1941: Naval Science, American

United States Naval Policy.

When Japan struck her treacherous blow at Pearl Harbor on the morning of Dec. 7, the United States, though surprised, was not unprepared. The year 1941 had marked an unprecedented era in the development and expansion of the U.S. Navy. This was brought about not only by the entry of the United States into the war but also even earlier by four very important changes in the national policy, namely: (1) The adoption of the policy of building and maintaining a 'Two-Ocean Navy'; (2) the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement; (3) all-out United States aid to the nations fighting the Axis; and (4) the announced return to the time-honored American contention that 'the seas are free.'

The kaleidoscopic parade of startling Nazi successes in 1940 had aroused the American people from their apathy and even the governing powers began to discover facts that had long been reported by the military and naval advisers. The Two-Ocean Navy Program is a gigantic one that cannot be consummated prior to 1946-47. The Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement is, according to President Roosevelt, the most important land acquisition since the Louisiana Purchase. This agreement with Great Britain goes a long way towards strengthening the hemisphere defense in the Atlantic. It provides British territory for the construction of American naval and air bases in the following strategic locations: Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana.

These bases, during 1941, have been the scene of feverish construction. The American armed forces moved in with the contractors and so speeded the defense of the selected sites. The importance of these bases cannot be overestimated. With the addition of Iceland and Greenland, the defense chain is completed in the north and in the critical Caribbean area which is the key defensive area for the safety of the Panama Canal.

It is believed that the South American Republics will rally to the hemisphere defense plan if any attack is imminent. Yet, Spain, France, and Portugal hold territorial possessions both in and off the coast of Africa, that might easily be used by an aggressor nation in initiating a hostile campaign against the Western Hemisphere. This factor must not be overlooked in the calculations for the perfection of our Atlantic defenses.

In the Pacific great activity was evidenced in the fortification and supply of the island fortress of Oahu in the Hawaiian group, and in the development of naval and flying bases in Alaska and along the United States island chain in mid-Pacific to Samoa and thence to the Canal Zone.

The Canal Zone defenses were greatly augmented. A third system of locks are about completed, and the Canal is well guarded by a system of anti-aircraft batteries, coast artillery, planes, and the far-flung arm of the Navy.

Early in the year, the establishment of policies of 'all-out aid' and 'freedom of the seas' was the measures that threatened war and hastened action on the national defense programs.

Shipbuilding Program.

The present expansion program of the U.S. Navy is the greatest ever undertaken by any naval power over a similar period of time. The Congressional authorization of this plan was the enactment of the so-called 11 per cent and 70 per cent Expansion Acts of June 14, 1940, and July 19, 1940, respectively. Together these two Acts authorized the construction of approximately 267 combatant vessels aggregating 1,492,000 tons. In addition the two Acts further authorized the construction of 52 auxiliary vessels of 175,000 tons. To this, the Act of Jan. 31, 1941, Congress added authorization for a small vessel program of 400 ships. During the twelve months since the enactment of this Congressional authorization the Navy Department has awarded contracts for the construction of practically the entire program at a cost of approximately $7,000,000,000.

This is the most costly program of naval construction ever undertaken. Some appreciation of the astronomical magnitude of this figure may be realized when it is noted that it is more than twice the total amount spent by the Navy on new construction during the past thirty years including the period of World War I. During which period we had built or had under construction a navy that would have ranked first in the world had we not destroyed it to achieve a naval disarmament pact of questionable value and limited duration.

There was a period of twenty years during which this country did not build a battleship. In the meantime the new designs embodied many radical changes. The later ships carry more guns, have a greater speed and have taken into account defense against aircraft on a much broader scale. In power capacity alone the first battleship of the modern period has an increase of more than 400 per cent over the last one built. Yet the engineering plans of the two ships reveal that the power plant of the later ship has been compressed into a space not much larger than that occupied by the machinery of the older ship. Such a development entails more precise engineering, the use of special alloy steels and metals, and special methods of fabrication which must accompany the working of these metals. It is only in the light of these and other related developments that one can make an intelligent appraisal of the increase in the cost of naval vessel construction today.

The original plans contemplated the completion of the Naval Expansion Program in 1947. Notwithstanding the fact that this was generally regarded as an optimistic estimate, the progress which has been made in the first year of the program indicates that the estimates will not only be met but will be considerably reduced in time. This, of course, provided materials are available and the building pace can be maintained or even accelerated.

The unprecedented construction speed has been made possible by a combination of factors, one of which was the right of the Navy Department to award the construction of a particular vessel to that shipyard which appears best adapted for efficient production in the best possible time. This prerogative was conferred by Congress in the National Defense Act. It has served a most useful purpose because, vested with such authority, the Navy Department has been able to capitalize on the specialized experience of certain yards in the construction of particular types of vessels.

A second and very important factor was the adherence by the Department to a policy of duplicating the existing designs for individual types of vessels to be constructed. This policy has made it possible to approach production line methods in the construction of naval vessels.

A third factor of the greatest importance was the expansion of the shipbuilding facilities of both Government and privately owned shipyards. When the Navy embarked on this huge building program it was fully realized that great expansion of building facilities would be necessary in both Government and private yards, but that another important item was trained personnel. The current estimated cost of the facility expansion now under way is $800,000,000. As now planned, this total estimated expenditure is divided between shipyards and various plants producing component parts going into ship construction in the rough proportion of 75 per cent for the shipyards, and 25 per cent for the general industry. Comparing the present estimated cost of facility expansion with estimated cost of vessel construction, it appears that the present program contemplates an expenditure of one dollar for expansion to facilitate and expedite approximately nine dollars worth of ship construction.

By the end of 1941, the expansion program was being carried on by about 125 private shipyards, in addition to the 10 navy yards, engaged in building vessels for the Navy. Regular training systems have been set up to train men to carry on the work in the various yards. This has necessitated a tremendous increase in shipbuilding employment which is scattered on both coasts, the Gulf, and Great Lakes area.

On July 1, 1941, there were approximately 345,000 men engaged in construction of the two ocean fleet, and by July 1, 1942, the total is anticipated to reach over 550,000. This personnel is now operating on a forty-eight hour work-week basis and in addition in many cases three labor shifts are being employed.

A circumstance that was generally overlooked, but which unquestionably played a great part in making possible the magnitude and progress of the present expansion program, was that for the seven years preceding the present program there was being carried on a program of naval construction, modest when judged by present day comparisons, but steady in its operation and well diversified in its planning. This program made possible the development of standard designs for the various types of naval vessels, and the building up of the experienced nucleus of shipyard facilities and trained personnel which today is being so widely expanded.

The naval expansion program when completed will provide the United States with a tremendous sea power greater than that of any other nation on earth. In combatant ships alone by 1946 the U.S. Fleet should present a combat force of 32 battleships, 18 aircraft carriers, 91 cruisers, 364 destroyers and 185 submarines.

In total combatant tonnage as of Jan. 1, 1941, the United States, with approximately 1,250,000 tons, surpassed any other nation. When the present building program is completed in 1946 or 1947 the Navy will be composed of 3,547,700 combatant tons of which some 500,000 tons will be overage.

Chief Naval Lessons of the War.

The chief naval lessons learned by hard experience since the outbreak of the World War have involved these factors:

(1) Naval warfare is undoubtedly three-dimensional.

(2) Modernized bases.

(3) Revision of tactics.

(4) Technical expertness of design and operation.

(1) Three-Dimensional Warfare.

With the development of the plane and submarine the time honored phrase 'Control of the Sea,' with some reservations, passes into the discard when bombers fly the Atlantic with ease and armed patrol seaplanes can cruise 5,000 miles. When submarines can operate in distant waters for a period of 30 days it is pure wishful thinking to hold that superior surface craft control the seas.

Before this war it was generally believed that an air force superior in numbers could control the air in the limited theatre of operations. Yet, Germany with her great numerical superiority in aircraft could not control the air over the British Isles; nor in the occupied coastal areas, nor even over Germany itself. The outstanding case of complete control of the air, however, was the Nazi occupation of Crete which showed that complete control of the air by the enemy makes even naval superiority untenable. Absolute control of the air in the local theatre of operations there jeopardized the British Fleet Units in the Eastern Mediterranean and in spite of British naval superiority effected a quick Nazi military occupation of that island.

On the other hand, surface craft by a relentless cruiser warfare have practically cleared the open sea of Axis shipping and trade communications with the world's raw material markets outside of Europe.

At the same time, the Nazi submarines, bombers, and an occasional raider have had a devastating effect on English shipping. So great, indeed, that the turning point in this great struggle may depend upon the outcome of the so-called 'Battle of the Atlantic.'

The old discussion of surface craft versus aircraft is outmoded. Both have equally important functions. The battleship remains the bulwark of sea surface control and in our scheme of hemisphere defense is just as vital to our success as in the days of Mahan.

Actually to control the sea and keep open the trade routes of the future will require strong air patrols, heavy surface craft, and reserve attack groups plus patrol and convoy craft, and anti-submarine weapons in great number. The weapons to be used, their number and strength will depend upon the types and composition of the opposing forces.

From our viewpoint the government of the United States fully appreciated the national defense needs and made adequate provisions for the three paramount arms of our sea defenses, namely, air force. surface craft, and submarines: all essential components of a well-balanced fleet and trained for their maximum cooperative effort.

Prior to this war the scope of action of both the air arm and the submarine was not fully appreciated. The actual test of war has revealed glaring weaknesses of all these components of sea power that are speedily being corrected.

The war has shown conclusively that fighting ships are still the fundamental means of dominating the trade routes of the world and the best means for maintaining an effective blockade. It has also shown that air power has exerted a great influence on ship design, naval strategy and naval tactics. Like the plane, the submarine has proved itself an essential part of naval warfare. Submarine operations co-ordinated with airplane operations make an effective combination most difficult to combat.

While on the subject of undersea operations we must not overlook the menace of the high explosive mine. Actuated by widely differing mechanisms and successfully laid by minelayer, plane or raider, they are also difficult to combat and require great numbers of mine sweepers, patrol craft and escort vessels to provide adequate defense for ocean borne shipping.

(2) Modernized Bases.

The Navy has always accented the need of bases either for a defensive or an offensive campaign and though politicians have talked of coast defense fleets and defensive warfare, our naval strategists have always known that the best defense is a vigorous offense. As a result our Navy has been imbued with a healthy offensive spirit, trained to seek, decisively engage and destroy any probable enemy.

This war has brought out like no contest of the past the vital need for adequate and secure naval bases. The advent of air power and the proximity of British home bases to the continent of Europe has been costly to the English Navy.

The historic naval bases in the British Isles, the war base at Scapa Flow and the naval base at Malta have taken a terrific beating from bombers during this war. The great industrial centers, shipyards, and supply bases, all so essential to the maintenance of the fleet, have suffered terribly. The bomber has cut down the places where ships could dock, refit and overhaul with safety. The great commercial seaports and unloading centers as well as communications have come in for their share of aerial havoc. This lack of security in home bases has had a very detrimental effect on British naval efficiency, and since Great Britain is geographically located so near to the continent, she may have to seek naval bases in Canada in order to secure the one indispensable requirement of sea power.

By the same token Germany occupies a similar position except that German bases in occupied French, Belgium, and Dutch territory provide shorter runs to English objectives by the German Air Force. It is expected, however, that as the British and Americans attain air supremacy the German naval bases will suffer a corresponding loss.

The United States for the next century should be the home of sea power. With the two great moats, the Atlantic and the Pacific, the coming development of great naval and air bases in close proximity to the homeland with the subsidiary bases in the outlying islands will give us a security that borders on the ideal, providing, of course, we take full advantage of the situation.

This war has shown how vital bases are to sea power and the home defensive system. Every plan for our successful defense against Axis aggression has forcibly emphasized this fact. Thus, the military departments of our government have made extensive surveys and have made plans for the development of these bases. The plans are rapidly being consummated and if the race against time is won the force that strikes America from across the seas will get a warm reception.

(3) Revision of Tactics.

World fleets for the past fifty years have been trained for fleet actions where it is expected that the full naval strength of opposing contestants will be thrown into action simultaneously. The acme of tactical perfection was to bring the battle line of battleships into action under favorable conditions for a decisive engagement. All other units of the fleet such as aircraft, cruisers, destroyers, submarines and minecraft support and coordinate their actions with that of the battle line.

In the last war the naval battle of Jutland was an outstanding example of the tactical handling of great opposing fleets on a grand scale.

The present war presents an entirely different problem in naval tactics. The Axis naval strength is not imposing and is not handled as a fleet unit. There has been some semblance of naval tactics of the past in the Mediterranean but the German has elected to conserve his surface strength and only resorts to timely raids at opportune occasions by task groups of the German Fleet. In the meantime, bombing planes, submarines, and mine layers coordinate their actions, independent of the German surface craft, to raid merchant shipping.

To combat this type of warfare the British Navy has had to scatter its Home Fleet widely to meet the situation in different critical areas. This has resulted in the practical demobilization of the Home Fleet as a fleet.

The main tactical lesson of the war has been the necessity of getting away from the old practice of ship concentration and form Task Groups competent to handle special missions, or Striking Forces composed of carrier groups, protected by planes, fast armored ships and destroyers.

This was beautifully exemplified in the British Fleet dispositions that were so effective during the hunting down and destruction of the Bismarck. Before the final 'kill' several different task groups of British ships had cut off escape and then deliberately closed in for the final action.

Many naval experts have claimed that there will never again be a major fleet action on the high seas. While this may be a somewhat exaggerated statement it is safe to assume that the final chapter of naval warfare in the Battle of the Atlantic will be written by Task Force Commands, which may be composed of British and American ships. But these groups will act independently, their movements being coordinated by a common head.

This type of naval warfare and the tactical handling of the several groups is a radical change from anything of the past. It will require a different type of naval commander; one who can readily visualize a situation and act with skill and precision.

The 'Carrier Striking Group' has been used by the U.S. Navy in fleet maneuvers for some time. The group is designed for detached and independent operations capable of striking at enemy commerce in far removed waters against enemy coast lines or to harass the communications of the enemy fleet. These high speed, long ranged, heavily armed groups are thus capable of great offensive action in zones where they may be least expected.

It may be said that this development may be extensively used in the future and be productive of great results at sea.

(4) Technical Expertness of Design and Operation.

The Germans, as a nation, have been deliberately planning for war since 1933. When they were ready the fireworks began. During these years the best technical brains in Germany were engaged in the planning, design, and building of the engines of war. Nothing was overlooked; time and money were of no consequence. The goal was to have new surprise weapons and a well-trained and organized personnel of skilled technicians to operate them.

The democracies during this period were at a great disadvantage. First, they were deceived; second, they refused to believe, and third, in most cases appropriations were not available for experimentation purposes to build or improve deadly weapons. Furthermore, expenditure for armament was not popular with democratic legislative bodies. Hence when the war broke, Germany, and, to a much less extent, Italy, Japan and Soviet Russia were the only nations ready for action.

The German technical experts did an outstanding job in designing new devices to be used in land, sea and air warfare. They were also successful in turning them out in mass production. Furthermore, they had the trained technicians to operate them.

In a modern navy there is a continual struggle to keep up with the times. Inventions and complex installations are coming to the front every day. They cover every field: aircraft, surface ships, submarines, mine devices, sound equipment, various types of detectors, complicated fire-control equipment, protective equipment from mines and torpedoes; not to mention construction, engineering, gunnery, and devices for hunting down the wily submarine.

This mechanical age at sea has assumed such proportions that the technician has nearly superseded the sailorman in manning our rapidly expanding sea forces.

It has been said that seamanship in the modern navy is definitely of secondary importance to technical expertness in design and operation. But let us not forget that it still requires a seaman to put these instruments of sea warfare in the most advantageous position to fight and to successfully maneuver.

American scientific genius is exerting every effort in the present struggle but the naval expert has a full realization that there is plenty of room for achievement along these lines.

Naval Air Force.

The efficient policies of naval aviation are often cited as a good argument against a separate air force, as advocated by some American papers and commentators. The argument that both England and Germany have such a force is advanced in support of the theory. As a matter of fact the British Navy, with no reflections on the RAF, trace much of their wartime inefficiency upon this one factor which tends to obstruct the fine cooperation necessary for proper support. However, the plane has been sometimes used almost in place of the German Navy as well as in the reporting of convoys. Further direct evidence is lacking, but the latest Navy Boards that have given consideration to the feasibility of a united air force have vigorously opposed it on the grounds that perfect coordination of effort demands that the flyers themselves as well as their directors be trained navy personnel.

The Navy is proud of the efficiency of its crack air arm and has been careful to guard against loss in efficiency by over-expanding too rapidly. The contemplated expansion of naval aviation has an ultimate objective of 15,000 planes. Careful planning has been given to this expansion program, as well as with the even larger current programs of the army and foreign allies. The question of procurement has been a vital issue.

The Navy, therefore, steadily progressed with the enlargement of training centers for the development of pilots and personnel and in the expansion and building of naval air bases both in the continental United States and in the island chains in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. This sound policy will insure that planes delivered to the Navy will go into active service the minute they come off the assembly lines.

In programs of such unprecedented magnitude and in which the time factor is a dominating consideration, it is obvious that many and varied unforeseen difficulties will be experienced. The progress made on delivery of planes to the Navy has fallen short of expectations but real gains have been made. For instance, as of June 1, 1940, there were in service 2,190 naval airplanes of all categories. The corresponding figure for June 1, 1941, was 3,363. As of June 1, 1941, 5,303 airplanes of various types were on order. So, it may be seen that the air force is building up at a corresponding pace with surface ship construction.

In the new naval tactical airplanes being procured, major effort is being devoted to the incorporation of increased fire power, armor, and fuel tank protection. War experience abroad has been the guiding influence in construction changes. Each new model has been evaluated to produce the maximum fighting efficiency.

Training planes were procured in great numbers as flight training was accorded the highest priority as the natural and logical step in the augmentation of naval aviation strength. The popularity of the Navy helped to attract the finest type of young American college man to aviation. The result is that the personnel of the air corps is of a very high caliber and is kept fresh by the constant entrance of a stream of young officers of the regular line of the Navy.

Naval Auxiliaries.

The U.S. Fleet has always been woefully deficient in the types and numbers of vessels that maintain and serve the fleet. This train of important ships goes hand in hand with shore bases in keeping the combatant units ready to fight, replenished as may be necessary and to provide the means for service to the fleet in overseas campaigns.

Shipping authorities in this country have estimated that it would require a thousand merchant vessels to serve the military needs of this nation in war.

The Navy during the year 1941 has been rapidly acquiring the vessels necessary to serve the fleet, while the Maritime Commission has been busily engaged in speeding construction of new tonnage intended for the Navy, for the normal commerce of the country and for transfer to Great Britain to help offset the appalling maritime losses of that empire.

Under the category of Train Vessels the Navy has under construction destroyer tenders, mine sweepers, net-layers, transports, repair ships, submarine tenders and rescue vessels, fleet tugs, seaplane tenders, mine layers, submarine chasers, torpedo boats, and fuel tankers.

Of the many vessels acquired are included 48 large merchant ships, scores of smaller craft, 13 transports and the 12 twin-screw high-speed tankers built with the assistance of the Maritime Commission.

Several miscellaneous auxiliary ships have been purchased, it is said, for the purpose of converting them into plane carriers.

Provision ships have been procured and two liners converted into hospital ships.

Two vessels, the Seatrain Texas and Seatrain New Jersey, have been purchased. They were originally designed to carry whole trains of freight cars in the inter-coastal trade. The Navy proposes to convert them into plane transports. Their big holds are well adapted for that purpose.

In addition the Coastal Frontier Commands have acquired hundreds of small craft suitable for inshore patrol work and to aid in carrying out the various functions coming under the jurisdiction of the Naval District Commandants.

The present emergency has accelerated the attention due naval auxiliary craft and the results are most gratifying. The accomplishment along this line for the year is notable.

Naval Communications.

The geographical area over which the recent naval action in the North Atlantic was fought emphasizes more clearly than ever before the vital necessity for rapid and accurate naval communications. The interception and destruction of the Bismarck followed the efficient use of modern means of communication; information concerning her movements — information without which she might well have escaped.

Modern warfare requires alertness supported by unity of action and concentration of power which cannot be achieved without the intelligent, immediate and efficient use of modern means of rapid communications.

The modern defense system entails a system of communications that will insure early warning of the intentions of hostile aggression and give our forces the information necessary to meet the enemy before he strikes a vital area.

By an Executive Order, the Defense Communications Board was created to coordinate the relationship of all branches of communications to the national defense.

The subject of communications is so far-reaching and enters into so many phases of the national life that such a board was necessary to solve the many complex problems that at once arise with a national emergency such as the country now faces.

Our naval communication service girdles the world and in cooperation with national communications is the connecting link between all shore stations and units of the fleet at sea and in the air.

Here again we find a highly technical field of endeavor. American science is playing an important role as new ideas are being developed and put into effect to improve communications and keep not only apace with the times but also keep ahead of our opponents.

Naval Shore Establishment.

To maintain the fleet and operating forces on the proposed expansion basis requires radical changes in the shore establishment.

The Navy Department in Washington has been expanded to meet the administrative and technical requirements. Many retired officers have been ordered to return to duty and the services of some of the nation's leading technicians and scientists have been secured.

Under the shore establishment are the continental navy yards which are the home bases of the fleet for repairs and alterations. In some cases they are construction yards as well. These are supplemented by supply and fuel bases, ammunition depots, training stations, and the naval air bases. The new subsidiary bases are being expanded and rushed to completion.

A most important item in this expansion program is the matter of dry docks. Twenty graving docks and one floating dock are under construction involving an expenditure of over $100,000,000. These will fulfill a long needed want and will contribute a great deal in the operation of future American Sea Power, both commercial and naval.

Personnel.

To man this growing fleet has been a task handled with admirable foresight by the Bureau of Navigation.

The manpower of the U.S. Navy as of June 1, 1941. totaled 264,793 officers and men divided as follows:

7,712 commissioned line officers, U.S. Navy

2,117 commissioned staff officers, U.S. Navy

1,998 commissioned warrant officers, U.S. Navy

975 commissioned line officers, U.S. Navy, retired, recalled to active duty

228 commissioned staff officers, U.S. Navy, retired, recalled to active duty

82 commissioned warrant officers, U.S. Navy, retired. recalled to active duty

8,820 commissioned line officers, U.S. Naval Reserve, on active duty

2,402 commissioned staff officers, U.S. Naval Reserve, on active duty

99 commissioned warrant officers, U.S. Naval Reserve. on active duty

522 regular nurses

121 reserve nurses on active duty

203,725 enlisted men, U.S. Navy

766 enlisted men, U.S. Navy, retired, called to active duty

35,231 enlisted men, U.S. Naval Reserve, on active duty

To man the two ocean fleet now under construction, it is estimated that the total enlisted strength of the Navy will be increased to 533,000 by 1946.

During this period it is expected that the commissioned officers of the Navy will be increased by about 5,000. This increase will come from the Naval Academy, special officer's training schools, and by the promotion of many qualified enlisted men.

Officers' training courses have been carried out for some years at selected colleges and the results have been most gratifying.

The Naval Aviation Schools have been taking in excellent college material and the training of naval aviators has progressed very rapidly, thus insuring trained flyers qualified for the exacting duties of naval aviation well in advance of plane production.

This farsighted training program well in advance of a general mobilization has stabilized the Navy personnel situation to a point far in advance of that which it encountered in 1917.

Enlistment in the Navy has always been voluntary. The quality of American naval personnel is in general excellent. The regular Navy enlisted man today is the highest type in our history; he is intelligent, aspiring, and has initiative to a high degree, albeit a ready and cheerful susceptibility to discipline.

The same may be said for officer personnel. The new material has been hand-picked, trained under a pressure system, and sent to the fleet to acquire the practical side of sea warfare.

Marine Corps.

This important adjunct of the Navy, the soldiers of the sea, has kept apace with the expansion of the Navy. As a tactical unit of the U.S. Fleet, the Marine Corps is organized and equipped to proceed to any focal point with the greatest rapidity and meet the situation. When the President ordered the occupation of Iceland, the Marines were ready. The only time factor lost was that expended in transportation.

The lessons of the war have been carefully taken into account with the result that the Marines have an effective, ever-ready, streamlined striking force with the most modern equipment and trained to support the fleet ashore in defensive or offensive action.

The new subsidiary bases acquired under the Lease-Lend Bill were occupied by the Marines before the ink was dry on the contracts.

The Marines are self-contained and supporting; have their own organization which includes a well-trained and efficient air arm, all correlated for cooperative effort with the Navy.

Research, Developments and Tests.

In peace times much space may be devoted to this section. The veil of secrecy is now drawn tight for the obvious reason of national security.

However, the Navy in facing the terrific expansion program, has acquired aid from every helpful governmental agency in the field of science and has taken in the best available help from industry. The result has been much saving in time and effort. Furthermore, national war needs have brought into conference with naval technicians the best talent in the country. This aid has been invaluable. The cooperation with industrial firms, technical societies and civilian engineers has been essential. The results attained are conclusive evidence that such a program could not have been started without the splendid cooperative attitude of American industry and American scientists. See also MILITARY SCIENCE; MERCHANT MARINE, AMERICAN; WORLD WAR II.