1942: China

Although 1942 was the first year in which China had military allies against Japan, the Chungking government faced increasing difficulties after the rapid Japanese conquest of lands to the south and severance of the Burma Road supply route.

CHINA AND THE WAR IN ASIA

Nature of the Fighting in China.

The war remained one of attrition, with each side seeking to wear down the other. The few important operations — the drives against Changsha, into Yunnan province, and along the Chekiang-Kiangsi railway — were restricted actions initiated by the Japanese. The Chinese Army, although strong in manpower, carried through no significant offensive movements. One of the reasons for this situation was explained in a memorandum of Oct. 12 by United States Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who declared: 'No Chinese armies are actively engaged in large-scale offensive operations against the Japanese — for the reason, principally, that there are lacking to all Chinese armies types and amounts of equipment which are essential to such operations....' Chinese activity was confined largely to counter-attacks by regular forces and guerrilla warfare. It was clear that many battles reported in the press were essentially skirmishes in which the Japanese sought to destroy supplies or to devastate an area and then retire. Nevertheless, China was performing the invaluable function of tying down well over 500,000 Japanese troops and maintaining a Far Eastern land front for the United Nations.

Third Battle of Changsha.

In the first week of January Chinese forces smashed the third Japanese drive toward Changsha, capital of Hunan province and leading economic center of the south Yangtze hill region. This was the first United Nations victory of the Pacific war. After retreating toward the end of December 1941, the Chinese, who had been laying a trap for the invaders, struck in the Japanese rear while the defending troops at Changsha moved forward at the front. The Japanese forces were said to include 150,000 men, supported by planes, tanks and heavy artillery, against 300,000 Chinese troops possessing only machine guns, rifles, grenades and a few howitzers. According to Chinese sources, enemy losses totalled over 60,000 killed and wounded, with about one-tenth as many for the defenders.

Japan Invades China from Burma.

In January Chinese troops, under agreement with Britain, entered Burma to participate in the defense of that territory, but it was not until March that they came into contact with Japanese forces on a large scale. On March 10 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed an American general, Joseph W. Stilwell, his chief of staff and on March 19 placed him in command of the Fifth and Sixth Chinese Armies in Burma, at a time when a major battle was developing in the vicinity of Toungoo on the Sittang river. Although fighting heroically, Chinese troops were outflanked and had to break through to the north of the city at the end of the month. Chinese opinion was critical of the apparent lack of a unified command in Burma and the long delay in bringing Chinese troops into action. On April 29 the Japanese entered Lashio, terminus of the Burma Road, and soon swung eastward up that famous highway. Reaching the border on May 5, they entered Yunnan, China's southernmost province, which since 1937 had been untouched by war except for Japanese bombings. On May 10 they took Tengyueh, an important center on a spur of the Burma Road, and then marched toward the bridge over the upper reaches of the Salween; but the structure was destroyed by the Chinese, who retreated to the east bank. Aided by American Volunteer Group aircraft and by artillery which shelled the other side of the river, the defenders caused havoc among the Japanese forces and compelled their retreat to Lungling. This saved the city of Paoshan toward which the Japanese had presumably been driving. Subsequently, despite some changes, the front in Yunnan was more or less stabilized, although in December Chinese sources reported that the Japanese were preparing to resume their drive toward Kunming, the provincial capital.

Campaign in Chekiang and Kiangsi.

Meanwhile fighting on other fronts in China had been of a minor character. In late January and early February there was a brief contest east of Canton in the area of Waichow, which the Japanese entered but soon evacuated. In the first part of March fighting began in southwest Shantung province, and later in the month activity was reported from the Canton region. A new factor was introduced into the military situation on April 18, when American planes executed their famous raid on Tokyo, Yokohama, and Nagoya. Although the bases used for this action were never announced and Chungking denied that they were located in China, Japan suspected that the raiders had operated from Chinese soil or, at least, had landed there. Soon Japanese aircraft were carrying through systematic reconnaissance and bombing activity in the Chinese coastal zone, especially over the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsi, which are relatively close to Japan. It was known that for some time China had been preparing a number of airfields in anticipation of the day when the Allies would make planes available in large numbers.

On May 15, less than a month after the raid on Tokyo, Japanese troops in Hangchow (Chekiang province) began to push inland along the railway leading to the Kiangsi provincial capital of Nanchang, while other troops in the latter city moved eastward. The object was to complete the occupation of an important rail line, part of which remained in Chinese hands. At the same time attacks on Chinese forces were initiated north of Canton, giving the impression that the whole Chekiang-Kiangsi campaign might be one part of a gigantic pincers movement designed to establish complete control over the vital rail route from Canton to Hankow. Japanese statements about plans to establish through rail communications from Shanghai to Singapore — by linking the lines of China, Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya — also caused considerable speculation in the American press, since the realization of such a scheme would enable Japan to reduce the number of ships exposed to attack on the long sea voyage to and from conquered Southeast Asia.

Actually, as the subsequent development of the campaign indicated, Japan's purposes were far more moderate, and probably embraced two main objectives: (1) to seize and hold, at least temporarily, various air bases which might have been used in the raid of April 18; (2) to weaken China politically and economically by damaging the links between two vital eastern provinces and the rest of Free China. In this connection, it should be noted that Chekiang is an important producer of salt, in connection with which China was already having serious supply difficulties. Together with Kiangsi, it was also the scene of much smuggling between occupied and unoccupied China — one method by which areas under Chungking control were able to meet at least a small part of their supply needs.

For two months the Japanese forces advanced, seizing valuable airfields, including those at Chuhsien and Lishui, occupying Kinhwa — the temporary capital of Chekiang and an important economic center — and securing control over the entire Chekiang-Kiangsi railway. This was followed by operations south of Nanchang in Kiangsi, as well as in the vicinity of Wenchow, an important Chekiang port which was still held by the Chinese. From July 18, however, the Chinese forces advanced quickly, retaking most of the towns previously lost, although Kinhwa remained in Japanese hands. In view of the weakness of the Chinese troops and the swiftness of their return, it would appear that the Japanese were not driven out but had decided to withdraw. It may be assumed that the main objective of the campaign had been achieved, at least in part. Important air bases had been kept out of use for more than two months and had probably been subjected to extensive damage. The Japanese, moreover, had deliberately caused widespread destruction in the invaded areas, which they did not abandon until after the harvest. This meant that for some time to come Chungking would face a very difficult relief problem in Chekiang and Kiangsi.

Air Exploits of the A.V.G.

For many months after the Japanese attack the United Nations had a pitifully small number of aircraft in the Far East. During this period, however, a distinguished record was established by the American Volunteer Group (A.V.G.), popularly known as the 'Flying Tigers,' which, despite its inferiority in numbers and types of planes, repeatedly shot the Japanese out of the skies over China and Burma. Under Colonel Claire I. Chennault — later a Brigadier General — the A.V.G. had been organized in May and June 1941 as an unofficial body designed to protect the Burma Road and the dispatch of supplies to China. Its first members, recruited from the United States air forces, arrived in Rangoon in September 1941, and on Dec. 20, 1941, the initial air combat with the Japanese took place near Kunming, capital of Yunnan province. Thereafter the A.V.G. was extremely active in China and Burma (in addition to making a few forays into Thailand and Indo-China) until it was replaced on July 4, 1942, by the United States Army Air Force in China. According to the official figures, in less than seven months of activity the A.V.G. destroyed 286 Japanese planes — and those not recorded totaled perhaps 300 more. It was conservatively estimated that at least 1,500 Japanese airmen were killed in encounters with the A.V.G., which itself lost only 11 men, in addition to 4 missing and 9 killed accidentally. At no time did the A.V.G. have over 55 combat planes capable of flight or more than 70 trained pilots. Its successor, the U.S.A.A.F., in cooperation with the Chinese air force, continued the raiding of Japanese-held territory, bombing such centers as Hankow, Nanchang, Canton, and Hongkong in the effort to destroy Japanese planes, airfields, ships, docks, and other objects of military value. The presence of these American planes, although they were old and few in number, probably played a large part in reducing the number of Japanese air raids against Chinese cities. In 1942, for the first time during the war, the capital at Chungking was virtually undisturbed by enemy air marauders.

China and Pacific War Strategy.

During 1942 there were clear indications that China was not satisfied with the role assigned her planning or waging the war in Asia. Though their forces were weak at the moment, the Chinese felt that their territory should be the chief base for a future drive against the enemy armies. They also desired an equal voice in discussions concerning United Nations strategy in the Pacific. A step toward equality was taken on March 30 when a Pacific War Council was formed in Washington, but the main decisions were still made principally by Great Britain and the United States. Chungking was especially anxious to secure supplies in large quantities, a desire which was expressed by Chiang Kai-shek on May 31 in a broadcast to the American people. 'I pledge you my word,' he said, 'that given 10 per cent of the equipment you produce in America the Chinese Army will reap for you 100 per cent of the desired result.' By the end of the year, however, no adequate substitute for the Burma Road had been found, although first steps were being taken in the reinvasion of Burma necessary for reestablishing the route. The Chinese were also disturbed by the fear that the European war would be emphasized to the exclusion of the war in Asia. Therefore, although welcoming every offensive action in the West — for example, the Anglo-American drive in North Africa and the Soviet winter campaign — Chungking deprecated any suggestion that Japan was a minor enemy which would collapse almost automatically upon the defeat of Germany.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Relations with other countries differed sharply from those of previous years. For the first time China had military allies, and for the first time it was cut off from Germany as well as Japan. The major emphasis of China's foreign policy was therefore placed on methods of securing the fullest possible recognition of equality from the allies, a recognition which depended most of all upon the United States and Great Britain. An important step in this direction was taken on Jan. 1, when China joined with twenty-five other nations in signing the United Nations agreement, pledging all to prosecute the war vigorously and not to make a separate peace. Another significant move occurred on June 2 when China concluded a 'master' lease-lend agreement with the United States, providing for mutual aid during the war and outlining the principles of a post-war economic settlement. Nevertheless, the Chinese were dissatisfied with certain aspects of their international position. In facing these difficulties, they felt obliged to pay special attention to events in India and to Allied plans for the future of the Pacific, as well as to such other matters as extraterritoriality and the delivery of supplies.

Policy Toward India.

In February Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek visited India, partly to discuss problems of supply after the severance of the Burma Road and partly to encourage a settlement between Great Britain and the Indian nationalists. The Chinese were greatly concerned because they knew that, if Burma fell, India would become a key area in the war in addition to serving as their last southern link with the outside world. The details of Chiang's discussion with British officials as well as Gandhi, Nehru, and others are not known, but in a farewell address to the people of India on Feb. 21 the Chinese leader urged Britain 'as speedily as possible to give them real political power so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for securing victory but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom.' At the same time he expressed the hope that the Indians would 'wholeheartedly join the Allies' in the war against aggression.

Plans for the exchange of diplomatic representatives between China and India were announced on March 11, the day on which Prime Minister Churchill revealed that Sir Stafford Cripps was going to India. Extremely anxious that the ensuing discussions result in an agreement, the Chinese were bitterly disappointed when the Cripps mission failed. Although Chungking thereafter followed a cautious policy to avoid any adverse effect on relations with Great Britain, it was clear from the tone of the Chinese press that a resumption of discussions in India was desired. This was especially true after early August when — following the adoption of a civil disobedience resolution by the Congress party — the government of India arrested various nationalist leaders and declared the Congress illegal. On Aug. 10, Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan (Department) of the Chungking government, stated that 'Chinese sympathy is entirely with the Indians,' while the official Central Daily News appealed for British 'forbearance' on the ground that the arrest of Gandhi and others 'does not solve the Indian problems, which, if permitted to pursue its own course of development, will not only affect the war in the Pacific, but also the war as a whole.' Here it is important to note that the Chinese, who only recently had been regarded as a semi-colony and were still not free, felt very close to the Indian nationalist movement which seemed to them similar to their own.

Full Equality for China?

Although China was one of the Allies, it was still subject to certain inequalities in international law at the beginning of 1942. Britain and the United States, for example, maintained gunboats on the Yangtze river — China's Mississippi — and, under the terms of various treaties, held special rights on Chinese soil. These privileges, it was true, had lost almost all practical significance following Japanese invasion of the coastal and Yangtze valley region. Yet the Chinese desired their early abolition in law, lest they be revived after the defeat of Japan or used as bargaining points at the peace conference. A small step in this direction was taken in March when Great Britain presented three Yangtze river gunboats to China and the United States likewise made a gift of the Tutuila, thus destroying an old symbol of China's lack of full independence.

Far more important, however, was the problem of extraterritoriality — in its narrowest sense the right of foreigners to be tried in special courts and not under the courts and laws of China, but more broadly the whole system of foreign territorial and economic privileges. These arrangements had been a principal feature of the 'Unequal Treaties' imposed on China in the nineteenth century and long regarded as an insult by Chinese patriots. The first break in the system had occurred at the end of World War I, when the Soviet government had given up the Tsarist special rights, while the defeated European powers — first of all, Germany — had been deprived of theirs. In 1942, although these privileges were held by a number of countries, their continuance in law depended primarily on the United States and Great Britain. Several times in recent years the two governments had issued statements indicating their willingness to negotiate with China for the end of extraterritoriality when conditions should be favorable, i.e., at the end of the Far Eastern war. On Oct. 9, however, on the eve of the thirty-first anniversary of the Chinese Republic, the United States and Britain announced their intention to relinquish their rights before that time. According to the text of the American declaration, 'the government of the United States is prepared promptly to negotiate with the Chinese government a treaty providing for the immediate relinquishment of this country's extraterritorial rights in China and for the settlement of related questions, and ... expects in the near future to present to the Chinese government for its consideration a draft treaty which would accomplish the purpose mentioned.' The British statement was expressed in similar language. In the message of appreciation to President Roosevelt — both for the announcement and for the ringing of the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia to commemorate China's October 10th anniversary — Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek declared that these steps would 'do more to uphold the morale of our people in continuing resistance than anything else could possibly do.' On Oct. 27 the Political Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that the text of the United States draft treaty had been received and that its scope was 'very wide.' Subsequently it was understood that the British draft had also been presented.

Wendell Willkie in China.

The British and American statements on extraterritoriality were made one week after the arrival in Chungking of Wendell Willkie on Oct. 2. Acting as President Roosevelt's special representative on a fact-finding mission, the Republican candidate of 1940 had already visited a number of countries, but nowhere was his reception warmer than in China. Chinese circles appreciated the fact that he was the most important foreigner to visit their capital in the course of the war and were stirred to new hope for their own future by his statements on the need for immediate steps toward world freedom. In a declaration issued to the press on Oct. 6 he stressed the doubts of the common people of Asia as to the willingness 'of the leading democracies of the world to stand up and be counted upon for the freedom of others after the war is over.' He urged that everything be done as soon as possible to erase this doubt and arouse popular enthusiasm within the nations of Asia, 'determined no longer to live under foreign control.' He asked for a definite statement as to whether the Atlantic Charter also applied to the Pacific, spoke of China's great role in the war and referred to the fact that 'some of our Allies have seen very little of our actual arms.'

China's Diplomatic Relations.

During 1942 China concluded treaties of amity with Iraq and Turkey. Announcements were made concerning the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Egypt, the Vatican, India, Iran, Iraq, and Canada. In September, Hu Shih, Ambassador to the United States, was replaced by Wei Tao-ming. At the beginning of the year Sir Horace Seymour succeeded Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, British Ambassador to China.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

Problem of Inflation.

During 1942 China's economic difficulties increased, and prices skyrocketed to new high levels. In Chungking by the middle of the year wholesale prices were approximately 50 times their pre-war level, as compared with perhaps 27½ times in December 1941. Although speculating merchants and landlords were often able to profit from this situation, most Chinese, especially the middle class, suffered from it. The government sought to alleviate conditions by giving rice allowances to many of its own employees, and private business firms frequently did the same. In May 1942 the Ministry of Education decided to grant every normal school student approximately 2.2 pounds of government rice each month. The price problem was closely connected with a rise in the note issue of the four government banks from an estimated total of 15,000,000,000 Chinese dollars in Dec. 1941 to probably 20,000,000,000 by June 1942, as compared with approximately 1,500,000,000 before the war. In one sense, however, inflation was a method by which Chungking could continue to finance the war in face of a serious decline in the usual sources of revenue. By 1942 the maritime customs, salt tax and consolidated tax on the production of various manufactured articles, which had furnished the bulk of the government's pre-war income, yielded no more than one-fifth of their peacetime returns. Partly in order to compensate for these losses, in the first six months of 1942 Chungking established official monopoly control over production, prices and distribution of salt, sugar, matches, and tobacco, and it was expected that tea and wine would be added later. Through the salt monopoly alone the government hoped to raise 1,000,000,000 Chinese dollars in revenues as compared with the salt tax return of 100,000,000. On May 5 a National General Mobilization Act went into effect, giving the government the power to commandeer food, medical supplies, the means of production, and transport facilities and, in effect, to direct all aspects of economic life. This move appeared to be chiefly of legal significance, since Chungking had already established far-reaching economic control.

Shortage of Supplies.

One of the important factors behind price difficulties was the shortage of supplies, as a result of transportation problems, hoarding of commodities, and the low level of production. After the seizure of Hongkong by Japan in December 1941 and the cutting of the Burma Road early in 1942, China had only three sources of outside supply: the long northwest highway to the Soviet Union, the dangerous air channels from India, and the devious land and water ways by which goods were smuggled in from Japanese-occupied China. All of these combined were inadequate to meet the country's supply needs. Therefore efforts were made to develop new land routes into China from India or to use old trails, but by the end of the year there were no clear indications that such attempts had brought results. It was presumably in connection with China's supply problems that Lauchlin Currie, President Roosevelt's Administrative Assistant, visited Chungking for the second time in July 1942. Some months before, in February, the United States Congress, at the request of the President, had approved a U. S. $500,000,000 loan to be used at China's own discretion. This grant was paralleled by a British offer of £500,000,000 at the same time. The American loan was of limited immediate value because the Chinese had no means of using it to secure supplies, but they employed part of it to back the issuance of Savings Deposit Certificates and Allied Victory Bonds. This, it was hoped, would reduce speculation and hoarding by absorbing part of the money that wealthy persons were using for these purposes, but the sale of the issues was not particularly successful.

Food Problems and Land Taxes.

Although food supplies, if properly distributed, were probably adequate to meet the country's needs, there were actual shortages on the market as a result of hoarding. In June 1941, Chungking had initiated an ambitious plan, designed in part to meet this situation, under which the existing land tax in cash was converted into a tax in grain. The object was to furnish the government with food, chiefly for the army, and to force landlords to make available some of the supplies they were withholding. This was supplemented by a purchase-loan scheme under which the government was to buy additional quantities of rice and other grains, paying partly in cash and partly in Food Treasury Notes. Collections were completed by the end of February 1942 and were on the whole successful, especially in the capital province of Szechwan. Therefore the national quota for 1942 was increased. In prosecuting this new tax policy, the government faced very strong opposition from the landlords. In an address of June 1942, for example, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek attacked the 'very small minority of rich landowners who grumble at the slightest increase of the amount of food required of them and who attempt evasion.' He stated in unmistakable terms that food difficulties 'do not turn upon any question of lack of food but simply and solely upon ways and means of control and distribution.' At the same time he referred to 'cases of connivance on the part of the authorities in practices of evasion' and declared that 'all officials engaged in food administration should cultivate habits of strict frugality and never forget that the food they are handling has been produced by the hard work of the people.' In addition to these problems of food control, Chungking had to face a very difficult famine situation in the strategically located north central province of Honan, resulting from drought, spring frosts, locust plagues, and a brief Japanese invasion of some districts during the previous year. With thousands said to be dying each day and millions reported on the verge of starvation, the government took steps to alleviate conditions, but was hampered by poor transport facilities for bringing in food or removing people from the area.

Development: of the Northwest.

Early in the war China had taken steps toward the economic development of the southwestern provinces, especially Szechwan. During 1942 plans were also initiated for the reconstruction of the northwest. Early in August members of the Chinese Institute of Engineers met in Lanchow, capital of Kansu, where, at the request of the provincial authorities, they offered opinions on the problems of waterpower development, mining, railroads and communications. In a message to the conference, the Generalissimo declared that the engineers' next task would be to develop the resources of the northwest. During preceding months many high officials, economic experts and Army men had visited the region, and shortly after mid-September it became known that Chiang Kai-shek had just spent a month there. Back in Chungking, he declared that considerable progress had been made in Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai in surveying farm lands, building highways, and carrying on reforestation activities.

Political Developments.

In 1941 relations between the government and the Chinese Communists had attracted international attention, since civil war had for a while appeared imminent. In 1942, however, the situation was a stalemate. The Communist-led New Fourth and Eighteenth Group (formerly Eighth Route) armies continued their activities in the north, and there were no reports of new friction with Central forces, although old problems remained unsolved. On Oct. 12 United States Under-secretary of State Sumner Welles declared it had been the State Department's view that civil strife in China would be extremely unfortunate and that the Chinese government 'should try to maintain peace by processes of conciliation between and among all groups and factions in China.' 'The State Department in Washington,' he said, 'has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.'

On Oct. 22, after a lapse of almost a year, the Third People's Political Council — the governmental advisory body originally established in 1938 — met in Chungking. In an opening address, Chiang Kai-shek stressed the importance of avoiding extravagance, stabilizing prices, developing popular understanding of taxation, public loans, and saving, and promoting voluntary enlistments in the military and labor service while preventing evasion of these obligations. At the closing session on October 31 he declared: 'China is the largest and most ancient of Asiatic countries, but it is not for us boastfully to talk of her right to a position of 'leadership' among those countries.... Recognizing equality as the highest guiding principle of international affairs, we shall do well neither to underestimate nor overestimate our own importance and dignity.' At his suggestion the People's Political Council had already adopted a program calling for intensified control of commodity prices, in addition to passing resolutions on many other questions. On Nov. 12 the tenth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang — the official Nationalist party — convened in Chungking. In December certain changes in government personnel took place, perhaps as a result of the plenary session.