1962: United States

A summary of United States foreign relations, political events, and legislative and judicial developments in 1962 is presented below.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The major challenges confronting the United States abroad in 1962 differed from those of previous years mainly in their persistence and intensity. Although new elements developed in the U.S. relationship to its European allies, the specific clashes of interest between the Communist powers and the West centered in the same issues that had plagued international life throughout the era of the cold war. At Berlin the East-West friction was almost continuous. South Vietnam remained the chief focus of conflict in Southeast Asia. By autumn the immediate Communist threat to Western security had been transferred to Cuba, where U.S. detection of Soviet nuclear installations inaugurated one of the most dangerous crises of the postwar period. As the year receded into history, the United States had demonstrated again its ability to coexist successfully with a wide variety of international pressures without manifesting the power to resolve any of them on terms wholly acceptable to the Western World.

With the aggravation of world tensions in 1962, the nation's leadership was obliged to formulate policy amid an accumulating variety of domestic pressures, which often seemed to permit it little flexibility. Spokesmen of the American Right accused the government of pursuing 'no-win' policies and of revealing insufficient vigor in its effort to frustrate Communist objectives in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and South Vietnam. If some Americans opposed all compromise, various peace groups, such as Turn Toward Peace and Women Strike for Peace, demanded the end of nuclear testing as well as total and universal disarmament. Not since the late 1930's have peace organizations been as active as they were in 1962.

Leading a nation that harbored a wide range of expectations in foreign affairs, the administration of President John F. Kennedy yielded nothing on such fundamental and established positions as continued Western access to West Berlin. It sought to avoid a general war while defending the vital interests of the United States. The style and rhetoric of the Kennedy leadership varied perceptibly from that of the Eisenhower years; the policies themselves remained largely unaltered.

U.S.-Soviet Relations.

Disarmament.

During the early weeks of 1962 the unrelenting realities of the cold war were nowhere more apparent than at Geneva, Switzerland. There three years of United States, British, and Soviet negotiations to terminate nuclear weapons tests had produced nothing but deadlock. The crucial issue, declared U.S. delegate Charles C. Stelle, was whether a projected test ban agreement would be monitored by a system of international verification and control. The minimal Western demand had been met by persistent Soviet objections. Finally, on January 29, the conference members disbanded after 353 sessions, unable even to agree on a communiqué to end their deliberations.

Despite this failure, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. looked forward with considerable hope to the opening of the general disarmament conference at Geneva on March 14. Indeed, on February 12, during an apparent thaw in the Moscow atmosphere, Premier Nikita Khrushchev proposed that the heads of government inaugurate the work of the eighteen-nation conference. Secretary Rusk explained the prompt U.S. rejection of the Russian proposal: issues of such complexity, he said, ought first to be explored through other channels. Early in March the United States countered with the suggestion, accepted by the Soviet Union, that the foreign ministers meet at Geneva on March 12. At the time President Kennedy made it clear that the United States would continue to insist on international inspection as a safeguard against treaty violations. Several days earlier the President had warned in a television speech that in the absence of any test-ban treaty the United States would proceed with a series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere over the Pacific, beginning in late April. At Geneva in mid-March two important delegations were absent. The French boycotted the conference, convinced that it could achieve nothing. The Chinese had received no invitation at all. This reduced the conference to seventeen nations, four representing the Western bloc, five the Soviet bloc, and eight the nonaligned nations of the world.

Within two days of its opening, the Geneva disarmament conference had before it two rival programs that again demonstrated the vast gulf separating East from West. The two sides agreed only that nuclear weapons threatened mankind with total annihilation and that, in principle, total disarmament was the only path to genuine security. Secretary Rusk urged an immediate test-ban treaty, a 30-per-cent cut in major world armaments over a period of three years, an end to production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, reduction of all armed forces, and measures to prevent surprise attack— all steps to be guaranteed by effective international inspection and verification. The Soviet plan demanded the dismantling of the entire Western defense structure in Europe and the withdrawal of American troops from the Continent. It provided for no control except 'national self-control.' This stand was totally unsatisfactory to the West, and thereafter the conference remained deadlocked.

Throughout the subsequent search for a test-ban agreement the U.S.S.R. rejected all inspection other than that available through existing detection systems. As the moment for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing approached, the neutrals offered a compromise plan on April 16 'to save humanity from the evil of further nuclear tests.' The United States and Britain declared the control system sketched in the plan inadequate. Two days later the United States countered with a complex three-stage disarmament plan. Again the Soviets ruled out any genuine agreement by accepting the proposal of the eight nonaligned nations as the basis of further talks. Having failed to achieve a satisfactory test-ban treaty, the United States resumed its nuclear testing over Christmas Island late in April.

After a month's recess, the seventeen-nation disarmament conference reconvened at Geneva on July 21. As the United States pressed new and simplified proposals for a test-ban treaty on August 5, the U.S.S.R. resumed its nuclear testing with a powerful high-altitude blast over Novaya Zemlya. The neutralist countries responded with a proposal for an immediate test ban that would eliminate both atmospheric and underwater nuclear explosions as a 'first step' toward a general treaty. Early in November 1962 the UN General Assembly, by unanimous vote, with the nuclear powers abstaining, condemned all forms of nuclear testing and asked that all such explosions end not later than Jan. 1, 1963. President Kennedy revealed that the atmospheric test in the Pacific early in November was the last by the United States in the current series. Premier Khrushchev followed with the assurance that the Soviet test scheduled for late November was the last in the current Soviet series. At Geneva the neutralists, led by India, exerted pressure on the U.S.S.R. to accept at least minimal international inspection, an effort welcomed by the United States. In December, however, the U.S.S.R. announced that it would stop testing unilaterally on January 1. The United States declared that it would not be shamed into entering what would amount to an uninspected test ban.

Berlin.

In 1962 the question of West Berlin's future again dominated the East-West struggle for power in Europe. For the Soviets, the beleaguered city remained a powerful pawn in their persistent efforts to force a formal Western acceptance of a divided Germany.

Another year of fruitless U.S.-Soviet conversations over West Berlin began on January 2 with a series of meetings between U.S. Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn E. Thompson and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. Their five probing talks, continuing into February, ended in total failure. Late in February, however, Secretary Rusk announced that he would resume the Berlin discussion when he met Gromyko at Geneva in March. On March 11, as the conference opened, the Kremlin hinted that it might soon impose a new deadline for the signing of an East German peace treaty, which would terminate Soviet responsibility for Allied status in West Berlin. What mattered to the U.S.S.R., Gromyko insisted, was not access but a German peace treaty. The United States proposed that Allied access to West Berlin be supervised by an international control authority; Gromyko demanded that this control authority be linked with Allied evacuation of Berlin. Neither side offered any significant modification of its position.

Despite the improved atmosphere in April, when Rusk began a new round of talks with the new Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli F. Dobrynin, the Soviets revealed no greater interest in compromise than in the past. Rusk, equally adamant, announced that he would offer no proposals that did not have the full approval of the West German government. In his subsequent conversations with Dobrynin, Rusk suggested an international authority to supervise the access routes into Berlin consisting of thirteen members—five Communists (including East Berlin and East Germany), five Western, and three neutral (Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria). The Soviets insisted that East Berlin was part of East Germany, while the West German government complained that the American proposal involved a creeping recognition of East Germany. It was clear that the United States required the support of both French and West German leaders before it could accord any formal recognition to the East German government. At the NATO meetings in Athens early in May the NATO allies approved the continuation of Rusk's talks with Dobrynin to the point where they might become actual negotiations.

By midsummer the discussions on Berlin had reached another impasse. On July 10 Premier Khrushchev proposed that the Allied troops in West Berlin be replaced by troops from the small NATO nations and from members of the Warsaw Pact, all under UN supervision. Shortly thereafter, President Kennedy called the Soviet ambassador to the White House and impressed upon him that the United States would not negotiate the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. The complete failure of the Rusk-Gromyko and Rusk-Dobrynin talks brought hints again in late July of a Soviet peace treaty with East Germany.

During August a new series of incidents at the hated Berlin wall set off riots in West Berlin against the East German regime as well as bitter condemnation of American forces for not rescuing an East German youth who was mortally wounded by Communist gunfire. By October the growing crisis over Berlin convinced many Allied leaders that the Kremlin would shortly challenge the entire Western position in the divided city. Events elsewhere, especially in Cuba, relieved the tension in Berlin during November and early December, but the lull was possibly deceptive. At any moment of the Kremlin's choosing, West Berlin could again become the chief focus of the cold war.

NATO.

U.S. policy toward Europe, failing any resolution of the East-West conflict, centered on the creation of a stronger, more flexible Allied military structure. To this end the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Europe. On May 17 President Kennedy declared: 'The U.S. cannot withdraw from Europe, unless and until Europe should wish us gone. We cannot distinguish its defenses from our own. We cannot diminish our contributions to Western security or abdicate the responsibilities of power.'

At the same time the President warned the Allies to strengthen their own defenses. 'We cannot and do not take any European ally for granted,' he said, 'and I hope no one in Europe would take us for granted either. . . . American public opinion has turned away from isolationism, but its faith must not be shattered.' Gen. Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, continued to pursue the goal of thirty combat-ready divisions in Europe. Norstad informed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March that the reinforcements in central Europe, dispatched at the time of the Berlin crisis of July 1961, had impressed the Kremlin 'with the sericusness of our intentions.' But more was required, he told the committee. North Atlantic forces were still below the minimum levels that Western military leaders considered adequate.

NATO spokesmen were not yet ready to resolve the issues posed by the threat of conventional attack. In February, American Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara warned the U.S.S.R. that the United States and its allies were prepared to fight limited 'twilight-zone' wars in the new nations of Africa and Asia. But American leaders admitted that in Europe the West possessed no genuine deterrent other than the threat of nuclear retaliation. Adequate Western defense, McNamara was convinced, required a wider range of options that would permit a limited action and avert the immediate escalation of a local clash into an atomic holocaust. Leading NATO partners, however, continued to reject this concept as an acceptable system of defense. Britain announced in February that it would decrease its conventional forces and again base its military planning on the nuclear deterrent. Bonn, which in 1962 boasted the largest conventional army in NATO, still feared that U.S. leadership was placing too much stress on chemical weapons. The French government condemned the refusal of the United States to help France build a nuclear weapons system. The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Athens in May welcomed the announcement of the United States that it would make nuclear weapons available to the alliance. But in return it agreed only to examine further the balance between conventional and nuclear forces required for Europe's defense. As late as December what was militarily desirable to U.S. spokesmen remained economically and politically elusive. British and French forces assigned to NATO were vastly below strength; German forces, because of the rapid turnover, were never quite combat ready. Through twelve years of its existence NATO had never achieved the level of defense demanded by its own judgment of the Soviet military threat.

Britain.

U.S.-British relations were marred by two critical issues during 1962. A major crisis resulted from the U.S. decision to abandon the Skybolt missile project. The missile, designed to be launched by aircraft and capable of a range of 1,000-1,500 miles, had been promised to Britain, and British military planning had been organized around the Skybolt weapon. Even more important for the British was the fact that Skybolt, with its nuclear warhead, was the symbol of Britain's independent nuclear striking force. Washington press reports during the first week in December gave the first indication of the decision to abandon the project and immediately provoked sharp reactions in London. U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara flew to London on December 11 to confer with British defense chiefs, and as the crisis in Britain continued to build up, the Skybolt issue was placed on the agenda of the meeting scheduled to be held in Nassau, British West Indies, between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan later in the month.

The Nassau conference, held December 18-21, resulted in formal British concurrence in the abandonment of the Skybolt program and agreement by the United States to provide Britain with Polaris submarine-launched atomic missiles instead. While the Polaris missiles would assure Britain an independent nuclear weapon, the dislocation of British defense planning remained a critical issue for Macmillan. Both Labour and Liberal Party leaders severely criticized the Nassau decisions in Parliament on December 23, and widespread dissatisfaction existed within the Conservative Party.

The second divergence in the policies of the two governments concerned the year-end UN military action in the Congo, designed to force the unification of Katanga Province with the rest of the country. As was the case in 1961, Britain insisted that unification must be achieved by negotiation and not by force of arms, while the United States supported the UN action launched in December and provided needed military supplies.

U.S. Relations with Asia.

At the heart of all American policy in the Far East throughout 1962 lay the problem of containing the aggressiveness of Communist China. The establishment of military and political stability along the periphery of this revolutionary giant proved once more to be an impossible goal. American influence alone could not erect viable regimes, capable of commanding the allegiance of their peoples, in Southeast Asia. Nor could the United States, with only the token physical support of its allies in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, achieve any genuine military stability. As a result, the United States was forced to wage an interminable cold war, often unilaterally and against mounting odds, on a variety of Southeast Asian fronts.

Laos.

As the year opened, the prospects for the success of American aims in the Buddhist mountain kingdom of Laos seemed remote. Laos had been thrust into the maelstrom of the cold war because of its strategic geographical position, having common borders with China, North and South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia.

Following the repeated failure of the American-supported right-wing government to create political stability, President Kennedy agreed with Premier Khrushchev in June 1961 to establish a neutral Laos as a buffer between the power blocs in Southeast Asia. By January 1962 the fourteen-nation conference at Geneva, attempting to arrange a coalition government for Laos, had neared agreement when right-wing Prince Boun Oum and his deputy, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, refused to surrender the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior and returned to Laos. Boun Oum continued to resist the plan for a coalition government even after the United States, in February, held up the monthly payment of $3,000,000 to his regime. Finally, in May, Boun Oum created a major crisis when he strengthened Nam Tha, an outpost twenty miles from the Chinese border, despite U.S. warnings that such action would endanger the cease-fire. On May 7 the left-wing Pathet Lao attacked Nam Tha and soon drove the government forces into full retreat, taking control of all northwest Laos. When 2,000 troops of the royal Laotian army fled into Thailand, President Kennedy dispatched 4,000 American troops into Thailand to guard the Mekong River boundary against the triumphant Communists. The Kennedy Administration wrote off the right-wing Laotian army as militarily useless, rebuked its leaders for their conduct, and withdrew all political support from them.

Quite as suddenly, the prospects for a coalition government improved. During the crisis Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian neutralist leader, returned to Laos to reopen negotiations with Boun Oum and the left-wing leader, Souvanna Phouma's half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong. On June 11 the three feuding princes agreed on a coalition cabinet. Souvanna Phouma assumed the leadership of the new government. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan remained in the new administration as Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance. Souvanna Phouma took over the Defense Ministry, and the neutralist faction also gained the Interior and Foreign Ministries. Souphanouvong became a Deputy Premier and Economics Minister. Of the nineteen men in the cabinet, eleven were neutrals, four were former members of Boun Oum's royal government, and four represented the left-wing Pathet Lao movement. In July the new Laotian government submitted a declaration of official neutrality to the fourteen-nation conference at Geneva.

Laotian neutrality promised greater internal stability, but it left the military situation critical. The United States had permitted Moscow a predominant position in Laos as the only means of keeping Peking out. The new neutrality removed the protection of SEATO from Laos until such time as Western forces might be invited to return. In October the United States withdrew its last military advisers from the country. Meanwhile, within Laos, the armies of the three factions were to be integrated and partially demobilized. With the chief military power in the hands of the Right and Left, Premier Souvanna Phouma had the backing of neither a large army nor an established party. In a crisis the Premier would be forced to turn to one of the extremes, and it appeared certain that he would turn to the stronger, more disciplined, and generally more cooperative Left. With pro-Communists in control of most of the nation's area and population, it was not clear how the still unscheduled election could prevent a Communist victory. As late as December, moreover, undetermined numbers of North Vietnamese military personnel remained on Laotian soil. The future success of the neutralist experiment would hinge on the political leadership of Souvanna Phouma.

South Vietnam.

Throughout 1962 the struggle for control of South Vietnam still raged along the countryside. Determined to resist the Communist conquest of this Southeast Asian republic, the Kennedy Administration inaugurated a crash program late in 1961 to increase the strength and efficiency of the South Vietnamese defense effort. What motivated this vigorous American effort was the clear evidence that the 'liberation' movement in South Vietnam was directed by the Communist leadership of North Vietnam. By 1962 the government troops, trained and equipped by the United States and supported by U.S. Marine Corps helicopters, fighter planes, and light bombers, were moving into battle with increasing maneuverability and effectiveness. Early in March, Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, declared in Saigon that South Vietnamese troops had 'gone on the offensive' against the Communist Viet Cong.

Despite some gains, much remained to be done before the West could anticipate any decisive turn in the struggle. American observers in Saigon agreed that the inadequacies of the Diem regime were the weakest component in the South Vietnamese war against the Viet Cong. At this moment of peril South Vietnam lacked an inspirational leader. So determined was Diem's resistance to U.S. pressure for reform that his regime inspired attacks on the United States in the Saigon press. By August 1962 the hostility between U.S. and Vietnamese forces, caused partially by racial tension, threatened to ruin their joint efforts against the Viet Cong. Native opponents of Diem, some of them in exile, warned that only if the United States supported an alternative South Vietnamese government, one that had the support of the people, would there be any long-term possibility of defeating the Communist insurgents.

China.

As in previous years, U.S. policy toward China in 1962 continued to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by supporting the Nationalist regime on Taiwan at its two points of maximum vulnerability-the UN and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. That neither position was challenged during the year could be explained more by decisions within the Communist bloc than by the fundamental strength of the U.S. position.

Soviet intransigence at the UN General Assembly in December 1961, demanding the removal of the 'Chiang Kaishek clique' and the seating of a Communist Chinese delegation, eliminated the problem of Chinese representation for the United States indefinitely. It was not clear when a two-thirds majority of the UN would vote to reject Taiwan from representation completely. The minority bloc of thirty-seven that voted for Peking, however, included Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

When the UN met in September 1962, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson again warned against the danger of admitting Communist China. 'Let there be no mistake about it,' he said. 'Those who speak in support of the admission of the Chinese Communists . . . inevitably lend support and encouragement to the aggressive concepts which today govern the actions and policies of this regime, thereby endangering the principles of the UN Charter.' Chinese aggression against India's northern frontiers appeared to substantiate Stevenson's charges, although India, as usual, led the movement for recognition. Eventually the UN voted overwhelmingly against the Soviet draft resolution to expel the Nationalist regime on Taiwan for the thirteenth consecutive year. It also seemed possible that the prompt U.S. military and moral support of India in its increasingly serious border war might bring about a change in India's traditional policy of nonalignment.

Similarly the United States maintained its ambiguous commitment to the offshore islands rather than retreat to the strategically stronger position of defending the independence of Taiwan. If Quemoy and Matsu were physically worthless to both the Nationalists and the Communist Chinese, they kept alive for Taipei the almost mystical dream of eventual return to the mainland. When, in June, the renewed build-up of Communist forces in Fukien Province opposite the offshore islands appeared to exceed the needs of defense, President Kennedy reasserted the traditional American threat that the United States would 'take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores.' What it would do about an assault on Quemoy or Matsu was, as usual, left unanswered. Few Washington officials favored the continued U.S. commitment, however vague, to the tiny offshore islands. But the President, aware both of Peking's interest in proving the United States a 'paper tiger' and of Taiwan's interest in dragging the country into a war against the mainland, preferred to cling to the middle course of postponing the ultimate decision until an actual crisis occurred.

U.S.-Latin American Relations.

Punta del Este.

Late in December 1961 the Council of the Organization of American States announced that the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere would confer at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Jan. 22, 1962, to meet the continuing problems arising from Cuba's alliance with the Soviet bloc and its subversive activities in other Latin-American states. Behind this decision was a month of disagreement, in which Mexico and Cuba bitterly opposed the calling of such a meeting, and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador refused to vote at all. On January 3 the United States published a white paper on Cuban communism, designed to impress Latin America with the necessity of censuring Cuba and isolating it from inter-American affairs.

At Punta del Este it was clear from the outset that the United States could not win acceptance of its plan for diplomatic sanctions against Cuba. Seven Latin-American states, including the largest ones, issued a memorandum on January 24 denouncing 'the incompatibility between the present regime in Cuba and the inter-American system,' but they opposed sanctions. Thereafter Secretary Rusk limited his goal to an arms embargo and the suspension of Cuba from the OAS. Even on the issue of suspension Rusk failed to gain the approval of the powerful minority bloc. In his plea to the delegates on January 25, Rusk declared that 'we have no quarrel with the Cuban people or even with the avowed principles of the Cuban revolution, but rather with the use of Cuba as a 'bridgehead in the Americas' for Communist efforts to destroy free governments in this hemisphere.' On January 31 the conference voted unanimously (except for Cuba) that 'the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American political system.' On the main resolution for excluding Cuba from the OAS, however, the vote was 14 to 1 (Cuba), with six abstentions. This was considerably less than a victory for American purposes. Nor was it clear how the exclusion of Cuba from the American system would resolve the problems of the hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress.

Aug. 17, 1962, marked the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Throughout the year that followed the 1961 signing of the alliance charter at Punta del Este near Montevideo, the United States had placed major emphasis on its economic aid program for Latin America. Unfortunately, the actual progress under the American program was hardly commensurate with its high purpose. The military revolution in Peru early in the summer of 1962 prompted American officials to question the entire U.S. arms assistance program for Latin America. Such assistance merely encouraged an arms race among nations that could not maintain a decent standard of living for their people. By August two other important Latin-American states, Argentina and Brazil, were convulsed with revolution. Elsewhere there was similar unrest.

So negligible was the first year's achievement under the Alliance for Progress that Teodoro Moscoso, its director, informed his staff in all Latin-American centers that there would be no celebration of the alliance's first anniversary. He believed the situation sufficiently critical to require taking chances and making mistakes. Honest miscalculation, he said, was preferable to inertia. What disturbed Moscoso especially was the absence of social reform. Latin-American economic experts, meeting in Mexico City on September 30, agreed that the regional economies were in a state of 'quasi stagnation.' Despite a record of negligible accomplishment, the chief weakness of the Alliance for Progress lay not in concept or objectives but in the exaggerated hopes it created when it was launched. When President Kennedy announced his ideas to the Latin-American diplomatic corps on March 13, 1961, he predicted that the alliance would 'transform the American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts.' As the alliance entered its second year, American officials agreed to press on, subdued by the realization that genuine progress might require decades or even generations.

The Cuban Crisis.

Three years of increasing antagonism in United States-Cuban relations culminated during the late autumn of 1962 in a major cold war crisis. In his news conference of September 13 President Kennedy acknowledged the steady movement of Soviet technical and military personnel into Cuba. Should the island become transformed into an offensive military base for the Soviet Union, he said, 'then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.' Two days earlier Premier Khrushchev had warned the United States that any attack on Cuba might inaugurate a general war. He appealed to the United States 'to display common sense, not to lose its self-control, and soberly to assess what its actions might lead to if it unleashed war.'

The Russo-Cuban action created the gravest threat to American security in the Western Hemisphere since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed to meet such threats. To cope with the danger and with domestic pressures demanding that the administration 'do something' about Cuba, the President requested stand-by authority to call up 150,000 reservists. After a month of observation and study, President Kennedy announced to the nation in a special emergency broadcast on October 22 that the U.S. government had obtained 'unmistakable evidence' that the U.S.S.R. was developing a series of offensive missile sites in Cuba. He then proclaimed 'a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba.' He called upon Premier Khrushchev to 'halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.' He warned that the United States would consider any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere 'an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.'

On October 23 a powerful U.S. war fleet fanned out across the Atlantic to intercept a large number of Soviet cargo ships possibly carrying missiles to Cuba. The Kremlin accused the United States of hypocrisy and warned of nuclear war. Following this stopgap response, Khrushchev announced a broader proposal, which would include the dismantling of Soviet bases in Cuba in exchange for the removal of analogous NATO weapons from Turkey. This offer was summarily rejected by the United States. President Kennedy offered instead to lift the blockade and 'give assurances against an invasion of Cuba' if the U.S.S.R. would remove its weapons from Cuba under inspection. Khrushchev accepted this program and ordered the dismantling of the Cuban missile bases. On November 2 the President assured the nation that Soviet technicians were crating missiles and other equipment and demolishing the fixed installations in Cuba.

On the critical question of inspection the United States and the Soviet Union achieved less progress because neither could defy the jurisdiction of the Castro government over Cuban territory. The Kremlin dispatched Anastas I. Mikoyan, Soviet First Deputy Premier, to negotiate with Castro. In twenty-four days of negotiation Mikoyan achieved no agreement acceptable to the U.S. government. Late in November Mikoyan opened a series of conferences with American leaders in Washington, where he preferred to treat the Cuban matter as finished. President Kennedy recognized fully the Soviet removal of forty-two nuclear missiles and the Soviet pledge to withdraw at least thirty jet bombers. But he stressed the failure of the U.S.S.R. to provide international verification of the dismantling of missile bases and the withdrawal of all offensive weapons. Without such guarantees, the President declared, the United States would withhold its firm no-invasion pledge and continue its aerial surveillance of Cuba. Early in December, as Mikoyan departed for Moscow, he promised that the U.S.S.R. would evince the same good will as had the United States while the two nations continued their efforts to find a solution for the Cuban problem.

U.S. POLITICS

Again in 1962, the most important domestic political fact was the personal popularity of President John F. Kennedy. In December, according to a Gallup poll, 74 per cent of the people expressed approval of his performance. Earlier in the year his rating had fallen slightly, once after a stock market slump and again (in the South) after he had dispatched federal troops to the University of Mississippi during an integration dispute.

Mr. Kennedy's popularity was not reflected in the second session of the Eighty-seventh Congress. Much of his domestic program was killed in committee or defeated on the floor. But in November the President led the Democratic party to a virtual standoff in the congressional elections. Not since 1934 had the party controlling the White House done so well in mid-term polling.

Primaries.

California.

On June 5, former Vice President Richard M. Nixon won the Republican gubernatorial nomination. He received about 65 per cent of the vote against an avowed conservative, State Assembly Minority Leader Joseph C. Shell. One issue in the campaign was Nixon's repudiation of the controversial John Birch Society. Shell repeatedly asserted that Nixon could not be elected, but after the primary he promised the former Vice President his support. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, a moderately liberal Republican, won renomination easily over two right-wing opponents. The Democrats renominated Governor Edmund G. 'Pat' Brown over token opposition and chose State Senator Richard Richards to oppose Kuchel.

Massachusetts.

The year's most celebrated primary was the senatorial contest between thirty-year-old Edward M. Kennedy, the President's youngest brother, and thirty-nine-year-old Edward J. McCormack, nephew and protégé of U.S. House Speaker John McCormack. Many of the President's friends contended that his young brother, whose only previous post had been an assistant district attorney-ship in one county, was inexperienced and unqualified. One McCormack slogan was 'I Back Jack, But Teddy's Not Ready.' Prominent Democrats warned the chief executive that the 'dynasty issue' would hurt the party throughout the country in November. But young Kennedy won the endorsement of the state convention and went on to defeat McCormack in the September 18 primary, 559,000 to 247,000. Republican voters chose George Cabot Lodge, Jr., son of the former UN delegate and 1960 vice-presidential candidate, to oppose Kennedy. Lodge, 35, defeated U.S. Representative Laurence Curtis, 69, for the nomination.

Redistricting.

Congressman Curtis was one of a number of members of the House of Representatives left without constituencies as a result of redistricting in conformity with the 1960 census figures. There were heated controversies over redistricting in several states. In New York there were charges of a Republican gerrymander; similar complaints were leveled at the Democrats in California. Alabama failed to redistrict and arranged for its nine incumbent Democratic congressmen to run at large on a statewide basis for eight seats. Representative Frank Boykin was the loser. In seven of the nation's congressional districts, Republican and Democratic incumbents were pitted against one another in November.

On the whole, redistricting reduced the political power of the South and increased that of California, which in December became the nation's most populous state.

The Campaign.

President Kennedy made it clear early in the year that he would take an active part in the fall campaign. He visited more than thirty cities in eleven states. In Kentucky and Indiana, he called specifically for the defeat of Republican Senators Thruston B. Morton and Homer E. Capehart. It was the most extensive off-year campaign undertaken by a chief executive in many decades. On October 20, however, Mr. Kennedy suddenly interrupted a Western trip and returned to Washington to tell the country that the Soviet Union was secretly planting missiles in Communist Cuba. He did no further campaigning.

A number of Republicans had been attacking the administration for being insufficiently aggressive in its policy toward Cuba. In the view of many observers, Mr. Kennedy's handling of the missile crisis greatly enhanced his personal prestige and his party's prospects. On October 28, just nine days before the elections, Nikita Khrushchev dramatically agreed to pull back the missiles. A few Republicans charged that the President had deliberately timed the climax of the crisis for political purposes.

Surveys indicated that Cuba weighed far more heavily on voters' minds than any single domestic issue. Other issues mentioned included medical care for the aged under social security, government spending, and the President's attitude toward business.

Election Results.

On the congressional level, the elections were a standoff. The Democrats gained three Senate seats, increasing their representation to 68 against the Republicans' 32. (The lineup was changed to 67-33 later in the year. Upon the death of Democratic Senator Denis Chavez of New Mexico, Republican Governor Edwin L. Mechem, who had been defeated in a re-election bid, resigned the governorship and had himself appointed to the Senate vacancy.) In the House, the Democrats lost four seats and the Republicans gained two. (The size of the House, which had been raised temporarily to 437 to provide one seat each for the new states of Alaska and Hawaii, reverted to the normal 435.) On the state level, the Democrats gained six governorships and lost seven. Some state-by-state highlights:

Alabama.

Veteran Democratic Senator Lister Hill was reelected, but his majority over a conservative Republican opponent was only 6,000 out of a total of nearly 400,000 votes.

Arizona.

Eighty-five-year-old Democratic Senator Carl Hayden, a member of Congress ever since Arizona achieved statehood in 1912, was easily re-elected.

Arkansas.

Internationalist Democrat J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had no trouble defeating an isolationist Republican who was supported by Senator Barry Goldwater.

California.

The outcome of the gubernatorial election appeared to end the elective political career of Richard Nixon. Having carried his home state as a presidential candidate in 1960, Nixon now lost to Governor Brown. Brown polled over 3,000,000 votes, Nixon 2,740,000. During the campaign Nixon had had difficulty finding vulnerable spots in the record of his opponent, whom many voters considered competent although not brilliant. Reverting to a theme that he had used successfully in earlier California and national campaigns, Nixon charged that Brown had been insufficiently vigilant against the threat of internal Communism. In an election-eve broadcast reminiscent of his 1952 'Checkers speech,' the former Vice President charged that he had been made the victim of a smear campaign. On the day following his defeat Nixon unexpectedly appeared at a news conference and castigated reporters for alleged unfairness. In a voice choking with emotion he declared, 'you won't have Nixon to kick around any more.' He also criticized his own volunteer workers and his victorious opponent. Senator Kuchel, less controversial and more popular among Republican and independent voters, was re-elected by more than 700,000 votes.

Colorado.

Colorado was a bright spot for the Republicans. Liberal Democratic Senator John A. Carroll was unseated by Republican Congressman Peter H. Dominick, and Democratic Governor Stephen L. R. McNichols by Republican John A. Love.

Connecticut.

Former Governor Abraham Ribicoff, who had resigned on July 12 as President Kennedy's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, was elected U.S. senator to succeed retiring Republican Prescott Bush. Ribicoff's majority over Republican Rep. Horace Seely-Brown, Jr., was 26,000. Democratic Governor John N. Dempsey had a wider margin over Republican John Alsop.

Florida.

Democratic Senator George Smathers was easily re-elected, and former Senator Claude Pepper, a controversial Washington figure during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, was elected to a new House seat.

Hawaii.

Democrats swept the fiftieth state. John A. Burns unseated Republican Governor William F. Quinn, and Democratic Congressman Daniel K. Inouye won the Senate seat of retiring Democrat Oren Long. Inouye became the first U.S. senator of Japanese ancestry.

Idaho.

Democratic Senator Frank Church was re-elected, but Democratic Congresswoman Gracie Pfost lost to Republican Leonard B. Jordan in a contest for the Senate seat to which Jordan had been appointed following the death of Republican Henry Dworshak. The gubernatorial campaign was enlivened when Democratic candidate Vernon K. Smith proposed that Idaho follow Nevada's example and allow local option on the question of legalized gambling. Smith was defeated by Republican incumbent Robert E. Smylie.

Illinois.

Republican Senate Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen was re-elected, defeating Democratic Congressman Sidney R. Yates. Dirksen's majority was smaller than expected: about 170,000 out of a total of more than 3,500,000 votes.

Indiana.

Democrat Birch E. Bayh, thirty-four, scored a narrow upset victory over three-term Republican Senator Homer E. Capehart, sixty-five. Capehart had been a prominent critic of the Kennedy administration's Cuba policy, and the President had denounced him as an 'armchair general.'

Kentucky.

Republican Senator Thruston B. Morton, a former National Chairman of his party, had an unexpectedly easy victory over Lieutenant Governor Wilson W. Wyatt.

Massachusetts.

In a new demonstration of the family political appeal, Edward Kennedy won over George Cabot Lodge, Jr., by 1,162,000 to 877,000. Democrat Endicott 'Chub' Peabody rode young Kennedy's coattails to unseat Republican Governor John A. Volpe in a contest so close that a recount was required.

Michigan.

George W. Romney, who as president of American Motors had revolutionized Michigan's largest industry with his compact Rambler, achieved success in 1962 in revolutionizing the state's politics. Charging that both parties had been dominated by special interests (the Republicans by business and the Democrats by Walter Reuther's United Auto Workers), Romney appealed for citizen participation in politics. He ended fourteen years of Democratic rule in Lansing by defeating Democratic Governor John B. Swainson, 1,419,000 to 1,341,000. Romney's victory made him a possible contender for the 1964 GOP presidential nomination. Democratic leader Neil Staebler, in his first bid for elective office, defeated Alvin Bentley for congressman at large.

Nebraska.

Fred A. Seaton, who had been Secretary of the Interior in Eisenhower's administration, failed to unseat conservative Democratic Governor Frank B. Morrison.

New Hampshire.

Republican factionalism resulted in the loss of the governorship and of a Senate seat. Incumbent Republican Governor Wesley Powell, defeated in the primary by John Pillsbury, threw his support to the Democratic candidate, John W. King, who was elected. In a four-way primary contest for the Senate seat of the late Styles Bridges, the candidates were: Bridges' wife, Doloris; Maurice Murphy, whom Powell had appointed to the vacancy; and the state's two incumbent House members, Chester Merrow and Perkins Bass. Bass was the victor but lost the election to Democrat Thomas J. McIntyre, former mayor of Laconia. The state's other Republican senator, Norris Cotton, was unaffected by the quarrels and easily won another term.

New York.

In this state the Democrats very nearly defaulted. Until a few weeks before the state convention, they had no important contenders for the governorship, held by Republican Nelson Rockefeller, and the Senate seat, held by Republican Jacob Javits. Under the influence of Lou Harris, the professional pollster favored by the White House, party leaders finally settled on U.S. Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau as their gubernatorial candidate. Morgenthau, son of Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of the treasury, was not widely known in his own right. For the Senate seat the Democrats selected James B. Donovan, a Brooklyn attorney. Donovan had helped negotiate the release of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers from a Russian prison in exchange for the Soviet spy Colonel Rudolph Abel and in 1962 represented a committee seeking to ransom from Cuban prisons 1,100 veterans of the previous year's ill-fated invasion attempt.

Both Morgenthau and Donovan proved to be ineffective candidates. Javits was re-elected by nearly 1,000,000 votes. Rockefeller's majority, however, was 528,000, somewhat short of his 1958 margin over Averell Harriman. Nonetheless, and despite his March divorce from Mary Clark Rockefeller after 32 years of marriage, Rockefeller emerged from the election as the odds-on favorite for his party's 1964 presidential nomination.