1940: Presidential Election

In one of the most hotly contested campaigns in American history, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was re-elected to the Presidency, the first man to be elected three times as President of the United States.

The campaign of 1940 was rather late in getting under way, because of the late dates of the National Conventions of the two major parties. The Republican National Convention, meeting in Philadelphia, nominated Wendell L. Willkie for President the evening of June 27, 1940. Senator Charles L. McNary was selected as the party's nominee for Vice-President. The following July 17, the Democratic National Convention nominated President Roosevelt to be the party's candidate for President for the third successive time. Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency.

Outstanding Issues of the Presidential Campaign.

Presidential campaigns are, of course, affected by many different factors, and it is impossible to measure the exact importance of each one, but the campaign of 1940 undoubtedly had three outstanding issues — the New Deal, foreign policy, and the third term. Naturally each party interpreted these issues somewhat differently.

The New Deal, a term loosely applied to the domestic policies of Roosevelt's Administration, was not, according to Willkie, all bad. He distinguished between its good and bad features, singling out for endorsement the various 'Social Security' measures. He did, however, insist that economic security, of a really desirable kind, was contingent upon a general recovery of business which would put the unemployed back to work. Following Willkie's lead, the Republicans argued that a hostile spirit on the part of the Administration towards business leaders generally, the unbalanced national budgets with chronic deficits, extravagance and inefficiency in the Federal Government, an excessive and unwise taxation of industry, and an alarming growth of the enormous National Debt discouraged the expansion of private enterprise, and thereby choked recovery. An alarming growth of autocracy in the Federal Government, Willkie claimed, would ultimately destroy the traditional American way of life.

The Democrats, on the other hand, emphasized the humanitarian features of the New Deal, the homes which had been saved or improved, the human misery which had been alleviated. In defending the basic economic soundness of the New Deal, Democratic spokesmen compared conditions in 1940, after eight years of the New Deal, with those existing in 1932, after twelve years of Republican rule. The expenditure of tremendous sums of money was justified, they said, as a measure both of humanity and social policy. As to a threat of dictatorship, the Democrats accused the Republicans of raising a bogey-man, pointing to the campaign itself as evidence that there was no curtailment of the traditional American liberties.

Foreign Policy.

In foreign policy, the most definite criteria of the Democratic views were to be found in the party's record in Congress and in the public utterances of President Roosevelt. The more belligerent remarks of the latter were toned down somewhat by Democratic interpreters of the party's position on foreign affairs. Briefly, the Democratic party claimed to stand for all aid to Great Britain short of actual entry into the war, meanwhile arming the country to the teeth for purposes of defense. Willkie's early endorsement of the Administration's foreign policy seemed to remove foreign affairs as a campaign issue, a removal which was further indicated by the similarity of the foreign-affairs planks in the platforms of the two parties. As the campaign progressed, however, the Republicans, probably in an effort to catch the votes of those dissatisfied with Roosevelt's foreign policy, tried to create a distinction between the two parties with respect to foreign affairs. The Democrats were, said the Republicans, both willing and likely to take the country into the European War, Democratic assertions to the contrary notwithstanding; whereas the Republicans, as one wag bitterly put it, would under no circumstances do more than fight to the last Englishman. The defense program, closely connected with the important question of foreign policy, was brought into the campaign by both sides. The Republicans claimed that the New Deal's alleged inefficiency would imperil national safety; while the Democrats, in turn, pointed to the Republicans' opposition in Congress to the revision of the Neutrality Law, whereby aid to Great Britain was made possible, and to their persistent attempts to block measures for national armament and defense. Conscription, which became both a law and a reality during the campaign, received the approval of both candidates.

Third Term Issue.

The Republicans made quite an issue of the third term. Roosevelt's candidacy was represented as a dangerous violation of an old tradition which was based upon a sound principle of political democracy. Departure from this tradition, it was claimed, was a move in the direction of a dictatorship. Willkie in his speeches never wittingly referred to President Roosevelt in any other way than as 'the third-term candidate.' The Democrats generally took the position that the third term was a matter for the American people to decide by a majority vote. Democrats were inclined to keep away from the subject on the whole, but occasionally they recalled the fact that, earlier in the year, John D. M. Hamilton and Willkie himself had several times expressed the hope that Roosevelt would run for a third term, so that the public would have a chance to express itself on both Roosevelt and the New Deal.

The campaign strategies of the two men were radically different. Willkie was to be 'a fighting candidate,' whereas President Roosevelt announced that public affairs would not permit him to leave Washington long enough for campaign speeches. He would, however, Roosevelt said, restrict himself to refuting any false statements which might be made by the opposition.

Republican Campaign.

Willkie's timing of his campaign was said to have been a bad blunder. After his nomination at the end of June, he did not make a major address until his acceptance speech at Elwood, Indiana, his boyhood home, on Aug. 17. Then his next important address was a month later, Sept. 16, at Coffeyville, Kansas. Many persons wondered whether, by this procedure, he had not permitted his campaign to die on his hands. It was pointed out that the flaming enthusiasm for Willkie which had spread over the country like wildfire in June had possibly gone out for lack of fuel. The Gallup Poll, for instance, at the beginning of August had shown Willkie with a substantial electoral majority, and with a popular majority outside the states of the Solid South. Then by the middle of September the pendulum had swung far the other way. Of course, there could have been, and probably was, more than campaign strategy involved in this change of public sentiment. Events in Europe may have led persons to believe that the time was a bad one to change the country's leadership. There is also the possibility that many voters changed their minds about Willkie, concluding upon further thought that he had not lived up to their expectations. Moreover, there is the further possibility of error in the August poll of public opinion.

However lacking in vigor Willkie's campaign may have been up to the middle of September, it was strenuous enough thereafter. Leaving Rushville, Indiana, on Sept. 13, he headed westward for Coffeyville, Kansas, and thence to the Pacific Coast. The following day, Sept. 14, he gave several short talks along the route in Illinois. In one of these, at Joliet, he made his famous 'bull,' when in scoffing at Roosevelt's alleged extraordinary skill in handling foreign affairs, Willkie rhetorically asked: 'Was it extraordinary skill . . . when he telephoned Hitler and Mussolini and urged them to sell Czechoslovakia down the river?' The statement was promptly explained as a slip, and later the same day, Willkie put the matter in somewhat different form by saying that President Roosevelt, by telephone, had urged Hitler, Mussolini, and Chamberlain to Munich, where 'they sold Czechoslovakia down the river.' The original remark, nevertheless, quickly brought a stinging rebuke and denial from Secretary of State Cordell Hull; and Democrats, generally, pounced upon Willkie's statement, characterizing it as rash and reckless, and as convincing evidence of his unfitness for handling the delicate foreign affairs of the nation.

It was an inauspicious beginning for what was to be one of the most strenuous campaigns for the Presidency in American history. The vigor and frequency of his talks took away Willkie's voice that first day, and his hoarseness grew steadily worse during the campaign. Despite this handicap, however, Willkie, from platforms, trains, and open automobiles, in every section of the country, except the states of the Solid South, hammered away at the evils of the New Deal, asserting that they were an obstacle to business recovery and a menace to the American way of life.

The public-opinion polls in October indicated that Willkie had gained in popularity. The vote in certain pivotal states seemed so close that, allowing for a margin of error in the polls, the result could not be definitely predicted. Experts were extremely cautious in their prophecies, and there was a widespread feeling that the matter was so close to a toss-up that personal sympathies were influencing most predictions.

As Election Day approached, popular feeling on both sides ran high. Even for a presidential campaign, the public appeared to be extraordinarily interested. The fad for wearing campaign buttons, some of them as big as saucers, was unusually strong. The buttons on both sides were both witty and venomous. Roosevelt buttons declaring 'Two Good Terms Deserve Another' and 'Better a Third Termer Than a Third Rater' were matched by 'Life Begins in Forty,' 'Dr. Jekyll of Hyde Park,' and 'Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 5.'

In several cities Willkie was a target for various missiles such as eggs, melons, tomatoes, thrown by hoodlums, and even a metal waste basket which a woman hurled from a Detroit hotel room. On another occasion a stone was hurled through a glass window on the Willkie train. President Roosevelt characterized the throwing of things at his rival as reprehensible and criminal.

With the contest so close, it was inevitable that both parties should try to make the most of the breaks that came their way, such as the 'down the river' remark of Willkie. The Republicans, for instance, made a great pother about the appointment of Elliott Roosevelt to a captaincy in the Reserve Corps. The Republicans also gave full publicity to a 'smear circular' assailing Willkie's German ancestry, issued by the Colored Division of the Democratic National Committee. Edward J. Flynn, Democratic National Chairman, hastened to apologize for the circular, and, in completely disowning it, explained that its issuance had never been authorized by the Publicity Division of the Democratic National Committee. Then, too, there was the alleged 'kneeing' of a colored policeman in New York City by Stephen Early, President Roosevelt's secretary. Batteries of cameramen and newspapermen were rushed to the bedside of the injured man, so that the Negro voters would receive full information of this affront to their race. The whole affair took a ludicrous turn for the Republicans when the injured policeman, upon being asked, said that he was a Democrat, and that he was going to vote for Roosevelt.

Democratic Campaign.

The uncertainty of the outcome may have been responsible for Roosevelt's decision to make several campaign speeches, although the reason given was the systematic and deliberate 'falsification of fact by the opposition.' President Roosevelt delivered five political addresses between Oct. 23 and Nov. 2, in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Brooklyn, and Cleveland. In August, the President had refused Willkie's challenge publicly to debate the issues, saying that he had no time for it. He declined again when Willkie offered to share a Baltimore platform with him the night of Oct. 30. In his campaign speeches, President Roosevelt declared that there was no secret understanding with foreign powers, as had been suggested by the opposition, and that he did not intend to lead the country into war. The Republicans were described by the President as having sabotaged the National Defense Program, and as having shown 'timidity, weakness, and shortsightedness' in their attitude toward foreign affairs. The President also reviewed his own record on domestic policies.

The campaign closed the night before Election Day with brief radio addresses by both candidates. The President spoke from his home at Hyde Park in a clear, firm voice with a thoroughly Olympian detachment, ending by leading his listeners in prayer. His rival's voice as it came over the radio a little later was in startling contrast. So hoarse, that he could with difficulty make himself heard, his remarks had about them a quality of almost frenzied exhortation.

Election Results.

President Roosevelt's electoral vote, 449, to 82 for Willkie, was a sweeping victory, but was closer than the plurality showed. The popular vote was 27,241,039 for Roosevelt, and 22,327,226 for Willkie. Under the present electoral system, it was pointed out that a shift of less than a million votes in certain pivotal states would have carried the election the other way. The Republican party showed its greatest strength in the Middle West. Willkie carried ten states — Maine, Vermont, Michigan, Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado. Roosevelt, of course, carried all the others.

Political experts have expressed the opinion that it was the loyalty of the lower-income groups in the cities and of labor (in spite of the efforts of John L. Lewis, C.I.O. president, who threatened to resign if Roosevelt was re-elected), which contributed largely to the re-election of Roosevelt. The international situation may very well have benefited Willkie more than it did the President. Many votes, to be sure, were cast for President Roosevelt for reasons directly or indirectly connected with the international situation, but it is equally certain that several important groups cast their votes against him because of his attitude on foreign affairs. The pacifists and the isolationists could hardly have indorsed the announced program of either candidate, but for some indefinable reason Willkie's election seemed to promise the better chance for preserving the country's peace. The so-called Italian, German, and Irish votes also, from all reports, were cast for Willkie, because, even though it was only a matter of degree, he seemed less pro-British than his rival. As to the third-term issue, naturally, whatever influence it had was against Roosevelt. In December, the American Institute of Public Opinion published some interesting figures which tended to show that the new voters in the 1940 election were preponderantly for Roosevelt. Of the 10,300,000 voters in the 1940 election, who did not vote in 1936, either because they were not old enough or for other reasons, 6,500,000 of them voted for Roosevelt.