1938: Palestine

The Arab revolt which started in April 1936, not only continued during 1938, but gained in intensity. It may be said that during 1938 the whole Arab population of the country, either out of conviction or by pressure from the organized nationalistic revolt, joined the forces of the revolution against the British mandate, and against what the Arabs considered the danger of transforming Palestine into a Jewish country. A consequence of this situation was, that during the year large parts of Palestine passed under the administration of the revolutionary government, which in many cities and especially in the mountainous districts of the country, replaced the British administration.

Under these circumstances the Palestine Government under High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael found it most difficult to reestablish peace. The British Government in London proceeded with its policy of trying to find a solution to the thorny Palestinian problem where the aspirations and demands of the Arab people and of the Zionist movement were apparently of a contradictory and mutually exclusive character. In July 1937 the British Government had accepted the proposal for a partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a British mandated territory, as set forth in the report of the Royal Commission, and had promised to present to Parliament a definite scheme after adequate inquiry. At that time it had regarded 'a solution on the lines of partition the best and most hopeful solution of what the mandatory power itself is convinced is, in fact, a deadlock.' On January 4th, 1938, a new Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead, to proceed to Palestine and to recommend, taking into account any representations of the communities in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, such boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas, and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under British Mandate, as will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish State, and which will necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa.

The Woodhead Report.

This Palestine Partition Commission spent over three months in Palestine, where they took evidence from British and Jewish witnesses. As Arabs boycotted the Commission, no Arab witnesses came forward to give evidence. The Commission submitted its report in October 1938. The majority expressed itself in favor of a curtailment of the proposed Jewish state to the lands really inhabited by a Jewish population, mainly therefore the land of the coastal area between Tel Aviv and the Carmel Ridge. On the other hand it proposed that the northern territory of Galilee and the southern district, largely desert, be retained under British mandate. But the Commission came to the general conclusion that any plan of partition would suffer under very serious disadvantages. It recognized 'that there is a deep-seated hostility to partition among the Arab population of Palestine, and that the plan recommended by the Royal Commission would lead to an outbreak of general rebellion which could only be put down by stern and perhaps prolonged military measures.' The Commission felt unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which would give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states. On the strength of this report the British Government reached the conclusion that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish states inside Palestine were so great that this solution of the problem was impracticable.

The British Government announced therefore, in November 1938, that it would continue to assume responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine and try to find alternative means for meeting the difficulties of the situation. 'It is clear that the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews, and His Majesty's Government is prepared in the first instance to make a determined effort to promote such an understanding.' To this end the Government issued invitations to the Palestinian Arabs and to the Governments of all the Arab states, as well as to the Jewish Agency, to send representatives to London to confer there with the British Government on the future policy of Palestine, including the question of immigration to Palestine. The British Government hoped that a decision would be reached at an early date. If the London discussions, foreseen in this declaration of policy, should not produce agreement within a reasonably brief period of time, the British Government promised to make its own decision in the light of its examination of the problem and of the discussions in London, and to announce the policy which it proposed to pursue. Thus the year 1938 left the Palestinian problem as completely unsettled as it had been since the outbreak of the Arab revolt in April 1936.

The Arab Revolt during 1938.

The beginning of the year witnessed ever-increasing manifestations of racial hostility, violence and widespread disorder in Palestine. The stern measures which the British Government had taken in 1937 to suppress the revolution seemed on the contrary to fan the fire of revolt. This revolt developed during 1938 on an unprecedented scale, until it embraced the whole Arab population of Palestine, deeply affecting the Arabs of the neighboring countries, and increasing the intense hatred and bitterness prevailing in the Holy Land.

To enforce the unity of the Arab revolutionary movement, of which the generally recognized leader was the Mufti, Hai Amin el Husseini, who had been exiled in 1937, the Arabs exercised, especially during the second half of 1938, a campaign of intimidation and terrorist action against those leaders who disagreed with the policy of the Mufti. Several Arabs were killed by terrorists. On the other hand some of the Zionists resorted to acts of retaliation against the Arabs, and during several weeks retaliatory assassinations of Arabs by Zionists, especially in the cities of Jerusalem and Haifa, were not infrequent. Some of the outrages against the Arab civilian population, like the famous explosion in Haifa of July 6th, 1938, which claimed many victims, caused widespread commotion, but the actual perpetrators remained unknown. From July 1 to October 25, the list of people killed in Palestine reached not less than 1,308. Of these, 1,057 were Arabs, 211 were Jews and 40 were British.

In the fall the Government took still stronger measures against the Arab uprising. Not less than 7,800 Jews were enlisted as special policemen, replacing Arab policemen in many strategic points and patrolling and guarding all Jewish settlements. Meanwhile, outside of a few large towns and outside of the Jewish colonies, civil administration completely disappeared and the revolutionary government of the Arabs was in control of the largest area of the country. As a report to The New York Times of October 2 pointed out, 'the rebel successes and the repressive measures to which the Government had had to resort had united the Arabs as never before.' It was no longer the Arab townsmen who dominated the Arab movement, but the Arab country people. Traffic on the roads and on the railways was mostly suspended or only carried on at great risk, communications by telephone and telegraph became entirely uncertain, the ordinary police control and public works ceased. Even whole cities including the old city of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus and others, were for a shorter or a longer period exclusively controlled by the rebels. To mark their new national unity and determination, the Arabs of Palestine, men and women, Mohammedans and Christians, gave up the customary headdress of the tarboosh or the European headdress, and instead all accepted the traditional national headdress of the Arabian peasants at the behest of the rebel leaders. The Palestine Government had constructed with the help of Jewish workers a unique, strongly-fortified wall of barbed wire, completely separating Palestine from Syria, an unprecedented sort of separation of neighboring countries. In spite of that, the contact between the Palestinian Arabs and the Arabs of neighboring countries remained as intense as before. It was also frequently reported that the Palestinian Arabs were supported by Germany and Italy, partly by the supply of armaments and munitions and partly by the cooperation of foreign instructors.

On October 11 an Arab Interparliamentary Congress for Palestine concluded its session in Cairo, and expressed the aroused interest of the Arabs in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and of their Governments in the cause of the Palestinian Arabs. The Egyptian Government supported openly the cause of Arab nationalism, and the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies presided over the Congress. The Egyptian King, believed by many to have aspirations to the dignity of a recreated Caliphate, expressed his warm sympathies for the Palestinian Arabs. As mentioned above, the British Government, in its November declaration, sent invitations to the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Trans-Jordan to participate in the planned Arab-Jewish Conference in London, to discuss the problems of Palestine and of Jewish immigration. The above named Governments accepted the invitation. A formal invitation was sent also to the King of Yeman, but no reply had been received at the close of 1938.

The British Government ordered also the release of the five Palestinian Arab leaders who had been held as prisoners on the Seychelles Islands. They were not allowed, however, to return to Palestine, but were expected as Arab representatives at the London Conference. Among these five leaders were Dr. Hussein Khalidi who until his arrest had been Mayor of Jerusalem, and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, the general manager of the Arab Bank in Jerusalem and the leading financial expert of the Arabs. The British Government declared that it would not allow the former Mufti of Jerusalem to represent the Arabs at the conversations in London. There is no doubt, however, that the Arab representatives at the Conference will be largely dominated by the spirit of uncompromising nationalism, as expressed by the Mufti, and that their program will insist upon a stoppage of Jewish immigration to Palestine. On the other hand the Zionists insist on opening wide the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration, and do not wish to agree, under any condition, to a restriction of the Jews in Palestine to a minority position in the country. Under these conditions, there is very little prospect for a negotiated solution of the Palestine problem at the London Conference.

Meanwhile at the end of October the British Government concentrated a force of more than twenty thousand soldiers, with many airplanes and tanks, in Palestine and started the reconquest of the country. The Arab armed forces under the command of General Abdul Rahim Haj Mohammed, a former Turkish army officer of high position, were estimated at about twenty-five thousand men. The military command of the Arab revolutionary forces had well-equipped services and issued decrees and proclamations like a government, and its orders were generally obeyed throughout Palestine. The British troops proceeded to clear the larger cities of the occupying rebels and their rule. In spite of the successes of the army and of the heavy losses inflicted upon the Arab troops, peace was by no means restored at the end of 1938, and although all the highways were heavily patrolled by armored cars, frequent acts of isolated terrorism and guerilla warfare still continued to make the Holy Land unsafe.

The Jewish Position.

During all these difficult months the Jewish settlers in Palestine continued their work of construction, and although naturally the standards of life were lowered and the pace of numerical and economic expansion slowed down, the Jewish position was nevertheless not only maintained but much strengthened. The immigration of Jews into Palestine continued at the rate of about 15,000 a year, which of course marked a great decline compared with the record figure of 62,000 in 1935. In October 1938 the Government announced that Jewish immigration to Palestine would be continued for the six months period beginning October 1, on the same basis that prevailed for the six months ending September 30. Thus the Government refused to accept the Arab demand to stop Jewish immigration, but on the other hand refused Jewish demands for increased immigration in accordance with the need of so many refugees from Nazi terror in Central Europe. According to the new immigration schedule, 2,000 capitalists, meaning persons in possession of $5,000 or more and 1,000 workers without capital and accompanied by their wives and children, were to be admitted during the next six months, as well as 800 dependents other than wives and children.

The number of Jewish unemployed was relatively small. A surprisingly large number of new agricultural settlements were established, which absorbed about 2,000 people, and valuable tracts of land were acquired for new settlement. The all-Jewish City of Tel Aviv grew rapidly, and its new port outdid the old neighboring port of Jaffa and progressed in almost geometrical proportion. It gave employment to about 1,500 Jewish workers, and accelerated the development of a Jewish merchant fleet. About 8,500 Jews were enrolled as special constables and supernumeraries, so that there were officially about 10,000 Jews under arms, apart from the Jewish police. Jewish unemployed were also employed by the Government for its large defense work, especially for the building of the northern wall, the so-called Tegart's wall, which separates Palestine from Syria. The large Jewish orange groves which formerly had employed Arab labor to a certain extent, now employ exclusively Jewish labor. So it may be said that the Jewish settlement weathered very well the storm of the difficult year of terror, unrest and civil war. On the other hand Arab economic life was completely disorganized, the suffering of the masses was very great, and the number of persons killed and wounded on the Arab side was several times that on the Jewish side. For November alone casualties were estimated at 197 persons killed, of whom 174 were Arabs, 13 Jews and 11 British.

At the beginning of October it was generally feared in Jewish circles that the British Government would yield to the Arab demands and close Palestine, at least for a transitional period, to Jewish immigration and that it might abandon the Balfour Declaration. It was the pressure of Jewish and general public opinion, especially in the United States, which prevented the British Government from taking the envisaged steps, or so it appears. Large sections of American Jewry asked the Department of State to intercede with the British Government, and on October 14 Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a statement in which he expressed American sympathy for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Although, as it was declared, the American Government had no legal right to interfere, as long as American interests were not touched, public opinion in America generally backed the attitude taken by President Roosevelt of a moral obligation not to abandon the project of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, especially at a time of so great a pressure upon all countries to facilitate Jewish immigration. There is no doubt that the sentiment of the American public and of the American Government carried great weight with the British Government in its determination to continue Jewish immigration into Palestine, and not to alter, for the time being, the basic principles of the Palestine mandate, thereby refusing to accept the Arab demands for an abolition of the mandate and for the establishment of an elected National Government in Palestine.

On the other hand the British Government felt itself unable to authorize any great alteration in the existing rate of immigration, as it would prejudice its position in the forthcoming discussion with Arabs and Jews. The Jewish Agency had demanded an additional immigration of 10,000 young German Jews into Palestine. The British Government did not immediately authorize this additional immigration. It stressed the fact that the question of Jewish immigration would be one of the major points in the London discussion scheduled to begin during January 1939. Thus the British Government maintained a half-way position between Arab and Zionist demands, and is looking forward to the possibility of a successful outcome of the envisaged Conference, although most observers regard this possibility as very slight.