There are apparently no limits to human gullibility as to the treatment of bodily ills. This is illustrated by the Indiana case of Crum v. State Board of Medical Registration, 37 N.E. (2) 65. In that case, Crum, who was licensed to practice chiropractic, naturopathy, and electrotherapy, claimed to have invented an 'etherator' with which he treated a wide variety of human ills including cancer, blindness, nervous disorders, abscesses, kidney ailments, hemorrhoids, varicose veins, etc. His machine was so marvelous that it could lengthen a leg, cause an amputated finger to grow back and fill a decayed tooth by restoring it to its original condition. The patient did not even need to come to the office for treatment. Treatments could be broadcast by Crum's wonderful invention. If the patient was financially embarrassed, the 'etherator' could also be relied on to treat his financial ills. Crum was deprived of his licenses although numerous witnesses appeared at his trial to testify to the miraculous cures effected by his extraordinary machine.
It is a sad commentary on the state of medical practice in this country that Crum who was only a high school graduate could be licensed without examination in chiropractic, naturopathy, and electrotherapy, after only one year at the 'College of Drugless Physicians,' which the court called a 'mere diploma mill.'
With medical qualifications so low in certain parts of this country and medical charlatanry so much in evidence, one would expect a liberal attitude toward the admission to practice in this country of distinguished foreign physicians, as one means of elevating the standards of the medical profession. Yet, one internationally known neurologist, Dr. Marburg, formerly head of the Neurological Institute of Vienna met an attitude of narrow provincialism when he sought admission to medical practice in New York State. Under New York Law, a foreign doctor could be admitted to practice without examination if he had reached a position of conceded eminence and authority in his profession. The New York Commissioner of Education claimed that Dr. Marburg did not come within this category although his eminence was attested to by leading American neurologists, many of whom had been his students and although he had been made clinical professor of neurology at Columbia University on his arrival in the United States. This action of the Commissioner was such a patent abuse of discretion that it was upset by the courts and Dr. Marburg's application to practice medicine was granted. (Marburg v. Cole, 23 N.Y.S. (2) 501.)
The North Carolina case of Mitchell v. Saunders, 13 S.E. (2) 242, exacts a high standard of care from the surgeon in accounting for the sponges which he uses in the course of an operation. The defendants in that case had left a gauze sponge buried in the leg of the plaintiff upon whom they had operated, requiring a second operation for its removal. No evidence of negligence in the performance of the first operation was adduced by the plaintiff. Nevertheless the court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the mere fact of leaving a sponge within the body of the patient was in itself inconsistent with standards of due care and was necessarily negligent.
This high standard of care may be contrasted with the attitude of the Kansas court in the case of Bugg v. Security Benevolent Assn., 112 P. (2) 73. There a doctor on the defendant's staff diagnosed the breast of the plaintiff's wife as cancerous and stated that it should be removed. The plaintiff's wife then went to the Mayo Clinic and upon the basis of this diagnosis, the physicians attached to the Clinic removed the breast. The breast was in fact non-cancerous and should not have been removed. A majority of the Kansas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the hospital and its doctor for monies expended by him for the care of his wife. The wrongful diagnosis in the opinion of the court was not the 'proximate cause' of the injury. Three justices dissented from this finding, stating that the defendants could have reasonably anticipated what would follow their negligent diagnosis and therefore should have been held liable for its consequences.
Stemmer v. Kline, 17 A (2) 58 (N.J.), presented a malpractice situation which is a law professor's dream. In that case an action was brought by an infant plaintiff against a doctor for injuries caused by the doctor's negligent diagnosis and treatment with x-rays of his mother while he was still 'en ventre sa mère.' As a result of the doctor's treatments, the plaintiff claimed that he was born microcephalic, an idiot, without skeletal structure, sight, speech, hearing or the power of locomotion. Generally, the courts have denied the right of an infant to recover for injuries occasioned by a defendant's negligence which occurred while the infant was as yet unborn. In this case, however, the court concluded that where the defendant was a doctor and knew or should have known of the existence of the child 'that he owed a duty to that child and if that duty was disregarded and through his negligence the child was injured while the mother was quick, if it is born viable, an action should lie on behalf of the child for the damages occasioned.'
Limited licenses to practice the healing art are granted to the practitioners of disciplines such as osteopathy. A number of cases in 1941 illustrated the difficulty encountered in keeping these practitioners within the limits of their disciplines and of their licenses. Typical is the Nebraska case of State v. Wagner, 297 N.W. (2) 906, in which the defendant, an osteopath who had performed tonsillectomies, appendectomies, and other surgical operations, claimed the right to practice surgery on the ground that this subject was taught at the school of osteopathy which he had attended. But the court denied the right of osteopaths to engage in surgery since the general use of the knife or other surgical instruments was regarded as unnecessary and opposed to the osteopathic system of treatment. This method of treatment, according to the court 'is a system of manipulation of the limbs and body of the patient by kneading, rubbing, or pressing with the hands upon the part of the body. No drug, medicine or other substance is applied either internally or externally nor is the knife used or any form of surgery resorted to in the treatment.'
Canons of ethics and legislation deny the use of advertising to attract business to many professions. Members of the dental profession seem to have had particular difficulty with this prohibition during 1941 and disciplinary action was taken in a number of cases against dentists who resorted to advertising to increase business (see for example the California cases of Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 110 P. (2) 992, and Barron v. Board of Dental Examiners, 113 P. (2) 247). The case of Rust v. Missouri Dental Board, 155 S.W. (2) 80, illustrates the determination of the courts to enforce prohibitions against advertising by dentists even where it is not done by the dentists directly. Dr. Rust, a licensed dentist, had organized the Dr. Rust Dentist Laboratories Inc., which advertised in ways prohibited to a dentist. The laboratory did the work of taking x-ray pictures and making and repairing plates. Dr. Rust's dentist offices were, however, on the same premises as the laboratory and he and men employed by him did the dental work of examining teeth, fitting plates, etc. It was evident to the Missouri Dental Board that the purpose of the advertising by the corporation was to attract professional business to Dr. Rust. As a result, it revoked Dr. Rust's license and this revocation was sustained by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The Illinois case of Lasdon v. Hallihan, 36 N.E. (2) 227, presented a problem similar to the Rust case. There, the dental laboratory was run by unlicensed individuals who advertised their dental plates for sale directly to the public. As in the Rust case a licensed dentist took the impression for the plates and fitted the plate after it was made. The court decided that the owners of the laboratory were 'practising dentistry within the terms of the Illinois law and being unlicensed had to desist.' In answer to the defendants' claim that they had a constitutional right to advertise their business and sell their products to the public the court stated:
'It is obvious that if they were permitted to thus advertise their business, the practise of the profession of dentistry would, to a great degree, be subservient to the business of those engaged in the making of plates. It is well known that masses of the public do not comprehend or understand the skill that is necessary to the making of proper dentures and the proper charges to be made for such services. Such persons are often attracted by the advertisement of the quack and charlatan and seek his services.'
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