1941: Italy

The year 1941 was one of the most disastrous in the history of modern Italy. Mussolini had taken his country into war on June 10, 1940, in the belief that the war was about to end in a German victory, and that Italy must therefore join in the fight if she were to obtain any of the spoils. France was, at that moment, on the point of collapse, and it was fully believed in the Axis countries that England, staggering under the loss of her war apparatus and much of her army at Dunkirk, would likewise soon have to surrender. But the fall of France was not followed by the fall of Britain. Mussolini had miscalculated, and from his miscalculation there followed a series of misfortunes for the Italian people that had by no means reached its end at the close of 1941.

Italy had not gone to war at the side of her ally in September 1939 because — as the Fascist Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, later admitted — she was unprepared to wage a war of any length or intensity. As Ciano explained, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain had so depleted Italy's supply of war matériel that her armed forces, especially the army, were in no condition to engage in serious warfare. The complete truth of this assertion was soon evident in the manner with which the Italians conducted their operations against the Greeks.

Disastrous Campaign Against the Greeks.

The advance of the Greeks in 1941, after their initial successes in Albania in the fall of 1940, was held up more by bad weather than by the resistance of the Italians. Early in January 1941 there were reports that Nazi aircraft were fighting in Albania — an interesting development in view of the fact that the Fascist leaders had originally wanted to defeat Greece without any help from their German partners. On Jan. 19, Athens claimed that the Greeks had brought down 105 Italian planes since the start of the war. Units of the Greek and British navies were active in the Adriatic during January and February, and accounted for the sinking or damaging of a dozen or more Italian troop and supply ships. A Greek flotilla also bombarded Valona, one of the two principal ports of Albania, early in January. On Jan. 10 Klissoura was taken.

Altogether, the Greek campaign was one long series of reverses for the Italians, on land and on sea. On Jan. 30, presumably in an effort to instill new vigor into the Italian forces, Mussolini appointed General Ugo Cavallero to succeed General Ubaldo Soddu as commander in Albania. General Cavallero was regarded as more pro-Fascist and pro-German than his predecessor, and his appointment was therefore interpreted as a sign that Italy's war machine was coming more and more under Nazi domination. However, General Cavallero's offensive, into which he threw men and machines regardless of cost, failed to register any gains and by the end of January his forces were in retreat. The organization and the supply services of the Italian Army in Albania were bad — inefficiency, demoralization and even graft being widespread. Thousands of soldiers died of wounds or suffered amputation of frozen limbs because they lacked adequate clothing and facilities. The Fascist forces in Albania were saved from a complete débâcle only through the intervention of the Germans, who attacked Greece via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The situation in the lower Balkans was already threatening as 1941 opened, and it rapidly became worse. By the middle of February it was clear that Bulgaria was in process of occupation by German troops. On March 2 they were in Sofia, and on the next day they reached the Greek frontier. In other words, Hitler was preparing to rescue Mussolini from the Greeks. But before being rescued, Mussolini asked for time to undertake one more offensive in the hope of defeating Greece singlehanded. It was reported that Il Duce visited Albania in early March and that he was appalled at the chaos and defeatism prevailing there. By March 14 his offensive, which had beaten in vain against the Greek lines for five days, had failed after causing over 40,000 Italian casualties. The Nazis, therefore, had to rescue their partners.

Thus on April 6, Hitler sent his troops into Yugoslavia from the north and east. The German thrusts against the Yugoslav Army, only partially mobilized, and against the Greeks, led to a steady succession of victories. Salonika fell on April 9, and three days later Italian and German forces met north of Lake Ochrida. The threat of a Yugoslav invasion of northern Albania did not materialize, and Italian morale improved. On April 23 the Greek Army of Epirus and Macedonia under General Tsolakoglu surrendered to the Germans. This brought the Greek campaign to an end as far as the Italians were concerned, for they do not appear to have taken part in the Nazi drive against the Anglo-Greek forces in eastern and southern Greece.

This conquest had been almost exclusively a Nazi triumph, for Italian troops had occupied only a small zone in Epirus, plus the island of Corfu — which they reached only a few hours ahead of the Germans. In the Aegean Sea, however, Italian forces occupied many of the more important Greek islands during the early days of May. Italy's role in the campaign in Crete late in May was very minor. On June 10, first anniversary of Italy's entrance into the war, Il Duce announced that Italian troops were to take over the occupation of Greece. This was done in order to free German troops for the attack on Russia. Many Nazi officials remained in Greece, and there were thus in effect two occupying administrations, often in conflict with each other. The Germans in particular did not disguise their contempt for the Italians. The latter were inclined to be less harsh with the Greek population, but both enemy forces plundered and engaged in graft on a large scale.

Italy Gains a Balkan Empire.

The invasion of Yugoslavia from the north was carried out almost exclusively by German and Hungarian troops. Only in Slovenia and along the Dalmatian and Montenegrin coast where Italian forces engaged. On April 12 Fascist troops were reported in Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia, and on April 15 more than a third of the Dalmatian coast was in Italian hands. The Fascist press had of course been reminding Germany of Italy's historic claims to this region. These territorial ambitions had been promised satisfaction in the Treaty of London (1915) between Italy and the Allies, as the price of Italian participation in the First World War. The Paris Peace Conference had, however, refused to be guided by this engagement, and hence the reconquest of Dalmatia — the 'Fifth Shore' — had been one of the slogans of Fascism. The Fascist press now expanded its demands and claimed the Kossovo region of Serbia on the ground that it contained a large Albanian population.

Croatia.

On April 10 it was reported that the Ustashi, a group of anti-Serbian Croat terrorists, had set up a Croat state with Ante Pavelich as President and Sladko Kvaternik as Prime Minister. On April 15 the Axis Powers formally recognized the sovereignty of 'independent' Croatia. Once set up, however, the new Croatian government did not always accede to Rome's wishes, for on April 25 the Italians were complaining that Croatian troops were taking over parts of Dalmatia which Italy had earmarked for herself. There was some suspicion that in this the Croats had the blessing of Berlin, for everyone knew that the Germans wanted the Italians to take only a small share of Yugoslav territory. On May 3, Italy annexed the part of Slovenia nearest her own territory, including Ljubljana.

On May 18 an Italian prince, the Duke of Spoleto, was designated as King of the revived kingdom of Croatia. At the same time the new Croatian government recognized Italy's sovereignty over 'classic' Dalmatia — the area promised her in the Treaty of London. Italy also obtained the islands off Dalmatia, except Pago, Brazza and Lesina, in addition to Suak, Cattaro and the Montenegrin coast. The Croatian government promised to demilitarize its zone along the Adriatic and not to create a navy. Italy guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Croatia, in return for which the latter agreed not to make any foreign commitments contrary to Italian interests. Italy was also to have charge of the organization of the Croatian Army. The treaty, which was to last for 25 years, also stipulated that further accords would be made to cover such matters as currency, customs, railways, minorities and cultural relations. On May 19 Virginio Gayda, foremost Fascist political commentator, declared that Italy was going to force the Fascist form of life on Croatia. On June 16 in a ceremony held at Venice, Croatia signed as a member of the Axis alliance.

Dalmatia and Montenegro.

The part of Dalmatia annexed by Italy was divided into three provinces — Zara, Spalato and Cattaro — and placed under the governorship of Giuseppe Bastianini, former Italian Ambassador in London. On June 7 the Italian Cabinet decided that 500,000,000 lire were to be spent on 'immediate and urgent' public works in the Dalmatian provinces. Montenegro was also within the Italian sphere of influence, and the Fascist Government sought to occupy this small but rugged land of mountaineer warriors. Repeated attempts only resulted in a mounting toll of casualties among the occupying troops and the few Montenegrins who were willing to collaborate with the Fascist Government. Apparently the authorities at Rome had expected the Montenegrins to acquiesce in Italian rule because Queen Elena of Italy was a Montenegrin princess, daughter of the last king of that country. During the latter half of the year the Italians were obliged to bombard various coastal towns in Dalmatia and Montenegro in order to suppress or punish nationalist insurrections.

War in Africa: Early Libyan Campaign.

The close of 1940 found the Army of the Nile pushing into Libya in pursuit of the crumbling Italian Army of Marshal Graziani. On Jan. 4 Bardia fell before a combined land, sea and air attack; and 25,000 Italians (including six generals) were captured. The authorities in Rome waited three days before disclosing this reverse to the Italian people. Other Fascist defeats followed in rapid succession: Tobruk was captured with 20,000 prisoners on Jan. 22; Free French forces operating from Chad raided several bases in southern Libya; Derna fell on Jan. 30; and Bengasi itself, chief city and port of Cyrenaica, was taken on Feb. 7. At the same time, overland escape to Tripoli via the coast road south of the Gulf of Sirte was cut off by a brilliant maneuver of the Empire forces.

Thus, in less than two months Cyrenaica had been conquered by a small Allied force numbering no more than 25,000. Mussolini, in a speech on Feb. 23, admitted that the Italian Tenth Army and the Fifth Air Squadron had been destroyed. The excuse he gave was that the British attack had caught Graziani just as he was on the point of launching an offensive of his own. Neutral observers were inclined to doubt this; they pointed out that in equipment and morale, the Italian Army, as shown in its subsequent collapse, was in no shape for waging an offensive. In addition to the 150,000 men captured during this campaign, the Italians lost — according to British sources — 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, 22 merchant ships, 2 torpedo boats and 1 tug boat.

The British thus found themselves in possession of a vast area containing several hundred thousand inhabitants, mostly Arabs but also including a considerable number of Italian colonists. As far as possible these were left undisturbed; in fact, many Italian civil officials were allowed to continue in their functions. The natives welcomed the British troops, for Fascist rule had been harsh and many natives had been dispossessed of their land to make way for agricultural colonists from Italy. The Arabs naturally took this opportunity to pay back old scores: a number of Italian settlements were looted and some colonists killed. But these disorders were sporadic and the British authorities did their best to maintain order. In the south the nomadic tribes were reported to be restive, and this fact may help to account for the occupation of the Kufra oases in late February by Free French forces.

The British success in Libya was destined to be short-lived. The necessity to implement Britain's guarantee of assistance to Greece obliged General Wavell to remove most of his best troops and equipment from Cyrenaica. Only half-trained and poorly equipped troops were left to hold that large area, and as events proved, these were inadequate to hold it against a new Axis force, stiffened with German troops and arms, which began to exert pressure on the British forces at the end of March. The Axis counter-push caught the British unprepared. As General Wavell admitted on Nov. 10 before the Council of State at New Delhi, it came a month earlier than he had anticipated.

On March 24, El Agheila, at the head of the Gulf of Sirte, was wrested from the British. On April 3 Bengasi was retaken, and on April 7 Derna fell. The retreat of the British continued until the Axis forces under General Rommel reached the Egyptian frontier a week later. The front again became stabilized along the line held by the Italians before the British offensive, except that Tobruk remained in British hands. This was important, for that town possessed one of the best harbors on the North African coast. Just before the Axis counter-offensive had begun, it was announced in Rome that Graziani had resigned as Chief of Staff and as Commander in Libya. He was succeeded in the first post by General Mario Roatta, said to be close to the Germans, and in the second by General Italo Garibaldi.

Collapse of the Italian East African Empire.

By its geographic location Italian East Africa was destined to become isolated on the day that Italy went to war against England; for the only practicable way to reach the new Fascist empire from the mother country was via the Suez Canal, and this could be closed by Britain at a moment's notice. This is exactly what happened, with the result that by the beginning of 1941 Italian East Africa had been isolated for nearly seven months.

In January 1941 the situation became even worse, when the British invasion of Libya forced the Italian Government to stop sending supplies to Italian East Africa by air. At the same time it was evident that the British were planning to attack Ethiopia from several directions. On Jan. 15, Haile Selassie, who had come from England by plane, raised his banner on Ethiopian soil and called upon his countrymen to throw off the Fascist yoke. Three days later Kassala was retaken; on Jan. 20 Eritrea was invaded; on Feb. 1 Agordat was captured, and the retreat of the Italian forces in the north became general.

By mid-March Allied forces were striking into Italian East Africa along some twelve fronts. Among those fighting against the Fascist Army of some 200,000 men were troops from Britain, Free France, the Belgian Congo, British West Africa, Kenya, Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, the Sudan, India and elsewhere. In addition, 'patriot' forces of Ethiopians loyal to Haile Selassie, and organized British officers, fought against the Italians, particularly in Gojjam province. On Feb. 4 Foreign Secretary Eden announced that the British Government would welcome the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian state and that it recognized the claim of Haile Selassie to the throne.

In early February an invasion of Italian Somaliland was begun, and within a few weeks it achieved phenomenal successes, as is indicated by the dates for the capture of the following places: Afmadu, Feb. 11; Chisimaio, Feb. 14; Mogadiscio, Feb. 25; Jijiga. March 18; Harrar, March 26; Addis Ababa, April 6. By April 1 more than half of Ethiopia was reported lost by the Italians. Italian losses were also heavy on the sea. At Chisimaio, nine Axis ships were captured or scuttled; in March an Italian raider in the Indian Ocean was taken by the British; in early April five Italian destroyers were scuttled or captured in the Red Sea. Thus ended the Fascist threat to British seapower along the short route to India south of Suez.

In Eritrea the Allied advance was held up by the stubborn defense of Keren, which surrendered only on March 26. Asmara, the capital, was taken on April 1, and nine days later the port of Massowah fell. In the west Debra Marcos, capital of Gojjam, was taken April 7 by Ethiopian forces, and on May 5 the Emperor Haile Selassie reentered Addis Ababa. The remnants of the Italian forces, cut up into small pieces, surrendered one by one: those under General Santini in the south on April 4; those under the Viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, on May 19 at Amba Alagi; and finally the last pocket of Italian resistance at Gondar on Nov. 27. Thus ended Mussolini's costly adventure in East Africa. (See also ITALIAN EAST AFRICA.)

British Victories Against Axis in Libya.

The most important land operations in which Italian forces were engaged at the close of the year were those in Libya. On Nov. 17 the British announced the formation of a new Eighth Army in North Africa. Two days later this Army launched a heavy attack against eastern Cyrenaica. This assault, well-prepared and buttressed with many new American tanks, sought to split the Axis forces into small groups for annihilation one by one. In general the British avoided following the coast, choosing instead to spring upon the Axis units from the south — a strategy that helped isolate the various Axis garrisons and posts from one another.

One of the first objectives of the British thrust, achieved on Dec. 10, was to relieve the long-besieged garrison at Tobruk. The task of splitting up and annihilating the Axis mechanized forces proved not to be an easy one, and the campaign lagged during early December, while each side sought to consolidate its position and bring up reenforcements. In this the British had the advantage, for the Italians and Germans were cut off from Europe by the British Navy. Air superiority in Cyrenaica also lay with the British. By Dec. 18, however, General Rommel's forces were in full retreat; Derna was entered two days later; and Bengasi fell on Dec. 25. At the year closed, the remnants of the Axis forces were in process of dissolution under the pounding of Allied tanks, artillery and planes, while their retreat to Tripoli seemed to be cut off by Allied concentrations south of the Gulf of Sirte.

Naval Warfare.

One of the most vital links in British grand strategy has always been the retention of naval control in the Mediterranean Sea. In spite of serious aerial opposition, this control was maintained during 1941. As a result, the threatened Axis thrust into French North Africa and the Near East was made impossible, or at least so costly in men and material that it was not attempted. At the same time, Britain's control of the Mediterranean helped her carry out land operations in Greece and Libya. Most of all, it made possible a war of continual attrition against the Italian Navy and merchant marine. With her long coastline and under the necessity of supplying and reinforcing her army in Libya, Italy was — as every strategist had always predicted — exposed to constant attack from the warships, submarines and planes of Britain and her allies.

Early in January German planes, particularly dive bombers, made their appearance in the central Mediterranean. These planes were based on airfields in Sicily. The British bombed these fields frequently and heavily, from Malta — which in turn was subjected to large-scale Axis raids. The British cruiser Southampton was put out of action in mid-January by Nazi planes off Sicily, and had to be abandoned and sunk by its crew. In spite of other similar attacks, British ships continued to pass through the narrow waist of the Mediterranean between Sicily and Africa.

Battle of Cape Matapan.

On March 28 occurred the Battle of Cape Matapan, described by some observers as the greatest naval engagement since Jutland. The losses sustained by the Italians were a matter of dispute, but they apparently lost at least 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers and sustained damage on several others, including one of Italy's newest battleships. For their part, the British lost only a few planes. The battle, which took place at night, left the Italian fleet, already crippled by the attack on Taranto of the previous year, in such a sorry physical and moral state that during the remainder of the year it stayed very close to home ports. This made it possible for British ships to scour the central Mediterranean from time to time, and sink Italian supply ships and their naval escorts. On May 28 the British claimed that since the start of the war they had accounted for 215 Italian ships, aggregating 1,100,000 tons.

British naval units, with the help of planes, shelled Tripoli on April 21 and Bengasi on May 22, in each case inflicting serious damage. The bombardment of Tripoli lasted 42 minutes and was said to have been the heaviest assault of its kind in naval history. Even Sardinia was subjected to heavy raids, one by the R.A.F. on the Elmas air base near Cagliari, on July 30, and one on Porto Conte and Alghero by the Navy, on August 1. In retaliation for these and other attacks, Axis planes inflicted considerable damage on the Suez Canal area during July and August. On Aug. 15 Cairo was bombed, thus putting Rome in jeopardy under the threat made by the British to bomb holy city for holy city. The Italians also made a daring attack on Gibraltar with some of their mosquito fleet of MAS boats in mid-September, though the British maintained that only one old hulk was sunk. The Italians also claimed that on Sept. 27, torpedo-carrying planes attacked a large British convoy, sank 3 cruisers and 3 merchantmen, and damaged 9 other ships. But three days later the British Admiralty replied by asserting that the convoy had reached its destination with the loss of only one merchantman and some damage to the Nelson.

September was a bad month for Italian shipping, with losses amounting to approximately a vessel a day. This serious situation continued into October, when the British reported that they were sinking or damaging 50 per cent of the convoys going to Libya. On Nov. 9 the British wiped out near Taranto 2 convoys of 9 or 10 merchantmen and 2 destroyers. Two days later 4 troop or supply ships, 2 sailing vessels, and a destroyer were sunk by the British. December saw further serious losses inflicted on Fascist supply and naval vessels. For instance, 3 cruisers were sunk on the 12th and 13th, together with 3 transports. Two days later 6 more Axis ships were sent to the bottom, followed in a week by another 6. The only outstanding Axis success was the sinking of the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal, by a Nazi submarine Nov. 11.

According to official Italian figures, released on Nov. 27, Fascist submarines had sunk 82 enemy ships, with a tonnage of 524,958, in the Atlantic Ocean, since the war started. The next day the British countered by declaring that since Aug. 1 they had sunk 72 Axis ships in the Mediterranean, with 35 probably sunk, and 33 hit. By the end of the year it was doubtful whether more than half of Italy's prewar merchant fleet was still of use to her.

Italian Token Army in the Russian War.

The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June caught the Italian people unawares, though Il Duce had presumably been informed of it by Hitler at their meeting at the Brenner Pass on June 2, if not before. Shortly afterwards Italy took over the major part of the task of occupying Greece in order to free Nazi troops for the Eastern campaign. Italy dutifully declared war against Russia on June 22. Four days later Mussolini reviewed a motorized division destined for the Eastern front; on July 3 he reviewed another. By the latter part of the fall, four Italian divisions were believed to be in Russia, with four others preparing to go. Reports from Rome indicated that the Fascist forces found a greater enemy in the mud of the Ukraine than in the Soviet army. However. Soviet accounts told of wholesale desertions by Italian soldiers, sometimes led by their officers, especially after winter clamped its icy vise on the steppes of southern Russia. Neither the Italian people nor the Italian Army manifested any enthusiasm for the war against Russia, and when in December the campaign turned into an Axis retreat, their disillusionment increased still further.

British Air Raids.

Much more than in 1940, the Italian people in 1941 felt the force of the war at home. On New Year's Day heavy air raids were made by the British on Naples, Taranto, Syracuse, and other cities. These were followed a few days later by more attacks, including one on Turin, where the Arsenal was fired. On Jan. 9 units of the British fleet bombarded the city and harbor of Genoa almost without resistance, causing considerable havoc. In the middle of February British and anti-Fascist Italian parachutists dropped to earth in southwestern Italy and wrought a certain amount of damage before they were rounded up.

British air raids increased in intensity during the fall, Naples in particular being pounded severely. With the smoke and illumination of Vesuvius to guide them, the R.A.F. fliers made repeated attempts to destroy the various arms plants near that city, and to wreck its port in order to disrupt the shipment of supplies and reinforcements to Libya. Other port cities in southern Italy — such as Palermo, Syracuse, Brindisi, etc. — were given similar punishment.

Casualty Statistics.

The number of casualties suffered by the Italian armed forces was a matter on which Fascist and British figures differed widely. According to Rome, the losses for all branches, in dead, wounded, prisoners, and missing, were 207,398 from the beginning of the war up to the end of May 1941. The bulk of these casualties were in the army, with the navy suffering only to the extent of 8,500 men, and the air force about 2,000. The Italians were reported as having lost 232 planes compared with 1,439 for the enemy. Against these statements must be placed the British estimate of 582,000 Italian casualties (including 206,000 native African troops) up to the end of June 1941. The Albanian campaign alone was said to have cost 100,000 dead, wounded (including many thousands of cases of amputation due to frostbite), and prisoners. Most of the latter were later liberated, however, when Greece was conquered by the Nazis. There is no way of verifying either of these sets of figures; but we do know that in general the Axis Powers make a policy of understating their losses.

Foreign Relations.

Germany.

Italy's relations with Germany were, of course, more important than those with any other nation. However, as Italy's military and naval strength waned and as her prestige diminished, her position within the Axis became more and more that of an inferior, until by the end of the year it was almost literally true that she could be classed, with France and Hungary, as a vassal state in the Nazi 'New Order.' Most of the outward forms of equality were maintained in the relations between the two countries, but the reality no longer existed. Not only was it necessary to send German troops and planes to help Italy on her own soil, but German technicians, experts and secret agents appear to have gone to Italy in growing numbers. The productive apparatus, especially in industry, of the two countries became even more closely connected and interdependent. In this combination Germany played the predominant role, for Italy's industrial functions tended to become limited to the production of parts and semi-manufactured goods for fabrication in Germany. This development was in line with the Nazi policy of centralizing all important industrial production of a military nature in areas and plants controlled by Germany, thus depriving the rest of Europe of the apparatus for making those machines of war without which they could not hope to fight for their own liberation.

As already indicated, German air forces were operating in southern Italy early in the year. Furthermore, the Italian squadrons sent to northern France in 1940 were recalled, except for a 'token' unit, to take part in the campaigns in Libya and Albania, and against British vessels in the Mediterranean. The first joint action of Italian and German planes in the latter theatre occurred early in January. One of the results of the transfer of several Luftwaffe squadrons to southern Italy was a series of orders from the Fascist Government limiting the movements of foreigners. On Jan. 10 all non-Italians except Germans were reported to have been ordered out of Sicily. The next day foreign diplomats were informed they must stay in Rome unless given special permission to leave. On Feb. 14 foreign correspondents were also forbidden to leave Rome.

On Jan. 7 the Fascist Council of Ministers felt obliged to issue a solemn order of the day reaffirming the strength of the Axis, and Italy's determination to fight on to final victory. On Jan. 20 Mussolini and Hitler, together with their military chiefs, met and 'exchanged views.' Plans were presumably laid for the spring campaign in the Balkans. In February Rome was visited by a German economic delegation under Dr. Clodius, which made a comprehensive agreement with the Italian Government. Though the details were kept secret, the accord was described by Virginio Gayda as effecting the 'coagulation' of the economies of the two countries. It was apparent that the terms called for Germany to give Italy raw materials — such as coal, iron, copper, etc., in return for foodstuffs, certain specialty manufactures and labor. No effort was made to balance trade accounts between the two countries. On paper Italy was obviously in the debt of Germany, and there was some speculation as to whether Berlin might not sometime present Rome with a bill similar to that sent by the latter to Madrid (see Spain) on the same day (Feb. 27) that the signature of this Italo-German economic pact was announced. According to German sources the annual turnover under this agreement was expected to reach 2,000,000,000 marks a year. Italian workers continued during the year to go to Germany in increasing numbers, most of them to work on farms but some to serve in factories. By June, 400,000 of them were reported to be so employed, thus helping to relieve the unemployment situation in Italy.

Another meeting between Mussolini and Hitler took place at the Brenner Pass on June 2, where plans for the Russian campaign were doubtless gone over. Still another encounter occurred late in August when Mussolini paid the Eastern front a five-day visit. At this conclave, evidently intended as an answer to the Atlantic meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill, the two dictators pledged themselves to destroy 'the Bolshevist danger, and plutocratic exploitation.'

On Oct. 20 Walther Funk, German Minister of Economics, told an audience at the University of Rome that under the 'New Order' Italy would have political and economic control of the Mediterranean. He also declared that since the start of the war the volume of trade between Germany and Italy had tripled. On the following day Dr. Clodius arrived in Rome with a large staff of experts. Two days later Funk announced that 'full agreement' had been reached and declared that the two countries were now virtually merged economically. In return for giving Berlin a high exchange rate on the mark, Rome obtained a promise that Italy would receive more war goods, now manufactured almost exclusively in Germany.

In an imposing ceremony at Berlin on Nov. 25, seven new satellite states signed up with the Axis — Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Rumania, Slovakia, and the Nanking régime of Wang Chingwei. Perhaps this event was intended to discount in advance the impending entry of the United States into the war against the Axis. On Dec. 11 — the day Germany and Italy declared war on the United States — the three principal Axis Powers signed a pact precluding a separate peace by any one of them.

Spain.

With Spain, Italy continued to enjoy superficially cordial relations during the year. Mussolini met Franco and Serrano Suñer at Bordighera on Feb. 12, apparently in the hope of persuading them to bring Spain into the war as an active Axis partner. Failing to accomplish his purpose, Il Duce allowed the official Italian news agency Stefani to disclose on Feb. 27 that the Fascist Government had asked Spain to pay 5,500,000,000 lire, in 24 annual instalments, for Italian help during the Civil War. The total value of Italian aid to Franco, according to this announcement, amounted to 7,500,000,000 lire. The items furnished by the Fascist Government were listed as follows: for the air force — 763 planes, 1,414 airplane motors, 1,672 tons of bombs, 9,250,000 rounds of ammunition; for land operations — 1,930 cannon, 10,135 automatic guns, 240,747 small arms 7,514,537 rounds of artillery ammunition, 324,900,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 7,668 motor vehicles; on the sea — 91 Italian warships engaged in hostilities; 92 vessels ferried war material to Spain; and Italian submarines sank 72,800 tons of 'hostile' shipping. These figures administered the coup de grace to the fiction of Fascist 'non-intervention' in the Spanish Civil War.

France.

With France, Italy's relations were those of a rival for Germany's affections. France had more to offer Germany in the way of natural resources, industrial plants, and naval and air bases (in North and West Africa) than Italy, and under the influence of such men as Laval and Darlan the Vichy Government bade fair to supplant Italy as the No. 2 Power in the 'New Order.' Throughout the year Mussolini maintained (for instance, in his speech of Nov. 3) that Italy had not forgotten her grievances, nor her territorial claims, against France. Early in December Darlan went to Turin to confer with Ciano. This visit gave rise to much speculation concerning the French fleet, the French merchant marine, Bizerta, etc.; but no important facts were divulged by either government except that Italy had released the French war prisoners she had taken — one officer and 136 men. The French counter-concession for this gesture was indicated when the Journal Officiel at Vichy revealed, late in December, that on Nov. 22 there had been signed a Franco-Italian protocol by which Italy obtained the right to demand the French arms and munitions that had been used against her. From Libya the British reported that the Fascists were, in fact, using French war matériel. Whether this détente in Franco-Italian relations foreshadowed a watering-down of Rome's ambitions in the Mediterranean remained to be seen.

United States.

Italo-American relations deteriorated as the year progressed, until finally on Dec. 11, simultaneously with Germany, Italy declared war against the United States. The long story of growing friction to which this event was a culmination is summarized in the following chronology:

Early February saw troops thrown around the American Embassy in Rome to 'protect' it from student demonstrations. In a speech on Feb. 23, ll Duce referred to the United States as 'a political and financial oligarchy dominated by Jewry through a very personal dictatorship.' Three days later the Rome correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, John Whitaker, was asked to leave Italy. On March 5 the American Government ordered the Italian consulates at Newark and Detroit closed. On March 30 all Italian ships in American ports were boarded by the Coast Guard, which found that considerable sabotage had taken place aboard some of them. In all, 28 vessels (168,944 tons or 5 per cent of Italy's merchant marine) were seized. The United States asked the recall of the Italian naval attaché in Washington, Admiral Lais, for complicity in the sabotage. Italy thereupon asked the recall of an American military attaché.

Anti-American campaigns in the Italian press usually followed the significant speeches and acts of President Roosevelt. Colonel Lindbergh was one of the few Americans who met approval in Fascist eyes. On June 10, Mussolini told the Chamber that the United States was already in the war, and six days later he retaliated against Washington's freezing the Axis funds by doing the same to American funds in Italy. On June 19 Italy, synchronizing her action with Germany's, ordered all American consulates closed by July 15. The United States replied with like action on the following day. One of the last incidents, before the actual break on Dec. 11, was the arrest of the pastor of the American Church in Rome on charges of 'espionage.'

Mussolini announced Italy's declaration of war against the United States in an address on Dec. 11 in which he declared that 'one man, one man alone, a true tyrannical democrat ... wanted the war and prepared for it day by day with diabolical obstinacy.' In Washington, when the Italian Ambassador went to the State Department, he was told by one of the officials that the American Government had fully expected Italy to 'follow obediently along' with her Axis partner.

Italy's Sad Economic Plight.

The effect of the war on Italian economic life during 1941 showed itself in many ways. In January a seven-day week had to be decreed for workers loading freight, in order to break a traffic bottleneck. In February the use of taxis was restricted to conserve gasoline and rubber. On April 10 the consumption of gasoline by private cars was cut by 50 per cent, and on Oct. 1 it was stopped entirely, apparently because the oil that had previously come from Rumania was now being used by the Nazis on the Eastern front.

Coal likewise became very scarce and Germany found it impossible to deliver the million tons a month promised early in 1940, because of the demands put on her railroads by the Russian campaign. At the end of September it was announced that private consumers would receive coal for the coming winter on the basis of 30 per cent of their 1939-40 deliveries, while prices would be increased by 20 to 30 per cent. Strict limits were also placed on the days and hours when radiators could be turned on, residents in northern Italy being allowed more heat than those of the center and south. On Dec. 1 the use of gas for heating and cooking was restricted to 7 hours a day. Industry naturally suffered too, not only from lack of fuel but from the countless rationing systems imposed by the government.

Italy is not so dependent on foreign sources for her food supply as she is for fuel. Nevertheless, the food situation was far from a happy one. The Italians have always been a frugal people, but during 1941 frugality became a government-imposed necessity for everyone in the country. After Feb. 1 spaghetti, rice and noodles were rationed, and heavy sentences were imposed on hoarders and profiteers. Another stunning blow fell at the end of the same month when the ration of olive oil, butter and fats was cut in half, and meat consumption was further restricted. By May meat could be served on only two days a week.

By June it had been decreed that all wheat, oats, barley, rye, straw and hay must be turned over to the government for distribution, private sale being strictly forbidden. In spite of the threat of large fines and long prison terms, many dealers raised prices, and this led to much public outcry, even from important Fascist spokesmen. Food bootlegging also became rife. As a result, the government promised to increase wages, family allowances and other subsidies.

The most sensational steps were taken at the end of September, when suddenly the sale of most consumer goods was banned for two weeks, during which interval stocks were to be inventoried and plans drawn up for a rationing scheme. This edict stunned the Italian people and brought home to them the bitter realization of their sad economic plight, and this caused a new lowering of public morale. On Oct. 1 several other new restrictions were imposed: public eating places could serve only standardized meals at fixed prices; shoes and clothing were rationed; a bread ration was imposed allowing 200 grams (c. 7 oz.) a day per person, this was later modified for certain classes of workers and other special categories of persons. The explanation for this last measure was that the wheat crop for 1941 — 71,500,000 quintals — had been below estimates, even though slightly above last year's harvest.

Breadlines, an evil omen of worse times to come, appeared in Italian cities at the end of September, though Herbert Matthews, reporting to the New York Times from Rome, stated that 'people with money to spend are not going to go hungry.' By December real shortages developed in many indispensable foodstuffs; the ration of edible fats and oils, for instance, had to be cut to 38 per cent of the per capita consumption for 1938. The Italian people were paying for the miscalculation of their government, which, gambling on a short war, had allowed its food reserves to disappear through a too liberal rationing system and because of the large shipments to Germany during the first year of the war.

Financial Affairs.

The intensity of the war effort was naturally reflected in the country's finances. From time to time the Fascist Government issued statements in regard to its budget, and lacking any other source of information we must accept these, if not at face value, at least as an indication of general trends. It must never be forgotten that Mussolini himself has proclaimed that 'statistics' should be made to serve the purposes of the totalitarian state.

Finance Minister Thaon di Revel reported on Jan. 7 that the deficit for the fiscal year 1939-40 had been 28,000,000,000 lire, of which 22,000,000,000 were for military purposes. The total expenditure for the year had been over 60,000,000,000 lire. For 1941-42 he presented a 'normal' budget of 39,876,000,000 lire, in which the estimated deficit was put at 8,794,000,000. However, this did not include the 'extraordinary' budget, much larger than the 'normal' one. As the Finance Minister revealed to the Budget Committee of the Chamber on April 18, the deficit for the current year would be 65,000,000,000 lire. The previous six years of war, he said, had cost 82,000,000,000, to which must be added 96,000,000,000 for 1941-42. Obviously, then, the proposed budget of 39,000,000,000 for the coming year had very little relation to the actual state of the government's finances.

Nor was the budget, once drawn up, sure to endure for long without considerable changes. The navy, for instance, was authorized in mid-August to spend an extra 2,500,000,000 lire for war purposes, and 482,858,000 lire on ship construction. On Aug. 30, 24,000,000,000 lire were put at the disposal of the army — the largest budgetary provision in Italy's financial history. This colossal sum more than absorbed the 18,000,000,000 lire which the government had raised by Oct. 1 in its campaign, launched Sept. 15, to sell 9-year treasury bonds. In view of some of the compulsory features of this campaign, it was in the nature of a forced loan.

One of the interesting phenomena of the year was the wave of speculation in stocks and bonds, excepting those of the government. In January many stocks were listed at prices which brought in an income of less than 2 per cent. By the end of June the index of stock prices was up by 69.5 per cent. They went still higher during the next three months, only to crumble at the end of September when the market was hit by a selling wave, induced by the sudden ban on the purchase of many consumer goods, already described above.

Internal Disorder and Dissatisfaction.

The events of the year in the field of domestic politics — if such an expression can be used in regard to a totalitarian state — reflected the growing restlessness, not only of the masses, but among the armed forces and even within the ranks of the hierarchs of the Fascist Party. The gap between the Party and the people had tended to widen with each costly and unsuccessful venture abroad. With defeat following upon defeat, it became even more difficult for the régime to justify the tremendous sacrifices it was calling upon the Italian people to make. Mussolini felt obliged, on Feb. 23, to break his long silence and deliver a speech, dripping with sarcasm and hate for the democratic Powers, in which he assured the Italians that victory would eventually be theirs. He also resorted to one of his well-tried formulas — 'Go back to the people.' It was announced on Jan. 22 that all men in the fighting services could join the Fascist Party, whereas in the past, wholesale admissions had been frowned upon. At the last roll call the Party membership totaled 3,619,848.

During the next month or so, several dozen high Fascist officials resigned, voluntarily or otherwise, and were sent to the front. Among those who went were 16 Federal secretaries and 7 Cabinet ministers, including Ricci, Bottai and Grandi. The shakeups extended into the provinces where, as in Rome, many of the younger men were replaced with old Party stalwarts. This housecleaning, which continued intermittently through the year, was interpreted in some quarters as indicating that Mussolini was afraid of a 'palace revolution' by the 'Young Turks.' In May the worst student riots in the history of the University of Rome caused the temporary closing of that institution. On May 17, a Greek Nationalist fired several shots at King Victor Emmanuel in Tirana (Albania), but without hitting him.

By late summer the Jewish question appeared well on the road to a solution along Fascist lines. In July a report from Rome stated that a law to fix the status of Jews had been drafted and would soon be put into effect. The object of this legislation was to eliminate all Jews from Italian life except a few who were entitled to 'favorable discrimination.' Those with a 'pure Aryan' in the family, and those who had performed 'patriotic services' to the fatherland, might apply for 'Aryanization' and the reacquisition of rights as Italian citizens. Jewish schoolteachers, however, were not to be allowed to have their positions back. Jews not subject to these exemptions were to be forced to leave Italy. Apparently even Christianized Jews were included in this ban, a policy against which the Church had protested on several occasions.

An official communiqué of Oct. 24 stated that there were then in the country 39,444 Italian Jews and 3,674 foreign ones, or only one tenth of one per cent of the total population of 45,354,000. According to this announcement, 25,000 Jews had left Italy since 1938. An interesting and amusing angle to this policy of 'racial' discrimination was given by the Fascist spokesman who declared that Italy's Japanese Allies were 'yellow Aryans.'

During the latter part of the summer the dissatisfaction of certain elements in the Fascist Party with Mussolini's subserviency to the Nazis seems to have forced him to effect further drastic changes in personnel. Articles which appeared in his paper, the Popolo d'Italia, called for ridding the Party of 'democrats,' 'Socialists' and other undesirable elements. The malcontents appear to have been found on both the Right and the Left, and one of the uses to which Il Duce put the Gestapo agents around him was to track down and intimidate those Fascists who strayed out of line. The employment of the Nazi secret police for this purpose naturally only accentuated the bitterness of the dissident elements.

In order to insure that no politically undesirable persons filtered into the administrative services, the Council of Ministers decided on Sept. 27 that no appointment to any post involving the public interest or political structure of the state could be made unless first approved by the Fascist Party. On Oct. 25 Mussolini dismissed the heads of 19 out of the 22 guilds, ostensibly to improve the efficiency of the country's economic machine. However, it was noted that this drastic action was taken only a few days after the signing of a new Italo-German economic agreement, and it was felt that at least some of the victims of this purge had suffered for their lack of pro-Nazi zeal.

Early in December the Fascist Government officially announced that a plot had been discovered, with the aim of killing Mussolini, starting a revolution, and setting up a Yugoslav Communist régime. The conspiracy, the announcement said, had been discovered in time, and as a result 60 persons were being held and others were being sought. Foreign Powers were accused of complicity. A trial was to be held at Trieste before the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State. There naturally arose in the minds of foreign observers the question as to why this trial should receive such a fanfare. The choice of Trieste was regarded as far from accidental, for it was known to be an anti-Fascist and partly Slav city. Holding the trial there would thus not necessarily reflect on the loyalty to the régime of the Italian people as a whole. On Dec. 14, 9 defendants were condemned to death, 48 were sentenced to prison, and 3 were acquitted.

As the year closed it was becoming increasingly evident that Italy had become merely a Nazi gau with Mussolini as its gauleiter. Only members of the Fascist Party, and by no means all of them, were happy at this turn of events. The army in particular was opposed to it. Furthermore, the officer corps, at least its older members, were in no mood to forgive Mussolini for the great damage inflicted upon the army's personnel, matériel and morale by the ill, advised war against Greece. In December, nearly three-fourths of the Italian army was outside the country, and therefore in no position to make its weight felt in the councils of the Fascist Government. But there were those who believed that the time was not far distant when Mussolini might have to reckon with his generals. See also GREAT BRITAIN; WORLD WAR II; YUGOSLAVIA.