1976: United States

Foreign Relations

The United States this year began to reassess its global role. In the wake of revelations about unsavory Central Intelligence Agency activities and about Lockheed bribes to foreign officials, a concern for the reaffirmation of American values in U.S. foreign policy mingled with apprehensions about the expansion of Soviet influence and military force.

The cooling of the public's enthusiasm for détente and the emergence of human rights as a rallying cry in U.S. foreign relations were both reinforced by election-year criticism of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's realpolitik foreign policy. For his part, the secretary expressed open pessimism about shifts in the U.S.-Soviet balance of power, viewing U.S. policy in Africa and the increasing strength of the Western European left through the prism of East-West relations.

Africa.

Southern Africa provided the arena for the quintessential demonstration of U.S. bafflement about the uses of its power (in Angola), and later in the year, for the reemergence of U.S. activism (through Kissinger's mediation in the Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts). Much neglected in the last decade, U.S. African policy had been dominated by an assumption of the durability of southern Africa's white minority regimes. This attitude proved extremely shortsighted, however, in light of the success of Chinese- and Soviet-aided liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. The presence of three rival liberation groups in Angola made that country almost unavoidably a magnet for outside intervention; in the West, Soviet ties to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) drew the United States to support its two allied opponents—the Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Americans learned after the fact, in late 1975, that the Ford administration had begun to send covert aid to the FNLA earlier in the year and had increased its assistance in July 1975, so that by the end of the year military aid had exceeded $30 million. As U.S. involvement became increasingly evident, the intervention of South Africa on the side of the FNLA and UNITA in fall 1975 swung the political balance in black Africa decisively in favor of the MPLA. In addition, U.S. and South African involvement muted potential African opposition to the arrival in Angola of an estimated 12,000-18,000 Cuban troops, whose support for the MPLA tipped the military scales in its favor.

At the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, both houses of Congress acted decisively to end the U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war, amending the defense appropriations bill to prohibit the Ford administration from continuing covert aid to the anti-MPLA forces. The congressional challenge to executive authority in foreign affairs brought forth protests and warnings from President Gerald Ford, who called the vote 'a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States,' and Secretary Kissinger, who gave notice to both the Soviet Union and Cuba (as well as to the Congress) that the United States would 'resist without question any [Communist] military expansion.' The conflict between the executive and legislative branches aroused anxieties among some U.S. allies about a leadership vacuum in the Western alliance. American public opinion, however, appeared to solidly support the congressional action. Toward the end of February, Gulf Oil was authorized by the U.S. State Department to resume business transactions with the by then victorious MPLA, although the administration declared that the United States would recognize the MPLA government only when all Cuban troops had left Angola.

Widely criticized for a lack of understanding of African political realities, a lack reputedly demonstrated by his Angolan policy, Secretary Kissinger made a two-week trip to Africa in late April and early May. He visited Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaïre, Liberia, and Senegal. (Invitations to Kissinger to visit Nigeria and Ghana were withdrawn, and Mozambique reportedly refused to extend an invitation.) On his trip, Kissinger worked to mend fences with black African leaders. In a speech delivered in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger set forth what was heralded as a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa. This policy included a ten-point plan to help bring about black majority rule in Rhodesia. Kissinger promised 'unrelenting U.S. opposition' to the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith; administration efforts to obtain the repeal of the so-called Byrd amendment, permitting Rhodesian chrome to be imported into the United States in contravention of UN sanctions; and $12.5 million in financial assistance to Mozambique to help compensate for economic losses resulting from the closure of its border with Rhodesia this March. On the question of Namibia (South West Africa), the territory administered by South Africa in defiance of UN resolutions, Kissinger urged the South African government to present a timetable for Namibian independence and to promote the political participation of all Namibian groups. Regarding South Africa itself, the secretary did not speak of the necessity for majority rule there, but he appealed to the Pretoria government to end 'the institutionalized separation of races' and warned that time was running out for a peaceful reconciliation of South Africa's peoples. Black African reactions to Kissinger's statements mingled warmth and skepticism.

Meanwhile, following up overtures made on Kissinger's trip, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Kenya and Zaïre in June to offer military equipment to counter Soviet and Cuban military aid to the neighboring countries of Angola, Uganda, and Somalia. The United States made a deal with Kenya involving the sale of 12 F-5 jet fighters valued at over $70 million, and with Zaïre for $50 million worth of armored vehicles and antitank weapons.

Although he had avoided stopping in South Africa on his spring trip, Kissinger talked with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster in West Germany in late June. The first high-level meeting since World War II between representatives of Washington and Pretoria, the encounter took place in the wake of rioting in black townships of South Africa. The highly secret discussions were viewed with some suspicion in black Africa, but the talks—as well as further discussions later in the summer in Zurich—evidently laid the basis for Kissinger's ambitious 'shuttle diplomacy' in southern Africa in mid-September.

Although it was at first written off as merely another expression of the secretary of state's personal penchant for active diplomacy, Kissinger's effort at achieving a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia came to be regarded as evidence of continued U.S. vitality in international politics. Probably also significantly influenced by a threatened economic squeeze on Rhodesia by South Africa, Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith unexpectedly agreed late in September, after a meeting with Kissinger in Pretoria, to accept a British-American plan providing for majority rule within two years, as well as for an interim multiracial government. Black African responses combined deep suspicion of Smith's intentions with fairly broad acceptance of a two-year transition, whose details were to be worked out at a British-chaired conference in Geneva.

On Namibia, the elements necessary for a settlement seemed much closer at hand when Kissinger commenced his September trip. South Africa had already indicated in August its readiness to grant independence to the territory by December 1978. However, even after discussions between Kissinger and Vorster on Namibia, South Africa still did not agree to permit UN-supervised elections in the territory.

Cooling of détente.

U.S. activity in Africa was spurred by a desire to contain growing Soviet influence there. Although the Soviet Union had been aiding the liberation movements in southern Africa since the early 1960's, its aggressive support for the MPLA in Angola, and particularly the introduction there of large numbers of Cuban troops, seemed to many American observers an attempt to stake out a new sphere of influence. Veiled threats of retaliation against the Cubans were made by Secretary Kissinger, and an embargo on food exports to the Soviet Union was widely discussed, although explicitly rejected by President Ford. The notion that the United States was 'getting taken by détente' became a popular election year theme, particularly with Republican challenger Ronald Reagan and Democratic contender Senator Henry Jackson (D, Wash.). President Ford, in fact, after his defeat by Reagan in the May 11 Nebraska primary, postponed for several weeks the signing of the U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes.

The treaty constituted the single positive event in a largely stagnant or deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relationship. It complemented the 1974 treaty on underground nuclear weapons tests by limiting underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to 150 kilotons and by providing for on-site inspection of tests. (Congressional ratification was not expected until early 1977.) There was little visible progress this year in the strategic arms limitation talks and in the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. Nor were there any discernible effects from the 1975 Helsinki accords on the free movement of persons and ideas between East and West.

Western Europe.

The U.S. government, represented by Kissinger, reiterated this year its strong opposition to the participation of Communists in Western European governments. The main focus of concern was the Italian elections this June, in which, it was feared, the Communist Party, already Italy's second-largest political party, might get more votes than the ruling Christian Democrats and thus be in a position to demand seats in the new cabinet. (The Communists did not, in fact, win a plurality or enter the cabinet, but they did obtain important leadership posts in Parliament.) The success of the French Socialist and Communist parties in March local elections also sparked administration fears of a leftward trend. The Socialists and Communists together won a majority of the vote for the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic.

Kissinger warned that the advent to power of Communists in Western Europe would weaken the political and military solidarity of the West and inevitably erode American support for the defense of Europe. In part, the security erosion would result from a tendency on the part of the Communists to 'put security issues lower on their list of priorities than economic and social problems.' On Italy, he voiced skepticism about the survival of Italian democracy should the Communists enter the government. Kissinger also expressed strong doubts about the future of NATO and foresaw a 'domino' effect, in which the entry into government of the Italian Communists would be followed by similar developments elsewhere in Western Europe. President Ford warned that the United States 'would certainly have to take a real hard look at the NATO set-up if a Communist-dominated government took over in Italy or any other country.'

Both the Italian Communist and Socialist parties responded angrily to the U.S. statements, characterizing them as interference in Italian internal affairs. In France the parties of the left voiced similar criticisms of U.S. admonitions.

Despite U.S. concern, however, the sum of the year's political developments in Western Europe did not add up to a clear leftward trend, but rather to a complex rearrangement of ins and outs. In Portugal's June presidential election, for example, the army chief of staff, General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, who came to prominence when he crushed a November 1975 leftist revolt, won by a landslide. In Sweden in September, Olof Palme's Social Democratic Party was defeated by a conservative coalition after 44 years in office. In West Germany, the moderate Social Democratic government of Helmut Schmidt narrowly overcame, in October elections, a strong challenge on the right from the Christian Democrats.

The complexities of European political-ideological developments, and their implications for U.S. and Soviet interests, were further illustrated at the European Communist parties' summit conference in East Berlin in late June. The meeting of leaders of 29 East and West European Communist parties challenged the claim of the Soviet Union to leadership of the world Communist movement and instead endorsed the right of each party to seek independently its own means of attaining socialism. Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer was one of the speakers who reiterated his support of Communist pluralism.

Middle East.

The civil war in Lebanon temporarily replaced the Arab-Israeli conflict as the main focus of international activity and concern in the Middle East, removing pressure for the time being from both Israel and the United States. In addition, the intervention by Syria in support of the Lebanese Christian forces against the left-wing Muslims and the Palestine Liberation Organization constituted a realignment of Arab forces away from the so-called obstructionist front that had endeavored to impede U.S. efforts to find areas of agreement between Israel and its Arab adversaries. The Syrians thus moved closer to the moderate, pro-Western Jordanian monarchy, whose action in curbing the military activities of the PLO in Jordan in 1971 presaged Syria's operation during the summer of 1976.

The fact that U.S. interests were implicitly congruent with those of Syria in Lebanon was evidenced in protests to the Syrian government from the Soviet Union. Reportedly, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev urged Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon and warned that Syrian actions were aiding 'imperialists' in their drive against leftwing governments and movements in the Middle East.

Another development in the Middle East affecting the United States was the abrogation this March of the 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty between Egypt and the Soviet Union. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury William Simon announced at the end of a visit to Cairo in early March that U.S. economic assistance to Egypt for the 1977 and 1978 fiscal years would be over $1.8 billion. The United States also arranged to sell six military transport planes to Egypt.

Relations with Turkey appeared to improve this year. An agreement was reached in March providing for U.S. military aid to Turkey in return for the reopening of American military installations there. Congressional ratification of the treaty, however, was delayed until 1977, as Greek-American interests mounted a concerted lobbying campaign against it.

Asia.

As a measure of the enormous post-Vietnam contraction in U.S. involvement in Asia, events in Indochina this year occupied only a miniscule portion of American attention. The United States was effectively ousted from all its bases in Thailand as of June 20, despite the opposition of the Thai military to the U.S. withdrawal. As far as Vietnam itself was concerned, the United States continued to oppose that nation's admission to the United Nations and at the start of the fall UN session was able to have the question postponed. The rationale for the U.S. position was that Vietnam must first demonstrate that it is a peace-loving nation by supplying the United States with a full list of Americans missing in action in Indochina. Vietnam reportedly was eager for the economic benefits that might come from a normalized relationship with the United States, but it repeatedly insisted postwar reconstruction aid was a U.S. obligation under the 1973 Paris peace accords and had to precede an MIA accounting. Representatives of the two governments met briefly in Paris on November 12. The State Department officially reported that no progress had been made, and three days later the United States vetoed UN membership for Vietnam.

U.S. relations with China remained stalemated. Of great potential importance for American interests were the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung in January and September. While the impact of these events was still being weighed, the State Department disclosed approval of an agreement to sell China a sophisticated computer system, which some say has potential military uses, as a goodwill gesture toward the new leadership.

U.S. and South Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea were attacked by North Korean soldiers in August, and two Americans were killed. U.S. protests and a military buildup in the area to deter further attacks ensued, and in September the United States and North Korea agreed to a partitioning of the Panmunjom truce site, where the attack had occurred. Soon after, U.S.—South Korean relations became strained when it was reported that Justice Department investigators had uncovered evidence of a massive program by South Korean agents to influence members of Congress through political contributions and other favors.

Latin America.

The barely perceptible movement toward a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations during 1975 ended abruptly with the deployment of Cuban troops in Angola. Secretary Kissinger warned that the United States would 'not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad,' and he refused to rule out any moves by the United States, including a military invasion of Cuba, in the event that Cuba became involved in armed struggles elsewhere in southern Africa. Despite a letter from Fidel Castro to Sweden's premier this May stating that Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola at the rate of 200 a week, troop levels appeared to remain fairly constant for the rest of the year. Meanwhile, Castro accused the CIA of complicity in the bombing of a Cuban airliner in October, and he abrogated the 1973 U.S.-Cuban antihijacking treaty.

Secretary Kissinger made a long-postponed Latin American tour in February, visiting Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. The trip was designed to affirm U.S. interest in good relations with Latin America, and particularly to smooth over problems caused by allegedly discriminatory U.S. trade practices. Kissinger's visits were received coolly in Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia, where student riots occurred. The most significant event of the tour was the signing of a pact with Brazil effectively recognizing that country as the major power in Latin America and setting up regular semiannual consultations on foreign policy matters. The agreement was denounced in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela—and criticized in the United States—for favoring Brazil's repressive regime over more democratic governments in Latin America.

CIA intervention in Latin American politics continued to be a major issue this year. A report by the Senate select committee that investigated U.S. intelligence operations, released at the end of 1975, documented a systematic and sustained campaign against the Chilean left by the U.S. government. The United States had spent some $8 million on covert intervention in Chilean politics during the presidency of leftist Salvador Allende Gossens and had attempted to stimulate a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's coming to power in 1970. Seeing a possible parallel between his own situation and that of Allende, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley declared a state of emergency this June, alleging that 'external elements' were involved in an attempt to 'destabilize' his government to facilitate the return to power of the conservative opposition.

All progress on negotiations regarding increased Panamanian authority over the Panama Canal Zone and the canal ceased this year, as Ronald Reagan made a campaign issue of the need to prevent infringements on U.S. sovereignty in the area.

Third World.

The resignation of UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan in February and his replacement by former Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton signaled a less hostile U.S. attitude toward the Third World, although the policy of increased U.S. assertiveness in UN politics was slated to continue. The various multilateral negotiations on economic and geopolitical issues were largely stalemated, however, as the positions taken by industrialized nations and the Third World countries became more entrenched. The May meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, in Nairobi, Kenya, rejected a U.S. proposal for a Resources Bank through which foreign private investors would lend money to poorer countries to develop resources; and Third World delegates had to content themselves with an agreement to negotiate further on a common fund for financing buffer stocks of basic commodities. Two law-of-the-sea conferences this year came close to agreement on definitions of territorial seas and economic zones extending out from the shoreline; they made little progress, however, regarding control of the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed. The United States and other industrialized nations advocate the mining of at least a portion of these resources by private enterprise, and the less developed countries insist that all resource extraction be strictly controlled by an international body.

National Defense

Defense and the campaign.

It was not surprising that in a presidential election year national defense policy became a major issue. But the role that the defense issue played in the campaign—and, conversely, the impact that the campaign itself had on defense policy—was unexpected and contrary to the experience of recent presidential elections. In 1968 and again in 1972, for example, when the debate over national defense policy was dominated by the Vietnam war, the candidates of both major parties had promised to restrict defense expenditures as part of their efforts to end the war and establish new national and foreign priorities for the United States. Their position was consistent with the expressed willingness of Congress, and apparently of a substantial number of the voters, to reduce the defense budget and place greater emphasis on domestic social programs.

At the beginning of 1976, the trend of restricted defense expenditures appeared to be continuing. President Gerald Ford had made his position clear in late 1975, just before the presidential primary campaign opened, when he dismissed Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger after the latter had publicly opposed administration cuts in the Defense Department's budget request for the coming year. Underlining the president's desire to restrain defense expenditures was the administration's general policy of fiscal restraint as a central element in the struggle to bring inflation under control. In the ranks of the Democratic Party, only one of the aspiring presidential candidates supported increased defense expenditures, Senator Henry Jackson (Wash.), who was eliminated fairly early from the race. All the other candidates, including the eventual winner, Jimmy Carter, proposed reductions in defense expenditures of varying amounts.

Yet, as the campaign wore on, the trend changed markedly. The administration's proposed defense budget for fiscal year 1977 (beginning on October 1, 1976) contained a major increase in spending. And both candidates, in their public statements, supported a stronger defense posture, although they disagreed about how much it would cost. Thus, the campaign inspired a more pointed and general public discussion of defense policy objectives and requirements than had been expected. The issues of concern included the requirements for, and risks inherent in, the achievement of new strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union, efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, the continuation of a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, and efforts to maintain a conventional deterrent force in Western Europe.

Underlying President Ford's change of position on the defense budget issue were political pressures that began to build shortly after his dismissal of Schlesinger. Ford's major challenge came from former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who, speaking for the conservative wing of the Republican Party, attacked with increasing vehemence the administration's 'weak' defense policy in the face of what Reagan perceived to be a significant Soviet military buildup. As Reagan began to pose a greater threat to Ford's effort to claim the Republican nomination, the administration began to take a more favorable view of expanding the defense budget. After submitting to Congress, in early 1976, the largest defense budget in history (it represented the first 'real' increase, after accounting for the effects of inflation, in defense allocations in nearly a decade), the administration proposed additional defense budget increases, in the form of supplemental appropriations bills. It also predicted that the fiscal 1978 budget would have to be increased again by at least as much as, if not more than, the fiscal 1977 budget had been. In addition, the administration came to champion the procurement of several new and extremely expensive strategic weapons, such as the B-1 bomber. The result of this about face was that the Ford administration ultimately supported the very defense budget increases that Schlesinger had been dismissed for advocating previously.

Having survived an extremely close primary campaign in which his position on defense policy had been a major source of weakness, Ford then tried to turn his newly more expansive position on the defense budget to his favor in campaigning against the Democratic nominee, Jimmy Carter. In his primary campaign struggle, Carter had suggested that he might make substantial cuts in defense spending. By the time he captured the nomination, he had developed a position, formally made a part of the Democratic Party's platform, that reorganization and 'efficiency' improvements in the Defense Department—not actual reductions in military capabilities—could possibly result in the saving of $5-$7 billion. If, however, it proved necessary to increase military capabilities because of the actions of the Soviet Union, both Carter and the platform statement indicated that a defense budget increase would be sought. In the face of President Ford's criticism that Carter's earlier position would seriously impair the U.S. defense posture, Carter increasingly emphasized his intention never to allow the United States to 'fall behind' in the arms competition, whatever the financial burden required.

Thus, the two candidates appeared to move closer together on the question of the defense budget. But Carter's effort to counterattack on general defense policy resulted in the raising of a number of issues that had not previously been central in the wider political debate. The one issue on which the two candidates maintained clearly distinct positions was the future of the B-1 bomber. Ford argued that the aircraft was essential for U.S. security; Carter opposed its procurement because of its high cost, which was estimated at $30 billion. Perhaps to maintain the viability of this issue during the campaign, the Democratic Congress refused to accept the Ford administration's request to begin large-scale procurement of the B-1 this year, voting instead, after much infighting, to postpone a final production decision until February 1977, so that the post-election administration could reevaluate the program.

On other issues raised by Carter, the two candidates were less apart. Both, for example, supported the conclusion of new strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union, although Carter criticized the Ford administration for its apparent delay in completing a new agreement, suggesting that the delay may have been politically motivated at a time when the general policy of détente proved a liability for Ford among conservatives. Carter also criticized the administration for not having a strong policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the past few years, the U.S. government has sanctioned the sale abroad of nuclear power plants and nuclear materials that could be used by some recipient nations to develop atomic weapons, as evidenced by India's detonation in 1974 of a nuclear bomb made from reprocessed power plant fuel imported from Canada. What had heretofore been a debate within the government over the imposition of safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons was now made a matter of public discussion. Carter proposed 'internationalization' of the supply and reprocessing of nuclear materials; Ford proposed an international moratorium on the sale of reprocessing plants abroad. Neither candidate's position, however, represented a definitive policy to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, which is rapidly becoming a major foreign policy concern.

Another major defense issue raised by Carter concerned the transfer of U.S. conventional armaments abroad. During the era of the cold war, the United States either sold or gave away enormous supplies of armaments. Since the Middle East war of 1973 and the resulting oil embargo and quadrupling of oil prices, the transfer of U.S. arms has reached record levels. In 1975 alone, more than $11 billion worth of U.S. arms were transferred to foreign countries, with the bulk going to the Middle East. Israel has received much of the arms transferred on a grant basis, while the oil-rich Arab countries have greatly increased their purchases of arms, to a level that has offset, to a considerable extent, the increased cost to the United States of Arab oil. Carter contended that the increased arms transfers were contributing to political and military instability in the Middle East in particular and throughout the underdeveloped world. Ford defended the government's arms transfer policy and criticized Carter for his threat to halt sales of arms and other goods in the event of another Arab oil embargo.

Although the two presidential candidates helped increase public attention to the general question of national defense policy, they did not reveal in any comprehensive fashion how they would handle the specific policy issues raised in the campaign debate. Events of 1976 suggested how these issues may evolve, what policy alternatives will be available to the new administration in Washington, and what constraints may limit effective policy actions directed at those issues.

The defense budget.

Given its success in gaining a substantial increase in the fiscal 1977 defense budget, the Defense Department is generally expected to exploit a favorable political climate and request an even larger increase in the fiscal 1978 budget; that is, the current budget of more than $101 billion may be followed by a budget request of $120-$130 billion. Several factors favor such a request: the apparent public support of a stronger defense posture, as revealed in the presidential campaign; the continuing and rapid Soviet buildup of both strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces; and the general weakness of the economy, as revealed in the last half of 1976, which may reduce concerns about inflation and fiscal restraint. Opposition to a large increase in the defense budget is expected to come from the Democratic majority returned to Congress in the November election.

There are, however, built-in pressures for defense budget growth that go beyond support for new military systems. Such pressures became apparent in the congressional debate over the fiscal 1977 defense budget. One source of budget growth that is becoming a contentious issue is retirement pay for military personnel. This item now represents many billions of dollars, with rapid growth in the total expected as a result of cost-of-living increases in pensions and of retirement pay inducements necessary to maintain an all-volunteer army. Indeed, the all-volunteer army raises a more general cost problem. Military recruitment has recently been adequate primarily because of the generally high unemployment rate; with economic recovery, the ability of the military to recruit will become more difficult, so that the economic inducements to get individuals to enlist may have to be increased. The result will therefore be upward pressure on the defense budget just to maintain current military capabilities.

Other pressures on the defense budget will come from the long-term cost implications of weapons procurement plans approved in 1976 or up for decision in early 1977. The army, for example, plans to replace its tank forces with new tanks that will be several times more expensive than current ones. The navy, too, expects—and Congress has expressed considerable willingness to approve—a major shipbuilding program to meet the dramatic growth of the Soviet Navy. The debate on this issue in 1976 was not over whether there existed a need for more ships, but over whether a significant number of new ships should be nuclear powered or not. Top navy officials did not want a large number of nuclear ships, but Admiral Hyman Rickover, long an advocate of a nuclear-powered navy, convinced Congress to support a program providing for the construction of such ships—a choice that meant higher costs per ship and, consequently, fewer new ships. Finally, the air force is in the process of replacing a major fraction of its tactical air squadrons with new fighter and attack aircraft—the F-15, F-16, and A-10. In addition, the air force still hoped this year for a go-ahead to procure some 240 B-1 bombers and also expects to procure the new M-X land-based missile system, to replace the Minuteman missile force.

Each of these new weapons systems was considered in detail in 1976 during the budgetary debate, with the result that at least some budgetary allocations were provided for all of them. Decisions, of course, may be reversed in the future, but that has been a rare occurrence in the defense field. Even if B-1 development is discontinued, if each of the other programs is carried forward, dramatically increased burdens will be imposed on the defense budget.

Strategic arms limitation.

It was widely hoped that a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union would be achieved in 1976, to supersede the U.S.-Soviet accord of 1972, which is due to expire next year. In late 1974, President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, meeting in Vladivostok, had reached tentative agreement on the principles of a new strategic arms pact, but the effort to formalize a second agreement has proved inconclusive. The negotiations have bogged down over the U.S. demand that the new Soviet bomber, the Backfire, be included within any new ceiling on strategic arms and over the countering Soviet demand that the nuclear cruise missiles being developed by the United States also be included. The disagreement is unlikely to be easily resolved. If the Backfire is defined as a strategic weapon, then the Soviet Union would have to dismantle some of its missile force in order to stay within the ceiling of 2,400 strategic delivery systems agreed to at Vladivostok. Similarly, if each U.S. cruise missile is counted as a separate strategic delivery system, then the United States would no longer find it feasible to deploy such a missile. The cruise missile is considered desirable by many analysts because its deployment would be less expensive than developing a bomber to overcome improved Soviet bomber defenses. The idea is to use as many as 20-24 long-range cruise missiles on a single U.S. bomber; they could be launched while the bomber stood outside the cover of Soviet air defense capabilities, which have reduced a bomber's ability to penetrate Soviet air space. If, however, each cruise missile is counted as the equivalent of a bomber, then insufficient numbers of cruise missiles could be deployed to offset improved Soviet air defenses.

The strategic arms limitation negotiations were further complicated during the year by allegations of Soviet 'violations' of the 1972 agreement. Cited as examples were the testing of a new Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) system, the construction of new and larger missile silos beyond the number allowed, the failure to dismantle 'old' land-based missiles to compensate for the construction of new submarine missile systems, and the deployment of more 'heavy' missiles (missiles with very large nuclear warheads) than allowed.

NATO policy and nuclear proliferation.

During 1976, relations between the United States and its NATO allies centered around the questions of how to improve the conventional deterrent posture in Europe and how to limit the prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation. With respect to improved conventional warfare capabilities, the focus of policy concern was standardization of NATO weapons—the use of common weapons by all component NATO armies in order to reduce costs and ensure that the best weapons available would be deployed. Standardization has long been a general NATO objective, but to the European members it has come to mean purchasing American weapons rather than European weapons, with the economic benefits accruing to the United States.

Last year this concern was underlined when the U.S.-built F-16 fighter was selected over competing European-designed fighters to replace obsolete tactical aircraft in Europe. In 1976 the issue was whether the U.S.-built XM-1 tank or the West German Leopard II tank would be selected to replace the aging NATO tank force. With the U.S. Army reluctant to buy a West German tank, long negotiations resulted in agreement for both the United States and West Germany to build a comman 'hybrid' tank that would be able to use components from both nations' new tanks.

Relations between the United States and Western European nations were more contentious on the issue of nuclear proliferation. The United States has recently increased its sales of nuclear power plants to countries that may have an interest in constructing nuclear weapons from the materials consequently made available to them. A major debate within the U.S. government over necessary safeguards has not been resolved. To add to the problem, France and West Germany, in particular, are also actively trying to sell nuclear power plants abroad; France has even been willing to sell nuclear reprocessing plants, by which plutonium in spent nuclear fuel can be reclaimed either for power plants or for nuclear weapons. Both France's and West Germany's policies in this area are dictated by the need to generate foreign exchange to pay for imports of oil from the Middle East. The United States worked strenuously to prevent such European sales and was successful in denying a French sale to South Korea. But the competition for nuclear power plant and reprocessing facilities is growing, and preventive efforts by the United States come at the price of alienating both its Western European allies and the countries wanting to purchase Western European nuclear technology.

Supreme Court

One of the most significant events of the 1975-1976 Supreme Court term was the retirement of Justice William O. Douglas and the subsequent appointment of John Paul Stevens to fill his seat. Douglas, named to the Court by President Franklin Roosevelt, had served for more than 36 years, longer than any other man in history, until a debilitating stroke forced him to resign in November 1975.

Some commentators anticipated that Stevens' arrival on the Court would profoundly alter its philosophical balance, swinging it sharply to the right. It was true that the most liberal member of the Court had been replaced by a more conservative jurist, but just how conservative remained to be seen. Although five justices, a majority of the present Court, have been appointed by President Gerald Ford or his predecessor, Richard Nixon, a Supreme Court justice does not always reflect the philosophical bent of the president who chooses him. For example, Justice William Brennan is commonly regarded as being more liberal than Justice Byron White, yet Brennan is an Eisenhower appointee and White a Kennedy appointee. Some generally conservative judges, moreover, have been rather progressive on particular social issues, including Justice Harry Blackmun on abortion and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on some First Amendment questions.

Analysis of the principal decisions of 1976 supports the thesis that if there is now a conservative majority, it is a tenuous one at best. Perhaps most revealing were the Court's responses to two politically sensitive issues, abortion and capital punishment. Both matters had been before the Court in recent terms, and their reappearance provided an opportunity for observers to evaluate whether the Court's philosophy was indeed changing, and if so, in what direction.

Abortion.