Against the Japanese invasion which began in mid-January the defenders of Burma were able to do little more than fight a series of delaying actions. Within a month British forces had retired from the lower Salween River (an important natural defense in southeast Burma) and almost the whole east shore of the Gulf of Martaban was in Japanese hands. On the other side lay Rangoon, capital of the colony and one of the leading ports of the Orient. Three weeks later, on Mar. 7, after setting fire to the city, the British garrison at Rangoon began to withdraw in a northwesterly direction toward Prome. Elsewhere they were supported by Chinese troops which, under agreement with Britain, had begun to enter Burma at the beginning of the year. On Mar. 19, an American general, Joseph W. Stilwell, who had only recently been named Chief-of-Staff by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China, was given command of the Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies that were to defend east Burma.
Superior in numbers, equipment, and tactics suited to the territory, the Japanese now initiated a two-pronged drive into the interior; up the Irrawaddy river in the west toward the British at Prome and up the Sittang in the east toward Toungoo, where Chinese troops were located. When the defenders retreated on one front, those on the other were often obliged to retire or face the danger of being outflanked. Thus, at Toungoo late in March the Chinese had to fight their way north through the Japanese lines at great cost. On Apr. 2, the British evacuated Prome, and about the middle of the month withdrew from Yenangyaung after destroying the oil fields, the last held by the United Nations in southeast Asia. Toward the end of April Japanese forces made a strong drive from northwest Thailand into northeast Burma and on Apr. 29 seized Lashio, terminus of the Burma Road. From here they pushed ahead, reaching the Chinese frontier by May 5. Continued Chinese resistance north of Mandalay enabled the British, under heavy air attack and with great loss of equipment, to follow the Chindwin river valley into northeast India. Subsequently, Chinese troops also escaped to India.
The fall of Burma within so short a period was the product of many factors. The British had at the outset no more than two divisions of Empire forces and did not add to them during the campaign, while the handful of native troops under British officers (the Burma Rifles) were unreliable and unprepared for war with the Japanese. There were, it is true, between two and three divisions of Chinese troops, but they did not go into action until lower Burma had been lost. On the other hand, although the Japanese forces were not large, perhaps from 50,000 to 100,000 men, they were well trained and well supported. At the beginning of February, however, the combined air strength in and about Rangoon of the R.A.F. and A.V.G. (American Volunteer Group) was 57 planes, only a dozen of which were genuine bombers.
The civil government of Burma was unprepared to stand the strain of war. After the first bombing of Rangoon on Dec. 23, 1941, tens of thousands of Indian coolies fled from the city, since no provision had been made for their protection from air raids. Although this development crippled the operation of wharves, warehouses and municipal services, the authorities could not be induced to invoke martial law. More important, however, was the active aid given the Japanese by certain Burmese nationalists as a result of hatred of Britain. According to a later statement by the British commanding officer, this group constituted only 10 per cent of the population, yet it was effective in doing much damage and apparently reached into high native circles. On Jan. 18, Britain announced the detention of U Maung Saw, Burmese Prime Minister, for having been in contact with the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. He had left England in November following an unsuccessful effort to secure dominion status and was on his way back to Burma.
Little news was received from Burma after the end of the Japanese campaign. In August it was reported that the Japanese Commander-in-Chief had established a joint Burmese-Japanese puppet administration under Ba Maw, a former Prime Minister. Supreme power rested with the Japanese who at the same time dissolved the Burmese Parliament. During the summer, and especially in the fall and early winter, Allied air raids were carried through regularly from India against key points in Burma. On Sept. 1 General Stilwell declared in New Delhi that 'the Burma front is . . . still the best way to get at the Japanese. The first thing to do is to go back and take Burma.' In mid-October it became known that General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in India, had just made an inspection trip into Burma itself, where some Allied troops remained. Soon afterward British, Chinese, and American generals conferred in New Delhi. On Dec. 19 a communiqué announced that British forces had crossed from India into Burma, but warnings soon appeared that only a part of the forces in India was involved and that the action was of a limited character. The invaded area, a coastal strip leading to the port of Akyab on the Bay of Bengal, was geographically isolated from the rest of Burma. The chief problems involved in developing a major offensive were whether the United Nations had the men and supplies available, and whether India in view of its unsettled political state, would furnish a secure base for such an attack.
Burma Road.
The famous highway from southwest China into Burma was cut in February by Japanese military action. The loss of this route over which significant amounts of equipment and other materials had reached China for several years brought that country face to face with its most difficult economic situation. It was now shut off from outside supplies except for what could be brought in over the Northwest Highway from the Soviet Union or through loopholes in the Japanese blockade. At the end of the year China hoped that the small British drive toward Akyab in Burma would develop into a major offensive to retake the whole area and reopen the Burma Road.
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