United Mine Workers.
In 1942 the C.I.O. faced its most difficult internal problem. This arose mainly out of the relations between that organization and John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers. The immediate cause of the differences was a request by the miners that the C.I.O. repay a sum of more than one million dollars, which Lewis claimed had been advanced to the C.I.O. in the first days of its existence when it was waging expensive organizing campaigns and had little if any funds in its treasury. The C.I.O. refused to regard these advances as a loan and the miners retaliated by stopping the payment of dues to the C.I.O. in behalf of its half million or more members.
While this incident was the apparent cause of the split between the founder of the C.I.O., John L. Lewis, and his former close associate and now president of the C.I.O., Philip Murray, their differences went back to the presidential campaign of 1940. At that time Lewis alone among the leaders of the C.I.O. decided to oppose Mr. Roosevelt and support Mr. Willkie, while, at the same time, severely criticizing the Roosevelt foreign policy. On the occasion of his public announcement in support of Mr. Willkie, Lewis promised that, if his candidate was defeated, he would not be available to succeed himself as president of the C.I.O. Since Mr. Willkie was defeated, Lewis kept his promise and Philip Murray was elected to the post which Lewis had relinquished.
From that time on the relations between the two men steadily deteriorated. Each became more and more critical of the other. Lewis's attempt early in 1942 to sponsor an A.F. of L.-C.I.O. peace conference was publicly rebuffed by Murray, who sharply reminded Lewis that he, and not Lewis, was president of the C.I.O. and, in that capacity, he had the authority which Lewis was presuming to usurp. The activities of District 50, the United Mine Workers' affiliate which took jurisdiction over farmers, the chemical industry and related industrial activities, and of the Construction Workers' union, headed by Lewis's brother, which had for some time been a thorn in the flesh of the C.I.O. now became a source of open dissension.
The upshot of all this was a series of steps taken by Lewis to complete the split between the miners and the C.I.O. At a meeting of the Miners' executive board he had charges brought against Murray and forced his removal as vice-president of the United Mine Workers. Because Murray was elected president of the United Steel Workers of the C.I.O., he was expelled from membership in the Miners. At the national convention of the Miners, that union took the final step by withdrawing from the C.I.O.
The United Mine Workers had now become an independent organization. It amended its constitution by claiming unlimited jurisdiction over American industry. Thus a third powerful unit arose to challenge the authority of both the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. and to threaten, when the time was ripe, the multiplication of quarrels inside the labor movement.
Disputes between A.F. of L. and C.I.O.
Because Lewis was not very popular with either William Green, president of the A.F. of L., or Murray, president of the C.I.O., it might be assumed that his withdrawal from the C.I.O. would remove a formidable obstacle from the road toward labor peace. But the fact is that the real obstacle to peace was the keen and incessant competition for members in which constituent unions of both organizations were constantly engaged and which was increased rather than reduced after the outbreak of the war. This competition is illustrated in two disputes between C.I.O. and A.F. of L. affiliates which aggravated their differences and substantially reduced the chances for peace. One dispute centered on plants of the Curtiss-Wright airplane company. In the weeks before an election for the choice of a bargaining representative to be held under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board, the A.F. of L. machinists' union promised the employees that, if it won the election, it would force the company to pay penalty overtime rates for Saturdays and Sundays even when these days were a part of a 5-day week. This promise was a direct violation of a pledge to waive such rates made by organized labor to the President of the United States. The promise was resented by the C.I.O. union and did not help to cement union relations. The second dispute was concerned with the Kaiser shipyards. Here the A.F. of L. unions had made a closed-shop contract with the company when the company employed less than 1,000 men. Due to war orders, employment expanded to more than 70,000 and all additional employees were automatically required to join and remain in the A.F. of L. This contract was challenged by a C.I.O. union on the ground that it had been made without the consent of the workingmen. The challenge precipitated a bitter controversy which, at the end of the year, was still raging. Such disputes are typical and general. They are difficult to prevent because the stakes for which unions fight are very great indeed. But as long as they continue a general labor peace would seem impossible.
C.I.O. on War Production and Policies.
Throughout the year the C.I.O. was one of the severest critics of the management of the war. It charged that lack of adequate labor representation in the leading war agencies was responsible for the failure to elicit full labor cooperation and knowledge, without which maximum production could not be achieved. In a sense this campaign for representation was a continuation of the Reuther plan for the conversion of industry of the year before. But, since conversion had taken place at an extraordinarily rapid rate and war production had risen to unprecedented heights, the representation accorded to organized labor in war agencies took the form of membership on advisory boards.
The C.I.O. took an equally strong position on matters of tax policy and price administration. With respect to taxes it opposed any form of sales tax and pressed for still higher taxes on the middle and high incomes and on business profits. In its criticism of the Office of Price Administration it deplored the failure of that agency to have embarked upon universal rationing and to have controlled, more effectively than it did, the cost of living.
Membership.
Despite the loss of close to 600,000 members upon the withdrawal of the United Mine Workers, the C.I.O. came through the year with its aggregate membership unimpaired. Like the A.F. of L. it unionized new plants and additional employees and succeeded in renewing all of the most important of its contracts. It was not so successful in its political as in its economic undertakings. In the months before the congressional elections the C.I.O. and its affiliates campaigned extensively against Republicans and other critics of the administration. The strong reverses suffered by the administration in the November elections was conceded by the C.I.O. to be a severe set-back to its own political fortunes.
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