1940: Greece

Greece, a kingdom in the Balkans, found herself involved in the late fall of 1940 in a defensive war against Italian aggression. Until then Greece had shared the general situation of all Balkan countries, trying hard to avoid involvement in the European war by remaining neutral. The Greek government of General John Metaxas had in preceding years definitely shown its strong sympathy for the fascist governments; its economic policies and its general outlook had been deeply influenced and to a large extent molded by National Socialist Germany. But the exposed maritime situation of the country and the fear of Italy's often-shown expansionist ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean forced Greece to remain neutral and to accept the British and French pledges of assistance in maintaining her independence and integrity. The Greek people, however, were pro-British at heart. Finding herself in a situation similar to that of Turkey and having lived since 1930 in agreement and friendship with Turkey, Greece tried to a certain extent to coordinate her policy with that of her former enemy. This similarity of interests made itself felt at the Balkan conference in Belgrade at the beginning of February 1940, when Greece, represented there by General John Metaxas, who is Foreign Minister as well as Premier, consulted above all with Turkey as to a possible common stand. Metaxas, who is sixty-nine years old and the strong man of Greece, had assumed also the functions of Minister of War, of the Navy, of the Air, and of Education. During the four years of his dictatorship, he succeeded in building up a stronger Greek army and in fortifying the Greek frontier against Albania, after the occupation of the latter by the Italians on Good Friday, 1939. The Italians on their part had created strong strategic centers in Albania, and had pushed energetically the building of roads from the coast through Albania to the Greek frontier.

Italian Press Attacks Launched Against Greeks.

In August 1940, the Italian press began to attack the Greek government in a way reminiscent of the press campaigns preceding the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Greeks were accused of 'intolerable persecution' of the Albanian minority in Northwestern Greece, and it was suggested that the Albanians might be forced to 'liberate' their fellow men in the Greek Epirus around Yanina. This move by Italy came quite suddenly in view of the fact that the Italian press only a short time before had stressed the friendly attitude of General Metaxas towards Italy and the good relations between the two countries. On the other hand, it was remembered that Premier Mussolini had started his foreign policy in 1923 by making use of an alleged incident on the Albanian-Greek frontier in order to press hard demands upon Greece and to bombard and occupy the strategically important Greek island of Corfu. It was also believed that in view of Germany's failure to invade Great Britain, the Axis powers might try to occupy Greece and the Greek islands, so as to outflank the British position in the Mediterranean and in Egypt from the East. It was especially the important port of Salonica which was regarded as the chief aim of Axis strategy.

In spite of Italy's repeated warnings to Greece to heed the fate of Poland, Norway and Holland, and yield to Italian demands, the Greeks began to prepare for resistance and to put part of their army and very small navy on a preparedness basis. With the German occupation of Rumania in the first half of October, the danger of an Axis march towards the Aegean Sea seemed to increase; so the Greek army proceeded with its mobilization. The Axis powers seemed to rely upon the belief of Greek internal dissension and 'fifth column' activities to break the will to resistance of the small nation. They hoped for the formation of an outright pro-Berlin government under Constantine Cotzias, the governor of Athens, when the Axis demands were presented to Greece.

Italian Invasion.

But the Axis hopes of a disunited Greek nation, of Greek trepidation before the numerically superior Italian forces and of a quick collapse after an initial show of resistance, proved vain. On October 28 in the early morning hour of 3:00 A.M., the Italian Minister to Greece submitted an ultimatum to General Metaxas, demanding before the expiration of three hours agreement of Greece to an occupation by Italian forces of strategic points in Greece. The timing, the manner of presentation and the contents of the ultimatum were planned to frighten the Greeks into immediate submission. This attempt failed, and in the morning Italian troops, held long in readiness and thoroughly trained for the enterprise, crossed the frontier from Albania into Greece.

Italian dispatches during the first days reported steady advances of Italian troops, which were much superior in numbers and equipment to the defenders. In the northern part, from their base at Koritza, the Italians pushed toward Florina, while in the south, from their base at Argyrokastron, the Italians were trying to push towards the important Greek base of Yanina. Italians reported at the beginning of November that they had been able to pierce the Greek line of fortification, called the Metaxas Line. But it soon became apparent that the Italian successes were purely transitory. For the Italians, in spite of violent air bombing of Greek civilians in the important Greek cities and ports of Patras, Piracus and others, found their land attack stalled by fierce Greek resistance, and the fall of Yanina, which had been predicted in Rome as only a matter of hours, did not materialize. The British fleet and the British air force had also come immediately to the help of Greece, in accordance to their promise, and British troops landed on the island of Crete and established strong air bases from which they bombed not only Italy, but the Italian debarkation ports in Albania, in closest cooperation and support of their allies.

Greek Victories.

The torrential rains and the mountainous terrain were also in favor of the Greeks. Two Italian divisions were trapped in the defiles of the Pindus Mountains, and were destroyed or taken prisoner by the Greek forces. By Nov. 10 the Italian lines in the Epirus sector were broken and the Fascist troops were in full retreat at the southern end of the front. Soon it became apparent that the invasion of Greece had turned into a complete debacle of the Italian army. The situation at the northern end and in the central part of the 100-mile front had also changed to the advantage of the Greeks, who now pushed into Albania, where the Greek Evzones, or mountain troops, soon dominated Koritza, the important Italian base in the north.

The following weeks brought a widening of Greek victory and carried Greek troops deeper into Albania. Large quantities of Italian field guns and other munitions of war and motor trucks fell into the hands of the advancing Greeks, and thousands of prisoners were taken. On Nov. 22 Koritza fell into Greek hands after a protracted siege, and on Nov. 30 the important Italian base of Pogradec, near Lake Ochrida, dominating the road to Italian headquarters at Elbasan and to the Albanian capital, Tirana. There were similar successes on the south front, where the Greek army occupied Premedi (Dec. 4), the southern Albanian debarkation port of Porto Edda (Dec. 6), and the great fortress and base of Argyokastron (Dec. 8). Sweeping up closer toward the large port of Valona, the army took the Albanian port Palermo (Dec. 14) and the important coastal town of Khimara (Dec. 23). Fighting now in bitter cold and deep snow, the Greeks continued their advances on all sectors to the end of the year and fresh Italian reinforcements could not hold them back. See also ALBANIA; ITALY, and EUROPEAN WAR.