 1,200 steel ships totaling 12,000,000 deadweight tons, to be completed during the two-year period 1942-43.

With the actual outbreak of hostilities, shipping requirements were resurveyed and the already accelerated program was expanded twofold. Early in 1942, two successive additions of 6,000,000 deadweight tons each were made to the shipbuilding effort. By April 2, less than four months after Pearl Harbor, the Maritime Commission had awarded contracts for 2,300 cargo ships aggregating 24,000,000 deadweight tons, of which 8,000,000 tons were scheduled for delivery during 1942, and 16,000,000 tons in 1943. Construction of more than 1,000 special-purpose smaller craft, such as harbor and ocean-going tugs, barges, tankers and dry-cargo vessels for coastal use, was also authorized. These are not included in the deadweight tonnage total.

At the close of 1942 the first year's goal of 8,000,000 tons had been achieved, and out of a total of 3,600 vessels of all types contracted for, approximately 1,200 had been delivered.

Types of Ships.

The original program had been devoted largely to modern, high-speed, dry-cargo vessels and tankers. Several types of cargo carriers developed by the Maritime Commission for service on different trade routes are the finest merchant ships afloat. Propelled by turbines and gears, and a reasonable number of Diesels, equipped with the latest cargo-handling gear and safety apparatus, 500 of these fast ships would give America the competitive superiority in world shipping sought by the Merchant Marine Act of six years ago.

The Liberty Ship, of standardized design and simplified construction, was adopted as the best type for rapid building in the shipyards which were constructed along our coasts to meet wartime needs. It is of basic British design, modified and adapted to speed up production methods formulated in America. Nearly 1,600 of these 10,500-ton vessels were ordered and by the end of 1942 about 500 were in service. Also under construction are 500 C-type ships and several hundred tankers (the Commission's standard types).

Because the production of turbines and gears was limited by time, facilities and materials, Liberty Ships were provided with triple-expansion reciprocating engines of 2,500 horsepower. Ample facilities existed in the country to supply these engines in the numbers required by the program. Subsequently, production of these and of turbine machinery was increased at a number of inland plants to keep pace with the rapid construction of hulls at the shipyards. Liberty Ships will have their speed increased and they may be turbo-driven as soon as an increase in gear production permits the change. A modified design is well under way.

In January 1942 Liberty Ships were turned out in an average 241 days from keel-laying to delivery. By October the average construction time had been reduced to 66 days. Production of ships of all types rose steadily almost month by month. In January the shipbuilders delivered 16 vessels, in February, 26; March, 26; April, 36; May, 57; June, 67; July, 71; August, 68; September, 93; October, 81. The decline in October occurred because some yards were diverted to construction of special-type vessels for the armed forces.

Speed-up in Production.

Factors which contributed most to the speed-up in production were the extensive substitution of welding for riveting, and the prefabrication of large sections. Standardization is the keystone of the arch. Vessels were no longer built plate by plate, but literally assembled section by section. An entire forepeak, bulkhead or deckhouse would be welded at the fabrication shop, swung into place by powerful cranes, and then welded to the hull. With such innovations, shipbuilders were able to approximate the assembly-line methods employed in the automobile industry.

The shipbuilding facilities of America were expanded 600 per cent to accomplish the program. In October 1937, when the Maritime Commission let its first contract, the industry consisted of 10 shipyards with but 46 ways large enough to build ocean-going vessels 400 feet in length or more. Even with naval construction occupying half of these facilities, the meager interest in shipbuilding which had prevailed in America for the previous fifteen years failed to keep the remainder of the yards busy.

At the beginning of 1943, when production mounted to four ships a day, over 60 shipyards with more than 300 ways were building merchant ships for the Maritime Commission. Seventeen of these yards with over 130 ways were engaged solely in Liberty Ship construction. The bulk of these facilities had been brought into being after March 1941. In order to tap as many sources of labor and materials as possible, the yards were scattered along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Coasts, and on the Great Lakes.

Employment figures leaped from the low of 70,000 workers in 1937 to more than 500,000 by the end of 1942. A full million was expected at the shipyards by the time the peak of production in 1943 is reached. Thousands of additional workers are employed at many contributing plants scattered throughout 36 states, which are manufacturing marine equipment and accessories for assembly at the shipyards.

War Shipping Administration.

The expanding American Merchant Marine was placed under the control of the War Shipping Administration when that agency was established by Executive Order of President Roosevelt on Feb. 7, 1942. Broad powers over the operation, purchase, charter, maintenance, and requisition of all ocean vessels (with a few exceptions) under the flag or control of the United States, were assigned to the Administrator. The use of these vessels, the President's Order declared, 'shall comply with strategic military requirements.' The agency was created as part of the executive branch of the Government and the Administrator is directly responsible to the President.

Training of Crews.

The training program to provide adequate crews for the wartime merchant fleet was also placed under the War Shipping Administration. Facilities on shore were expanded and additional training ships were put in service to school the 30,000 officers and 100,000 seamen needed to man the new ships.

Three United States Merchant Marine Academies and five state academies, supported in part by Federal funds, are giving intensified courses to cadets training for deck and engine officer licenses. Because of the emergency, the course has been cut from three years to sixteen months. After a basic course on shore, the trainees spend six to eight months as cadet officers on a merchant ship in actual operation. Approximately 5,000 cadets were in training at the close of 1942.

The War Shipping Administration also operates seven training stations for unlicensed ships personnel. Four stations give a three-month course for apprentice seamen, another station trains radio operators in six months, and two stations are for experienced seamen who wish to study for an officer's rating. Cooks and bakers are also trained.

The Recruitment and Manning Organization of the War Shipping Administration makes surveys of crew requirements at all ports, and places the cadets and seamen aboard ship as they finish their training. In addition, this agency is conducting a registration drive to induce older or retired seamen to return to sea duty.