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1939: Sweden

National Defense.

The keynote of Swedish preoccupation in 1939 was sounded in the Speech from the Throne on Jan. 11, when King Gustav told the Riksdag (Parliament) of plans for strengthening national defense. On Jan. 7 Sweden and Finland had climaxed their long negotiations to fortify the Aaland Islands (see FINLAND), and the new Swedish budget — presented to the Riksdag on Jan. 11 — included defense expenditures of 238,486,000 kronor (almost $60,000,000). In addition to this original grant, the Riksdag in April voted a supplementary defense grant of 66,550,000 kronor, of which more than 40 per cent was consigned for development of the air force. Upon the outbreak of war in September, a special session of the Riksdag passed additional appropriations totaling 523,000,000 kronor for 'neutrality defense.' At the same time, on Sept. 3, three major contingents were called up to serve in the army, navy, and air force. Thus, at least 879,036,000 kronor — or well over $200,000,000 for a population of 6,300,000 — was appropriated for military purposes during the budget year 1939-1940, and the Swedish army's war-time strength was raised before the end of the year to about 600,000 men. (In 1933-34 Sweden's defense appropriations were only $30,000,000; the country's regular army prior to the crisis in August 1939, numbered 60,000 men.) Meanwhile, great progress had been made ever since the September crisis of 1938, in protecting the civil population against possible air raids on Swedish cities. Many industrial and business establishments furnished underground shelters for workers, and in 1939, the city council of Stockholm appropriated 1,000,000 kronor for public shelters and air defenses.

One important retreat in defense precautions resulted from Soviet opposition to the Aaland fortification plan. Although the Swedish Government on May 9 had proposed in the Riksdag an amendment to the conscription law to permit sending Swedish recruits to defend the Aaland Islands, this proposal was withdrawn on June 3 to avoid antagonizing the U.S.S.R. The Finnish Minister of Defense declared in Stockholm two days later that the original fortification plan (of Jan. 7) would be carried out, but when Sweden refused to give the project further tangible support, it was set aside until December, when the two countries again co-operated to keep Russia and Germany from occupying the Islands.

Relations with Germany.

German-Swedish relations were strained throughout the year. In December 1938, Germany sought to force 'Aryanization' of Swedish concerns with which the Reich had commercial transactions. At that time Swedish business men decided to answer all German inquiries about the race of proprietors or employees in their firms with the single word 'Swedish,' even though these uniform replies might result in considerable loss of German trade. On Feb. 9, 1939, Swedish courts ruled that in the case of debts owed German concerns whose Jewish owners had left the Reich, payment should be made to those owners, rather than to the German Government. The decision explained that Nazi practice was 'so foreign to the Swedish conception of legal rights that it can have no effect on property in this country.' On Feb. 20-22, Sweden joined the other Northern countries at Helsinki (Helsingfors), Finland, in considering what further action could be taken to aid political refugees.

The Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, and Danish Foreign Ministers convened in Stockholm on May 9, 1939, to discuss Chancellor Hitler's proposal that their governments conclude non-aggression pacts with the Reich (see NORWAY). While each country was left complete freedom to decide its course for itself — and Denmark actually signed a pact with Germany on May 31 — the communiqué from the meeting deplored the conclusion of treaties which might be construed as favoring any power against a possible adversary. In almost identical language with that used by Finland and Norway, Sweden on May 17 declined the German offer.

All of the Scandinavian States suffered heavily when the Reich's submarine campaign got under way in September, but anti-German feeling ran highest in Sweden. On Sept. 24, 25, 28, and 30, German torpedoes sank Swedish merchant ships in rapid succession. The Swedish Government protested vigorously in Berlin against German sinking of the 3,378-ton steamer Nyland on Sept. 28, barely outside Norwegian territorial waters, while the vessel was bound for neutral Belgium with a cargo of iron ore.

Other Effects of the War.

As the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement freed the U.S.S.R. to press its demands on the Baltic States and Finland, Sweden organized resistance against eventual pressure on other small western countries. Partly to strengthen Finnish resistance, partly to assure supplies of needed commodities among all of the Scandinavian States. King Gustav invited King Christian of Denmark, King Haakon of Norway, and President Kallio of Finland to confer in Stockholm on Oct. 18-19. Restating the decisions made at Copenhagen a month earlier (see DENMARK), the rulers agreed to continue consultations and to carry on trade relations with all states.

In December, the press of both Sweden and Norway reflected the alarm felt in these countries that they would be next in Russia's drive to the West. Many Swedish business men and political leaders contributed heavily to the Finnish cause, and before the end of December it was reported that more than 10,000 Swedes had volunteered to serve with the Finnish army. Meanwhile, German spokesmen warned the Swedish Government against permitting war supplies to be transshipped from Britain to Finland. These supplies nevertheless continued, and the secrecy which veiled the British-Swedish trade pact, concluded on Dec. 27, 1939, further irritated the German Government. The Reich feared that British influence in Sweden would cut off its supplies of Swedish iron ore, which became more and more essential as the European War continued. As the year 1939 closed, Sweden — strangely threatened by Russia, warned by Germany, and courted by Britain — found it increasingly difficult to remain at peace. See also WORLD ECONOMICS.

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