1942: India

Moves Toward a British-Indian Agreement.

As 1942 began, fears grew that Japan, which was rapidly overrunning southeast Asia, would soon be in a position to invade India, a country of almost 390,000,000 people with enormous raw material resources, a moderately developed but valuable industry, and a strategic key position. Sentiment therefore developed in Britain for the presentation of new proposals to the various Indian groups as a basis for full Indian cooperation in the war effort, while in India itself there was increasing uneasiness and a desire to see whether an agreement with Britain could be reached. One sign of the times was the appointment of Jawaharlal Nehru on Jan. 15 to succeed Mahatma Gandhi as leader of the Indian National Congress, the country's major political party. Nehru was a confirmed opponent of the Axis, who had supported Republican Spain in its struggle and was an old friend of China. Similarly in Britain, in a debate in the House of Lords on Feb. 3, a Director of the Bank of England with Indian business connections urged rapid adjustment of the Indian situation, so that India's leaders could regard the war as their own.

On Feb. 9 it was announced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had arrived in India. During the days that followed he had discussions with government officials, representatives of the Indian Princes, Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, president of the Congress party, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, president of the leading Moslem organization, the All-India Moslem League. On Feb. 11 Britain asked the Indian government to appoint representatives to both the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council in London, and on Feb. 19 Sir Stafford Cripps, long considered a friend of the Indian nationalists, was appointed Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons as part of a general governmental shakeup. Cripps's entrance into the Cabinet was widely interpreted as indicating that new steps would be taken to end the impasse in India.

On Feb. 21, shortly before his return to China, Chiang Kai-shek issued a message in which he declared: 'I sincerely hope and I confidently believe that our ally Great Britain, without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, will as speedily as possible give them real political power so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for securing victory but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom.' At the same time he asked that the Indian people 'wholeheartedly join the Allies ... and participate in the struggle for the survival of a free world until complete victory is achieved....'

While the details of a plan for India were being debated in the British Cabinet, the various Indian political groups were active in publicly clarifying their points of view. On March 5 Nehru of the Congress party declared that effective defense of India could be based only on Indian freedom and suggested the immediate establishment of a provisional National Government responsible to the Indian people. This was the Congress position throughout the following months. Three days later Jinnah of the Moslem League cabled Prime Minister Churchill, urging that he avoid any proposals prejudicial to Pakistan — the name given to a proposed Moslem state that would include the predominantly Moslem areas and be independent of the rest of India. Meanwhile the Hindu Mahasabha, a conservative Hindu body, had asked 'the proclamation of the independence of India with copartnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth.' The Non-Party Group (also known as the Liberals or Moderates) led by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, reiterated proposals made early in January that India receive Dominion Status and that the Viceroy's Executive Council become a National Government consisting entirely of nonofficial Indians in public confidence. These statements all indicated a significant measure of agreement among the various Indian groups, except for the Moslem League, and even the League was probably inclined to be less intransigent in fact than in its political utterances.

The Cripps Mission.

On March 11 Prime Minister Churchill announced that the War Cabinet had unitedly agreed on a policy toward India and that Sir Stafford Cripps would go there to present a plan. This declaration came after several weeks of rumors that the original British scheme had been modified on the insistence of conservative elements. On March 23 Cripps arrived in New Delhi, capital of India, and initiated discussions with the leaders of the Congress, Moslem League, Hindu Mahasabha, Non-Party Group, Sikhs, Princes, Scheduled Castes (known also as Depressed Classes or Untouchables), and various prominent individuals, as well as the Viceroy, members of his Executive Council, the British Commander-in-Chief, and the Provincial Governors. On March 30 the proposals were made public under the title, 'Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders.' This statement, the avowed object of which was 'the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion,' contained the following salient points:

(1) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps would be taken to form a body to draft a new Constitution for India. This assembly would consist partly of elected delegates from British India and partly of appointed delegates from the Indian States — all chosen according to a plan prescribed in the Draft Declaration, unless 'the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities' should agree during the war upon some other method of organization. (2) No individual Province or State would be obliged to join the Indian Union. 'With such nonacceding Provinces,' moreover, 'should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as the Indian Union....' New treaties, replacing those concluded in the 19th century would also be negotiated with all States, whether or not they joined the Union. (3) Britain and the constitution-making body would negotiate a treaty which 'will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member states of the British Commonwealth.' (4) 'During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defense of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desires and invites the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.'

These terms went far beyond any previous British proposals to India, for they constituted a definite offer of Dominion Status and were concrete in their suggestions for the postwar period. Nevertheless, following intensive public and private discussion, they were rejected by the Congress party, Moslem League, Hindu Mahasabha, Sikhs, and Scheduled Castes, while it is doubtful whether the highly qualified statement of the Non-Party Group could be described as acceptance. The reasons for rejection lay both in the nature of the proposals and the time at which they were made. Had they been advanced before war began in Europe in 1939 or even before outbreak of the Pacific conflict at Pearl Harbor, they might have been welcomed. But they were actually offered after Japan had delivered smashing blows to the British Far Eastern empire. Under the circumstances there was increasing agreement in India that what mattered most was the organization of effective defense by a truly national government, not the discussion of remote plans to be executed after a war whose outcome was very uncertain.

The Cripps terms represented a skillful effort to meet the minimum demands of the main Indian groups and interests, especially for the postwar period. The Congress party was promised a future government that would have Dominion Status. The Moslem League received the hope of Pakistan in the provision that provinces not wishing to join the Indian Union could remain outside and form their own combination. Similarly, the Indian Princes were assured that they would not be obliged to become part of the new India. Certain of the provisions pleased one group and outraged another, but the decisive differences were those between the Congress and Britain over the wartime organization of the Indian government. Had the Congress indicated its intention to accept, the other groups would very likely have followed, including even the Moslem League which was careful not to reject the plan until Congress had already done so.

On the question of the war period the Draft Declaration was precise in stating that Britain would 'retain control and direction of the defense of India,' but vague in merely expressing the desire to 'invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations.' Although in the course of the discussions the latter point was clarified, the result did not satisfy the Congress. According to a letter of April 10 to Cripps from the Congress president, Maulana Azad, defense was the heart of wartime government and would have to be of a popular character, involving effective Indian participation, even though 'there was no question of our interfering with the technical and operational sides' of the war. Moreover, he asserted that Cripps had 'referred both privately and in the course of public statements to a National Government and a Cabinet consisting of Ministers. These words have a certain significance and we had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; but the new picture that you placed before us was really not very different from the old, the difference being one of degree and not of kind.' To this Cripps replied the same day, detailing the duties that Indian Ministers would perform if the proposals were accepted and reiterating that 'nothing further could have been done by way of giving responsibility for defense services to representative Indian members without jeopardizing the immediate defense of India under the Commander-in-Chief.' He declared that the suggestions for a National Government would require 'constitutional changes of a most complicated character,' which would be a 'practical impossibility ... in the midst of a war and at such a moment as the present.' Soon afterward Cripps returned to England.

Aftermath of the Cripps Mission.

The Indian political situation was now more confused than ever, since no party or group had any clear alternative to the rejected proposals. Within the Congress party Gandhi's pacifist circle, which, though active in opposing the Cripps offer had been operating in the background, now once more assumed open leadership, drawing strength from Britain's failure to secure Indian participation in the war effort. The Congress was a coalition of persons of different religions, economic interest and political points of view, united principally in the desire for an independent India. Because of this composition and the long-standing bitterness against Britain both within the party and the country, those leaders desirous of cooperating in the war effort, for example, Nehru and Azad, felt that a united party and nation would support the war only if the terms of collaboration involved an unmistakable, immediate break with the past. They did not believe that the British proposals were an adequate basis for the defense of India and even held that acceptance would have a divisive effect, possibly providing ammunition for fifth column elements led by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former Congress leader who had fled India some time before and was broadcasting his ideas from Axis territory. Regardless of the merit of these considerations, so powerful was the Congress spirit of unity that there was only one significant defection among the leaders — that of C. R. Rajagopalachariar of Madras, who on April 30 resigned from the Working Committee after his stand in favor of accepting the Moslem League's demand for Pakistan resulted in sharp criticism. He did not, however, publicly dissent from Congress policy, but simply initiated his own efforts to secure unity among the leading Indian groups as a basis for reopening discussions with Britain.

The retreat of the non-pacifist group in the Congress was revealed in a Working Committee resolution of May 2 which declared that India would resist invasion, but only by 'non-violent non-cooperation, as the British Government has prevented the organization of national defense by the people in any other way.' Since the resolution was passed by 7 to 4, with Azad abstaining and Nehru voting for it out of respect for Gandhi after making a strong effort to secure its withdrawal, it could hardly have passed had there been any prospect of Britain's resuming negotiations. Aware of dissatisfaction and confusion in Congress ranks, Gandhi now sought to strengthen his leadership by initiating a new campaign, for immediate British recognition of India's independence and the withdrawal of British and American troops. He was soon obliged to modify this, declaring that foreign troops were necessary for India's defense and that an independent Indian government would at once conclude a treaty with the United Nations for defense against Japanese aggression. Early in July, however, he again altered his position and said that a free India would send Ambassadors to Rome, Berlin and Tokyo, 'not to beg for peace but to show them the futility of war.' These inconsistencies were often misunderstood abroad because of failure to realize that Gandhi's opinions were not necessarily identical with those of the Congress, even though he was its most important leader and was venerated by most nationalists as a symbol of India's aspirations. Moreover, there was little recognition of the fact that he was not only a religious leader, but an extremely skillful politician, constantly trimming his utterances to the winds of Indian opinion, while seeking to secure more general acceptance of his own pacifist views. All during this period there were considerable differences within the Congress over policy, and Gandhi's statements often represented part of the struggle to reach conclusions rather than decisions already made.

Meanwhile, Britain, through the Viceroy, was attempting to strengthen and to a certain extent draw together all those groups that favored cooperation in the war effort. On July 3 a reorganization of the government was announced. The Viceroy's Executive Council was increased from twelve to fifteen members, consisting of eleven non-official Indians, one non-official British member, and three British officials. Sir Firoz Khan Noon, former High Commissioner for India in London, became a member for Defense, and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a leader of the Scheduled Castes, received the Labor post. Two Indians were appointed to sit with the War Cabinet in Britain. On July 22 the Government announced the lifting of the ban on the Communist Party of India and its publications, in view of their support of the war effort.

The Congress Working Committee in July adopted a resolution calling for 'immediate withdrawal of British rule from India,' but there was a difference of opinion between Gandhi and Azad as to whether this was an ultimatum or simply a reiteration of the normal Congress position. The issue, in fact, was undecided, since, to be effective, the resolution had to be approved by the larger All-India Congress Committee. From mid-July until Aug. 7, when this body met in Bombay, there was intense political discussion in India. Many groups and individuals, including a section of the pro-Congress press, took a strong stand against a new civil disobedience campaign, which had been threatened in the July resolution. All that was lacking was a fresh conciliatory move by Britain to crystallize the opposition to Gandhi's policy about some definite alternative plan. On July 30, however, the Secretary of State for India declared in the House of Commons that the government stood firmly by the 'broad intention' of the Cripps offer, but 'will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation' existing after the Working Committee resolution.

When the All-India Congress Committee met, it adopted a compromise statement, which omitted Gandhi's demand for passive resistance. The resolution asked the 'withdrawal of British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence a provisional government will be formed and free India will become the ally of the United Nations....' If however, British rule were not withdrawn, mass civil disobedience would be initiated. This resolution was passed on Aug. 8. The following day the Government of India declared the Congress illegal and arrested its outstanding leaders, including Gandhi, Nehru and Azad.

Unrest and Disturbances.

There followed a period of considerable violence, marked by rioting in most, if not all the eleven provinces and a number of Indian States. By mid-August arrests were reported running into the thousands. Strikes occurred in many industrial establishments, including important textile plants and the Tata works, the country's leading producer of steel, and there were hartals, or shutdowns of shops and businesses by their owners. Violent action was directed chiefly against communications, especially key sections of the railway system. On Sept. 11 the Secretary of State for India announced that over 300 railroad stations had been attacked, and at least 24 trains derailed. According to a statement the previous day by Prime Minister Churchill, the number of persons killed approached 500 — a figure which later increased. At the end of September the situation was still serious, but subsequently, as a result of police action, outbreaks declined. Yet, foreign observers reported growing bitterness throughout India involving not only the cities but the countryside, where some villages were required to pay collective fines for sabotage. Despite these developments, Congress apparently confined its activity for the most part to local demonstrations and did not play a major role in the outright violence and sabotage.

In face of these difficulties, various Indian leaders and groups made new efforts to find a way out of the impasse. In August representatives of the Non-Party Group and Hindu Mahasabha as well as several persons close to the arrested Congress leaders visited New Delhi and consulted with government officials. On Aug. 20 the Moslem League Working Committee voted to consider any proposals for a provisional government, if the right of Pakistan was conceded. The League's position — like that of Congress — was generally misunderstood abroad, where its intransigence was often cited as a fatal obstacle to Indian unity and therefore to a British-Indian agreement. In fact, however, there were many different tendencies within the organization: some of the leaders, notably President Jinnah, were anxious to safeguard their position by emphasizing Pakistan, but, considering the nationalist sentiment of many members, were hardly in a position to stand apart from any provisional government.

On Aug. 31 the Hindu Mahasabha called for an Indian national government composed of the principal political groups, and on Sept. 9, Dr. Mookerjee, working president of the body, conferred with the Viceroy at length. These endeavors received a serious setback the following day when Prime Minister Churchill attacked the Congress sharply and declared that Britain would not go beyond the 'settled policy' represented by the broad principles of the Cripps proposals. Yet, throughout the fall various elements sought to achieve a working agreement among the Indian groups. Indian circles were discouraged when it became known that the Viceroy had refused Rajagopalachariar permission to see Gandhi, still in custody. The moderate nationalist leader declared: 'I would not bother the Viceroy with a request to see Gandhi if I did not think there was a reasonable chance for the meeting to bring a settlement.' On Dec. 7 it was announced in London that the Viceroy's term of office, which had been scheduled to expire in April, would be extended another six months to October 1943. This underlined the British Cabinet's determination to take no new action. In mid-December an informal conference of Indian leaders outside the Congress met at Allahabad partly to discuss methods of bringing the Congress and the Moslem League together, the major step necessary for Indian unity. Among those present were Rajagopalachariar, Mookerjee, Sapru, and a representative of the Indian Communist party. The meeting apparently considered the principle of self-determination of nationalities as a means of meeting the Moslem League's Pakistan demand. In a statement issued after the conference, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, noted Moderate, rejected the idea of treating Congress as 'a body of rebels' and at the same time expressed strong opposition to violence or sabotage on the part of Indians.

British Opinion on India.

The British public was undoubtedly far less intransigent about the Indian problem than the Churchill government, just as most Indian nationalists were more moderate than Gandhi and the Congress high command. During the months leading up to the August crisis, there was strong British sentiment for a resumption of negotiations. Although after the outbreak of violence predominant opinion held that Britain could not simply back down, the desire for further peace moves remained. On Oct. 21, for example, both the conservative Times and the Labor Daily Herald asked for action to end the stalemate.

United States and the Indian Crisis.

The American press and government were intensely interested in Indian developments. Colonel Louis Johnson, leader of an American Technical Mission described below and a personal representative of President Roosevelt, participated in the later phases of the Cripps negotiations, apparently in an unofficial capacity, and had interviews with both Nehru and Azad. After the failure of the discussions, Washington's concern about the situation increased, in view of the danger of Japanese invasion. Militarily, India was almost the last supply link with China, as well as a front to which American aviators and troops were being sent, and an essential base for the reinvasion of Burma. Politically, it was a test of United Nations principles, especially in the eyes of the peoples of Asia. There was significant sentiment within the United States for mediation of the dispute by Washington alone, or in combination with China and Soviet Russia, but the government was deterred from any action by fear of injuring relations with Britain in a very trying period of the war. On Dec. 11 William Phillips, veteran career diplomat and former Ambassador to Italy, was appointed President Roosevelt's personal representative in New Delhi with the rank of Ambassador.

Chinese Attitude.

Neighboring China's interest in the situation was more direct and immediate than that of either Britain or the United States. China, moreover, because of its own struggle for independence, felt especially close to the Indian nationalists and their aspirations. This was indicated not only during Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India, but after the failure of the Cripps negotiations, when the Chinese clearly desired a resumption of discussions. On Aug. 10, Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Department of the Chungking government and son of the famous nationalist Sun Yat-sen, declared that 'Chinese sympathy is entirely with the Indians ...' The Chinese press also did not conceal its sympathies. Yet, like the United States, China sought to avoid any move that might create a rift with Britain.

INDIA AND THE WAR

Toward the end of 1942 the Indian Army — partly British, but chiefly Indian in composition — was estimated to number 1,500,000, a considerable increase over the beginning of the year. This was but one symptom of an improvement in the military situation, even though the danger of Japanese invasion had by no means been removed.

American Technical Mission.

Early in March the United States announced that it would send a supply mission to India, under Louis Johnson, former Assistant Secretary of War, who was to be aided by Henry Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State, and a group of industrial leaders. The mission arrived in New Delhi on April 17, and initiated efforts to determine how American lease-lend aid for Indian war production could be increased and accelerated and what steps could be taken to raise efficiency and output. Considerable suspicion of the mission's purposes existed in some circles in India, and Johnson and Grady both found it necessary to explain that their objectives were confined entirely to war needs and that there was no desire to establish an American economic foothold for the postwar period. After examining Indian industry, the mission reached the conclusion that 'though much has been accomplished, especially during the last year, to stimulate the war effort ... much remains to be done before a complete mobilization of India's resources is attained.' Although the Indian government was said to have decided to implement the mission's recommendations, newspaper reports later alleged that the proposals had in large part been shelved.

Economic Conditions in India.

War developments, although raising the level of Indian production, had certain adverse economic effects on the general population. Foremost among these was the food difficulty, created by the loss of rice supplies from Burma and wheat from Australia — a situation which was aggravated by transport problems within India. At the same time, Indian producers of export commodities — such as jute, textiles, cashew nuts, and carpet wool — were hard hit by the loss of foreign markets, resulting from shipping shortages, and the cessation of trade with territories under enemy control. In order to help meet some of these problems, the government encouraged the planting of food crops to replace part of the agricultural products involved in the export trade. At the year's end, however, little was being done about prices which were at unusually high levels.