1941: Spain

Economic Distress.

Throughout 1941 all phases of Spanish life tended to center around the all important subject of food. By the beginning of the year serious undernourishment which had been prevalent in certain areas since the close of the Civil War, had become general, and failed to improve as the months wore on. The provinces were worse off than the capital and most miserable of all were the regions of Barcelona and Andalusia where starvation and unemployment reached alarming proportions. Not only was bread adulterated until it became almost uneatable and rationed, when obtainable at all, to a loaf of three ounces daily per person, but other staples such as olive oil, sugar, butter, lard, potatoes, rice, meat, milk, eggs, and tobacco threatened to vanish from the market or commanded such prices as put them out of the reach of any but the well-to-do. The general scarcity was aggravated by unevenness of distribution of such supplies as the peninsula possessed. The breakdown of communications, due to the lack of gasoline, coal and rolling stock and the deterioration of the roads, aided in producing a situation where one region might have an over-supply of certain articles while others were in great need of them.

Government decrees covering every phase of production, transportation and sale of food stuffs and basic commodities, the extensive use of ration cards, the fixing of prices and the imposition of heavy fines on hoarders and bootleggers, all attempted to ameliorate the difficulties but met with little success. Unemployment spread, the number of beggars in the streets increased enormously, prices rose and general misery engulfed the nation. Among the most notable of the measures designed to cope with the situation were two that were taken late in January 1941, when the principal railroads were placed under government ownership and operation and a decree attempted to place responsibility for feeding workers on the shoulders of such key industries as mining, steel manufacturing and textile works by ordering them to maintain stores where their employees could obtain primary necessities.

The populace, generally, found the situation difficult to understand. Spain in the old days, while not a land of abundance, had always produced enough to feed itself. Even during the Civil War Nationalist Spain had had plenty to eat. In explanation the government emphasized the fact that during the war period much of the agricultural land had been allowed to lie fallow, much of the live stock had been killed off, and badly-needed fertilizers could not be imported because of the strictness of the British blockade. The exhaustion of surplus stocks in the shops, unusually bad storms and insect plagues were also pointed to as factors in the situation. Critics of the government, however, laid stress on the continued export of food and basic raw materials to Germany in payment for the help given to the Franco cause during the war. They also blamed the smaller acreage under cultivation and the reduced crops, estimated at one half of the normal, on the continued detention in the jails, concentration camps and labor gangs of numerous agricultural laborers who had been Republican sympathizers.

The long-continued undernourishment, wide spread unhappiness, poverty and misery had the natural effect of rendering the population unable to cope with the huge task of rebuilding the areas that the Civil War had left desolate. Although a rebuilding program had been elaborated in a law of March 1939, and placed under a special Credit Institute for National Reconstruction, through which loans could be obtained on easy terms, and compulsion had been placed on all males between the ages of 18 and 65 to contribute annually fifteen days labor, or its equivalent, to the national task, all neutral observers throughout 1941 agreed that the ruined cities remained in much the same state as the civil struggle had left them. Rehabilitation must evidently wait on a full bread basket. Success in economic reconstruction was also hampered by inadequate funds due to the smaller output of industrial establishments which were suffering from the absence in exile of thousands of skilled artisans as well as the reduced energies of the workers. Returns in taxes were low and more than half the budget continued to be allotted to the armed forces.

Educational and Religious Matters.

Progress in extending educational facilities and providing for adequate social security would also, it was evident, be delayed until the return of economic prosperity. Religious instruction in the schools, however, has been restored as in the days prior to the establishment of the Republic. It is under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church which in this as in many other fields has been reinstated by the Nationalist government in its former privileged position. Recognized once again as the established church with the salary of its clergy a charge on state revenues, its favorite policies are again the order of the day; cemeteries are again under church supervision; divorce is prohibited; civil marriage restricted, and the religious orders, including the wealthy Jesuits, have been restored to their legal status and properties. A long controversy with the Vatican over the question of the appointment of the higher ecclesiastics reached a decision in June. A concordat was finally signed in which the Pope agreed to recognize the possession by the present Spanish government of the right, formerly enjoyed by the King, to appoint the Spanish bishops, subject to papal confirmation. As some seventy Spanish sees, including that of Toledo, had fallen vacant this agreement was of considerable immediate importance. The Franco government took the position that it wished to insure that the church in Spain should be a truly national Spanish church.

Political Situation.

Politically, Spain continued organized in 1941 as under the decrees of August and December, 1939. These provided for a Caudillo in whose hands rest the supreme military and civil authority of the state. His decrees are law. He is assisted by a ministry and is advised by an appointed national council of 100 delegates. Behind the government, and almost indistinguishable from it, is the single, all-powerful political party of the Falange Espanola whose executive body, or junta, is headed by Serrano Suñer, General Franco's brother-in-law. Since last autumn Serrano Suñer has held the two important posts of Minister of Government (of the interior) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is said to be higher in favor in Berlin than General Franco himself. With the government and the Falangist party the army is closely integrated, though it leans closer to General Franco than to Serrano Suñer. Under this central set-up each province is provided with a council as are also all city and rural districts. Nationalist Spain of today is thus highly centralized and prides itself on being well on the way to the elimination of the traditional regionalism that has for centuries been an outstanding feature of Spanish life. All manifestations looking toward local autonomy are now heavily frowned upon. The dominant Falangist party aims to control every aspect of the state through its power in the various national services. Anyone wanting employment, for example, must be known favorably at party headquarters.

Abdication and Death of Alfonso.

This political set-up was not appreciably affected by the death, in Rome on Feb. 28, of former King Alfonso, and the events that preceded and followed it. About a month previous to his death Alfonso had abdicated in favor of his son, Don Juan. In an address 'for the last time to all Spaniards' dated Jan. 15, 1941, the former King declared that he was convinced that 'the magnificent epic of the liberation of Spain ... opens the way to the solidarity of all the people for their unity, liberty and greatness'; that as 'by the inexorable law of circumstances perhaps my person would be an obstacle' he had decided to 'disappear for the good of Spain and offer my fatherland the renunciation of my rights' and 'designate Prince Don Juan, who will be tomorrow, when Spain judges it to be opportune, the King of all the Spaniards.'

This step appears to have been taken without encouragement from either General Franco or the Spanish Falangists. The latter are opposed to the return of any monarch. If General Franco himself at times thinks that a restoration of the monarchy might be a means of allaying the bitter internal dissensions, he is restrained, not only by the Falangists but by the disapproval of his former ally, Adolf Hitler, who does not look favourably on a proposal to place on the throne of Spain a man whose education was that of an English naval officer. King Alfonso in his abdication document had appealed directly to the Spanish people. But neither this appeal, nor an address made on March 7 by Don Juan (who uses the title, Count of Barcelona), to 200 Spanish monarchists promising that when the day comes, 'as it will come soon,' he will be ready to return to Spain, had any noticeable effect on the political situation in Spain. The monarchists, once a powerful factor in the Franco movement, are now weak and divided. The country under General Franco had, it would seem, definitely taken the Fascist road of dictatorship.

At the time of the king's death the royal family was in possession of all its former private holdings in Spain, as these, estimated at $8,500,000, had been restored by General Franco shortly after the cessation of hostilities.

Temporary burial of King Alfonso's body was made in the Spanish church of Montserrat in Rome to await the time when it might be deemed politically wise to have it removed to the royal sarcophagus in the Escorial, the traditional burial place for Spanish kings. The Franco government decreed national mourning. In one church of every Spanish diocese a memorial service was held for the former king; that in Madrid was attended by General Franco and members of the Cabinet.

That the real political issue in Spain was not the choice between a Fascist régime and a restoration of monarchy, but between General Franco's brand of Fascism and Serrano Suñer's more pro-Axis Fascism, was made clear early in May when there occurred a series of political shake-ups affecting the Spanish army and police. These had the effect of strengthening the existing régime as they placed army men, favorable to General Franco, in key positions. The changes did not, however, imply any liberalizing of the government.

Relations With Axis Powers.

Nationalist Spain's relations with the Axis powers, always sympathetic, became more cordial and whole-hearted with the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. Indeed Spain's sympathy with the Nazi cause and her consequent policy amounting, as one observer remarked, to 'pro-Axis non-belligerency,' became as outspoken as the necessities of her food situation, the relief of which depended on Great Britain and the United States, permitted.

The most dramatic item of the year in the relations between Spain and Italy was a meeting held in February between General Franco and Mussolini. This was the first occasion on which these two dictators had personally met. To the accompaniment of widespread preventive arrests, General Franco, with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, travelled through unoccupied France to a meeting, on Feb. 12, with Il Duce at Bordighera in northern Italy. The meeting was hedged about with extraordinary censorial obstacles and its exact significance could only be guessed at. According to the official report the conversations resulted in 'a complete identity of views concerning all the problems of European character interesting these two countries in the present historic moment,' and the outside world was left to speculate whether the two Fascist leaders had met merely to demonstrate their cordial relations or to discuss the possibility of Spain's immediate entrance into the war and plan its details. On their return journey through France from Italy the two Spaniards were met by Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan at Montpellier where further conferences were held.

Perhaps it is to be noted that the meeting at Bordighera preceded by a day the announcement of King Alfonso's abdication which had been executed three weeks earlier, while two weeks after the interview, on Feb. 27, Italy presented her bill for aiding the Insurgents in the Spanish Civil War. This immense bill, for armaments which the Italian leader long denied to the world at large that he was sending at all, amounted to 5,500,000,000 lire and was to be paid in twenty-four annual installments. The items in this account disclose that Italy had sent to Spain 763 planes, 1,414 motors, 1,672 tons of bombs, 9,250,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,930 cannon, 10,135 automatic guns, 240,747 small arms, 7,514,537 rounds of artillery ammunition, 324,900,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 7,668 motor vehicles. The statement further set forth that 91 Italian warships had been engaged in Spanish war actions, 92 other ships had ferried materials, and Italian submarines had accounted for 72,800 tons of hostile shipping. Commenting on this bill a former foreign minister of Republican Spain pointed out that it corroborated the Republican claim that the Spanish Civil War had not been won by General Franco but by his Axis partners, and he reminded the world that the Italian figures were triple those that Premier Negrin had deemed necessary to win the last decisive battle of Catalonia and had vainly asked France to supply.

In Spain's relations with Germany the principal items in the year's record were: the sending of a steady stream of food stuffs and raw materials, especially minerals, from Spain to Germany despite the starving conditions in the peninsula; the presence in Spain of large numbers of German 'tourists,' declared by many to number between 80,000 and 100,000 men; and the persistent rumor that German troops might at any moment, judged proper by Hitler, march through Spain to attack Gibraltar. Preparations seemingly directed towards an attack on the famous fortress were reported as going steadily forward under the direction of numerous German technicians. The goal apparently was to encircle the Rock by modern batteries of long range guns located on Spanish soil to the north and west of the fortress and at Ceuta in Africa. These, combined with fire from mobile batteries, aerial attacks from new aeroplane bases in southern Spain and from hydroplane bases located north of Cartagena, and backed by naval support based on the Spanish naval port of Ferrol, were expected to bring about the capture of the fortress. The repair of military roads leading to Gibraltar and Morocco was also reported as being given special attention as a preliminary step to a large-scale Nazi military movement southward. However, Hitler's fear of becoming responsible for the feeding of a starving population of 20,000,000 Spaniards, and the danger to German troops from wide-spread typhus, were thought by observers to be strong considerations that might well deter him.

Relations with England and the United States.

The relations of Spain with England and the United States in 1941 were marked by periodic outbursts of press and government attacks against these nations as responsible for the food situation in Spain. England, as the sovereign of Gibraltar and the power lying across the path of Spanish ambitions in Africa, was especially unpopular despite her persistent policy of appeasement. As the year opened angry recriminations were being hurled at England as responsible for the withdrawal of a purported American loan to Spain of $100,000,000. It was widely rumored that the British ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, had become convinced that Spain's conduct in dissolving the international administration at Tangiers and incorporating the territory with Spanish Morocco, as well as her harsh treatment of British nationals and suspicious war preparations in the peninsula, indicated that the Spanish government would enter the war on the Axis side, and had caused him to press for an adverse American decision in regard to the loan. Repeatedly, in the following months, the Spaniards accused the British of granting navicerts for the passage through the blockade of foodstuffs, from the United States and Argentina, only in return for promises from Spain that she would not take action detrimental to British interests. Both Serrano Suñer and General Franco made strong public protests against British and American policy of thus using Spain's food difficulties to further their political purposes. On Jan. 11 Serrano Suñer, speaking in Barcelona, expressed his government's determination to get food from abroad without hampering conditions. In July General Franco openly denounced the United States for refusing to aid Spain in her hour of need, declaring 'behind the generous appearance was always the attempt to interfere with our policy, which was incompatible with our sovereignty and dignity.' He strongly warned the United States to keep out of European affairs. A few weeks after this outburst, Arriba, Serrano Suñer's propaganda organ, launched another attack on America, accusing it of plotting to muster a Spanish Republican army under the leadership of General Miaja, in exile in Mexico, for the purpose of capturing the Canary Islands. This charge was promptly denied in Washington and Mexico. In September reports were rife that the fortifications of these strategic islands were being strengthened.

Spain and the Vichy Government.

Spain's relations with Vichy France through 1941 continued to bear chiefly on the subject of the Spanish republican refugees still living north of the Pyrenees. Approximately 150,000 Spaniards continued to prefer the miseries of exile, even in French shelter centers, concentration camps and on public works in French North Africa, to a return to Spain where the government still refused to consider amnesty a practical policy to apply to its erstwhile opponents. Instead Franco continued to keep many thousands in concentration camps and prisons. Throughout the year trials of notable republican leaders, the majority of whom were already in exile, went on before the Tribunals of Political Responsibilities. Such legal measures condemned Largo Cabellero, Diego Martínez Barrio, Alcala Zamora, Miguel Azaña, Julio Alvarez del Vayo and a number of others to pay fines amounting in many cases to their entire fortunes, and imposed sentences of exile of 15 years or more with loss of citizenship. Such sentences naturally did not encourage the return to Spain of republicans of lesser note. Demands from Spain for extradition from France were usually heard before the French Accusations Court at Aix and were generally turned down. However, Spain's influence at Vichy was sufficient, together with that of Germany, to prevent the departure of many refugees from France to asylums in Latin America where it was though their influence would be detrimental to the interests of the Fascist Powers.

Position at Close of 1941.

Spain at the close of the year 1941 presented the appearance of a land suffering from famine and police persecution, with its one political party strongly pro-Axis and conscious that a Fascist régime in Spain would probably not long survive a victory of the Democracies over Germany and Italy. Its leaders, however, continued to cling to a precarious neutrality.