1939: Poland

The year 1939 witnessed the greatest national catastrophe in the thousand-year-old history of the Polish people. The independence of the country has been lost, cities destroyed, and people humiliated and driven from their homes. However, the military defeat would not have been as destructive and demoralizing, were it not for the realization by the overwhelming majority of the nation, that the internal régime was partly responsible for the national tragedy.

Relations with Germany.

In January 1934, a non-aggression treaty was concluded between Poland and Nazi Germany. This treaty, which constituted a complete reversal of the German foreign policy, was favorably accepted by the majority of Polish public opinion. To the question bluntly put by the late Marshal Pilsudski—'peace or war'—Hitler, at that time, was forced to answer 'peace.' After the Marshal died, in May 1935, his successors, deprived of the only claim they had to power, began to imitate, in foreign as well as in domestic policies, the totalitarian régimes, especially Hitlerism. 'The Colonels' established what was called abroad 'a dictatorship without a dictator,' the rule of a military clique despised by the overwhelming majority of the Polish people. While the people were anti-German and pro-French, the régime after 1934 became increasingly pro-German. It allowed the Nazification of Danzig in violation of the Versailles Treaty, and contributed to the extinction of the authority of the League of Nations in the Free City. The Polish Government accepted, against its evident self-interest, an anti-Czech policy, and in October 1938 was an accomplice in Hitler's disregard for the rights of smaller nations by participating in the division of the spoils. Poland occupied the Teschen region, inhabited by a majority of Czechs.

But soon after Munich, it appeared that the position of Poland was more precarious than ever before. The régime by its policies had alienated public opinion in the democratic countries, and had not been able to create a national unity which alone might have saved the independence of the country. The government isolated itself, and Colonel Beck's policy of 'sitting on the fence,' which in practice meant playing into the hands of Germany, ended in the most disastrous national tragedy.

When the Nazis, after Munich, refused to accede to Poland's desire to have a common frontier with Hungary, and on the contrary began to use sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as a center for Pan-Ukrainian agitation, the Polish Government realized the mistake it had made by its anti-Czech policy. A rapprochement was sought with the Soviet Union, then the arch-enemy of Nazi Germany. A Soviet-Polish declaration of Nov. 27, 1938, reaffirmed the non-aggression pact of 1932, and stated that henceforth the relations between the two countries would be based on a good neighborly understanding. But the pro-German tendency was still so strong in Polish official circles, that the press was ordered to minimize the significance of that declaration. Moreover, on Jan. 5, 1939, Colonel Beck paid a visit to Berchtesgaden, where he was reported to have received assurances from the German Chancellor that the next German move would not be in the East, and that no Nazi support would be given to the Pan-Ukrainian movement. On Jan. 25, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Nazi foreign minister, visited Poland for the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Polish-German non-aggression treaty of 1934. The document was praised as one of the fundamental instruments of European peace, and as the basis for friendly Polish-German relations. In retrospect, this oratory, scarcely a few months old, appears as the 'swan song' in the strange marriage of convenience between the two dictatorships.

In fact, Polish-German relations became severely strained when in February 1939 anti-German demonstrations, lasting for several days, and organized by Polish University students; swept the country. The occasion was the mistreatment of the Polish minority and especially of the Polish students in Danzig. Those manifestations, organized by nationalistic students, were directed against the Government in power as much as against Nazi-Germany. Even the elements which otherwise were sympathetic towards the ideology and methods of Hitlerism, were condemning the foreign policy of the Government, which in spite of the now apparent dangers from abroad still refused to broaden the bases of the régime. On Jan. 23, General Slawoj-Skladkowski, Prime Minister of Poland, in a reply to a question in Parliament, stated that there would be no amnesty for the political emigrés, especially for the veteran peasant leader, Wincenty Witos. The Government also continued its intolerant treatment of minorities, and especially its anti-Jewish policies. When on March 4, Mr. Gafencu, Rumanian foreign minister, visited Warsaw to normalize the relations between Poland and Rumania, strained since October 1938 when King Carol refused to support a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, the Polish foreign minister in London undertook to be the spokesman of Rumania, as well as of Poland, on the question of Jewish emigration from those countries.

Only after Hitler destroyed Czechoslovak independence, in patent violation of the Munich agreement, did the Polish Government realize that Poland would be the next object of German expansion, and made some belated effort towards national unity. While the arrival on March 16 of Hungarian troops on the Polish frontier was celebrated throughout Poland, it was clear that this frontier added little to the security of the country, since Germany dominated Slovakia and 'encircled' Poland on three sides. Poland's anxieties were further increased by the German annexation of Memel, which considerably weakened the Polish position in the Eastern Baltic and put under Nazi control the estuary of the river Niemen, very important for the Polish lumber trade.

The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia also increased German economic pressure on Poland. Germany's share in the Polish foreign trade amounted now to about 30 per cent. When Robert S. Hudson, British Secretary of Overseas Trade, arrived in Warsaw for commercial talks on March 19, Poland looked hopefully towards a greater trade exchange with the British Empire. A general feeling in the country favored a national unity government and the demand for a change in the fence-sitting policy in foreign affairs became universal. On March 21, the most important political emigrés, especially the peasants Witos, Kiernik, and Baginski, were allowed to return to the country and soon were pardoned. (See also GERMANY.)

Problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.

Immediately after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Nazis began to press for a speedy solution of the Danzig and the so-called Corridor problems. At the time it was reported that Germany demanded: (1) the return of Danzig as a 'free city in the framework of the German Reich'; (2) the right to build a highway 25 kilometers in width across Pomorze; (3) German control of the important railway-junction of Bohemia; (4) a special status for the German minority in Poland.

The acceptance of these demands by Poland would have meant the loss of an independent access to the sea. Naturally Poland, remembering the fate of Czechoslovakia, refused to abandon sovereignty over any portion of its territory. No Polish Government could have accepted the Nazi terms. Poland replied that it was willing to negotiate and establish a common Polish-German guarantee of the autonomy of Danzig. It was also ready to grant to Germany all possible transportation facilities through Pomorze. This meant that the Polish Government was willing to help in abolishing the League of Nations control over Danzig, and to agree to a virtual political Anschluss between Danzig and the Reich while reserving the vital economic interests of Poland in the Baltic. Short of sovereignty, Poland was ready to make the most liberal concessions to facilitate transit through the Corridor. When no reply was received to these Polish proposals, the whole country awakened to the fact that independence was in danger. A national defense loan was announced by the Government and important troop movements took place on the Western frontier.

Guarantee of Assistance from Great Britain and France.

Meanwhile, British public opinion had been profoundly shocked by Hitler's violation of the Munich agreement. The Chamberlain Government decided upon a fundamental change in policy, and on March 31 the Prime Minister made his historic statement in the Commons. At that time, Chamberlain gave the unilateral assurance that 'In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered as vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to that effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position as do His Majesty's Government.'

This tradition-breaking statement, by which the British Government not only made a definite commitment in Eastern Europe, but which gave Poland the exclusive right to decide when it should resist and thus automatically bring Great Britain and France on its side, completely changed the European diplomatic picture and the position of Poland in the family of nations. Poland became a member of a bloc of powers directed against Nazi-Germany and further German expansion.

The cry of 'encirclement' was immediately raised by the German propaganda machine, while in fact, geographically, it was really Poland that was encircled by Germany on three sides. The statement of Chamberlain can be considered as the end of a period in Polish foreign policy which began with the non-aggression treaty with Germany of January 26, 1934. Poland again, after five years, returned to her traditional opposition to Teutonic expansion; Germany again became Enemy Number One. But this time, Poland's diplomatic position seemed better than ever before because its independence was guaranteed by two powerful allies.

A few days after Chamberlain's statement of guarantee, Colonel Beck arrived in London April 3 on a visit arranged long before Hitler's occupation of Prague. Great Britain and Poland agreed then to replace the unilateral guarantee by a mutual assistance pact that would apply to 'any threat, direct or indirect to the independence of either.' It is rather interesting that in those days when there was a general expectation that Germany would annex Danzig on Hitler's birthday, April 20, and thereby start a general war, Colonel Beck thought it necessary to bring up the question of Jewish emigration from Poland and Rumania. He extracted from the British Government the vague statement that it 'fully appreciated the difficulty' and promised to examine proposals for the solution of the problem. (See also GREAT BRITAIN; FRANCE.)

German Demands Regarding Danzig.

A new factor which probably averted a general war in April suddenly appeared on the international scene. On April 15, President Roosevelt made his dramatic appeal to Hitler and Mussolini, asking for a ten-year pledge of non-aggression toward thirty states, and expressing his willingness, if such pledge be given, to cooperate in a settlement of world economic problems. Hitler's answer, given in his speech before the Reichstag on April 28, was a blunt rejection of President Roosevelt's proposal, and a unilateral denunciation of the German-British naval treaty and of the German-Polish non-aggression treaty of 1934, which only three months before was praised by Herr von Ribbentrop, as one of the great examples of the Chancellor's political genius. On the same day the German Government in a memorandum explained that Poland, by accepting the British guarantee had violated the spirit of the 1934 treaty and had joined a bloc of powers hostile to Germany. Hitler in his speech before the Reichstag demanded the unconditional cession of Danzig and an extra-territorial road through Pomorze. This, he declared, was his 'one and only offer.' If Poland did not accept immediately, his demands would increase. This speech was also significant because of the lack of the usual attack on Soviet Russia. It gave rise to rumors that a German-Russian deal was in the offing. On May 5, Colonel Beck, imitating the Hitler technique, in a firm though conciliatory speech before the Polish Diet gave Poland's reply to the German demands. The unilateral denunciation of the non-aggression treaty was unjustified and contrary to international law. The pact with Britain, he stated, had only defensive purposes and would apply only if Germany violated the Briand-Kellogg pact. Poland by her treaty of 1934, did not give up her independence in foreign policy, and the treaty with Britain did not contain more than the previous Polish-French treaty, which Germany had recognized as compatible with the 1934 agreement. Poland fully recognized that Danzig had a majority of Germans but the economic life of the City depended on its Polish hinterland. Danzig and an independent access to the sea are vital for Poland, a nation of 35,000,000 inhabitants. Poland was always willing to negotiate on Danzig, and on March 26 had submitted proposals for a common guarantee of the rights of the Free City, but had never received a reply from Germany. The Polish Government was also ready, Mr. Beck stated, to extend the German communication facilities through Pomorze, but would not abandon its sovereignty over that territory.

The result of the two speeches was a deadlock and a general worsening of the situation. The League of Nations instructed its High Commissioner, Professor Karl G. Burckhardt, to return to Danzig and to resume his post. Professor Burckhardt, who on a previous occasion was publicly complimented by the German Chancellor, went to Warsaw and Berchtesgaden in an effort to bring peace to Danzig. But this was to no avail. The incidents and clashes, border violations, etc., became daily more numerous. The German press launched a campaign along the familiar Nazi pattern, and stories of 'Polish atrocities' were prominently displayed in the newspapers. The 'war of nerves' was in full swing, when on Aug. 4, the Danzig Senate informed Polish customs inspectors at four points on the Danzig and East Prussian frontier, that they could no longer continue their duties. The Polish Government immediately intervened and warned the Danzig authorities that the abolition of this customs frontier would not be tolerated and would be regarded as a casus belli. Germany protested against what she called the 'Polish ultimatum' but on her advice Danzig settled the question to the satisfaction of Poland.

While the 'war of nerves' was on, Poland attempted to get financial support from her allies to increase her armaments and to enable her to resist the threatening German aggression. Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, Inspector General of British Over-seas Forces, went to Warsaw for military talks. It seems certain that General Ironside and the Allied High Command had decided at that time that no direct military aid for Poland was possible. A French loan equivalent to 60,000,000 zlotys for the electrification of the Polish central industrial district was granted, and after considerable discussion and wrangling, Great Britain gave Poland a credit of £8,000,000 for purchases of war material in England. (See also DANZIG; UNITED STATES: Foreign Relations.)

German-Soviet Pact.

In the meantime negotiations between the Allies and Soviet Russia were going on with the object of bringing the Soviets into the 'peace front.' For more than four months these negotiations in Moscow continued without result. Poland, while not one of the negotiators, was kept informed, and one of the greatest obstacles to the successful conclusion of the talks apparently was the unwillingness of Poland to allow Russian troops to cross her territory in the event of a German aggression. However, while the negotiations between the Allies and Russia were widely publicized, other negotiations were going on in great secrecy between Germany and the Soviets. To the general surprise of the world, the two Governments on Aug. 19, signed a commercial agreement which four days later was followed by far-reaching political agreements. Only one of them, a non-aggression pact, was published at the time. This constituted a complete defeat for Polish diplomacy, and a major threat to Poland's independence. It was axiomatic in Poland that the main object of the country's diplomacy was to keep Germany and Russia apart and that whenever those two powerful neighbors came to an agreement, Poland's independence was in danger.

For Hitler, the Russian agreement was his trump card. He believed that it would bring about another Munich, this time at the expense of Poland. In spite of the repeated warnings of Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, that Great Britain would fight if Poland were attacked, the Chancellor was convinced that Britain would back down at the eleventh hour. It is rather surprising to read in a letter from Henderson to Halifax that Hitler himself believed in the 'atrocity stories' of his propaganda machine. Henderson reported that Hitler was so angered by the 'massacre of Germans' in Poland that he was willing to risk a general European war.

In the last days of August, Henderson was in constant negotiation with Hitler and von Ribbentrop. The account of those talks, since published by the British Government, and constituting easily one of the most interesting documents in modern history, indicates that Poland had never seen the 'sixteen points' containing the German proposals for a settlement, which Germany claimed that the Polish Government had rejected. Great Britain asked the Nazi Government to enter into direct negotiations with Poland. In his reply, handed to Sir Nevile Henderson on Aug. 29, Hitler expressed his doubts as to the outcome, but stated that he nevertheless would accept the British proposal to enter into direct negotiations, if Poland would by the next day dispatch to Berlin an emissary with full powers. The Poles refused to send an envoy to Berlin who, like Schuschnigg or Hacha, would be obliged to sign on the dotted line. They proposed real negotiations in a neutral country. In the words of a telegram sent to London on Aug. 30 by Sir Howard Kennard, British Ambassador to Warsaw, 'the Poles would certainly sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially after the examples of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Austria.'

The 'Sixteen Points.'

On Aug. 31, at 9 P.M., an official communication was read over the German radio, stating that the German Government had waited in vain for two days for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers. In these circumstances 'the German Government cannot but regard their proposals as having been virtually rejected.' Consequently the Nazi Government considered it timely to inform the public of the proposals that would have been submitted to the Polish envoy.

The 'sixteen points,' as made public, provided for the return of Danzig to the Reich, and for the retention of Gdynia by Poland. Pomorze was to be administered for a year by an international committee, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and Italy. At the end of the year, this committee would organize a plebiscite limited to those domiciled in the territory on Jan. 1, 1918. Under those conditions, German settlers and officials who had left Pomorze after 1918 could return and vote, while the Poles who had moved there since the World War would be deprived of the right to vote. If the Corridor went to the Reich, under the plebiscite, Poland was to receive a narrow corridor connecting her with Gdynia. If Poland won the plebiscite, Germany was to get an extra-territorial zone in which to build a road and a four-track railway line. Should Pomorze become German, the Reich would proceed to an exchange of population with Poland, though no such exchange was provided for by the sixteen points in the event that Pomorze remain Polish. All the complaints relative to the treatment of minorities should be decided by a neutral committee. Compensation of damages done to minorities on either side since 1918 should be made, and a new comprehensive agreement guaranteeing the rights of minorities would be concluded. Danzig, Gdynia and the peninsula of Hela were to be demobilized.

These proposals, much less favorable to Poland than those made by Hitler in the speech of April 28, would probably have been rejected by Poland. But Germany did not even give her a chance to reject them, and before Poland saw them, the German radio, on the evening of Aug. 31, and Hitler, in his speech the next day, before the Reichstag, stated that Poland had rejected the 'sixteen points,' and by mobilizing her army Poland threatened Germany, and became the aggressor.

War in Poland.

On Sept. 1, at 5:45 A.M., on the order of Chancellor Hitler, the first shot was fired in what some call 'the Second World War.' On the same day, a score of Polish cities, including Warsaw, Lwow, Cracow, were bombed. The best military experts predicted that Poland would be able to hold out for at least six months, and that the approaching rains, the bad Polish roads, and the excellence of the Poles as soldiers, would prevent the formidable German military machine from overrunning the country in a short time. It seems too, that the Allied High Command, while realizing that no direct military aid for Poland was possible, did not believe in the success of a 'Blitzkrieg,' and was convinced that Germany would have to fight for a considerable time on two fronts.

The facts, however, proved otherwise. Poland, in order not to commit any act that might be interpreted as being provocative, had not decreed a general mobilization until it was too late, and on Sept. 1, many soldiers had not even reached their army units. The anti-air defense was totally inadequate and Germany soon established complete domination in the air. Her planes could raid cities and destroy communications with practically no resistance. The shock of the German attack from three sides was such, that almost immediately the Polish High Command lost control over the army. On Sept. 3, when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, Hitler had already attained the objectives outlined in the 'sixteen points.' By Sept. 10, Germany had occupied a third of the Polish territory, and had destroyed large sections of the Polish army. (See also AVIATION: Military Aspects.)

The retreat of the Poles was at first interpreted by most foreign experts as part of a preconceived plan to abandon a country, which, because of lack of natural obstacles, was militarily indefensible. It was believed that the Polish army would make its stand in the 'strategic triangle' formed by the rivers Bug, Vistula and San. Individual army units indeed fought valiantly against overwhelming odds. But the Polish High Command showed such complete ineptitude and lack of courage, that no personal bravery of some of the Generals, such as General Sosnkowski, and of the great masses of soldiers and officers, could do much to save the situation. While the Government left Warsaw five days after the campaign began, the city, under the leadership of its Mayor Stefan Starzynski, held out heroically until Sept. 27, and finally surrendered only because of lack of food and water.

Russia Invades Poland.

All hope of further resistance for the isolated army units came to an end when on Sept. 17 Russia invaded Poland from the North and East. Previously Soviet Premier Molotov, in a radio speech, pointed to the 'national insolvency and obvious impotence of the Polish State.' He declared that there was no more a responsible Polish Government and therefore, the treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland, namely the non-aggression treaty of 1932, had ceased to exist. The Soviet Union, in view of the situation, could not, he said, 'remain indifferent to the fate of its blood-brothers,' the Ukrainians and White Russians. Consequently, Red Army troops would cross the frontier to take under their protection 'the lives and property of the populations of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.'

At least 1,000,000 Soviet troops marched into Poland and met with practically no resistance. It was obvious that the Russian invasion had been pre-arranged with Germany and both armies fraternized in several areas. On Sept. 22, the Soviet and Nazi authorities drew a military line of demarcation which gave to the Soviets the territory east of the Vistula and brought about the withdrawal of German troops from some of the territory they had previously occupied. This demarcation line was only temporary, and on Sept. 27, von Ribbentrop flew to Moscow, where a new agreement was signed on Sept. 28. By the new line, Russia withdrew from the Vistula to the Bug, and surrendered territory with an indisputably Polish majority, retaining the area inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians and White Russians.

Partition of Poland.

The agreement of Sept. 28, called by some 'the Fourth Partition of Poland,' leaves under Germany about 21,000,000 people, of whom 18,000,000 are Poles, about 2,000,000 Jews, and less than 1,000,000 Germans. Of the 13,000,000 that came under Soviet domination, about 8,000,000 are Ukrainians and White Russians, 1,300,000 are Jews, and approximately 3,500,000 are Poles. There are less than 100,000 Germans in the Russian-occupied territory, and according to reports they have since been forced to leave for Germany. Economically, Germany received the much richer section of the country, practically all the important industrial establishments, except for some textile factories in Bialystok and oil wells in Galicia. The coal mines, the textile industry of Lodz, the steel and chemical industries, and important agricultural areas of the provinces of Posen and Pomorze have all come under German control. Except for Lwow, under Russia, and Vilna now under Lithuania, all the important Polish cities, such as Warsaw, Lodz, Poznan, Cracow, Katowice and Gdynia, are in the German occupied territory.

The partition left 80,000 sq. mi. under Russian control while Germany received 69,700 sq. mi. The Russian boundary runs along the rivers Pisa, Bug and San, which constitute important natural defenses in the event of war. (See also U.S.S.R.)

German Persecution of the Poles; Migrations.

Until the end of 1939, it was quite impossible to have reliable information on the happenings in either the German or the Russian occupied territory. Neither foreign correspondents nor relief organizations from abroad could reach the territory of the former Polish Republic. The scanty reports that, nevertheless, could reach the outside world, coming from Catholic sources, indicate a systematic extermination of the Poles from the Western provinces annexed to the Reich. Catholicism, which in Poland, especially in the Western provinces, has always been identified with Polish nationalism, is being persecuted, according to reports presented to the Pope by Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland.

Germany has divided the territory under her control into two sections. The provinces of Posen, Pomorze, and Upper-Silesia, which before the World War belonged to the German Reich, on Oct. 19, 1939 were again formally annexed to the Reich. Also the city and province of Lodz, which prior to the war of 1914 were part of Russia, and which contain about 200,000 Germans out of a total population of 2,650,000, were annexed to the German Reich. The remaining territory under German control was temporarily organized into a so-called Government-General of Poland, with Cracow as the capital, Hans Frank, Minister without Portfolio, was appointed Governor General, and Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt was made the head of the military administration in the territory. The fate of the territory not annexed to the Reich, had not at the end of 1939 been definitely decided. According to reports, the German Government intended to create a special Jewish reservation in the Lublin province to which all the Jews from Bohemia-Moravia, and Germany would be transported. A beginning of the realization of this plan has already been made, and thousands of Jews have been forced to leave the German and former Czech territory for the Lublin reservation. The Vatican radio has also reported that scores of thousands of Poles have been forcibly evicted from the Posen and Pomorze provinces, and transported in cattle trains into the territory of the Government General. The end of 1939 witnessed a general upheaval in the territory of the former Polish republic. Millions of people were on the move. Germans from the Russian occupied territory were being exchanged for Ukrainians and White Russians under Germany. Poles from the Western provinces, annexed directly to the Reich, where they formed from 85 to 90 per cent of the total population, were being driven out of their homes, and Germans from the Baltic States were being brought into Posen and Pomorze. Jews from the German territory were being forced into the Government General, and it even seems that Jews from the Government General were being transported into the so-called Lublin reservation. While no complete information is as yet available, reports have it that in this general migration of peoples in the severest winter Europe has seen for 50 years, hundreds of thousands have perished. It seems that the policies of the German Government tend to present the world after the war, whatever its outcome, with an ethnological fait accompli. The Nazi régime is attempting to Germanize the Western provinces in a few months, a feat that could not be accomplished by the German Empire in a hundred and fifty years. (See also RELIGION: Jews.)

Polish Government in France.

While the Poles and the Jews were suffering the greatest hardships under Nazi domination, a new Polish régime was set up abroad. President Moscicki, who together with the Government fled to Rumania, nominated Mr. Raczkiewicz, former Governor of Posen, as his legal successor. President Raczkiewicz formed a new régime in Paris with General Wladislaw Sikorski as Prime Minister. The new Government was representative of all important political parties in Poland. The national-democrats, the peasants, and the socialists, the three most important Polish political parties, which since the coup d'etat of the late Marshal Pilsudski in 1926 had been excluded from the Government, were invited by General Sikorski to be represented in his Cabinet. The Sikorski Government is a government of national unity, dominated by people like General Sikorski himself, who always opposed the pro-German tendencies of Col. Beck's foreign policy. General Sikorski and most of the members of his Cabinet advocated a pro-French foreign policy and a Western European orientation.

President Raczkiewicz and the Sikorski Cabinet have been formally recognized as the legal government of Poland, not only by the Allies but also by the Neutrals. The United States Government, following its precedents in Manchuria and Abyssinia, refused to recognize the German and Russian occupation of the Polish territory in violation of the Briand-Kellogg pact, and formally recognized the Polish régime established in France. The Foreign Minister of the new Polish régime, August Zaleski, the predecessor of Colonel Beck and an outspoken advocate of the League of Nations, on Oct. 11, paid an official visit to London. It was agreed that Polish independence would be one of the main Allied aims of the war. While no boundaries were set for the future Polish state, and some differences seemed to exist on the subject, the Allies were outspoken in their support of the Polish cause of independence. The official program of the Sikorski régime contained a promise of a democratic government in the resurrected Poland, and a guarantee of equality for all national minorities. The new Government which in the meantime moved from Paris to Angers where it received from the French a territory of about a mile in length with extra-territorial rights, has established a close cooperation with the refugee Czechoslovak Government, headed by former President Edouard Benes. The Sikorski Government fully realized the mistakes of the former Polish régime, which was partly responsible for the loss of independence and was making attempts to lay the foundations for a future close economic and perhaps also political cooperation with the Western and Slavic peoples. Also a military effort was being made by the new Polish Government, and from the Poles living in the Allied and Neutral countries a new Polish army was being recruited and trained in Angers. This Polish army led by Premier Sikorski will fight together with the Allies against Nazi-Germany. See also FASCISM; SOCIALISM.