1942: Aviation

The year of 1942 saw the first combat tests of our offensive air strategy and an outstanding home front victory in the battle of production. Civil aviation operations were geared more closely to the war effort and the scheduled airline operators, fixed base operators, and private flyers, took full advantage of their opportunities to participate importantly in the solution of the greatest communications and training problems of any war in history.

Aircraft in the War.

During the year American military strategy ran the gamut from depressive defense and delaying action to the beginning of major offensive movement against the Axis. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor the United States was faced with a long series of reverses while the Japanese forces were expending great masses of men and materials in their rapidly moving occupation of the islands of the western Pacific. It was during these dark days that the basic lesson of the war was impressed indelibly upon American consciousness. This lesson, most simply expressed, was that air superiority is the essential ingredient of victory in any battle or campaign. But this is as far as the simplicity goes.

To gain air superiority a contender must provide greater air power than that possessed by the adversary at a given place and time. But, because of the tremendous mobility of the airplane, air superiority is an elusive and frequently local factor. It may be ours today and in a relatively short time aerial reinforcements may be provided by the enemy to change the balance. Counter action would then consist in attempting to prevent the enemy from establishment of communication lines and thus to impair his efforts to gain air superiority. The speed of the airplane has changed all previous concepts of the possible rate of change of the balance of power.

This situation is further complicated by the basic truth that air power depends upon three fundamental elements — planes, men, and bases, just as sea power depends upon ships, men, and bases. The airplanes must have pilots to fly them and bases from which to operate.

Considering the airplane and pilot elements, there has been found a very substantial difference in strategic philosophy between ourselves and our enemies concerning the relative expendability of aircraft and pilot. As civilization progresses, increasing importance is assumed to be placed upon human life, even in wartime. But beyond the humanitarian considerations are the purely practical considerations that airplanes can be built much faster than pilots can be born, raised, and trained. It is therefore our policy to sacrifice some of the elements of combat-plane performance to provide pilots with greater protection and fire power than that provided in certain types of enemy equipment, and the soundness of this policy has already been proven many times in this war.

Our protective equipment consists essentially of more rugged aircraft structures, leak-proof fuel tanks, and judiciously placed armor plate to protect not only the pilots and crews but the vital parts of the power plant and equipment. Our superior fire power results chiefly from our insistence upon the use of .50-caliber machine guns firing 800 rounds per minute, rather than the .30-caliber types firing 1,200 rounds per minute, so widely used abroad, and our persistent attempts to mount larger automatic cannon-firing equipment in our combat planes than that thought necessary by our enemies and even our allies. Although the .50-caliber machine guns fire at a lower rate than the .30-caliber types, the high muzzle velocity and superior penetrative effect of the .50-caliber type more than offsets its lower firing rate. The automatic cannon used most extensively fires a 20 mm. explosive shell, while we were the first to introduce the 37 mm. shell-firing cannon in a fighter plane, the Bell Airacobra Interceptor Pursuit, Model P-39.

We cannot include the Germans among those enemies who do not provide adequate pilot protection for their pilots. They provided it early in the war and swiftly taught the British its importance. It then became a prerequisite in the design and production of lend-lease equipment and thus found its way into our own airplanes. It is one of the technical lessons learned from British experience and should be credited as such. On the other hand, our Japanese adversaries, probably because of their fanaticism and deterministic outlook upon life, decided that performance was more important than pilot protection and designed their combat aircraft accordingly. As a result their most powerful aircraft, as exemplified by the so-called Zero types, were so designed that the structure was light, no protection was provided for pilot, fuel, or power plant. The airplanes performed spectacularly in acrobatics; frankly, they outperformed some of our own. But at this point our more effective fire power entered the equation and it was found that the higher muzzle velocity and increased accuracy of our .50-caliber machine guns as compared with the .30-caliber types used abroad, gave us an advantage over the highly maneuverable Japanese planes. Generally speaking, our pilots were able to shoot them down before they were able to fire effectively at us. They were no match in combat for our slower ships and the battle scores were tremendously in our favor. As this is written the weighted average ratio of enemy losses to our own in aircraft is 5:1. This ratio may be reduced as our action becomes increasingly offensive but it is sufficiently high to indicate that our strategy is correct.

It should be explained that Japanese aircraft designations make use of the last two digits of the calendar year and that the Japanese calendar dates from the year of the alleged birth of the Sun Goddess. The aircraft of the so-called Zero series are of the vintage of the year 2600. Those of the ninety-nine series were built in the year 2599.

Another advantage in our favor was the revolving gun turrets in our bombers, which increased substantially the field of fire and enabled us to attack enemies broadside, as is done in naval warfare. The element of surprise in this innovation has caused and is still causing great consternation among our enemies.

Controversy over Quality.

During 1942 a great controversy arose regarding the quality of our aircraft. Although this controversy bore the earmarks of subversive inspiration it was impossible to trace it to enemy propaganda machinery. More likely it was the result of the utterances of publicity-seeking speakers and writers who succeeded in reaping huge harvests of personal profit from their written and spoken words. It is a characteristic peculiar to the American people to spread gossip and rumor, and it was not long before the public was giving high credence to the idea that our aircraft were inferior to those of our enemies. And as it became profitable for self-styled military 'experts' to criticize our equipment, more writers and speakers joined in the clamor, and the ranks of 'typewriter strategists,' as they were called by the President, grew steadily to large proportions.

The situation was aggravated considerably by the statements of certain British writers who rose overnight to find ready acceptance of their views by the American press as well as their own.

The seeds of the controversy were sown long before America's entry into the war when some of our obsolescent aircraft trickled slowly across the Atlantic unaccompanied by a sufficient number of service men or factory representatives who understood the operation of the equipment. Pilots usually form strong opinions, sometimes based upon inadequate knowledge of new types of equipment, and British pilots were not exceptional in this respect.

During the early stages of the war it became axiomatic that the American airplanes accompanied abroad by the best organized and balanced overseas service crews found the most ready acceptance. Outstanding examples of well developed service organizations were those set up during the pre-war period by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to introduce their twin-engined Hudson Bombers. As a result of the work of this group the British pilots soon learned the characteristics of the Hudsons and few types of aircraft have performed greater service and withstood so well the rigors of warfare. When the time came to send over the first Bell P-39 Interceptor Pursuits, an excellent overseas service organization was set up and the acceptance of this type was greatly accelerated. Soon other companies realized the importance of this work and now all manufacturers are training foreign service personnel in their factories and sending them to all of the fighting fronts as rapidly as practicable.

By the summer of 1942 the quality controversy had reached such proportions that it was undermining the morale of our new crop of pilots and some of these men were going into squadrons with definite reservations about the quality of the planes they were about to fly. Whether the misunderstanding was or was not inspired by the enemy, it was having the same effect and our military leaders began to show signs of concern.

Almost all of this discussion had been going on before our airplanes and our pilots had seen substantial combat action against our enemies, and it was therefore largely speculative. But even after our Army and Navy pilots went to work in our machines and began to prove the quality of our planes and pilots by the high ratio of enemy losses to our own, the talk went on. And ironically, while the previously-mentioned British writer was deploring the policy of sending our boys to certain death in our long range bombers, our pilots were conducting highly effective bombing raids in broad daylight on well-defended enemy territory with negligible losses to ourselves and heavy losses to the enemy.

Meanwhile Congress took a hand and committees were formed in the Senate and House to investigate the quality problem. The House Committee under the chairmanship of Dow Harter proceeded quietly with its work and eventually turned out a very realistic and constructive report which did much to clarify public thinking. The Senate Committee, headed by Senator Truman, made substantial use of publicity and aggravated the situation by sounding off before sufficient study of the problem had been made. After several publicity outbursts the Senate Committee saw fit to go to headquarters for its information and invited high Army Air Force officers to testify in executive session. A short time later the committee made a very favorable report.

Subsequently others took up the cudgel in the realistic defense of our equipment. In the October issue of Aviation an editorial entitled 'To the Critics of American Airplanes' and two lead articles 'The Truth About Our Fighters' and 'The Truth About Our Bombers' presented the background and facts of the case. This material was widely quoted and reprinted.

A short time later the Office of War Information came out with a type-by-type analysis of the characteristics of our aircraft in a voluminous document which agreed substantially with the Aviation presentation. Other efforts to clear the air were made by Major Nathaniel F. Silsbee of the Army Air Forces who wrote several articles for various publications on the subject.

Briefly the facts of the matter are as follows:

In order to make a fair appraisal of the quality of our aircraft, one must first review briefly the background of research and design development behind the planes that are flying in the war today.

Aeronautical Engineering Problems.

Aeronautical engineering is one of the most complex branches of creative effort. Basic requirement in the design of an airplane is its power plant and airplanes must be designed around engines and propeller combinations available or expected to be available when the plane is to be built. Power available may be used for speed or climb or range or load-carrying capacity but the ultimate design is a compromise which depends upon the use for which the airplane is to be built. In an airplane built for racing, all elements of performance are subordinated to speed, while an airplane designed for long-range operation must sacrifice speed and climb in favor of the ability to carry a heavy load of fuel and passengers or cargo or both. The law of the conservation of energy applies as much to airplanes as to any mechanical device.

After a certain set of performance requirements is decided upon, the aeronautical engineer sets to work to find the best way to obtain them in a design. Such questions as number and location of engines, the most desirable of several basic types of plane, materials of construction, and many others must be decided upon. Wing-section shapes must be selected among thousands that have been tested in the laboratory, to find the ideal combination of aerodynamic efficiency, stability, and balance for a sufficient thickness to provide an adequate internal structure to support the required load of the plane as well as to carry the fuel load. Many highly efficient wing sections are impractical for structural reasons. The plan, form, and taper of the wings must be considered carefully for efficiency, safety, and production practicality.

After all of these and many other decisions are made, a perfect replica of the plane is made of wood and tested at small scale in a wind tunnel to check the performance and stability estimates. Next a wooden 'mock-up' or full scale model of the plane is built to check the internal dimensions, headroom, clearances, and, in the case of large aircraft, the degree of comfort of the accommodations. In some instances, static load tests are conducted on typical structural assemblies. In the case of one very large airplane, a one-quarter-scale flying model was built and flown to enable the designers to work out as many of the unforeseen 'bugs' as possible before they risked full scale construction.

The usual practice, however, is to build a full scale airplane after the preliminary engineering, model testing, and mock-up work have been completed, and to turn it over to engineering flight test personnel for a grueling series of flights and checks under all conditions of weather in both summer and winter operation. In one instance a new transport plane developed trouble in operation because its hydraulic control system was not properly designed for extreme cold and the test flights had been made in the relatively warm seasons.

After completion of the test flights it is safe to begin tool design for quantity production and lofting of the many bits and pieces to make templates for their manufacture in quantity. But it is highly important that the tooling be kept flexible, because the designers will continue to make improvements and each design change affects other elements of the design and requires changes in production tooling. This is a basic difference between aircraft and automobile production. The automotive industry has been accustomed to turn out many thousands of identical products at a rate of a thousand or more per day in a single plant. The requirements even of our present vast aircraft production program are much smaller. The maximum rate of production of any single type required is about one per cent of the automotive rate for any given plant and the manufacturer must expect to make changes in the product along the way.

A typical example of the extent of engineering required in developing an airplane is the highly efficient North American Mustang fighter (P-51), which is a small, single-engine type. More than 60,000 engineering man-hours were expended and 2,800 drawings were made in the preliminary design. In the two-year period that followed, the modifications and improvements required 156,000 engineering man-hours, many change drawings, and 4,100 new drawings.

Another example, involving a larger plane, is that of the North American B-25 medium bomber used by General Doolittle in his raid on Tokyo. The first ship of this type was built at a cost of 156,000 engineering man-hours and 8,500 drawings. Since that first B-25 was built its range and bomb load have been doubled at an expenditure of 500,000 engineering man-hours, innumerable change drawings, and 11,000 new drawings.

These examples serve to show the unusually high cost in money and time involved in airplane design development and to explain the reason why most of the airplanes now in large volume production were conceived originally more than seven years ago.

This seemingly long development period is not characteristic of American design alone. The same development is necessary in any country in the world. As a matter of fact, a large number of the present German designs have had the benefit of much longer development periods and more extensive flying than our own planes. This was generally true up to several years ago when aeronautical engineers returning from visits to Germany reported these facts and laid the groundwork for even more thorough development here. One of the serious mistakes made by the Germans was an attempt to freeze some designs early in the war. As their 'frozen' types encountered continuously improving enemy planes they found themselves at a serious disadvantage and hastened to correct the situation by design changes.

Likewise in England, the airplanes we hear most about from the fighting fronts are designs initiated in the early thirties. And our long-range bombers which are doing such brilliant work on all the war fronts were conceived in the early thirties and, like the British planes, have been modified and improved many times since.

The types of aircraft in any nation's air force are dictated by the overall military strategy of that nation and this in turn is based upon the problems of defense that are characteristic of that nation. Our defense problem always has been different from that of an island-controlled empire like England, or a central power like Germany. Our ocean barriers were broad, our neighbors to the north and south were friendly, and the area of our homeland was very large. Our strategists, by instinct, realized that we might be called upon to defend an even larger area than our immediate country. Thinking in terms of great distances led them to think in terms of aircraft of great range. That is why development of long-range bombers began early and led us to the present state of unquestioned superiority in this type. The exceptionally high development of air transport in this country and the exacting demands of our airline operators contributed much to the development of efficient heavy load carrying types and led us to the point where we were able to achieve such high efficiency that our bombers have not only long range and heavy load-carrying capacity but remarkable high-speed performance as well. This, of course, was necessary to provide mobility for our striking power.

American and British Types.

While we were busy at work developing the greatest long-range bombers in the world, British designers were hard at work developing a type well fitted to their particular problem of defense. The center of their commerce and their culture, London, was only 20 miles removed from a foreign country. True it seemed unlikely that England and France would ever become enemies, but it was also logical to provide adequate defense for London against any possible turn of events. And so the British laid great emphasis on the development of the interceptor fighter type. This was to be a small, agile craft with all elements of performance subordinated to its rate of climb so it could gain the advantage of height over an enemy on very short notice. A long line of interceptor fighters, designed exclusively for the defense of London in the daytime, resulted in the highly developed Supermarine Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane of which we have heard so much in recent months.

At this point we should consider the comparative versatility of our bombers and the British interceptors. Fortunately we avoided the temptation of high specialization in our long-range bombers. We did not use all of their power for range and load-carrying and sacrificed a little of these elements for speed. Concurrently we developed a turbo supercharger to give the efficient high-altitude performance. And most important of all we gave them terrific fire power and sufficient armament to defend themselves, thereby reducing the necessity for extensive fighter escort. That is why our Japanese enemies call them multi-engined fighters. They have been successful also in performing bombing missions against well-defended enemy territory in Western Europe alone against not only anti-aircraft fire but enemy fighters. But that isn't all. Our bombers have been used with telling effect against the Japanese fleet in a role for which they were never intended — as torpedo planes. They have also been used for other missions which we are not at liberty to disclose.

On the other hand, the British interceptors possess comparatively little versatility. It did not take them long to control the situation while Britain was being bombed in daylight. But when the Germans changed their tactics to night bombing, the interceptors were handicapped first by their very speed, which made them land faster and more dangerously at night, and secondly by their lack of range or duration in the air and load carrying capacity. They could not stay aloft long enough to be of any great value; frequently night landing for refueling increased the risk of operation; and they had no place nor any capacity to carry the radio locator and its operator. So the British turned in desperation to a much larger plane, our old Douglas DB-7. When France was lost to the Nazi hordes, the British suddenly took new interest in our long-range bombers and rushed through several designs of their own, again designed for a highly specialized job — the bombing of Germany. And the Germans, having no benefit of lend-lease help, concentrated on the manufacture of their own long-range bomber types to reach out into the Atlantic and harass convoys.

Fighter Planes.

As a background for our air operations in the war, let us look briefly at the development of several typical aircraft in this country and abroad. Ancestor of our present Curtiss P-40 fighter was the Hawk 75, designated by the Army as P-36 and some of whose basic design features are found in the Japanese Zero fighter. The P-36 used the 850 h.p. Wright Cyclone radial air-cooled engine and had a speed of a little over 300 m.p.h. It was slower than the British Hurricane and Spitfire of the same period and a little faster than the German Messerschmitt Me-109 at the time. Then Willy Messerschmitt came along with the Me-109E which was considerably faster than the 109 and that led our Air Corps procurement officers to consider liquid-cooled V-type engines for our single-seat fighters. In 1938 the P-36 was redesigned for the Allison V-1710, which was then rated at 950 h.p., and then became the YP-37. Other modifications caused this model to be designated P-40 and production was started in 1940. During this period the war broke out and the French needed fighter planes among other types. Radial engines of 1,000 h.p. had become available and were placed in planes of the P-36 type making them the P-36 to our Army and the Hawk 75A to the French. In spite of its light armament, consisting of but .30-caliber machine guns, and its insufficient pilot and power-plant protection, this ship gave a good account of itself against the Me-109E and Heinkel 112. The P-36, long since considered obsolete by our Air Forces, could not fairly be compared with the much more heavily armed and armored Hurricane of the early months of the war. But they were available, and when France collapsed the British took over the remainder of the French orders for Hawk 75A's and used them very effectively in the Middle East.

Meanwhile P-40 development was progressing in the United States and the first of this liquid-cooled-engine-powered model had a top speed of approximately 365 m.p.h. The rated output of the Allison engine was increased to 1,150 h.p. and the P-40 developed rapidly through A, B, C, and D models in 1940, the E series in the summer of 1941. The D and E series carried much greater fire power than their predecessors (six .50-caliber machine guns) and soon added small bombs to its assortment of ammunition. Some of the performance gain from the increased power available was absorbed by this increase in fire power. Some was absorbed by the weight of protective armor plate and leak-proof fuel tanks. But its high speed increased in spite of all this. It had become a worthy companion to the Hurricane 11B and the British gave it a new name — the Kittyhawk when it was just a fighter and Kittybomber when it carried a bomb.

Chief disadvantage in the P-40D design was a weakness in service ceiling although it is still performing at medium altitudes on almost all of the war fronts. This was corrected in the P-40F (Warhawk) series which is powered by the 1,210 h.p. Rolls-Royce Merlin XX (manufactured in this country by Packard) and equipped with a two-speed supercharger which increases the service ceiling to between 20,000 and 25,000 ft. All this development had been going on here while the Japanese contented themselves with a fighter only slightly better than our old P-36 and while they devoted each new increment in power of their available engines to performance alone, instead of a proper balance between performance and ruggedness.

The trend toward the liquid-cooled engine in the late thirties gave us the Bell P-39, single seat, single engine Interceptor Pursuit designed in 1937, with its radical design involving a rear engine location with a drive shaft passing forward through the cockpit and leaving the nose unobstructed for the installation of the 37 mm. automatic cannon, which is the heaviest armament so far installed in any airplane. This ship also carries .30- and .50-caliber machine guns, and sometimes 20 mm. cannon are used instead of the 37 mm. type. Ground handling is facilitated by the use of a tricycle landing gear which enables the airplane to maintain flying position while landing and taxiing. P-39's (Airacobras) are actively participating in the war on many fronts.

Another fighter of the liquid-cooled engine family is the single-engine P-51 (North American Mustang) whose performance is enhanced by the application of the laminar flow type of wing section, a new technical development providing increased aerodynamic efficiency by improving the air flow pattern over the wing surfaces. The P-51 already has made itself felt over Germany and on other fronts.

Power available was doubled in the Lockheed P-38 Pursuit, called Lightning by the British, by incorporating two Allison engines in the design, reducing the size of the fuselage and attaching the tail surfaces on booms. This conception is comparable to the Messerschmitt 110 which appeared on the western front fairly early in the war. The P-38 first attracted attention when, in the course of its test flights, it established a West-East transcontinental record of slightly more than 7 hours. The present production version, P-38, has the advantage of high altitude operation because its Allison engines are equipped with turbosuperchargers. It has come into extensive use during 1942 and it performed brilliantly in the defense against the Japanese attempt upon Dutch Harbor. It is one of the favorites of the Russians and has helped them in many of their valuable contributions to the war.

By the time this document is printed we will be hearing much of the exploits of the Republic P-47 (Thunderbolt), with its 2,000-h.p. radial engine, and a companion Navy Fighter, the Vought-Sikorsky (F4U), also powered by the same engine. Both these airplanes are the descendants of brilliant ancestors.

The P-47 was developed from the P-35, which became the P-43 (Lancer) when 1,200 h.p. radial engines and turbosuperchargers became available. Unlike our other fighters it did not use a liquid cooled engine at any point in its development. The step following the P-43 stage was to have been a P-44 with a 1,350 h.p. radial engine and six .50 caliber machine guns but new technical developments came on so rapidly that this excellent design never passed the mock-up stage and was replaced by the XP-47, designed in the fall of 1940 and test-flown in the spring of 1941. Design changes were rapid, and, as this is written, the P-47 is in production at several plants. The turbosupercharger makes this ship a high altitude fighter and its 2,000 h.p. gives it a speed in excess of 400 m.p.h. Its armament in general consists of at least 6 or 8 .50 caliber machine guns.

From the foregoing it can be seen that available engines have had a strong influence on the design of aircraft and will continue to do so. Our 2,000 h.p. radial air-cooled engines, now in quantity production by both aviation and automotive manufacturers, have no peer anywhere in the world. As this is written, much more powerful engines are also in production and still more powerful types are being tested. Many experimental aircraft now being tested, make use of the increased power afforded by these new engines. The latest German fighter plane, the Focke-Wulf 190, which made its first appearance in the war in the summer of 1942, is powered by an air-cooled radial engine, the BMW-801 which is rated at approximately 1,625 h.p.

The BMW (Bavarian Motor Works) -801 is a 14-cylinder twin-row radial engine of the direct fuel-injection type and is soon to be replaced by the model 802, an 18-cylinder model which develops 2,000 h.p.

A power-driven fan provides pressure-cooling in the tight cowling installation of the 801 in the FW-190 plane. Cylinder arrangement is staggered with the bottom cylinder of the front row and top cylinder of the rear row in vertical position. A two-speed mechanical supercharger with a hydraulically-operated clutch mechanism is used. In accord with the usual German practice the engine has no carburetor. The fuel-injection pump is probably the first multi-plunger high-pressure type built for production in radial form.

Overall diameter of the 801 is 50 in., length 58 in.; bore is 6.15 in. and stroke 6.15 in. Propeller used on the FW-190 is a 13 ft. 3-blade constant-speed type. The switch to air-cooled engines in fighter planes reflects a reversal in German design policy and may indicate that their liquid-cooled engine development has reached a plateau.

The present German fighter Focke-Wulf 190, like our fighters and those of the British, goes back to 1934, when the FW-159 was designed. The present version of the plane has a high speed of approximately 375 m.p.h.

Latest of the Messerschmitt single-engine fighter types is the 109G, a high-altitude type, powered with the Daimler Benz 603 engine of 1,600-1,700 h.p., and partially armored. Armament consists of three cannon and two machine guns. This design has evolved from the 650 h.p. model of 1936 and the several increases in power have increased the speed from 265 to 365 m.p.h. When the E model showed up poorly against Russian equipment in 1941, the F, with its protective armor plate, appeared.

The third in importance of the German single-seater fighters is the Heinkel He-113, which appeared at the beginning of the war and was so efficiently designed that its high speed was too great and its landing speed proportionally great. After many fatal accidents where landing facilities were inadequate it was redesigned. Power plant of the He-113 is the liquid-cooled DB-603 engine, rated at 1,300 h.p.

The British believe in a lot of little machine guns and the Hurricane and Spitfire carry at least eight .30-caliber types and sometimes more. Other types have combinations of .30-caliber machine guns and 20 mm. cannon, while the Hurricane 11c and Spitfire Vc have four 20 mm. cannon.

The philosophy of heavy armament for British fighters has been in force since 1934, when the Air Ministry called for bids on single-seat fighters to carry 8 guns. The Hurricane and Spitfire were test flown two years later and some production models were built in 1937. A few appeared in squadrons in 1938. Speed of the first Hurricane was 335 m.p.h. and the first Spitfire, 365 m.p.h., with the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. Through successive stages of development these planes have increased their load and speed through continuously more powerful engines. Latest model of the Spitfire shows a substantial increase in service ceiling.

The British also have a twin-engine fighter comparable to the Me-110 and Lockheed P-38. It is the Bristol Beaufighter. Its first models were powered by radial air-cooled engines — the 1,150-h.p., 14-cylinder Bristol Hercules. Speed, climb, and ceiling of the latest Beaufighter, Mark II, have been improved by switching to the new liquid-cooled Rolls-Royce Merlin XX.

Superior in speed, range, climb, and maneuverability but inferior in ruggedness, fire power, and pilot protection is the Mitsubishi 00, which worried us a little until we found how readily it disintegrated in the air. Top speed is about 340 m.p.h. with a 14-cylinder radial air-cooled engine developing about 1,000 h.p.

Before leaving the principal fighter types it should be mentioned that the maximum speed performance of all of them has been considered far more important than it really is and that a plateau probably has been reached in high speed performance — at least until we learn more about the physiological factors involved in acceleration of the human body. Angular acceleration, as in a turn at high speed, has the same 'blackout' effect on pilots as that experienced when pulling out of a dive and it is therefore necessary to turn very gradually at the high top speeds of present single seat fighters. Consequently, if the fighter pilot misses his first shot at the enemy, he may not be able to come back until it is too late to rejoin battle.

The additional demands in load and range are also detracting from high speed performance and justly so. But finally it should be remembered that single-seat fighters are limited to quick interception of enemy craft in the daytime or to escort of bombing planes and, in the latter type of mission, their short range is a disadvantage because it prevents them from following their bombers far into enemy territory and their protection is lost where it is needed most. And that brings us to the consideration of the longer-range or night-fighter type which overlaps the category of light bombardment planes.

Already we have discussed the Bristol Beaufighter, Messerschmitt 110, and Lockheed P-38. But we have made only passing mention of one of the most versatile airplane types, the Douglas A-20, which was called DB-7 by the French. Designed originally as a light bomber or attack plane for contour flying, the A-20 in various versions has been used also as a night fighter and dive bomber. It is powered by two Wright Cyclone 1,700 h.p., 14-cylinder radial air-cooled engines and has a very substantial speed and range and is therefore useful as an escort for bombing missions. Its versatility has endeared it to both the British and the Russians as well as to our own Air Force pilots.

First war appearance of a new British light bomber called the Mosquito created much interest because of its ability to outrun the German FW-190 fighters. The Mosquito, built by De Haviland (DH-98), is a development of the Comet of 1934 and is of wood construction. It carries a crew of two and its armament consists of four 20 mm. cannon and four .30-caliber machine guns. This type of ship was later used to bomb Berlin ironically during Goering's speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power. Goering had assured the German people that they would never be bombed.

Long-Range Bombers.

Next in importance and interest are the bombing planes of the present war and chief interest is centered around the large long-range bombers which have operated so effectively. At present we have two basic types — the Boeing Flying Fortress (B-17) and the Consolidated Liberator (B-24). These ships date back in development to the middle thirties and have undergone many modifications and improvements. They are similar in performance and have top speeds almost as great as many of the fast single-seat fighters, or well above 300 m.p.h. These ships have been designed for precision high-altitude long-range bombing in daylight, a tactical philosophy discredited by many observers until its effectiveness was first proved by our Air Force Bomber Command in England in highly successful daylight raids over Lille early in October of 1942.

It should be emphasized that these ships were not designed for the purpose of bombing Germany from England as are the British heavy bombers such as the Avro Lancaster, which is the latest ship of this type. The Lancaster carries nearly twice the bomb load of our B-17, which is about 4 tons, but both the B-17F and B-24 excel in all other basic elements of performance. Earlier British heavy bombers are the Handley Page Halifax and Short Stirling.

When the first B-17 was designed in 1934 it was powered by four 850-h.p. Wright Cyclone engines. Power of these engines has been increased to 1,250 h.p. each. The present B-17E has a large number of .50-caliber machine guns and power driven turrets as well as armor plate and leak proof tanks for its protection. Germany is well behind the international parade in 4-engine bomber development, with her two types; the Focke-Wulf Kurier and Heinkel 177 have not been used as extensively as most other types in the war so far.

Medium Bombers.

Our medium bombers of the twin engined type already have distinguished themselves in this war. The two general types upon which our Air Forces have concentrated are the North American B-25 and Martin B-26. In the case of the latter design, a considerable period of time was saved in development by tooling up for production while design development and test flying was still going on. Although some changes had to be made on the production line the time saving amounted to about two years, and the ship has made a brilliant contribution to victory not only as the most powerful plane of its class in the war (two 2,000-h.p. Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasps) but in missions for which it was not primarily intended. When the full story of its performance as a torpedo plane in the Aleutians and at Midway can be told, the wisdom of getting it into action in record time will be amply justified. Its presence in the above mentioned actions have made an important contribution to the favorable shift in the balance of sea power in the Pacific.

Most spectacular action involving the North American B-25 was the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. When the complete details of that expedition are available and the location of 'Shangri-La,' the base from which they took off, is made known, it will be apparent that these airplanes, too, were performing a function for which they had not been designed. Power plant of the B-25 consists of two 14-cylinder, 1,700-h.p. Wright Cyclone engines.

The time saved in getting the B-26 into production was also important from another point of view. It enabled us to get a medium-range bomber with two 2,000 h.p. engines into service while the Germans were still plodding along with the development of such a ship. Naturally their program called for the installation of the BMW-802 engine in a twin-engine bomber as soon as the engine became available. The type selected was the Dornier Do-217E2 and accordingly experimental 802 engines were installed in a prototype. As this is written we know that this experimental combination is available but we do not believe it to be in quantity production. At any rate, it has not been used in the war to date. The model at present in service is the Dornier Do-217E1, which is powered by two 1,600-h.p. engines. Other German bombers in service in the war are the Dornier Do-217E2 and the Heinkel 111K.

Typical of British twin engine bombers are the Handley Page Hampden (Flying Suitcase), the Bristol Blenheim, and the Vickers Wellington.

The Hampden, which also has been built in Canada, is powered by two 980-h.p. Bristol Pegasus XVIII radial air-cooled engines. It carries a crew of four persons. Available as a day bomber or multi-seat fighter, the Bristol Blenheim has somewhat higher performance than the Hampden. It is powered by two of the later and more compact Bristol Mercury XV engines, also of the radial air-cooled type. Most interesting structurally is the Vickers-Wellington medium bomber because of its Vickers-Wallis geodetic construction. This 'egg shell' structure, with its criss-cross wooden members arranged along geodetic lines, provides an exceptionally high strength-weight ratio. In the Wellington design, this weight saving is absorbed principally by fuel capacity, which gives the aircraft exceptional range. Latest version of this design is the Wellington III powered by two 1,370-h.p. Bristol Hercules twin-row radial sleeve-valve engines.

Cargo Planes.

In the furor of discussion about air-cargo planes, the general public has lost sight of the fact that the aviation industry of the United States has developed one of the most efficient air-cargo carriers in the world today.

This airplane was designed originally as a transport several years ago and one of its characteristics is a highly efficient structure, which combined with excellent aerodynamic design provides excellent performance for a twin-engine airplane. When our defense program was started, the Curtiss-Wright transport had not yet been used on the airlines, and was converted to a cargo carrier designated by the Army the C-46 and called the Curtiss Commando. It is a twin-engine type having a gross weight of 40,000 lb. Its carrying capacity provides for a large number of air infantry men with equipment and its size is sufficient to accommodate small motor vehicles. This airplane has achieved a new low in ton-mile operating cost. A modification of this design having a plywood structure is designated C-76.

The outbreak of the war found the Douglas DC-4 40-passenger transport about to go into service on a number of airlines, and this ship, with its gross weight of 52,000 lb. and its four engines was converted to a cargo carrier and designated the C-54. It is now in very substantial production.

Another four-engine landplane which was in service on two of the airlines at the outbreak of the war was the 45,000-lb. Boeing Stratoliner. These airplanes were taken over by the Army and are now being used for passenger and cargo carrying. It is designated the 307. Both the Boeing Flying Fortress and the Consolidated Liberator (B-17 and B-24) bombers are readily convertible to cargo carrying, and whether or not they are produced as bombers or cargo carriers is a decision that must be made by our strategists on the basis of need. In gross weight, both of these airplanes fall between the Boeing Stratoliner and the Douglas C-54, the figure being in the neighborhood of 47,000 lb.

A number of smaller airplanes have been converted to cargo carriers and chief among these is the Douglas DC-3 which has been familiar to airline travelers for the last few years. By substituting wider doors, reinforcing floors and eliminating seats, the DC-3 becomes a very dependable load carrier. It is designated by the Army as the C-47. Its gross weight is 26,000 lb. and its cargo load 3,000 to 5,000 lb., depending on range.

Similarly the 8,500-lb. twin-engine Lockheed Lodestar, which was beginning to go into service when the war started, may be used as a cargo carrier where small loads and high speeds are required. The twin-engine Beechcraft of 7,500 lb. gross, which was used as a command ship and for aerial photography, is also available, as is the obsolete Boeing 247-D which was in service on the airlines in the middle thirties.

Our transoceanic seaplanes are also well adapted to cargo carrying and hundreds of trips across both oceans have been made by the Clipper ships of the Boeing 314A class. This 84,000-lb. flying boat was the largest available when the war began. Designed for non-stop transatlantic operation is the Vought Sikorsky VS-44A which is now in service on the transportation of both passengers and cargo. Several steps forward in size have been taken in the design of the Douglas B-19 landplane and the Martin Mars. These airplanes are both flying but have not yet been placed in quantity production. Their gross weight is approximately 140,000 lb. The Douglas B-19 is powered by four engines and has wing span of 212 ft. The Mars is comparable in dimensions, weight and power plant distribution, the essential difference being that it is a seaplane. Although these airplanes are nearing the stage where they will be ready for quantity production it is probable that we will make use of the technical lessons in their design and development in an intermediate class of bombing planes which will be produced before the very large ships are manufactured in quantities.

Shrouded in deep secrecy is the Lockheed Constellation, the design of which was started as a transport plane. This landplane, which was test flown early in 1943, has been dubbed the Tokyo Express and you will undoubtedly hear more about it in the near future.

But the aircraft of the 140,000-lb. class are not by any means the largest in the minds of designers. More than five years ago Colonel Lindbergh, when he was technical consultant for Pan American Airways, asked the aircraft manufacturers for airplanes large enough to carry 200 passengers and sufficient fuel and comfort for non-stop transoceanic operations, and at least four manufacturers responded with preliminary designs — designs that are now on the drawing boards waiting for orders. In this connection a recent quotation from Glenn L. Martin is interesting. Mr. Martin said:

'The only limit to the size of aircraft is the cargo available for them to carry.'

Manufacturing.

Although the aviation manufacturing industry accomplished an industrial miracle in 1942, that year in a sense marked only the beginning of a vast program which is being performed on schedule. The year 1940 was devoted chiefly to the creation of production facilities and their partial utilization. In 1942 most of the new construction was completed and a large part of it was used. The year 1943 will see the full utilization of all of the facilities and another doubling of production in units and a four-fold increase in total weight of equipment produced.

Materials and Labor Shortages.

Shortages of materials and, to a lesser extent, labor, interfered with the production program during 1942. The labor shortages were aggravated by conflicting pronouncements from various agencies in Washington, regarding the status of aviation workers in their Selective Service obligations. As a result of the uncertainties in the minds of the workers, many were led to the belief that they should enlist voluntarily in the armed forces in order to be able to do the work for which they were best fitted in the war effort. Finally, the situation reached such proportions that the Secretaries of War and Navy issued a joint statement reminding aircraft workers of the importance of their contribution in their civilian jobs and requesting them to refrain from voluntary enlistment and to wait until they were called to military service. Promise of a more specific basis for allocation of manpower came with the announcement on Dec. 6 of reorganization of the Federal Manpower Commission to include the Selective Service System, all under the direction of Manpower Commission Chairman Paul V. McNutt. Industrial stability was improved by a concurrent announcement limiting the draft age to 38.

A more serious shortage in labor might have developed if the industry had not suffered from the shortages in materials and so-called government-furnished equipment. This situation posed a new dilemma for some aviation manufacturers. When materials were scarce, management was forced to decide whether or not to lay off workers. A layoff in these times frequently means permanent loss of trained personnel to other defense industries. If workers are kept on with little to do, there is usually a certain degree of demoralization in the organization of which they are a part.

A very appreciable rise in the percentage of woman workers was noted in 1942. As this is written the proportion of women in one airframe plant has reached 73 per cent. By the middle of 1942 the average percentages of women workers in the airframe, engine, and propeller industries was 9, 5, and 3 with some individual plants at much higher levels. It is reasonable to expect these figures to reach 40, 20, and 10 on the average, and already they have gone very much higher in special instances. As the year closed the number of women in aircraft plants had reached 120,000 and was rising rapidly.

The presence of women in aviation plants has had an important effect not only on the design of plants and machinery, but on policies and practices in these factories. One basic requirement demanded that plant layouts be changed to provide rest-room facilities. Tools and equipment have been redesigned to make work easier and simpler, and these changes have also reduced fatigue and increased efficiency of male workers. More frequent rest periods was another result of the utilization of women workers and experience tends to indicate that this does not detract from production.

Many delicate operations are now being performed and complicated machine tools being operated by women. In some inspection operations and on work requiring particular manual dexterity, the ladies have been found to excel. One Canadian manufacturer has had excellent results in training unskilled women workers by interpreting shop practice to them in terms with which they are familiar. For example he teaches them the metric system in terms of dollars and cents.

It was believed generally by the public that conversion of other manufacturing facilities, particularly automotive, would result in an almost instantaneous torrent of airplanes and equipment. This, of course, could not possibly be true as a practical matter and it was extremely unfortunate for all branches of industry that this public impression was permitted to persist.

Problem of Tools.

Actually the tools in an automobile factory that can be used in building aircraft or aviation engines were found to average about 20 per cent, in no case to exceed 35 per cent, and frequently they ran as low as 15 per cent. In most cases it was impractical to use existing automotive plants and new ones had to be built. The chief fruits of automotive conversion were the yields of management and labor. By mid-year the larger automobile companies had active labor forces, 80 per cent engaged in munitions manufacturing, which equaled the numbers employed at their previous peak. As the year closed the automotive labor force was well on its way to a figure between 50 and 100 per cent greater than ever before.