Business conditions in 1941 were the result of mounting Government orders for defense products and a boom in private business. As such they were unusually favorable to increasing wages and employment. Market forces and the demands of organized labor combined to raise wages continuously throughout the year. Wage concessions won from large industrial corporations, such as General Motors and United States Steel, spread to other industries and in the fall reached the railroad employees. During the twelve months the average hourly earnings of factory labor advanced roughly 15 per cent. Railroad labor's rates rose about the same amount. At the turn of the year American wages stood at the highest point for all times. Factory employees were receiving about 80 cents an hour; bituminous coal miners more than one dollar; and employees in the heavy industries, such as automobiles, close to $1.20.
These increases in wages far exceeded the rise in the cost of living. For some time living costs remained comparatively stable. But during 1941 they began steadily to rise. By December they had advanced nearly 10 per cent.
Employment and payrolls likewise recorded notable gains. Total civil non-agricultural employment increased from 37,500,000 to 40,700,000, or by more than 3,000,000, from November 1940 to November 1941. Manufacturing employment, in the same period, advanced 17 per cent. Expanding hours of work coupled with advancing wage rates and increasing employment accounted for still greater increases in aggregate wage disbursements, or payrolls. Thus while employment in factory industries increased 17 per cent, payrolls expanded 42 per cent.
These impressive movements in wages and purchasing power focused more and more attention on wage policy and its relation to threatened price inflation. Since the payments going to wage-earners and lower salaried workers accounted for more than 70 per cent of the national income, the rise in wages became the source of widespread fears of impending inflation. Inflationary price movements appeared all the more threatening because it was a foregone conclusion that, with the expansion of war production, the supply of civilian goods would become increasingly limited. Increased purchasing power, therefore, could be expected swiftly and cumulatively to bid up prices. Strict price control, combined with a policy of wage stabilization and steep taxes on labor income, was generally advocated. But organized labor successfully resisted the attempts to put a ceiling on wages.
The 40-hour week remained in force. Extra hours took the form of overtime for which employees received time and one half rates. The average hours worked by factory employees during the year were approximately 43 per week, but the machine tool industry worked more than 50 hours. Increased output was achieved mainly by the use of second and third shifts. After our declaration of war, there was a strong demand for the operation of plants 7 days a week. This measure required the use of swing shifts, whereby all employees worked 5 days a week but alternated in working on Saturdays and Sundays. The installation of the 7-day week was delayed by the demands of the unions that Sunday work be compensated at double the week-day rate. This issue was unsettled at the year's end.
The most notable change in working conditions was the gradual spread of the closed shop in American industry. The large companies succeeded in preventing its introduction into their plants. But whether they will be equally successful in 1942 depends largely on the policy of the Federal Government. See also BUSINESS; LABOR ARBITRATION; LABOR LEGISLATION; STRIKES.
No comments:
Post a Comment