1941: Agriculture

When war came to the United States at the close of 1941, American agriculture was ready. The year 1941 saw the greatest total production of farm products—livestock and crops—in the history of the Nation. The Department of Agriculture's nation-wide Food for Freedom goals for 1942 call for an even greater output. Looking back on the past year, during which farmers mobilized their total production energies for defense, there seems little doubt that agriculture will measure up to the war-time job it has set for itself, the greatest production effort ever undertaken in the world's history.

The United States farmer has five principal tasks in doing his share to win the war and write the peace: (1) He must provide all the food and fiber that a United States under arms must have; (2) he must produce the food and raw agricultural materials needed to keep the Allies going in high gear; (3) he must maintain and build up the stockpiles of food that will be ready for any emergency, that can be used, when the war is over, to help feed the millions of starving people left in the wake of this titanic struggle; (4) he must alter his farming methods so as to use less new farm machinery, labor, fertilizers, rubber, and other strategic materials while expanding his own production; and (5) he must, like other citizens, organize for fire defense, conservation of metals, and other materials, improved health, and all other civilian defense work.

This is a colossal task. Production goals for 1942 call for a total farm output about 14 per cent above the 1924-29 average, and 2 per cent above the record production of 1941. Not only will total out-turn be greater, but also it must be adjusted selectively. When every ounce of farm effort will be needed to produce the essential things, it would be a tragic waste to devote any of that effort to producing products that are not essential; that would involve a loss in labor, fertilizer, seed, land, machinery, and time. With two years' supply of wheat in granaries, with the equivalent of a year's production of cotton in warehouses, and with most types of tobacco backed up in storage, it would be the worst type of war-waste to increase production of these crops. The excess acreages of these crops would, in turn, curtail the production of other commodities which are needed in greater supply. Much more milk and dairy products are vital. The 1942 production goals call for an increase of more than 8,000,000,000 lbs. They call for nearly 400,000,000 dozen more eggs. They call for the slaughter of 79,000,000 hogs, 11 per cent greater than 1941's record; more cattle and sheep across the market scales to provide much-needed meat, hides, and wool; more feed grains to feed more livestock and to feed them better.

As 1940 drew to a close it was clear that farmers in the United States faced far-reaching readjustments in a world at war, even though it was then hoped that this nation would escape the conflict. Normal world markets for wheat, cotton, and tobacco practically vanished. Domestic markets for many farm products, particularly meats and dairy products, increased as men went to work in defense plants. But increases in domestic consumption did not offset the loss of foreign markets, and the domestic increases were not uniformly distributed among the various segments of agriculture. Furthermore, it appeared then that any gains in farm income might be offset by rises in the prices of goods and services that farmers must buy and, to add to the temporary confusion, it was not yet clear just what specific adjustments farmers might have to make.

Despite the uncertainties at that time, the Secretary of Agriculture took one action in the fall of 1940 which subsequently proved to be the beginning of agriculture's all-out war production program. Pig prices were sufficiently low in the fall of 1940 that farmers saw no use in continuing an unprofitable production of pork. They therefore reported that they would produce 14 per cent fewer spring pigs in 1941 than in the spring of 1940. A downward production spiral seemed impending. However, the Secretary of Agriculture appealed to farmers for an upward revision in their production plans in view of probable increasing consumer needs. Later the Secretary coupled this plan with action which assured a favorable feed-pork ratio. Farmers responded by increasing their total 1941 pig crop by 6 per cent rather than decreasing it.

Early in 1941 some things came into sharper focus. It became apparent that the war was not going to end in 1941, that Britain's food supplies were declining rapidly, and that the productive power of American farms might eventually play a decisive role.

The Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 cleared the way for large purchases of food for Britain. With this new buying power in the market, plus the expanded domestic market, the United States no longer had too much of most farm commodities, and not enough of some. The Food for Freedom program, designed to produce the essential amounts of the needed foods, was officially launched in April 1941.

This program, with its specific goals for expanded domestic use, enormous shipments to Britain and other democracies, and stockpiles for reserve, is fully as great an undertaking as industrial defense production. Increasing the output of the nation's farms involves as many complex adjustments as increasing the output of airplanes or tanks, and in some particulars is even more demanding. For example, the loss of a month in building a factory causes a loss of a 30 days' output, but the loss of a month at the beginning of the season for producing pigs or chickens or cows may defer increased production for 365 days. Then, too, price relationships in agriculture are numerous and involved; feed prices and prices for animal products must be kept in line with each other, or it may not be possible for individual producers to maintain continuous production.

Because of the seasonal element and the serious need of the British for animal protein foods, attention was centered first on pork, poultry, and dairy products. By releasing corn from the large supplies held in the Ever-Normal Granary, feed prices were stabilized at about their April levels, when corn was 69 cents a bushel at Chicago. The Department of Agriculture then promised to support, for a two-year period, the prices of these defense products at the following level (Chicago): Hogs, $9 a cwt.; butter, 31 cents a lb.; chickens, 15 cents a lb.; and eggs, 22 cents a doz.

In July, Public 147 (The Steagall Amendment) was enacted, permitting the Secretary of Agriculture to encourage the expansion of the production of nonbasic commodities (all commodities except cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco and rice) by using available funds for loans, purchases, or other price supporting measures; the law directed the Secretary to support prices under such circumstances at not less than 85 per cent of parity. The new law also increased the borrowing power of the Commodity Credit Corporation, which manages the Ever-Normal Granary loans, from $1,400,000,000 to $2,600,000,000.

Also in July, the Department of Agriculture announced that national defense was the first order of its business 'for the duration,' and established Agricultural Defense Boards in each state and county, to expedite and coordinate in the field all agricultural defense activities, and to coordinate the work of farmers in defense with that of other state and county defense agencies. As these boards are made up of county and state heads of the various Federal and state farm agencies and program, they are in a position to bring all of the machinery of agriculture to bear at state, county, or local levels, on any defense work or problem.

The ink on the Lend-Lease bill was not dry before food purchases for Britain were underway. In fact, before the bill was signed about $90,000,000 worth of commodities had been acquired by the Surplus Marketing Administration through funds advanced by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and were available immediately for Lend-Lease shipment. Flexibility in buying is necessary so that (a) Supplies can be available when and where they are needed, (b) the fewest possible bottlenecks are encountered, (c) purchases do not lead to an inflationary spiral, and (d) American farmers may widely benefit from the buying operation. Thus timing is an important factor. Had not advance buying been underway, dairy products and eggs would have moved out of farmers' hands and into storage at usual seasonally low price levels. The availability of buying machinery made it possible to increase farm income and at the same time to get the vital flow of foodstuffs moving to Britain without delay. Altogether about $500,000,000 of food will have been shipped to Britain by July 1942. By October 1941, 275,000 tons worth $60,000,000 were being shipped to Britain each month. In December Lord Woolton, Minister of Food, expressed the thanks of the British people for the 1,000,000 tons of Lend-Lease food that had arrived safely in England. United States farmers are now supplying Britain with about one-fourth of its food requirements, principally the animal protein foods.

Farm Production in 1941.

Crops.

Despite drought in some portions of the country, the weather was on the whole favorable to production in 1941. The national average of crop yields per acre broke all records, averaging 2 per cent above the excellent yields of 1940, and 21 per cent above the 1923-32, or pre-drought average. The acreage planted or used for the 46 principal field crops was about the same as in 1940, but crop failure took a lower toll than in any other year of the past decade. Consequently, about 338,000,000 acres were available for harvest, about one per cent more than in 1940.

Largely because of reduced plantings of cotton and wheat, the 1941 harvested acreage was not as large as it was in some previous years; in 1932, for example, an all-time record of 364,000,000 acres was set. However, on the smaller acreage the exceptionally high yields brought a near-record total crop production; in other words, on a substantially smaller acreage than the 1923-32 average, but with 21 per cent higher yields, total production was 11 per cent above the 1923-32 level.

Yields were at least fairly good in practically all parts of the country, except in a few scattered areas. Drought hit feed crops in northern New York. Bad weather and boll weevil caused severe damage to cotton and other crops in northwest Louisiana, northeast Texas, and central South Carolina.

Wheat yields, averaging 16.9 bu. per acre, set a new high record, and 1941 yields of corn, potatoes, tobacco, sugar beets, beans and soybeans have been exceeded only once or twice in the past 70 years. Yields of oats, barley, grain sorghums, rye, cotton, hay and peanuts were at levels reached only in unusually favorable seasons.

Livestock and Poultry.

The general upward trend in livestock population that started in 1938 continued unabated in 1941. Despite a sharp increase in beef slaughter this year, the number of cattle and calves on farms at the end of 1941 was larger than a year earlier and near the 1934 record of 74,000,000 head. Responding to appeals for heavier pork production, hog raisers produced a combined fall and spring pig crop of 85,000,000 head, about 6 per cent larger than the 1940 crop, and only 2 per cent under the record 1939 crop; they also set the stage for a crop in 1942 of 97,000,000 head. The 1941 lamb crop was about 5 per cent larger than that of 1940, and because of unusually good range, sheep and lambs will go into the winter in the best condition in several years.

This year marked the upturn of the cycle of chicken production, and the production of eggs has been setting new records, with total 1941 production about 3.5 per cent larger than a year ago.

Farm Income and Prices in 1941.

Income.

Farmers in 1941 had the largest income in years. The total cash going into their pockets from sales of products and Government payments was nearly $11,200,000,000, as compared with $9,120,000,000 in 1940, $9,176,000,000 in 1937, $4,743,000,000 in 1932, and $11,296,000,000 in 1929. Government payments in 1941 were smaller, contributing $600,000,000 to cash farm income, as compared to $766,000,000 in 1940.

The gross farm income, which includes the value of products grown on the farms for home consumption or use, is estimated at $13,400,000,000 for 1941, by far the largest total income received by farmers in 12 years.

The enlarged income was fairly well distributed among producers. A bumper crop, together with substantially higher prices, gave wheat growers their largest return since 1929. Cotton growers picked their first billion-dollar crop since 1929. Livestock and livestock products returned 25 per cent more income than in 1940, the largest percentage increase along the farm front, but the increase from poultry and eggs was nearly as large. Dairy products produced an income very close to their 1929 level, nearing $1,800,000,000.

Prices.

Prices received by farmers in 1941 were up 22 per cent from 1940. A number of forces supported stronger prices. Consumer buying power climbed steeply on a ladder of national defense expenditures. National income advanced well into the $90,000,000,000 bracket for the first time in history. Higher commodity loans to producers at 85 per cent of parity, and heavy buying of farm commodities for Britain under the Lend-Lease program became highly important.

Purchasing Power.

The price increases were not all net gain to farmers, of course. Prices paid by farmers for goods and services, not including labor, averaged only 4 per cent higher than in 1940, but as the year drew to a close there were indications that prices paid would rise faster than prices received, thus cutting down the purchasing power of farm products. Costs of farm production were higher; farm labor costs went up 30 per cent; fertilizer, building supplies, and farm equipment all became more costly.

For 1941 as a whole the farmer's income had a purchasing power of 92 per cent of parity as compared with 80 per cent in 1940, and 77 per cent in 1939. In September 1941, farm purchasing power reached as high as 102 per cent of parity but as the year closed the general level had dropped back to 99 per cent.

Wheat.

Wheat production in 1941 was 945,937,000 bu., the largest crop since 1919, and 16.4 per cent larger than the crop of 1940. The crop was harvested from 55,831,000 acres, as compared with 52,980,000 in 1940. The average yield of all wheat, 16.9 bu. per acre, was the highest on record, and compares with a 15.3 bu. yield for 1940, and 13.3 for the 1930-39 period. Winter wheat with an average yield of 17 bu. an acre on 39,547,000 acres, accounted for 671,293,000 bu. of production; spring wheat, with an average yield of 16.9 on 16,284,000 acres, produced 274,644,000 bu.; and durum wheat, with an average yield of 16.4 on 2,546,000 acres added 41,800,000 bu.

The crop was favored by ample moisture for seeding in the fall, and by small winter loss. The crop would have been even larger but for the excessive rains which interfered with harvesting in the Great Plains and the Pacific Northwest.

The domestic wheat supply as of July 1, 1941, the beginning of the new crop year, was 1,333,000,000 bu.—enough for two years. Domestic consumption during the present crop year is estimated at about 670,000,000 bu., leaving 663,000,000 for export and carryover. The quantity that may be exported cannot be estimated because of unsettled conditions, but it probably will be small.

The Ever-Normal Granary loan program continued to put a floor under wheat prices, holding them materially above the world level. The loan operates to reduce the free supply of wheat by enabling farmers to hold their grain off the market. On Dec. 15, 336,400,000 bu. of 1941 wheat were under loan, as compared with 278,000,000 bu. of wheat put under the 1940 loan.

The 1941 wheat loan rate, based on July parity prices of wheat, represents an average national loan rate to farmers of about 98 cents a bu., as compared to 65 cents last year. The average price of wheat for all classes and grades at six markets, ranged between 98 cents and $1.10 a bu.

Cotton.

Production of cotton in 1941 was 10,976,000 bales as compared with 12,566,000 bales in 1940, and 13,246,000 bales annual average for the period 1930-39. The crop was picked from 22,376,000 acres, 6.2 per cent under the 1940 acreage.

The most favorable highlight in the cotton picture is the heavy industrial activity and large military purchases of cotton textiles, which indicate that domestic consumption may exceed 10,500,000 bales, as compared to 9,750,000 in 1940, and a more normal domestic consumption of about 6,500,000 bales. Export prospects are dark, with a large proportion of the world's spindles under Axis control, making it unlikely that exports during the 1941-42 crop year will exceed materially the 1,100,000 bales exported last season—only one-fifth as large as the below-average exports of 1939-40.

The domestic supply of American cotton in 1941 was about the same as in 1940. The Aug. 1 carry-over was 11,900,000 bales, and this, plus the current crop, gives the United States more than double its domestic requirements.

During the first part of the 1941 season, farmers received the highest prices for cotton since 1929, and the highest prices for seed in more than 21 years. The average price to farmers for lint in mid-November was 15.78 cents per lb., as compared to 9.38 cents a lb. the same day last year.

The principal price support for cotton was the Government loan. During the 1940-41 crop season loans were offered at 57 per cent of parity, averaging about 8.90 cents a lb. The loans enable farmers to withhold 3,180,000 bales, a fourth of the production, from the market and assure minimum prices near or above the loan rates for the whole crop. During May, with the prospect of loans at 85 per cent of parity, prices advanced rapidly. It became profitable to redeem loan cotton, and on June 30, 1941, only 1,000,000 bales of cotton remained under loan, mostly from the 1938 crop. Up to October 1941, as a result of high prices, the Commodity Credit Corporation had completed loans on only 39,000 bales of 1941 crop cotton, as compared with 159,000 bales in 1940 during the like period last year.

Corn.

The Corn Belt utilized a season of variable weather to turn out the largest crop in 9 years, placed at 2,672,541,000 bu., which compares with the 2,460,600,000 bu. crop of 1940, and the 10-year average of 2,300,000,000 bu. Acreage harvested was 86,000,000, down about 640,000 acres from 1940. The yield, 31 bu., has been exceeded in 75 years of record only by the 1906 yield of 31.7 bu.

The crop was in excellent condition on July 1 over most of the Belt, and was not seriously affected by the drought and heat wave in late July and August. Hybrid corn, which in 1941 made up 62 per cent of the Corn Belt's total, proved its ability to withstand the drought and heat remarkably well.

Corn production plus carryover for the 1940-41 marketing season gave a total supply of 3,100,000,000 bu., 22 per cent larger than the average for 1935-39, and the largest in 20 years. With this quantity of corn in prospect, commodity loans were made available in November 1940, at 75 per cent of parity, 61 cents a bu., in the commercial corn area until September 30, 1941. More than 100,000,000 bu. of corn moved under the loan, as compared to 300,000,000 bu. of the previous year's crop. These corn reserves proved their value in 1941, when corn began flowing out of the Ever-Normal Granary to be converted into meat supplies needed for the defense program. For the first time in five seasons, 50,000,000 bu. more corn moved out of the Ever-Normal Granary than into it. At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1941, the Commodity Credit Corporation owned 202,000,000 bu. of corn, and held 289,000,000 bu. as collateral for loans.

Grain Sorghums.

Although the total grain sorghum crop is never large when compared to the American output of corn, it is highly significant because the drought-resistant sorghums provide Great Plains farmers with increasing opportunity to divert surplus wheat acres to the production of feed for livestock and poultry. The 1941 grain sorghum crop was 153,968,000 bu. from 8,903,000 acres, the largest ever produced. It was one-fifth larger than the 1940 crop, and nearly twice as large as the average annual production in the decade of the 1930's. The yield, 17.3 bu. an acre, was the highest in 13 years.

Fats and Oils.

It became apparent early in 1941 that the nation's usual supply of fats and oils could be threatened by disruption of ocean shipping and possible cutting off of the sources of drying oils and soap fats, as tung oil, sesame oil, palm oil, cocoanut oil, etc., usually imported from China, the East Indies and Japan.

To meet this contingency, farmers were urged to increase production of domestic fats and oils. The AAA program was revised to permit producers to harvest a larger acreage of soybeans for crushing than in 1940 without incurring reductions in program payments. A soybean loan program to aid in orderly marketing of the crop and to save as much of the crop as possible for oil, was announced by the Department of Agriculture in October, at the rate of $1.05 per bushel for soybeans grading No. 2 or better stored on farms. A purchase program on castor-bean seed was announced in June to make such seed available for expansion of 1942 production. Farmers were guaranteed 3 cents a lb. on cleaned seed.

Domestic production of fats and oils in the year July 1940 to June 1941, was about 9,100,000,000 lbs. Production in the 1941-42 year will probably be about 9,400,000,000 lbs., with increases in output of lard, soybean oil, tallow greases, linseed oil, fish oils, and corn oils. In 1940-41 imports of about 1,600,000,000 lbs. of vegetable oils and oilseeds were required to bring supplies into balance with requirements. Larger supplies are needed, but under present unsettled conditions it is unlikely that imports can be maintained at this level. The deficit probably will be taken from stocks, which fortunately are large—about 2,600,000,000 lbs.

Soybeans, which will play an important part in making up oil needs, produced an all-time United States record crop in 1941. Production was 106,712,000 bu. of beans, 38 per cent larger than in 1940, and three times the 10-year average production of 35,506,000 bu. The 1941 acreage harvested for beans, 5,855,000 bu., was 23 per cent above the 1940 acreage, and 185 per cent larger than the 10-year average.

The peanut crop was 1,500,000,000 lbs., or 11 per cent smaller than the 1,700,000,000 lbs. crop of 1940. A 1942 peanut marketing quota of 1,200,000,000 lbs. was proclaimed in November by the Secretary of Agriculture, but this applies only to peanuts for the edible trade, and the acreage allotment of 1,610,000 acres remains the same as in 1941. However, in addition, production goals for 1942 call for 1,900,000 acres of peanuts to be harvested for oil.

The 1941 production of flaxseed on 3,202,000 acres was 31,485 bu., 2 per cent larger than in the previous year, and three times the 10-year average.

Tobacco.

Events in 1941 materially improved the tobacco farmers' outlook despite the fact that the European war caused normal exports to drop to the lowest levels experienced since the Civil War. Exports will remain small as long as war continues. However, domestic demand increased markedly, and the flow of lend-lease exports is expected to move substantial quantities of tobacco owned or controlled by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Increased demand favored the cigarette tobaccos—flue-cured, burley and Maryland. The total tobacco crop was about 1,300,000,000 lbs., as compared to 1,400,000,000 in 1940. The flue-cured tobacco crop was about 650,000,000 lbs. as compared to 756,000,000 the year before. Ordinarily 50 per cent of this type is exported. The dark-fired tobacco crop declined by 29 per cent—about 76,000,000 lbs. The burley crop was down to 351,000,000 lbs. from 375,000,000 in 1940. Maryland increased 9 per cent, to nearly 30,000,000 lbs. This type is in a favorable position, as it is replacing certain imported tobaccos in blending, and is benefiting heavily from increased cigarette demand. Dark air-cured tobacco production was cut from 42,000,000 lbs. to 34,000,000 lbs. Cigar tobacco was down 4 per cent from 1940, at 138,000,000 lbs.

During 1941 growers of flue-cured, burley, fire-cured and dark air-cured tobacco approved marketing quotas for 1941, 1942, and 1943, and thus enabled farmers to make equitable division of the adjustment in their crop which drastically curtailed exports have required. In November, the prices being received by farmers for three principal types then being sold, were close to or above parity prices.

Livestock and Poultry.

Hogs.

On Dec. 23, Secretary of Agriculture Wickard announced that, according to the pig crop report, American farmers would exceed the 1942 hog production goals, assuring ample pork supplies for the United States, Great Britain, and their allies. The combined fall and spring pig crops of 1941 are estimated at 85,000,000 head, or 6 per cent larger than 1940. The combined 1942 pig crop is expected to be over 97,000,000 head, exceeding by 10,000,000 the largest previous production.

The total slaughter in 1941 is estimated at 72,000,000 head, as compared to 66,000,000 in 1939. A slaughter of 79,000,000 head is expected in 1942. Federally-inspected slaughter in the 1940-41 marketing year was 48,000,000 head, as compared to the large 47,600,000 slaughter the previous year.

The trend in hog prices has been up since the beginning of the year. In the late fall a year ago farmers were averaging $6 per cwt. for hogs; this fall the average has been around $10.

Cattle.

The number of cattle and calves has increased steadily since 1938, and numbers are now approaching the record of 74,000,000 head just before the drought of 1934. The total slaughter in 1941 was 25,000,000 head but a slaughter of 28,000,000 head is being sought under defense goals for 1942.

If the goal for cattle and calf slaughter in 1942 is reached, the marketings of beef and veal will be materially increased when it is needed to supply defense demand and the upward trend of cattle numbers, which threatens to overstock the ranges on the basis of their long-time normal forage production, will be halted.

Although the general level of cattle prices has averaged materially higher this year than last, the spread between feeder and slaughter cattle has been unusually narrow and unfavorable to feeders. The average price of good grade beef steers at Chicago in early October was $11.50, slightly higher than the corresponding week in 1940. Prices of feeder cattle in the fall were $1 to $2 higher per cwt. than in the fall of 1940.

Sheep and Wool.

The number of lambs on feed on Jan. 1, 1941—6 per cent larger than a year earlier—was the largest on record. The 1941 lamb crop totaled 34,500,000 head, 5 per cent more than the 1940 crop, and the largest in 18 years of record. The inspected slaughter of sheep and lambs in 1941 ran about 5 per cent larger than a year earlier.

Marked improvement in domestic demand was reflected in substantially higher prices for lambs. The average price of good and choice grade slaughter lambs at Chicago in October was $11.50 per cwt. as compared with $9.45 a year before.

Cash income received by farmers and ranchers from wool in 1941 was the largest in 20 years; prospects for 1942 were even brighter, as consumer and defense needs piled up. Wool production for the year was the largest on record, with a shorn wool output of nearly 400,000,000 lbs. Prices were the highest in more than a decade, standing at 36.1 cents a lb. in November, as compared to 31.5 cents a year ago.

Dairy Products.

The most urgent item on agriculture's calendar is the increase of milk production, and dairy farmers made a good start toward the goals in 1941. The total milk production in 1941 was the largest on record, 117,000,000,000 lbs., as compared to 111,000,000,000 in 1940. As 1941 opened there were 24,276,000 milk cows on United States farms and it is estimated that there will be nearly 26,000,000 in 1942. These large herds will be fed heavier quantities of feeds and concentrates to attain the 1942 goal of 125,000,000,000 pounds of milk.

Exports of dairy products surged upward as the United States began to feed Britain. The equivalent of 2,600,000,000 pounds of milk was exported in 1941 as compared to 700,000,000 pounds in 1940. It is estimated that 5,400,000,000 will be shipped abroad in 1942.

Prices received by farmers for milk and butterfat went against seasonal trends, and have been above the 1940 level during the fall of 1941. As of November, butterfat was 36.7 cents as compared to 31 cents at the same time last year.

Poultry and Eggs.

About 787,000,000 chickens were raised on farms in 1941, a 14 per cent increase over 1940. The slaughter of farm-produced chickens is estimated to have been 680,000,000 head, which with the 150,000,000 birds from the commercial broiler industry and a non-farm production of 50 to 60,000,000, established another new record.

Egg production for the year is estimated at 3,700,000,000 dozens, about 3.5 per cent larger than in 1940. As a result of higher egg prices and special efforts by the Department of Agriculture and cooperating Land Grant Colleges, farmers were encouraged to hold back more hens for egg production, and by early 1942 an increase of 10 per cent in layers is expected.

The average prices received by farmers for chickens and eggs averaged materially higher in 1941 than in 1940. In November the average farm price of chickens was 15.5 cents a lb., and eggs were 35.5 cents a dozen, as compared to 13.1 cents and 26.2 cents, respectively, in November 1940.

Production Goals for 1942.

In order to meet all war-time requirements, farmers of the United States must plan ahead with greater precision and with respect to a much greater number of commodities than they have ever done before. Early in the fall, the Department of Agriculture announced national and state 1942 production goals for all essential commodities. The goals were broken down by states on the basis of the proportion that each state was believed to be capable of producing. After the states had considered the goals and found them attainable, they were allocated to counties, and then to individual farms. This last allocation is being made on the basis of a farm-to-farm canvass, with the farmer signing a pledge to produce the amount of the various products that represent his personally attainable production goals. Further, the results of the farm canvass are being reviewed to see that, after individual farm modifications, they add up to the county and state production goals; the farm inventories are also being studied to determine whether problems in marketing, distribution, and credit must be solved to guarantee further the attainment of the goals.

National Farm Programs.

The machinery available to agriculture in this war has been functioning for many years. The action-program organization has been built since 1933; the nationwide extension system was created in 1914 and developed under the war load of 1917 and 1918; the research organization began in 1862 and has been developed and adjusted over a period of eighty years. This Federal-state-local machinery, created to deal with peace-time conditions, is proving wholly adequate to cope with war-time problems. In the first World War there was great confusion in Washington when new agencies were established outside the normal agricultural structure to deal with many phases of food processing and distribution, and price control. Today, experienced people, used to working together, are managing emergency activities on the farm front with maximum efficiency and with minimum confusion to farmers and the general public.

Without sacrificing the normal objectives of income stabilization, conservation, rehabilitation of low-in-come farmers, provision of adequate credit at reasonable rates of interest, reducing production costs, and so on, all programs have now been redirected toward obtaining the production of the needed kinds and amounts of commodities.

Through the AAA, farmers are being encouraged to increase the production of essential crops, raise less of others; the credit agencies are helping farmers finance the increased production and this involves reaching many farmers who have not heretofore had an established line of credit; commodity loans are being used to build up stockpiles or to divert supplies to their highest use, and to support prices to encourage production; conservation programs for farm lands, forest land, and range are more important than ever, to assure that vital resources are not uselessly wasted as they were during the first World War; efforts to rehabilitate low-income or disadvantaged farm families have been intensified because production on small farms is vital to reaching national goals but at the same time rehabilitation borrowers are repaying loans in greater volume than ever before; educational work is being redirected to help farmers use new and sometimes ingenious methods because of machinery, fertilizer, and other shortages, and research is tackling such war-borne problems as domestic rubber production.

Defense Relations.

On May 17, 1941, the President transferred to the Department of Agriculture all functions theretofore handled by the Agricultural Division of the 7-man Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. The reconstituted unit was placed directly under the Secretary of Agriculture as his Office of Agricultural Defense Relations, to serve as a central clearing house for the consideration of agricultural needs and problems as related to the national defense program.

One of its first jobs was to secure priority ratings and allocations for a wide variety of materials needed to permit continuous farm production. For example, early in the summer it obtained emergency allocations of steel for bins to store the bumper grain crop. Following that it arranged for priorities for farm machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, processing machinery, and otherwise saw that agriculture's metal and chemical needs were met as fully as possible.

In view of Food for Defense requirements, agriculture asked for sufficient materials to guarantee production of farm machinery at 107 per cent of the 1940 level in order to obtain the production goals and to offset diminishing labor supplies. It became apparent, however, that the Office of Production Management could guarantee only 80 per cent, together with an adequate supply of repair and replacement parts. The Department organized an intensive farm equipment repair campaign to offset the probable shortage of new machinery, and as the year closed it appeared that farmers all over the nation were cooperating wholeheartedly in this program to get their machinery in shape to do the most work possible. Particular attention was given to assuring that given metal supplies for agriculture are used for the most effective needs. The supply of milking machines, for example, is being increased, while supplies of other machinery, as wheat combines, not so much needed for defense foods, are being curtailed. It became apparent that items such as heavy-duty electric motors, heavy tractors, and certain kinds of water systems would have to be carefully distributed. Although farm construction requiring critical materials was drastically curtailed, it was expected there would be no difficulty in small construction, as lumber, glass, brick, stone and cement are plentiful and are not under priority control.

The supply of chemicals was uncertain at the year's end. If ships can be secured to bring nitrate from Chile, restrictions on nitrogen fertilizer should not be severe, but if ships are not available, there may be a shortage. There was a distinct possibility of sulphuric acid shortage, resulting in less phosphate fertilizer than needed. The potash supply seemed adequate. By conservation and careful distribution of supplies there was expected to be an adequate supply of insecticides, fumigants, and fungicides.

The farm labor situation was being carefully checked to see what further actions would be necessary. The Farm Placement Service was strengthened, and farmers were urged to use it in making the best use of available labor. The Office of Agricultural Defense Relations worked with the Selective Service in clarifying agricultural deferments, to assure that while making as many men as possible available for military service, vital agricultural production would not be jeopardized, WPA, NYA, and CCC were encouraged to use their training facilities for developing necessary farm skills among available labor. See also CHEMISTRY; CONSERVATION; PRODUCTION AND TRADE.