1939: Strikes

In 1939 labor trouble again became more widespread. The comparative quiet of 1938, which was often interpreted as the consequence of the spread of collective bargaining and the methods of peaceful negotiation associated with that instrument, was succeeded by a year of considerable unrest. Although the complete record for the year is not available, conservative estimates suggest that the number of man-days lost through strikes was more than double (or, roughly, 16,000,000 man-days) that of 1938, exceeded every year since 1933, but was materially smaller than in 1937 — the period of phenomenal organizing activity and the sit-down strike.

Sources of Trouble.

The upward swing in business activity and the approaching political developments of 1940 were probably the determining factors in this reversal of trend. In 1939, as in other periods of business recovery, organized as well as unorganized labor was impelled to take advantage of favorable conditions by demanding the restoration of concessions made the year before and by seeking improvements in the status of workers and their organizations. In industries like textiles where the depression had forced reductions in wages, the unions sought to recover in whole or in part the cuts of the year before. Where they were unable to gain wage increases through peaceful negotiations, they resorted to strikes.

A more fertile source of labor trouble was found in the efforts of many new organizations, most of them founded since 1935, to create a firmer foundation for their future existence and of all organizations, old and new, to protect themselves against the contingency of a changed political administration and labor policy following the presidential elections of 1940. Added to these influences was the fear of the majority of unions, affiliated with either the C.I.O. or the A.F. of L. of attacks upon them by rival organizations. Since a large number of unions in both federations of labor had overlapping jurisdictions, this fear was widespread and hardly any important union was free from it.

United Mine Workers Strike.

The largest and most significant stoppage of the year was that which took place in the bituminous coal industry, where close to 500,000 men were kept out of work by the failure of the United Mine Workers and the coal operators to agree upon the provisions of a new labor contract. The stubborn issue was the demand by the union for an arrangement tantamount to a closed shop, whereby all employees of the industry would be required either to join the union or lose their jobs. The purpose of this demand was twofold — to protect the United Mine Workers from defections in its ranks and, hence, to assure the union greater permanence and stability, and to prevent the Progressive Miners, a rival union affiliated with the A.F. of L., from taking away members and local unions. This demand was bitterly resisted by important groups of operators and the resistance was broken only after a prolonged strike and intervention by the President of the United States, himself. The settlement gained for the union not only the equivalent of a closed shop, but also union agreements in the hitherto non-union strongholds of Kentucky. For the time being, also, it effectively blocked the efforts of the Progressive Miners to obtain a foot-hold in the soft coal industry.

United Automobile Workers Strikes.

Equally important strikes were waged by the faction of the United Automobile Workers, affiliated with the C.I.O., against the General Motors' and Chrysler Corporations. Both strikes had much in common, although they took place at different parts of the year and differed materially in specific issues. But in each case, the main purpose of the strike was directed toward strengthening the ties between this union and its members and preventing the rival union of automobile workers, affiliated with the A.F. of L., from making gains at the expense of its C.I.O. counterpart.

In the General Motors strike, called in the spring of 1939, the C.I.O. union sought to disestablish the Federation union altogether whereas the Corporation refused, in those plants in which both factions were represented, to bargain with either until the status of the competing unions was determined by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board. While the strike ended in a compromise, the position of the C.I.O. union was strengthened by it.

The Chrysler strike was more complex. The immediate cause of the shut-down was a concerted restriction of output, or slow-down, obviously inspired by the union in various shops of the company. But the real purpose of the union policy was the winning of concessions in the provisions of a new contract which it was about to negotiate with the company. Although the C.I.O. union had won an overwhelming victory throughout the Detroit plants of the Chrysler Corporation in elections held under the direction and supervision of the National Labor Relations Board shortly before the slow-down and stoppage and, hence, had won the right to be designated as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in these plants, the union apparently hoped to safeguard its position still further. It, therefore, demanded machinery for the arbitration of disputes and joint union-management control over standards of production in order to assert its control over the shops, and some form of union or closed-shop aimed to force all employees into the union and to facilitate the collection of dues. In the settlement of the strike none of these demands were granted and the union was, as required by the law, recognized as the exclusive bargaining agency. The outcome of these strikes leaves the issues of the permanence of the C.I.O. union and its relations with its rival organization still unsettled. See also AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR; CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS; UNITED STATES: Supreme Court Decisions; UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE.