1974: United States

Foreign Relations

If President Richard M. Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate diminished his effectiveness in foreign and domestic policy, it did not undermine America's position abroad. Matters of national interest and power seemed to transcend temporary domestic political problems and even the question of who was to occupy the White House. The cold war continued to recede before new, more complex, more compelling issues that cut across old rivalries and alliances.

Europe.

The spirit of dé‚tente generated by the 1972 and 1973 summit conferences between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev did not resolve all U.S.-Soviet conflicts. Washington and Moscow remained at odds on questions involving the Middle East and strategic arms control. Congress insisted on refusing to grant most-favored-nation trading status to the Soviet Union until it agreed to liberalize its emigration policy, especially for Russians Jews. Meanwhile, some U.S. critics questioned the desirability of détente, pointing to the absence of Soviet cooperation on leading issues and the continued buildup of Soviet nuclear and naval power, a fact cited by the Pentagon in successfully justifying massive military budget requests to Congress. The benefits of détente—according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a continuing and promising relationship between East and West that far exceeds in importance the terms of any specific agreements—were already being taken for granted. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee interrogated Kissinger in late September on the status of détente, the senators could not find enough questions of interest to absorb their allotted time.

Eastern Europe.

U.S. officials made increasingly clear their acceptance of the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe as a condition of détente and a fact of life. In September 1973 the United Nations admitted the two German states to membership, thereby recognizing the hopelessness of reunification. About a year later, on September 4, the United States recognized the East German government; over 100 countries had already done so. The treaty recognized the ties between West Germany and West Berlin but specified that Bonn did not have sovereignty over the city. East Germany also gave up its claims to West Berlin. The recognition of East Germany at last enabled the United States to raise questions of debts and property seizures stemming from World War II.

The Moscow summit.

Kissinger's well-publicized trip to Moscow in late March presaged limited success for the June summit, and other signs were equally negative. East-West negotiations in Vienna on mutual troop reductions were stalled. The 1972 agreements that concluded the first round of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) had placed few restrictions on Soviet nuclear expansion; disagreements within his own administration on nuclear policy limited Nixon's freedom to offer a genuine compromise during SALT II, and Moscow seemed just as intransigent. Trade agreements were held up by Congress over the Jewish emigration question. Mindful of the president's domestic troubles, the Kremlin seemed more confident and uncompromising than in previous years. As if to underscore the difficulties that lay ahead, Nixon departed for Moscow in late June with gaps in his itinerary and position papers. Some doubted that the trip would be worth the effort.

As analysts had predicted, the Nixon-Brezhnev agreements were modest and failed to deal effectively with offensive nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the two leaders signed accords to limit underground testing to 150 kilotons by March 31, 1976, and to restrict to one the number of each country's antiballistic missile sites. The conference was a standoff; the arms race would continue. Still the summit managed to keep détente on track, as Nixon and Brezhnev signed a ten year agreement on the basic principles of economic, industrial, and trade cooperation.

The status of NATO.

NATO celebrated its 25th anniversary during April in less than a confident mood. Many observers wondered whether NATO was still necessary; for example, the New Republic described NATO as 'an alliance in search of an enemy.' Behind Europe's dissatisfaction with the alliance was the conviction that détente had reduced Europe's importance to the United States, encouraging American neglect and disinterest. European leaders complained that Secretary Kissinger treated them as subordinates, not as partners: American proposals, one British diplomat grumbled, were 'handed down on tablets from the mountain.'

The Europeans scarcely concealed their displeasure at U.S.-Soviet bilateral diplomacy. That same détente which provided Europe with security and diplomatic independence disturbed Europeans who feared that Washington-Moscow nuclear pacts might erode the American nuclear deterrent to which Europe had entrusted its defense. Europe's interest in nuclear arms agreements was limited by the fact that unless the United States could show its willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any direct Soviet attack, exposed countries such as West Germany would have no security at all. 'Mutual assured destruction' (MAD) remained the core of Europe's defense strategy.

In 1974 the United States maintained between 250,000 and 300,000 troops in Western Europe, together with the Second Fleet in the Atlantic, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and 7,000 nuclear warheads in Central Europe. No European military efforts, declared West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, could substitute for the weight and deterrent value of the U.S. Seventh Army and Sixth Fleet. Standing alone, the European members of NATO could not match the ready power of the Warsaw Pact in men, tanks, and aircraft. Europe's reliance on American military protection was so complete that Western leaders opposed any significant American military disengagement.

Trade and defense.

Under the American nuclear umbrella, Western Europe had created a massive market to rival the economic power of the United States. In his address to the Executive Club of Chicago on March 15, President Nixon indicated that the United States would not tolerate such a relationship indefinitely: 'The United States is indispensable to the security of Europe.... Now the Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have the United States' participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political fronts.... [W]e must sit down and determine that we are either going to go along together on [all these] fronts or we will go separately....'

U.S. officials admitted that quarreling with NATO was a luxury the country could not really afford. 'Under no circumstances,' Kissinger reminded the Kremlin, 'will we sacrifice European interests ... no matter what our disagreements may be with the Europeans.' At the NATO meeting at Ottawa in June, Kissinger assured the allies that Washington would consult them in all but emergency situations and that the United States would keep sufficient forces in Europe to deter war or, if necessary, to fight one. President Nixon reassured the NATO partners of American concern when, en route to Moscow, he stopped in Brussels to sign the new 'Declaration on Atlantic Relations,' a vague document designed to guide the alliance through its second 25 years. In their Brussels communiqué of June 26, NATO members pledged to resist any attack with all the forces at their disposal, including nuclear weapons. Again the United States offered its full strength in Europe's defense.

Cyprus.

Cyprus confronted the United States and NATO with an acutely embarrassing problem. In July, after a Greek-led coup overthrew Archbishop Makarios, Turkey landed troops on the island. Having long supported the Greek military government and holding no special love for Makarios, the United States reacted slowly. Ostensibly, the United States sought only to prevent a direct clash between Greece and Turkey. As Greece and Cyprus pressed the UN Security Council for a resolution demanding Turkish withdrawal, Kissinger was assuring Athens that the United States would support all efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue peacefully. But when the Turks broke a provisional ceasefire in mid-August and pushed southward, rapidly gaining control of the northern third of the island, the United States stood by and did nothing. Angered by the lack of U.S. support, the new democratic Greek government of Constantine Karamanlis informed NATO that Greece would withdraw its forces from the alliance, placing U.S.-Greek relations and American military bases in Greece in jeopardy.

Far East.

Indochina.

In October 1974, some 20 months after the cease-fire which President Nixon had called 'peace with honor,' South Vietnam remained torn by war, political dissension, and economic disintegration. Military analysts believed that Saigon's Communist-led enemy was gaining the advantage in the perennial struggle for power in Vietnam. Hanoi no longer revealed much interest in a political settlement, although it was clear that Moscow and Peking had cut their aid to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, arguing that Communist infiltration demanded vigilance, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu sustained his regime with stringent restrictions on press freedom and political activity. With opposition growing from Catholics and Buddhists alike, Thieu was also threatened by the declining morale of his army, caused in part by corruption among the generals who constituted his own power base.

In Cambodia, insurgents continued to undermine the authority of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government. The American ambassador, John Gunther Dean, tried to keep the government in operation amid increasing military chaos and political corruption, but it was evident that years of U.S. fighting and spending in Southeast Asia had resolved very little.

President Thieu insisted that South Vietnam would require $3 billion in aid to achieve economic takeoff by the end of the decade. In March the administration asked Congress for $648 million in economic aid; Ambassador Graham A. Martin declared from Saigon that South Vietnam needed $850 million in 1975 and somewhat less the following year.

Critics in Congress and out attacked this continuing American involvement in Saigon's troubles. When Senator Edward Kennedy (D, Mass.) inquired of the State Department the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam, Ambassador Martin warned Kissinger to avoid a clear and detailed answer. Kissinger admitted that the United States had no formal commitment to South Vietnam; but, he informed Congress, the country was bound by both the Paris agreement of January 1973 and the long U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 'We have thus,' he wrote, 'committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally. We believe that it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed.'

During May the Senate reduced the Vietnam appropriation to $1.1 billion. The administration's reaction was bitter. And when Congress turned down a supplementary $474 million request for Saigon, the administration announced that it had overlooked $226 million already appropriated. Thus, acting on perceptions of global insecurity, the United States continued its heavy military and economic program for South Vietnam long after the country's commitment to Saigon's defense had allegedly ended.

China.

During 1974, U.S. relations with China continued to move toward normalization. The communiqué which concluded Kissinger's sixth trip to China, in November 1973, declared that the two countries would move toward more extensive cultural and scientific exchanges, increased trade, and wider responsibilities for the liaison offices they had established in each other's capitals earlier in the year. The Chinese, still fearful of the Soviets and distrustful of Soviet-American détente, lowered the barriers to closer relations with the United States more rapidly than experts had predicted. Whether formal relations could proceed without a fundamental shift of U.S. policy away from recognition and defense of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan was not clear. Peking, in the interest of establishing lasting ties with the United States, raised the possibility that it might agree to full diplomatic relations without demanding a new policy declaration regarding Taiwan. In June the U.S. ambassador to Taipei, Leonard Unger, argued that the full normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China would serve the interests of both the United States and Taiwan by reducing international tensions in East Asia.

Japan.

During 1974, U.S.-Japanese relations were blurred. The reasons were largely economic. Japan had entered a period of financial uncertainty, aggravated by oil shortages, declining world sales of Japanese goods, and the winding down of the Vietnam war, which had brought Japan much foreign exchange revenue. Japan's economic expansion along the rim of Asia faced resistance in both the economic and political rivalry of China and the anti-Japanese backlash in countries (for example, Indonesia) heavily dependent on Japan for capital and technology.

Lacking military defenses, Japan still looked to the United States for security. As long as Washington maintained its defense commitments, the Japanese seemed disinclined to reconsider their military policies. Still, the possibility that U.S. warships in Japanese harbors carried nuclear weapons created a political uproar in Tokyo, and during October some Japanese leaders demanded that American war vessels be barred from Japanese harbors.

President Ford visited Japan in mid-November at the start of his Far Eastern tour; security was exceptionally tight because of left-wing demonstrations. Ford is the first U.S. president ever to visit Japan.

Middle East.

Kissinger's diplomacy.

U.S. foreign policy showed greater agility in the Middle East than elsewhere. Early in December 1973, Kissinger set out on a 15 day diplomatic venture which carried him to 13 countries in Europe and the Middle East. By late December he had brought Israel and the Arabs—except for the Syrians—to the peace table at Geneva for the first time in 25 years of conflict. An Israeli-Egyptian troop disengagement agreement was achieved relatively quickly.

What complicated the Mideast problem was the Arab oil embargo imposed against the United States and the Netherlands during the October war. In mid-February, foreign ministers representing 13 Western nations met in Washington to establish some common program to cope with the worldwide petroleum shortages and high oil prices, which had quadrupled in a year. The crisis that now concerned oil, Kissinger warned the ministers, could ultimately include other raw materials and foodstuffs. For Washington the oil crisis was the strongest test since the Marshall Plan of the ability of the Western allies (plus Japan) to cooperate in the face of economic chaos. The other countries accepted, in principle, the need for cooperative action; French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert alone argued for an independent European policy. Still, it was clear that the Arab nations would not lift the oil embargo as long as Israel and Syria were still in open warfare.

In late February, Secretary of State Kissinger set the stage for an Israeli-Syrian settlement when he delivered to Israel a list of 65 prisoners of war held captive by Syria, a prime Israeli demand. Kissinger returned to Damascus with a proposal for a demilitarized zone separating the two countries. On February 28, Washington resumed formal diplomatic relations with Cairo.

In May, Kissinger climaxed an unprecedented display of personal diplomacy by securing an agreement between Israel and Syria over the disputed Golan Heights. During 28 days of negotiations he flew back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus to arrange the Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory and the return of the Israeli prisoners of war. The breakthrough came late in the month, when Israel dropped its insistence on a Syrian guarantee against Arab guerrilla infiltration. The United States, Kissinger promised, would support Israel politically should it be compelled to retaliate against Arab attacks.

The accord, signed in Geneva, ended months of fighting on the Golan Heights. During June the United States reopened its embassy in Damascus, which had been closed for seven years, and signed a wide-ranging economic and military pact with Saudi Arabia. Kissinger had not only brought at least momentary peace to the Middle East but had also raised the image of the United States in Arab eyes.

Nixon's trip.

To solidify the new American friendship with the Arab nations, President Nixon embarked in June on a triumphal tour of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. Huge throngs greeted the president in Cairo, where he promised the Egyptian government nuclear reactor technology, atomic fuel, and substantial economic aid. In Saudi Arabia another 2 million cheered the president's arrival, and King Faisal, who met Nixon at the airport, praised him for his contributions to peace. In Tel Aviv, where Nixon met a cooler reception, the president reminded Israel that it had entered a new era in which it could no longer rely solely on military power to guarantee its survival; peace, Nixon said, would require compromises with the Arabs. He promised Israel an atomic aid program similar to the one he had pledged to Egypt. On his final stop, Nixon promised Jordan continued military aid, subject to congressional approval. King Hussein expressed Jordan's support 'for the very significant diplomatic efforts which the United States has made to help bring peace to the Middle East.'

Despite all the efforts at peacemaking and the claims of success, the fundamental Arab-Israeli dispute had clearly not been resolved. By August officials in Washington and Tel Aviv were predicting another round of fighting within a year. No one had even begun to deal realistically with the future of Jerusalem and with the status of the Palestinians, a topic which Nixon's hosts had often referred to. During October, Kissinger was back in the Middle East, shuttling between Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Tel Aviv. This time his reception was less cordial, partly because Congress had failed to follow through on many of the aid pledges Nixon and Kissinger had made in June. Furthermore, the Arabs were known to distrust the new president, Gerald R. Ford, who as a congressman had been strongly pro-Israeli.

Latin America.

In 1974 the Latin American nations, as possessors of important natural resources, assumed a new significance in international trade and diplomacy. Recognizing the power of Venezuelan oil, that country's president-elect, Carlos Andrés Perez, observed: 'We will use oil as a political lever to get more capital and technology and a voice for Latin America in international trade and monetary policy matters.' Ecuador and Peru, two new oil-producing regions, shared Venezuela's aggressive outlook. Everywhere in Latin America, producers of raw materials anticipated the benefits of higher prices.

Meeting with Latin America's foreign ministers in Mexico City during February, Kissinger opened what he called a 'new dialogue.' 'We meet here as equals,' he said, 'representative of our individual modes of life but united by one aspiration—to build a new community.' Kissinger announced the new U.S.-Panamanian agreement in principle on the Panama Canal, negotiated in January by Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker. He also noted the U.S. arrangement with Peru over compensation for expropriated mines and factories. At the April meeting of the Organization of American States in Atlanta, the secretary announced a 'good partner' policy, and he urged a greater spirit of collaboration and consultation.

Cuba.

In both Mexico City and Atlanta, Kissinger avoided the issue of Cuba's readmission to the OAS. Some troubled Latin American countries had little interest in lifting the sanctions against Cuba, voted 13 years earlier. But other nations, led by Argentina, termed the American-backed policy anachronistic. Argentina's foreign minister, Alberto J. Vignes, argued that Cuba's isolation 'paralyzes hemispheric activity and, more important, creates tensions.' Jamaican Foreign Minister Dudley Thompson termed the policy 'sheer Stone Age stupidity.'

Meanwhile, American business leaders, hoping to reestablish markets in Cuba, joined the chorus in demanding a change in U.S. policy. After President Nixon left office, President Ford announced that he would not derail the Latin American effort to reopen OAS doors to the Cuban government. Late in September, Senators Jacob Javits (R, N.Y.) and Claiborne Pell (D, R.I.), with reluctant State Department approval, visited Cuba and interviewed Castro at length. Upon their return they predicted the eventual normalization of relations. With the United States abstaining, a bid at the November hemispheric ministers' conference in Quito to lift OAS sanctions against Cuba failed to win the necessary two-thirds majority.

Chile.

Relations with Chile came under Senate Foreign Relations Committee scrutiny in the fall after the disclosure of testimony before a House subcommittee that the Central Intelligence Agency had spent over $8 million between 1970 and 1973 to 'destabilize' the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens. CIA activities allegedly included an attempt to bribe members of the Chilean Congress not to vote for Allende in 1970, subsidies for opposition newspapers, and financial support for a truckers' strike that led to Allende's violent overthrow on September 11, 1973. CIA Director William E. Colby acknowledged that the CIA had actively opposed Allende as early as 1964, when he was an unsuccessful presidential candidate on a Marxist platform. It was subsequently disclosed that, during the Nixon administration, anti-Allende activities had been coordinated by the so-called 40 Committee, a top-secret policy-making body headed by Henry Kissinger. Since Kissinger had denied at his Senate confirmation hearings that the United States was involved in Allende's overthrow, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the matter. The senators determined that Kissinger had not committed perjury, but the staff reportedly felt that other U.S. officials may have.

National Defense

In regard to national defense policy, the year 1974 proved quite unusual, not because of any dramatic new issues or events, but rather because of the unexpected outcome of a particularly heated debate over defense policy early in the year. Issues that commanded primary attention in the government and also in the press were essentially the same as those of the past few years: the growing size of the defense budget, the effort to achieve strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, the debate over the requirements of an adequate strategic deterrent, and the recurring pressures to redefine the American role in NATO and to reduce U.S. military forces in Europe.

The debate over these issues in early 1974 indicated the possibility of significant policy changes, but by the end of the year few significant changes in defense policy had resulted. New directions in policy were set, yet those changes had less to do with the achievement of agreed solutions to important defense issues than with the political environment created by Watergate-related events and by the economic pressures of inflation and recession.

Strategic nuclear weapons policy.

In January, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger ushered in the new year by calling for a national debate on the requirements of an effective strategic nuclear force. His comments were reminiscent of the proposals made in 1962 by a previous secretary of defense, Robert McNamara. At that time, McNamara argued that the U.S. deterrent threat of retaliating against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet attack against the United States or Europe was no longer rational, since the Soviets had the ability to destroy American cities in return. Instead, McNamara proposed a counterforce strategy that called for 'flexible options' by which the United States would, at least initially, attack only Soviet strategic military targets and avoid striking cities. McNamara's proposals came under attack from both European and American critics who argued, among other things, that counterforce targeting implied a first strike threat that would only incite a more rapid arms race. As a consequence of these criticisms, McNamara's proposals for changes in the U.S. strategic policy were soon dropped in favor of reliance on assured destruction of Soviet population and industrial centers.

Secretary Schlesinger's 1974 proposals were similar in many respects to McNamara's early position, and the critical responses to those proposals were also very similar to those received by McNamara. Schlesinger argued that the United States and the Soviet Union both have strategic forces capable of inflicting such horrendous mutual destruction that all-out nuclear war was very unlikely. However, the continuing and rapid buildup of Soviet strategic weapons and the development of new weapons technologies on both sides have increased the possibility of less than all-out strategic nuclear war. In particular, the increases in the number and size of Soviet missiles, coupled with their improvements in accuracy, raised the possibility of a Soviet counterforce strike that might eliminate the U.S. land-based missile and bomber force. To deter such threats, Schlesinger argued that the president should have some other option than reliance on the assured destruction threat to Soviet cities, knowing that in return the Soviet Union would be able to attack American cities.

To provide such an option, Secretary Schlesinger proposed the development of new strategic weapons, improvement in the accuracy of current weapons, and the design of new strategies for flexible and limited strategic nuclear operations. Thus, instead of relying on assured destruction to deter all forms of possible Soviet nuclear attack, the intention was to have the capability for attacking a variety of military or industrial targets in a limited, controlled way.

In making these proposals, Schlesinger called for a national debate on strategic policy in order to gain support for his proposals and to signal American willingness to compete with the Soviet strategic arms buildup if a new arms limitation agreement was not achieved in the near future. Schlesinger needed support, most importantly from Congress, which would have to authorize his proposed changes in U.S. weapons capabilities. However, there was one important change for which he did not require congressional approval. Early in the year, Schlesinger announced that the United States was retargeting some of its strategic missiles so that they were aimed at Soviet military installations and forces rather than at Soviet cities. And in a move to increase the flexibility of the U.S. strike force the air force, in an experiment conducted in October, successfully launched a traditionally land-based intercontinental ballistic missile from a C-5A transport plane.

Opponents of Schlesinger's proposals argued that these changes threatened to destabilize the strategic balance of power that had prevented the use of nuclear weapons since World War II. For the United States to have the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they could be used, it was argued, presented the possibility of a U.S. first strike against the Soviet Union. That possibility might encourage the Soviet Union to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons in crisis situations because of the threat of a U.S. attack against them. Senator Thomas McIntyre (D, N.H.), who led the Senate opposition to Schlesinger's proposals, argued that the counterforce threat to the Soviet missile force would put a hair trigger on nuclear war because it would motivate the Soviets to strike first in a period of international tension. Furthermore, it would encourage an even greater Soviet arms buildup to counter the U.S. threat. Finally, it might increase the possibility of nuclear war because the availability of limited options might make nuclear weapons seem less frightening and, therefore, more usable.

In spite of this opposition, Congress finally approved Schlesinger's proposals for new weapons and for improvements in the accuracy of current weapons. The rationale for this approval was that such actions were necessary to offer the Soviet Union incentives to respond more favorably to U.S. strategic arms control proposals.

Strategic arms control.

In early 1974, President Richard M. Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union in late June was announced, a trip that (it was hoped) would score a new breakthrough in reaching a strategic arms control agreement. In late March, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger traveled to the Soviet Union for discussions preparatory to the president's forthcoming visit. At his departure, Kissinger warned that U.S.-Soviet relations had entered a more difficult period, but he added that, with respect to strategic arms agreements, 'We are at a point where we should be making or should be attempting a conceptual breakthrough.' Contrary to these hopeful expectations, Kissinger reported on his return that he had failed to achieve such a result.

The upshot of these events was growing criticism from those who were concerned about the appropriateness of the 1972 interim strategic arms limitation agreement. Their contention was that the administration might be acting hastily and recklessly in seeking a new agreement in order to bolster its Watergate-damaged domestic political position. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Secretary of State Kissinger, and other administration spokesmen were repeatedly called upon to disavow any intention to accept hasty or ill-conceived agreements with the Soviet Union that might be disadvantageous to the United States. Thus, whatever the purposes of the Nixon administration may have been at that time, the Watergate political environment did serve to give opponents of further American compromises in strategic arms negotiations a clear advantage.

The public debate over the U.S. position in the continuing strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) revealed deep divisions on the issues within the government. In Congress, Senator Henry Jackson (D, Wash.) was a leading spokesman for those who believed that the initial 1972 SALT agreement had left the United States in an inferior strategic position. Because that agreement allows the Soviet Union more missiles and because the Soviet missiles are much larger than those of the United States, Jackson and others feared the possibility of a Soviet superiority that might diminish the American strategic deterrent position. Therefore, Jackson insisted that any subsequent SALT agreement be based on a concept of parity, or basic equality, both in the numbers of missiles and the amount of nuclear power those missiles are capable of delivering in an attack.

The inability of the Nixon administration to gain Soviet willingness to compromise on parity did not mean that no agreement at all could be signed at the forthcoming summit. In fact, the signing of a threshold nuclear testing agreement was the major event of President Nixon's June trip to Moscow. The agreement limited underground nuclear tests as of March 31, 1976, to levels producing earthquake-like tremors of less than 4.5 on the Richter scale. This threshold is considered quite high and will eliminate tests only of very large nuclear warheads, sizes which are very seldom tested in any case.

A more surprising agreement came at the Vladivostok summit in late November, when President Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reportedly achieved the 'conceptual breakthrough' that Kissinger had been talking about earlier in the year. Initial reports were sketchy, but the two leaders apparently agreed to instruct their respective SALT delegations to work out an accord which would limit, through 1985, each side's aggregate total of nuclear delivery vehicles—including missiles and bombers—to about 2,400 and which would limit to about 1,300 each side's force of missiles with multiple warheads.

NATO policy.

This year was the 25th anniversary of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which binds the United States to the defense of Western Europe. Over the past ten years the strains within the alliance have been growing, and this year the debate within NATO over the future of the alliance has indicated new sources of strain and additional signs of decay.

Growing European disaffection with U.S. foreign policy was exacerbated by the recurring debate within the United States over the maintenance of up to 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe. The Europeans have consistently held that the withdrawal of any American forces from Central Europe would be a signal of the withdrawal of the American commitment to defend Europe. In spite of these concerns, amendments to the defense budget were proposed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to withdraw as many as 125,000 U.S. troops from stations overseas. Though these amendments were all defeated, the votes were very close and raised the clear warning that pressure was growing in the United States to reduce American commitments abroad.

One amendment that did pass Congress was aimed at forcing the Europeans to pay for a greater share of the costs of keeping American forces in Europe. The amendment required American troops to be withdrawn from Europe in proportion to the failure of the NATO countries to offset balance-of-payments deficits incurred by the United States in stationing forces there. For example, if the European allies fell short by 25 percent in offsetting the deficit during 1974, then there would be a 25 percent reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. In the previous two years, the Europeans had paid $2.2 billion to offset U.S. balance-of-payments losses. It was now calculated that a 100 percent offset would be $3.3 billion for the next two years. After lengthy and difficult negotiations, the Europeans agreed again to offset U.S. balance-of-payments costs. However, the compromise was that the United States redefined the 100 percent total to be $2.2 billion—the total that had previously been paid.

The question of American troop withdrawals from Europe was debated in another forum as well, the NATO—Warsaw Pact negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe. Begun in October 1973, these negotiations have been mired on basic disagreements between the two sides. The NATO proposal put forward this year was for a reduction only in American and Soviet forces that would create an approximate parity between the opposing sides. The Warsaw Pact counterproposal was for equal percentage reductions that would retain the pact's numerical superiority in Europe. The Warsaw Pact also wants any force cuts to include U.S. airpower and nuclear weapons in Europe and to include reductions in non-U.S. forces in NATO as well. The stark differences in these positions indicate little hope for an early agreement. The American hope is to satisfy domestic pressures for reductions in U.S. forces in Europe and to gain equality in force levels with the Warsaw Pact. The pact, on the other hand, is under no pressure to reduce its forces and desires, instead, to create further divisions within NATO through prolonged negotiations.

There were other sources of strain on the NATO alliance. In particular, the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus resulted in the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. The Cyprus war raised another sensitive issue. During the conflict it was announced that the United States had taken extraordinary efforts to protect its nuclear weapons in Greece so that they might not be stolen or used in battle. This incident led to a congressional investigation on the safety precautions for guarding U.S. nuclear weapons stored in foreign countries. That investigation revealed some dramatic weaknesses that might allow terrorists or other groups to acquire or destroy those weapons.

The war on Cyprus also rejuvenated the debate over the usefulness of the more than 7,000 nuclear weapons stored abroad. Western European NATO members have long held that the maintenance of large numbers of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was a critical component of the NATO deterrent position. Early this year, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, then supreme allied commander of NATO, proposed a new program of small nuclear weapons for Europe. The debate on this proposal continued until May, when the United States renounced any intention to develop such weapons. Then, following the Cyprus conflict, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced that the United States was studying the possibility of reducing the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Should such a move take place, it will not be received well in Europe.