1955: United States

A summary of United States foreign affairs, political events, and legislative and judicial developments in 1955 is presented below.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Communist China and the Taiwan Crisis.

The 11 American Fliers.

As the year 1955 opened the United States was faced with the serious problem of attempting to gain the release of 11 American fliers who had been jailed by the Chinese Communists for espionage. From several quarters came demands that the United States take stern retaliatory measures, including the blockade of China itself, but President Eisenhower urged caution and suggested that the United Nations should try to obtain the release of the airmen.

Acting on this suggestion, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the action of Communist China as a violation of the Korean armistice and sent its Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to Peking to confer with Premier Chou En-lai concerning the matter. It was generally considered the most difficult mission ever undertaken by an official of the world organization. En route, he conferred with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

The talks between Hammarskjold and Chou En-lai were carried on for a total of 13 hours and 45 minutes during four days, but no apparent solution to the problem was reached. During the negotiations other questions pertinent to the relaxation of world tensions were also discussed, including Communist China's admission to the United Nations, the possible attack on China from Taiwan, the situations in Korea and Indochina, and the status quo of Chinese students detained in the United States. It was thought that these issues might be used as bargaining instruments. Although Hammarskjold did not publicly declare just what had taken place in Peking, his mission was declared a failure by Senate Minority Leader William F. Knowland.

Shortly after Hammarskjold's return, the Communists launched an amphibious and air assault against one of the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands, about 200 mi. north of Taiwan. The question was immediately raised whether or not the United States would consider this a danger to Taiwan. President Eisenhower, contending that the Tachens were not vital to the defense of Taiwan, proposed a cease-fire arrangement. This suggestion was received in Taiwan with unofficial but strong resentment. Communist China also turned down the proposal, declaring that it was a plot to interfere in the domestic affairs of China.

At the same time, an announcement came from Peking and UN headquarters that Communist China would provide facilities for relatives to visit U.S. personnel imprisoned by the Chinese Communists; however, the U.S. State Department did not encourage such visits, as it could not provide the normal guarantees of U.S. protection abroad. The request was subsequently denied.

Eisenhower Asks U.S. Defense of Taiwan.

On January 17 President Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to use American military power to help defend Taiwan against what he described as a serious threat of invasion by Communist China. He declared that, if necessary, the United States was compelled to remove any doubt regarding its readiness to fight in order to preserve the vital stakes of the free world in a free Taiwan. He asked the Democrat-controlled Congress to authorize the use of the country's armed forces to safeguard the Chinese Nationalist stronghold of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, but he promised that this authority would be used only to defend islands which were considered vital to the protection of U.S. Pacific defenses. He also asked permission to use American ships and planes to help withdraw Nationalist forces from the smaller islands off the China mainland that were not considered necessary to the defense of Taiwan.

The President drew no line beyond which the United States would not permit Communist aggressors to penetrate, but he declared that the United States was prepared to defend Quemoy and other islands in the Taiwan Strait which invaders could use as stepping-stones to Taiwan itself. The President said that the situation had become sufficiently critical to impel him to ask Congress for a specific resolution, empowering him to act to improve the prospects of peace without waiting for UN action. He recommended that the resolution expire as soon as he was able to report that the peace and security of the area were reasonably assured, either through UN action or other events.

The President's special message had the three-fold purpose of clearing up any confusion over his authority to act on his own, demonstrating U.S. solidarity in dealing with the Taiwan crisis, and carrying out his pledge to obtain Congressional approval before taking any step which might lead to war.

Identical resolutions to carry out the President's request were quickly introduced by Chairman Richards of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Chairman George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Within 24 hours the House voted 409 to 3 in favor of the resolution (those opposing were Barden of North Carolina, a Democrat, Sheehan of Illinois, and Siler of Kentucky, the last two both Republicans). In the Senate, however, there was a bitter debate over the measure. Senator Humphrey (D., Minn.) offered an amendment limiting U.S. military action to Taiwan and the Pescadores. Some feared that the resolution would empower Chiang Kai-shek or Admiral Radford to involve the United States in a war. Others fought hard to attach other qualifying and limiting amendments, but Senator George pleaded for approval of the President's request without restrictions, and the Senate finally gave its support, 85-3, without amendments. The three voting against were Langer of North Dakota, Lehman of New York, and Morse of Oregon. The eight absentees said that they would have voted their approval if they had been present.

Even among supporters of the resolution, however, there were some, such as Mansfield of Montana, who backed it with some misgivings. All were aware that it assumed grave risks of war in what the President said was an effort to insure peace. But there was back of the resolution a determination to let the Chinese Communists know that any attempt against Taiwan would bring them into a war which they could not win. On that basis it was considered a force for peace.

In the meantime, the UN Security Council was called into session to take up the question of a cease-fire. By a vote of 9-1, with Taiwan opposing and the Soviet Union abstaining, Communist China was invited to participate. The United States made no objection. The Reds were assured of fair consideration of their claims if they took part in the UN debate, but Chou En-lai flatly refused the invitation, unless representatives of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan were ousted from the Council.

The situation, therefore, became increasingly acute. Vice Adm. Alfred Melville Pride, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and Rear Adm. Frederick Norman Kivette, commander of the fleet's Taiwan patrol, were ordered to take their positions in the Taiwan Strait in case any overt act was committed. An air clash did take place when eight Russianbuilt MIG-15's attacked a U.S. four-engined jet bomber and its escort of F-86 Sabrejets. The Air Force said the bomber was on a reconnaissance mission over international waters of the Yellow Sea between Korea and China when the attack occurred and that the Sabrejets shot down two of the MIG's, while the other six returned to Communist territory. This was the biggest air battle since the end of the Korean hostilities.

Then came the announcement from the President that the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to help redeploy Chinese Nationalist troops from the threatened Tachen Islands, in spite of the opposition of Chiang Kai-shek, who insisted that there should be no evacuation of the Tachens without some firm guarantee in Quemoy and Matsu. This was also the view of many leaders in the United States, including Senate Minority Leader Knowland.