1941: Aviation

Air Warfare.

During the opening days of America's participation in the Second World War, the importance of air power was brought home with tragic emphasis to the entire world. It was air superiority that enabled the Japanese to maintain the advantage at Pearl Harbor. It was lack of British air protection that enabled them to sink the Prince of Wales and the Repulse with a comparatively small number of planes during the first few days of the Pacific campaign. And it was air superiority which laid the groundwork for their conquest of the Philippines.

Fortunately for the Allied cause, the capacity to produce aircraft in the United States had been augmented very substantially during the year and the initial losses suffered in the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and Manila could be replaced in a matter of a few days of production. But a much more serious problem for our far eastern fighting forces was the maintenance of communications and operating bases in a war theatre so far distant from the sources of supply.

The full story of the participation of our air forces in the present world conflict will not be known for some little time, but there is ample indication that the quality of our aircraft and the skill of our pilots is highly satisfactory. The unexpectedness of the initial Japanese attack found some weakness in our ground organization particularly in the matter of dispersal and concealment of aircraft on the ground. This was immediately corrected after the first mistake.

The confirmed presence of hostile aircraft off both coasts increased the general alertness and extensive preparations were made immediately against possible air attack. The likelihood of extensive air action against the Atlantic seaboard is remote unless enemy bases are established in that ocean or the French fleet is used by the Axis powers. The possibility of suicide raids, however, is one that must be considered. It must be remembered that during several pre-war years, the German Lufthansa conducted many flights to New York with mail from merchant ships stationed several hundred miles offshore. These ships were fitted with effective equipment for catapult launching and retrieving of aircraft. Most of this catapult equipment was developed under the direction of Dr. Ernst Heinkel, founder of the German aircraft manufacturing establishment bearing his name and an eminent authority on catapult design. It is not unlikely that the catapult ships Nordwind and Nordstern have been the prototypes of a larger number of similar vessels which might be used in limited tip-and-run actions against the Atlantic seaboard cities.

Probably the greatest surprise and the most important factor favoring the democracies in 1941 was the brilliant performance of the Russian Army and its air force in turning the tide of the Nazi invasion on the eastern front. As the year closed the Russians had recaptured a substantial amount of their territory lost in the German invasion and the Nazis were unable to resist the counter-offensive. Although details are lacking, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian success was made possible by their air superiority and this is borne out by the apparent inability of the Germans to conduct extensive air action on their western front or in the African campaign.

German air losses in Russia, coupled with the effective work of the RAF Bomber Command over Germany has seriously weakened Nazi air power. At the same time the Russian Campaign has given the British and Americans a much-needed breathing space for accelerated aircraft production.

During the time when Russia was absorbing the might of the Nazi was machine, and while the Russian Army was demonstrating that it had found an antidote to blitzkrieg, airplane production in the United States passed through the period of its greatest acceleration, sweeping past that of the Axis powers. This performance probably constitutes the greatest industrial expansion of any industry in any nation at any time in history. But before going into the details of this miracle of modern industry, let us return briefly to the progress of air warfare and to some of the technical lessons learned about it in the bloody laboratory of the present conflict.

During the earliest stages of the conflict we learned by British experience of the need in our airplanes for leak-proof fuel tanks, protective armor and greater fire power. Measures were immediately taken to incorporate these lessons in our designs as the British and even the Germans had done as soon as they learned them. Naturally this resulted in increased weight and a consequent sacrifice in performance. Our airplanes suffered along with those of the belligerents. Designers were faced with the problem of providing greater power, and as usual turned to the engine manufacturers. Our engine manufacturers responded splendidly, as they always have. As a result we have now in production 2,000 hp. engines, and soon will be turned out 2,300 hp. units. Other models on the test stand run up to 2,800 hp., and still others of even higher power are in closely guarded experimental laboratories. Equally amazing accomplishments in propeller design are secluded in the laboratories, but these are necessarily military secrets.

Armament.

As the race for greater fire power goes on there is a concurrent race for protection against it. Thus, when the Germans came over with 20 mm. automatic cannon in their fighter planes, it became necessary to provide more protection and find something better than .30 and .50-calibre machine guns. One quick solution was more machine guns and that is how the British Spitfire and Hurricane fighters came to be equipped with eight or more machine guns. We went them one better and turned out a fighter with a 37 mm. cannon in the nose and as many machine guns as were desired in addition. The first 37 mm. cannon-bearing aircraft was the Bell Airacobra (P-39) which is just getting into service abroad. Since we had neither engines nor propellers suitable for firing through the crankshaft, our designers had to provide a rear engine installation with a long drive shaft and gear box for the propeller drive in the P-39. Several incidental advantages resulted from the power plant arrangement. The third radical design feature of the P-39 is a tricycle landing gear which is exceedingly useful in landing and ground handling. The next cannon-bearing ship was the Lockheed P-38, twin engined fighter. The preliminary success of the 37 mm. cannon justifies examination of still larger types.

Bombing and Bombing Planes.

Before the war neither the Germans nor the British realized the need for long range bombers. Distances between belligerents were short. The Germans didn't realize that they would have to go out to bomb in the North Atlantic. The British didn't foresee the necessity for operating from bases west of the Maginot Line. But we had a bigger area to defend, and we needed greater striking power combined with mobility. So this became the birthplace of the Boeing Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B-24. These four-engine planes, with our higher powered radial engines, will do much to determine the outcome of the war. The British Purchasing Commission laughed when we offered them so proudly to them. Now a member of the Air Ministry writes with admirable frankness, that the possession of a fleet of 2,000-3,000 of these ships, plus the productive capacity to replace them with sufficient rapidity, will be one of the most important factors in winning the war.

In addition to these bombers with their superior engines, which will be replaced by even bigger engines as they become available, there are two other major contributions to democracy from America — the exhaust driven turbo-supercharger and the accurate bombsight. Great credit is due to our Army Air Corps, and the General Electric Company and its tireless worker, Dr. Sanford A. Moss, for the dogged determination with which they fought for more than two decades against seemingly insurmountable obstacles to achieved this development. This work will go down in history as one of the major contributions to military aviation and it won for Dr. Moss and the Army Air Corps the coveted Collier Trophy for 1941. It has pushed aerial warfare high up into the stratosphere above the effective range of anti-aircraft fire and above the effective ceiling of present-day fighters. With it our Boeing B-17E Flying Fortress can climb up into the comparative calm of the stratosphere and, as a stable platform for our remarkable bombsight, perform its mission undisturbed by enemy fighters or anti-aircraft most Bombers otherwise equipped must fight their way through. Credit must also be given to the engine of the Boeing Airplane Company for their altitude chamber experiments in which stratosphere conditions were reproduced almost exactly in a tank on the ground to study the effect of the necessarily wide temperature and pressure ranges on men and machine.

The mass bombing of London by the Germans had been proved to be a great strategic mistake. Obviously attempted as a strategy of attrition, or a 'war on nerves,' it was intended to undermine the morale of the British people. It might have done so more effectively if the clumsy Teutonic mentality had not caused the Luftwaffe to make a deliberate attempt to bomb Buckingham Palace and the most exclusive sections of London. Then the residents of the poorest districts suddenly realized that the Royal Family and the wealthier inhabitants were in the same fix as they were and a great bond of unity resulted. Next mistake was to bomb the radical element at Clydeside and that brought the Communists into line long before Russia could be considered an ally. Similarly, the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor solidified the Western Hemisphere.

By a strange paradox, might doesn't always make right, and it so happened that the larger the concentration of invading bombers, the better target they afforded for the eight-gun Spitfires and Hurricanes of the RAF Fighter Command. When the German-British loss ratio began to run about 3 to 1 or worse, it soon became apparent that this was not the correct method to obtain air superiority. And one of the lessons this war has taught is that air superiority is a prerequisite to invasion.

After a brief try at bombing British shipping and docks by daylight, the Luftwaffe entered upon one of the most terrorizing phases of the war — the night bombing of the British Isles. For a time there just was no adequate defense for this variety of attack. A number of dodges were devised, but the overloaded interceptors of the Fighter Command were unable to carry sufficient fuel to stay aloft very long, and since they were single seaters there was no space nor payload for the little black box which turned out to be the secret radio locator, nor for the man to operate it. So the British began to uncrate a number of our Douglas DB-7's which had been ordered by the French, together with some later models of this same type, and to equip them as night fighters. The DB-7 is almost identical to our Air Corps A-20-A Model which may be used for light bombing, dive bombing, or attack aviation. It has a tricycle landing gear and two engines, together with sufficient fuel capacity to stay out a good part of the night with two or more persons aboard. And it constitutes an admirable solution to the night defense problem.

This night-bombing antidote and the Russian Campaign have brought the people of London out of the air raid shelters, but it is difficult to predict when they will have to take to them again. The Luftwaffe, however, may find a few surprises awaiting them when that time comes.

In sharp contrast to the ammunition wasting policies of the attacks on England are the carefully laid offensive plans of the Royal Air Force. Since they have a much larger area to work on and since they have farther to go to take the war into the heart of occupied Europe, they must try to make each bomb, bomber, and bomber crew count.

The present work of the RAF Bomber Command might be considered an extension of the British Blockade, which is unquestionably a very effective weapon with many unexpected ramifications. Bomber Command missions are planned in collaboration with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and are directed at (a) known concentrations of strategic materials, of which there is a limited supply. (b) transportation centers in an effort to impair the operation of the already overworked German Railway System, and (c) armament production centers known to be engaged in the manufacture of strategic equipment, such as, for example, the Focke-Wulf factory, where German long-range bombers are built.

Unquestionably, this work is and will for some time be handicapped by the shortage of long-range bombers, but our production is increasing rapidly and the British factories are making good use of the bombing respite to turn out a number of Short Stirlings and other ships of this type. But it will not be until our new programs for bomber production get under way next year that these ships will become available in large numbers.

Torpedo Planes.

While these lessons were being learned on land there were some important discoveries made at sea. Outstanding among these was the effectiveness of the torpedo plane, and with this came new justification for carrier based aircraft. The three outstanding examples of torpedo plane effectiveness were the Naval Battle of Taranto, the destruction of the Bismarck, and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. At Taranto late in 1940 the Italian Fleet was very badly damaged by squadrons of torpedo planes and bombers from the British carriers Eagle and Illustrious. This battle drastically altered the balance of sea power in the Mediterranean. It was won at a cost of two aircraft, and it is believed that after these planes were shot down these crews were taken prisoner. Loss estimates included the probable loss of one of Italy's 35,000-ton Littorio class battleships, two of the four modern Cavour-class battleships, two cruisers, and two fleet auxiliaries. What appeared to be four additional craft under water were also reported by a British reconnaissance pilot after the battle.

Torpedo-carrying planes also took a major part in the historic hunt for the German battleship Bismarck in retaliation for the sinking of the Hood. It was torpedoes from airplanes that damaged the running gear of the Bismarck, slowing it up so that the pursuing warships could close in for the kill. And it was Japanese torpedo carrying aircraft that sank the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, in December 1941. This experience demonstrated an interesting principle of aircraft use in collaboration with Naval fleets. Although it is not always possible for aircraft to completely destroy war vessels, the airplanes frequently constitute the essential ingredient to shift the balance of strength and simplify the work of the warships.

Another example of air-sea cooperation is the German use of long-range bombers in coordination with small submarines. This team is a counterpart of the effective Panzer Division and Dive Bomber combination on land. It has been a particularly troublesome factor in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The Germans have had some success with dive-bombers against battleships, but there is reason to believe that this is a costly procedure. Apparently it requires long and continuous dive bombing with many airplanes to put a warship out of commission. And dive bombing losses at sea and on land have always been almost prohibitive in degree, excepting those cases in which the quality of resisting air power and other defenses were particularly low.

North Atlantic Ferry.

Although a few attempts were made to ferry bombers across the Atlantic in 1940, the service did not really get underway until late that year. A large number of American pilots have volunteered for this work which is handled by the Air Division of the Canadian Pacific Railway Co. Most of the aircraft flown across from Newfoundland are Lockheed Hudson Bombers with 2 Wright Cyclone Engines, Model GR 1820-G205A. Pilots received $1,000 per month, copilots or first officers $800 per month and radio operators, $600 per month. Each ship is thoroughly flight tested with load and overload before starting. The aircraft start out in formations of seven but break up at a predetermined distance.

No armament is carried on these trips. Equipment consists of several gallons of water, half a dozen cans of beef and half a dozen tins of chocolate. An emergency collapsible rubber lifeboat is built into the cabin door so that it is released automatically if the plane is forced down in the ocean. These boats are inflated from air bottles and are equipped with emergency food and water rations and signal flares.

In the beginning the ferry service was slowed up by the necessity for pilots and crews to return by boat. This situation has been improved by the sale to the British of several of the older transoceanic Clipper planes (Boeing 314 Flying Boats) operated by Pan American Airways. Another transatlantic ferry operation has been set up operating from the United States and numerous transatlantic flights have been made carrying military observers and defense officials back and forth across the ocean. All ferry service, over land or water, in the United States is handled by the Army Air Corps Ferrying Command, organized for the purpose during the year.