1942: Singapore

At Singapore, after much political controversy, Britain erected and opened in 1938, the world's greatest naval base constructed at a cost of $400,000,000. Great 18-inch guns with a range of 50 miles made Singapore, so it was said, 'impregnable.' The safety of the Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, even the Philippines all rested on Singapore.

On Feb. 15, 1942, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of Japan's Malayan jungle fighters, demanded the unconditional surrender of Singapore, and Britain's greatest fortress passed into the hands of the enemy. Japan thus came to control the sea-routes of the Far East, and the way was opened for her attacks on the Indies, Australia, and Burma.

The collapse of Singapore was both a shock and a revelation to the United Nations. Its causes have been debated vigorously, and conclusions vary widely. Two factors at this writing seem clear, though it will be many years before the full truth of Singapore's fall is known. One, the strength and resourcefulness of Japan's military machine was totally under-estimated by Singapore's defenders. Two, the British at Singapore were unprepared in every respect, materially, mentally, psychologically.

The tactics used by the Japanese under Yamashita (Nazi-trained in the doctrines of geopolitics under Karl Haushofer), proved effective in the extreme. Yamashita studied the Luftwaffe in Germany in 1941, returned to Japan with 200 German instructors and technicians, and finally applied the theory of land-air force cooperation to drive the British from Malaya. He seized the airport at Kota Bahru and advanced south on both sides of the central mountains. With this major movement he combined the infiltration of small bodies of troops to strike at the British rear. With this too was coupled flanking movements in small boats along the coast. Against these tactics and superior Japanese forces, the British steadily retired into their island base. By Jan. 11, the invaders claimed capture of Kuala Lumpur, rubber capital of the world, the second largest city in Malaya, 190 mi. from Singapore. By Jan. 25, Indian, Australian, and English troops were reported fighting the invader only 60 mi. from Singapore. By Feb. 1, the defenders had retired across the narrow strait of Johore. Singapore was besieged. Two weeks later the fortress surrendered.

The collapse of the world's strongest naval base focused attention on the causes of this unprecedented calamity to British arms and the cause of the United Nations. The most outspoken critic of British leadership was American correspondent Cecil Brown whose broadcasts from Singapore were banned by the British censor. Brown's criticisms of British leadership at Singapore included charges: (1) of ignorance of mechanized warfare; (2) of inadequate training for jungle fighting; (3) of failure to deal with the Japanese Fifth Column; (4) of failure to destroy supplies to prevent capture by the enemy. Along with these charges, the attitude frequently noted by recent travellers may be mentioned: the general reluctance of British official and business groups at Singapore to regard the Japanese as a serious menace to their fortressed security, or to believe that in the event of a struggle, the natives would prove indifferent.

The results brought about by the fall of Singapore, results that have plagued the United Nations throughout 1942 included among others the following: (1) Japanese control of the passage from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean; (2) the opening of the Indian Ocean to the Japanese fleet; (3) peril to the supply routes to Russia and China; (4) the threat that the Axis Powers would join forces in the Middle East; and (5) the fact that the way was opened for Japanese conquest of the East Indies, behind which lay the last Allied rampart — Australia.