1942: Labor Unions

Union Expansion.

War conditions continued to promote union expansion during 1942. As more and more men moved from industry into the armed forces and requirements for war production increased, labor shortages became more critical and more extensive. Since organized labor was already in control of the leading war plants of the country, it was easy, in the existing state of the labor market, for the unions to pick up new members as employment rose to higher levels. The A. F. of L. reported a gain of 700,000 during the year. The C.I.O.'s membership failed to increase, but this was mainly due to the loss of the 600,000 members of the United Mine Workers. Most of this loss was made up by gains in the membership of the C.I.O.'s other affiliates. The most important group of independent unions, the railroad brotherhoods, likewise expanded mainly because railroad employment was also growing.

Government Representation.

Much of the time and thought of union leadership was employed in protecting the interests of the labor movement in Washington and in directing organizing campaigns throughout the country. Because the critical decisions on labor policy were constantly being made by the various departments of the Federal Government, the unions sought more adequate and influential representation for themselves. In the first years of the national defense program Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and vice-president of the C.I.O., had reached the highest official position attained by any union leader, when he was appointed associate director, with William S. Knudsen, of the Office of Production Management. But early in 1942 this agency was replaced by the War Production Board under the single direction of Donald Nelson and Hillman disappeared from public life. When this happened, both the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L. hoped that Hillman would be succeeded by representatives of their organizations. But in this they were disappointed, for no office equivalent to that held by Hillman was established. This did not mean, however, that organized labor was not well represented. Union officers filled influential positions on the War Labor Board and most other agencies hesitated to take any action affecting the interests of organized labor without consulting the leaders of the movement and often waiting upon their approval. The result was that little was done to which unions were strenuously opposed.

Effects of the War on Labor.

There were few traditional union policies which organized labor found it necessary to abandon or revise because of the war. In spite of a very tight labor market and a constantly increasing need for labor, the unions, with the support of the administration, successfully resisted efforts to lengthen the basic 40-hour week. Many, of course, worked more than 40 hours but they received in return for the extra hours the penalty rate of time and one-half. In the non-war industries, there was little overtime because it was too expensive as late as December 1942; and the supply of labor released from this source proved much smaller than it should have been.

By submitting to the decisions of the War Labor Board which fixed the maximum increase in wage rates for the period from January 1941 to the second half of 1942 at 15 per cent, union labor doubtless surrendered the larger increases which they might have obtained if left free to strike and employ the full force of their bargaining power. But this concession was, in part at least, in their own interest. For it would have proved impossible to control the cost of living in the face of uncontrolled wage advances. As it was, many increases exceeded 15 per cent whenever the board found that it was dealing with exceptional conditions.

In the case of the closed shop, likewise, the unions made much of their willingness to accept the maintenance of membership formula which they held to be an unsatisfactory substitute for the closed shop. The chances are, however, that they might not have fared any better and might probably have done much worse, if they had been in a position to strike for this concession. The closed shop is still an unpopular measure in this country and any campaign to enforce it within a large segment of American industry would have so aroused public opinion as to have made the chances of union success very slim indeed. By accepting maintenance of membership the unions were, at the least, assured of retaining within their ranks many members who would otherwise have dropped their membership.

The movement, started in 1941, to secure greater union participation in the management of war production made considerable headway. Labor-management committees were set up throughout the land, often at the suggestion of the War Production Board and other agencies. The function of these committees was to afford labor a larger voice in shop management and to effect closer cooperation between management and labor. The spread of such committees was a considerable victory for organized labor since they were not always welcomed by the employer. What they had achieved, it is hard to say. No adequate or reliable record of their performance is available.

In the development of the country's policy toward manpower, the labor movement from the outset opposed all compulsion. Although labor stringencies became more and more serious during the year, the unions succeeded in preventing the adoption of successive measures aimed to 'freeze' employees on their job. High rates of absenteeism and labor turnover, which many wanted to attack with punitive measures, were similarly left to be treated by persuasion and other voluntary means. The fact that none of these problems had been effectively dealt with by the end of the year suggests that they may require different treatment in 1943.

Legal Position of Unions.

No important change in the legal position of trade unionism occurred during the year. Pressure for the closed shop, the suspicion that union labor was on occasion promoting slowdowns in production, the ban by Petrillo, president of the Musicians' union, on amateur broadcasts, and similar incidents stirred Congressional debate and demands for union regulation. But, as in the past, the administration used its influence with Congress to stop the enactment of legislation. The anti-trust division of the Department of Justice, meanwhile, continued its efforts to bring organized labor under the anti-trust laws. But by the end of the year it had failed to win a favorable decision in the courts. Similarly those who appealed decisions of the National Labor Relations Board to the courts were equally disappointed.

The A.F. of L. and the C.I.O.

The efforts expended by various Government officials to end the schism between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. failed to show tangible results. At the year's start John L. Lewis made public a letter calling upon the two organizations to make peace. The fear that Lewis's proposal might succeed and thus add to his power so disturbed William Green, president of the A.F. of L., and Philip Murray, president of the C.I.O., as well as the administration, that they all repudiated the proposal and went so far as to suggest that the time was not yet ripe for peace. In place of a peace conference the President announced the creation of a joint A.F. of L. and C.I.O. committee (the labor victory committee) with which he undertook to meet from time to time and discuss matters affecting the relations of these organizations as well as questions of general labor policy.

The rejection of Lewis's peace plan only hastened the break between him and Murray and the miners' union and the C.I.O. Before long Murray had been removed from the vice-presidency and expelled from the membership of the United Mine Workers. Thus one of the longest and closest relationships in the labor movement was ended. The United Mine Workers became an independent union, separated from both the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. In choosing this status, the Miners extended their jurisdiction by constitutional amendment over all industry and thereby set themselves up as a third federation of labor.

The defection of Lewis apparently paved the way for the resumption of peace negotiations. Late in the year the standing peace committee of the A.F. of L.-C.I.O. again met. It emerged from its meetings recommending that all disputes between the two organizations and their affiliates be submitted currently to arbitration for final settlement. The outlook for peace appeared to be brighter. Before anything could be done about the recommendation, a virulent dispute over the unionization of the employees of the Kaiser shipyards broke out between the shipbuilders' union of the C.I.O. and a group of metal trades' unions of the A.F. of L. This dispute raises such fundamental issues that, so long as it remains unsettled, the prospects for a general settlement are quite remote.

At the close of this comparatively peaceful year, signs of future disturbances began to appear. The plans of John Lewis and his union, though obscure, were considered a potential threat to the balance of the labor movement. The Kaiser fight had become not only an additional source of dissension within organized labor but a possible cause of radical amendments to the Wagner Act. The rising price of food was tending to undermine the wage formula of the War Labor Board and steps were being taken by the railroad unions and others to break through the existing wage-ceilings, which were the foundation of the administration's anti-inflation program.