1963: United States

A summary of United States foreign relations, political events, and legislative and judicial developments in 1963 is presented below.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

U.S. diplomacy in 1963 registered the gains and disappointments to be expected of a nation circumscribed in its decisions by the power and will of domestic as well as foreign detractors and yet increasingly mindful of the dangers inherent in a nuclear arms race. Basic U.S. Cold War policies toward both Europe and Asia remained unchanged. In Europe U.S. policy still sought a unified, free, and democratic Germany. The United States continued to display open disapprobation toward the Soviet repression of Eastern European nationalism. In the Far East, U.S. policies were still anchored to a general opposition to Communist expansion that favored neutrality for Laos but uncompromising war against the Communist guerrillas of South Vietnam. These views continued after the death of President John F. Kennedy. Lyndon B. Johnson, a short time after he took office, emphatically reaffirmed the policies that had been adopted by his predecessor.

U.S.-Soviet Relations.

At the same time, the rhetoric of the administration reflected a hopeful and realistic mood that emphasized the limits of national power and the resultant need for coexistence. In his Washington speech on June 10 President Kennedy asked the nation to re-examine its own thoughts and attitudes regarding the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Nowhere did he phrase this burgeoning theme more succinctly than in the Dallas address delivered shortly before his death in November: 'In a world of complex and continuing problems, in a world full of frustrations and irritations, American leadership must be guided by the lights of ... reason, or else those who confuse rhetoric with reality, and the plausible with the possible, will gain the ascendancy with their seemingly swift and simple solutions to every world problem.' This conservative mood of seeking the possible, paralleled at least partially by a new Soviet outlook, produced the significant test-ban treaty of July 1963, as well as an agreement in October to prohibit the orbiting in space of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. From such limited gains, U.S. leaders anticipated further East-West accords on both the political and the military fronts.

Such rays of hope did not remove the shadow of trouble and tension. In mid-October Soviet troops held up two U.S. convoys, one for over two days, on the Berlin autobahn. U.S. officials attributed the delay to a genuine Soviet misunderstanding. But a few days later Russians held up a British convoy for ten hours in a typical head-counting dispute. When, on November 5, another U.S. convoy was stopped at Marienborn checkpoint, President Kennedy called an emergency meeting of his advisers to discuss the continuing Soviet challenge to Western access rights. After a two-day war of nerves the U.S. troops entered West Berlin, but for the recurrent problem of the divided city there was no solution in sight. Indeed, it seemed clear that the critical questions of West Berlin and Germany could be resolved only at the end of a long series of Cold War settlements.

U.S. Relations with Europe.

Western Defense.

U.S. policy toward Europe was dominated in 1963 by the purpose of creating a multinational nuclear defense force that would terminate the proliferation of nuclear powers and reaffirm U.S. commitment to Europe's defense. The program evolved from the disagreement between Britain and the United States in December 1962 over the Skybolt missile, which under a 1960 arrangement was to be developed for joint use by the two nations. The missile had performed disappointingly in its initial tests, and to the U.S. Defense Department the missile was no longer of sufficient strategic value to merit the expenditure. The British government replied that its defense policy made Skybolt essential to the British nuclear deterrent after 1965. In a television interview on Dec. 17, 1962, President Kennedy expressed doubt that the United States would get full value from a project that would ultimately cost well over $2 billion. 'There is a limit,' he said, 'to how much we need, as well as how much we can afford to have a successful deterrent.' The United States, he added, was already spending $50 billion per year for defense, and this expenditure could rise to $60 billion or $65 billion unless the nation tightened up its defense program. The president believed it time for the prosperous nations of Western Europe to play a larger part in regional defense. The United States had six divisions in Europe, in large measure the only ones fully equipped and combat-ready. Nor did the president want Europe to divert its funds to nuclear deterrents, when the United States already had a tremendous nuclear arsenal.

On Dec. 21, 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced at Nassau that both governments had agreed that in place of Skybolt the U.S. government would make available to Britain Polaris missiles without warheads, that the United Kingdom would build the necessary submarines, that these forces plus at least an equal number of U.S. forces would be made available to NATO, and that these British forces, except where supreme British interests were at stake, would be employed in the general defense of Europe. Following the Nassau conference, President Kennedy offered Polaris missiles to the other NATO powers under the same arrangement.

Despite the eventual refusal of French President Charles de Gaulle to accept such weapons for France, the United States began an intensive diplomatic campaign among NATO members to implement the Nassau proposals. The West German government agreed in January to contribute to a NATO multinational force 'in accordance with its capacity.' President Kennedy discussed the matter with Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani in Washington on January 17-18, and their joint statement indicated that the Italian leader was greatly interested in the project. The president appointed Livingston Merchant, former undersecretary of state for political affairs, as head of a special team to negotiate a multilateral NATO nuclear defense force. During March Merchant and his associates visited Rome, Brussels, Bonn, and London. In April the United States and Britain signed an agreement for the purchase of up to 100 Polaris missiles. The United States at the same time withdrew its Jupiter missiles from Turkey and replaced them with Polaris missiles on submarines patrolling the eastern Mediterranean.

During April Livingston Merchant carried out a second round of multilateral defense negotiations, with talks in the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey. Although France had rejected the plan, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de-Murville, after conversations with President Kennedy in Washington, announced that 'the common interests of France and the United States are so great that there can be no really serious matter dividing the two countries.' At the spring ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, held in Ottawa on May 22-24, the foreign ministers approved the steps taken to organize the multinational nuclear defense force. Denmark and Norway were still opposed to the stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil, but this fact did not prevent them from taking part in allied discussions on nuclear questions. On June 15 the French government informed the NATO secretary-general that France would withdraw its naval forces from the NATO command. The State Department expressed regret but declared that what mattered was the capability of the French fleet and its availability for the defense of Europe in the event of war.

In an exchange of notes on April 16 Canada and the United States reached an agreement on 'the conditions under which nuclear warheads will be made available for Canadian forces engaged in North American defense and assigned to NATO.' This agreement followed months of bitter political controversy in Canada, inaugurated by sharp U.S. criticism of the Canadian government's refusal to accept a nuclear defense policy. This rebuke divided Canadian opinion and forced Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to call a general election for April 8. Lester B. Pearson's Liberal Party won enough seats to enable it to form a new government. On May 10 Pearson visited President Kennedy at Hyannis Port, Mass., to discuss Canada's commitment to the defense of the North Atlantic area. In their statement the two leaders emphasized the importance of continental security to the free world's safety and affirmed their mutual interest in ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral defense arrangements.

President Kennedy's European Tour.

In a further effort to reassure Western Europe of the U.S. commitment to its defense, President Kennedy spent the ten days from June 23 to July 2 visiting West Germany, the Irish Republic, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Secretary of State Rusk accompanied the president on his German and Italian visits and during his conversations with Macmillan.

Arriving in Cologne, President Kennedy assured the German people that U.S. forces would remain in Europe 'so long as our presence is desired and required,' adding emphatically, 'your safety is our safety, your liberty is our liberty, and any attack on your soil is an attack on our own.' In their joint communiqué, President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer affirmed their belief that 'the North Atlantic Alliance continues to be a major instrument for the maintenance of freedom.' They agreed that the proposed multilateral seaborne defense force would be a good means of combining NATO members' defense efforts, and they declared again the right of Germany to self-determination and agreed to defend Western rights in West Berlin.

Addressing an audience of West German political leaders in Frankfurt, President Kennedy reasserted his belief that the security of the United States was inseparable from that of Europe. The reunion of Europe, under European leadership, he said, would continue to have the determined support of the United States.

In Ireland the president addressed the Irish Parliament. At a meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan the two leaders discussed the major problems of the world, especially the prospects of achieving a test-ban treaty. They reaffirmed their efforts to bring about a multilateral NATO defense force.

In the final stage of his European tour President Kennedy conferred with President Antonio Segni and Premier Giovanni Leone. In their joint communiqué the two presidents agreed in principle to the multilateral defense force and the continuing process of European unification. At NATO headquarters in Naples Kennedy declared that he had come to Europe 'to reassert as clearly and persuasively as I could that the American commitment to the freedom of Europe is reliable.'

In his report to the nation, the president concluded: 'Western Europe is fast becoming a dynamic united power in world affairs. . . . There is still much progress to be made. . . . But today we can be more confident than ever that the old world and the new are partners for progress and partners for peace.'

The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

On June 10, a fortnight before his European trip, President Kennedy announced two important decisions aimed at easing international tension. In a speech at American University in Washington he informed the nation, first, that representatives of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union would meet in Moscow in mid-July to discuss the question of a nuclear test-ban treaty. London and Washington issued simultaneous statements that Lord Hailsham, lord president of the council and minister of science, and W. Averell Harriman, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, would represent the two Western nations in the forthcoming talks, designed to break the deadlock at the Geneva disarmament conference. The president announced, second, that the United States would conduct no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere 'so long as other states do not do so.' In his Washington address the president appealed for an end of Cold War attitudes and emphasized that the United States and the Soviet Union, together with their allies, had 'a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race.' Before the test-ban negotiations the Geneva disarmament conference reached an agreement on June 20, which provided for a direct communications link, a 'hot line,' between Moscow and Washington for use in an emergency, to help reduce the risk of war through accident or miscalculation.

As the result of brief negotiations which began in Moscow in mid-July, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union concluded, on July 25, a treaty banning all nuclear tests except those held underground. It was signed in Moscow on August 5 by Dean Rusk for the United States, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for the Soviet Union, and Lord Home, British foreign secretary, for the United Kingdom. The treaty contained an escape clause that permitted each signatory to withdraw if it decided that 'extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty' had jeopardized 'the supreme interest of the country.' The test-ban treaty was the first major international agreement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union since the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty eight years earlier.

In his address to the nation on July 26, President Kennedy described the test-ban agreement as 'a victory for mankind' and added that 'this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.' Early in August Secretary Rusk traveled to West Germany, where he secured the influential German signature to the treaty. On August 29 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty by a vote of 16 to 1 and agreed to bring it before the Senate on September 9. Unfortunately, in reassuring the Senate that the new agreement would not infringe on U.S. security, the administration was forced to discount much of the progress toward disarmament contained in the treaty. After two weeks of debate, the Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 80 to 19.

Stresses in the NATO Alliance.

Despite the gains for U.S. policy in Europe, it was apparent during the autumn of 1963 that the nation still faced a major dilemma in its widening commitments. The outflow of gold, reflecting a continuous deficit in the balance of payments, reached the substantial rate of $200 million a month in July. President Kennedy predicted that the United States would be forced to withdraw from some of its European obligations. In an address to Congress on July 19 he asked for a drastic new tax on American investments abroad, suggested a $300 million cut in U.S. military spending abroad, and opened a campaign to persuade American tourists to spend their holidays in the United States. Earlier, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had suggested to the president that the United States could curtail its expenditures in Europe with no loss of firepower if it brought some of its forces home but kept their weapons in Europe.

Against this background of U.S. concern over the outflow of dollars to Europe, NATO leaders were disturbed in October when U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, speaking in Chicago, declared that American forces abroad could be thinned out without weakening the nation's capacity to deal with Soviet aggression. This speech, coming in the midst of 'Operation Big Lift,' in which the United States flew a 15,000-man division from Texas to West Germany, suggested that henceforth the United States would station more of its troops at home. Secretary Rusk, to allay West German fears, reaffirmed the nation's intention to maintain its military forces in Europe. Speaking in Frankfurt, the secretary said: 'We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions here as long as there is need for them—and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed.' Secretary Rusk used the occasion of his trip to Bonn, however, to remind the prosperous Europeans that they were not meeting their defense commitments.

Britain and France remained the chief impediments to the creation of an effective mixed-manned NATO nuclear defense force. Britain continued to speak sympathetically of the program but refused as late as October to make a definite commitment. The British defense ministry doubted its military value and believed that it would undermine Britain's independent deterrent. The United States warned Britain in September that the mixed-manned defense force would be created with or without Britain, for it believed the plan to be the best means available of integrating West Germany into the Western defense system. Washington was assured the support of West Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey for the force.

U.S. Relations with Asia.

South Vietnam.

South Vietnam confronted U.S. Far Eastern policy in 1963 with a major challenge in concept as well as performance. The costly U.S. effort to sustain the war of attrition against the Communist Viet Cong had, since 1961, carried the political burden of the unpopular Ngo Dinh Diem regime. Yet Washington officials continued to anticipate victory on the military front. The establishment of more than 6,000 fortified strategic hamlets led some observers to predict increasing success in the jungle warfare. In April Secretary Rusk declared optimistically that 'there is a good basis for encouragement.'

What challenged the fundamental validity of U.S. policy in South Vietnam was the positive relationship between the political weakness of the Diem regime and the ultimate price of military victory. Only with the achievement of political stability could there be any end to the fighting. The disintegration of either the Diem government or U.S. policy seemed clearly predictable in May 1963, when Diem's troops fired into a Buddhist procession at Hué in central Vietnam, killing eleven people, including women and children. This incident, sparked by Buddhist determination to fly the multicolored religious banners instead of the South Vietnamese flag, set off an explosion of national anger. On June 11, amid mounting fury and opposition, a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, soaked his clothing in gasoline and burned himself to death in front of the Cambodian legation as a protest against the restrictions placed by a Catholic regime on the nation's ten million Buddhists.

As repression and rioting continued into July, the enemies and critics of the Diem government, in both the United States and South Vietnam, protested against the continuance of U.S. moral and physical support for the South Vietnamese regime. On July 16 more than 150 Buddhist monks and nuns demonstrated outside the home of U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting in Saigon. By mid-August, when the new U.S. ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, arrived in Saigon, five monks had died in suicides by burning and 15,000 U.S. clergymen had urged the president to terminate all financial and military support for the South Vietnamese government. The new ambassador, meanwhile, asserted that the U.S. purpose in Southeast Asia was to win the war against Communism.

As South Vietnamese troops and police swooped down on Buddhists and student sympathizers, the U.S. government moved closer to a direct confrontation with the Diem regime. Early in September it strongly advised President Diem to remove his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, from any position of authority in the government. As spokesmen of the South Vietnamese government charged increasingly that the United States was the enemy of the regime, President Kennedy repeated before a press conference that the only interest of the United States in South Vietnam was to win the struggle against the Viet Cong. U.S. policy in South Vietnam, costing over a million dollars per day, now faced the ultimate choice of deserting Diem or abandoning the war entirely. To resolve its dilemma, the administration on September 23 dispatched Defense Secretary McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor to study the political and military situation in the Southeast Asian country. Following their report to the National Security Council, the White House announced on October 2 that the United States would continue its military program in South Vietnam under the assumption that the U.S. military mission to that country could be concluded successfully by the end of 1965.

On November 1 a sudden military coup, which resulted in the death of President Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, resolved the political dilemma—at least for the moment. While Madame Nhu in the United States denounced the nation for its alleged faithlessness, a new military regime under Major General Duong Van Minh assumed control of Saigon. For several days the United States withheld recognition to determine the intentions of the new government, but by November 10 it had offered recognition and restored foreign aid to South Vietnam. Again U.S. officials predicted a quick and complete victory over the Viet Cong. On November 21-22 top-echelon U.S. leaders met in Honolulu to discuss the future of national policy in Southeast Asia. The conference reached the optimistic conclusion that not only would U.S. policy achieve victory but also 1,300 American troops could be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of the year. How the insurgent forces of 100,000 could be disposed of quickly and totally was not clear. Perhaps the best that the United States could hope for, Far Eastern analysts warned, was a military stalemate, especially if China were committed to preventing a Communist defeat.

Laos.

During 1963 the political situation in Laos continued to deteriorate from the high expectations of the Geneva agreement of June 1962. Right-wing and left-wing elements among the neutralist forces on the Plaine des Jarres divided when, following the shooting down of a U.S. plane carrying supplies to General Kong Le's forces, left-wing Colonel Deuane Sispaseuth accused Colonel Ketsana Vongsavong, Kong Le's chief of staff, of 'betraying the neutralist ideal' by adopting a pro-U.S. attitude. These parties carried their quarrel into the government, where Premier Souvanna Phouma supported Kong Le, and Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena supported Colonel Deuane.

On April 1 Quinim Pholsena, having returned from a tour of the Soviet Union and the United States with Prince Souvanna, was shot dead by a corporal of the guard, who charged that Quinim had attempted to undermine both the coalition government and the neutrality of Laos. In the skirmishing that followed, the Pathet Lao forces joined the left-wing neutralists, thus forcing the premier to seek support among the right-wing forces of General Phoumi Nosavan. On April 15 the British and Soviet foreign ministers secured a temporary cease-fire, which lasted only a few hours. Souvanna Phouma warned that the forces of Kong Le alone were preserving Laotian neutrality and that if they were eliminated the country would again fall into a civil war between the right-wing forces and the Pathet Lao.

For the United States as well, only a strong neutralist faction could preserve a coalition government for Laos. Yet political stability for Laos proved elusive indeed. On April 21 the Laotian government secured a cease-fire, but on May 17 fighting broke out again, when the left-wing forces charged that U.S. aircraft were landing reinforcements and equipment for the right wing. Throughout June there was skirmishing in southern and central Laos, and in July major fighting broke out again.

Against such tendencies the International Control Commission (ICC) could achieve little. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko joined Lord Home in support of the ICC in April but charged that the United States had not withdrawn all its military personnel from Laos, had continued to support the right wing, and had brought South Vietnamese and Taiwanese into the region of the Plaine des Jarres. The U.S. State Department denounced the Soviet charges as 'patently false' and maintained that 'the responsibility for the situation in Laos lies entirely with the Communists through the Pathet Lao attack on the forces of General Kong Le early in April.' On April 22, Undersecretary of State Harriman flew to Paris, London, and Moscow for conversations on the Laotian crisis. The Kremlin reaffirmed its support for the Geneva agreements. Even after Harriman's trip, however, Britain and the Soviet Union could not agree on a joint message to the ICC. On June 25 Phoumi Nosavan's forces occupied the Seno base, an action defended by Souvanna Phouma as necessary to insure the proper management of the installation. The Soviet government objected on August 9 and demanded of the British a joint statement that the matter in conflict be settled by all three elements in the coalition government. Lord Home again rejected the Soviet proposal. Thus the situation in Laos continued to be politically and militarily precarious.

U.S.-Latin American Relations.

Cuba.

U.S. policies toward Latin America were dominated in 1963 by a continuing effort to minimize, if not eliminate, the Cuban threat to the security of the hemisphere. This necessitated primarily the prohibition of any return of offensive weapons to Cuba and, in lieu of on-site inspection, the maintenance of surveillance to assure the nation that such weapons were not present. As early as Nov. 20, 1962, President Kennedy lifted the quarantine on Cuban shipping, and evidence that the Soviets were withdrawing their bombers led to a joint Soviet-U.S. letter to the secretary-general of the United Nations on Jan. 7, 1963, that the Cuban crisis need no longer remain on the agenda of the Security Council. During succeeding months the administration assured those who demanded action against Castro that it was convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that all offensive missiles and bombers had been removed. At his news conference on February 7 President Kennedy admitted that he was not taking the presence of 17,000 Soviet troops in Cuba lightly. But he reminded the nation that the matter of offensive weapons on Cuban territory was a matter of war and peace and that the Soviet Union was aware that if the U.S. government ever became convinced such weapons had reappeared, United States-Soviet relations would return immediately to the crisis point of late October 1962.

Secondly, U.S. policy attempted to demonstrate that Cuba itself had no future under the Castro regime. Following the U.S. lead, much of the free world withdrew its shipping from the Cuban trade. The U.S. government continued to restrict travel by its citizens to Cuba, and on July 8 it instituted blocking controls to terminate Cuba's access to U.S. dollars. In the absence of any direct Cuban threat to the security of the hemisphere, however, the administration scrupulously avoided acts of war against the island.

The Alliance for Progress.

Under the continuing Alliance for Progress program, the United States sought to prove that rapid economic and social development in Latin America could best be achieved through the functioning of free institutions. In his news conference of March 22 President Kennedy declared that he and the presidents of Central America and Panama were 'determined that we would both protect ourselves against the immediate danger and go forward with the great work of constructing dynamic, progressive societies, immune to the false promise of Communism.' Kennedy informed the Latin American leaders in Washington that as soon as the nations of Latin America had created an overall regional development plan, the United States would enlarge and expand its contribution to the development funds. The presidents agreed to increase Cuba's isolation by interrupting the clandestine flow of funds and personnel between Cuba and other countries of the hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress, formed at Punta del Este in 1961, entered its third year in August. Clearly, the achievements under the program still fell far short of its high promise. The region in 1963 experienced its customary political unrest. Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras passed through periods of deep political trouble if not actual revolution. Fourteen countries by November 1963 had enacted tax reform laws, but in none did these laws alter the vast disparity between rich and poor. Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela had undertaken major land reforms, but in each case the program had been launched before the alliance. The effort to increase per capita income failed to match even the meager gains of 1961. One special problem, obvious in Peru and Argentina, was the close relationship between reform and nationalization of foreign-owned industry.

At the annual review conference, held at São Paulo during November 1963, Brazilian President João Goulart suggested a new Latin American front of raw-material-exporting nations to protect themselves against overdeveloped customers, who constantly increased the price of manufactured goods. Immediately the delegates adopted the motto of 'trade, not aid.' U.S. representative W. Averell Harriman pointed both to the efforts of the United States to aid primary producers and to the achievements of U.S. economic aid. As early as June former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek and former Colombian President Alberto Lleras recommended to the Council for the Organization of American States that all alliance loans be channeled through an Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, which would direct them toward economic development and not social reform. The Kennedy administration favored this movement to 'Latinize' the Alliance and thus reduce criticism of U.S. management. Washington obtained unanimous agreement on the measure at São Paulo only after it promised to fight for lower tariffs on Latin American goods at the next conference of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

LEGISLATION

The Eighty-eighth Congress was unusual in several respects. Its first session was the longest of any in peacetime. Congress found itself urged on in personal appearances by two presidents — President John F. Kennedy before a joint session in January and President Lyndon B. Johnson in late November. Yet it failed to move. The upshot was a generally listless session with very little achieved in major legislation.

The session, beginning January 9 and ending December 30, was not without some accomplishments. It made history by approving the test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union. It broke some new ground with a program for attacking mental illness and retardation. It averted a nationwide rail strike in August with a bill requiring compulsory arbitration of a long dispute over work rules. And it passed some long-sought legislation on aid to colleges. But the record was spotty at best, and much of the program proposed by President Kennedy in the months before his death remained untouched.

By the end of the session, though, Congress was on notice that it would be under strong pressures in 1964 to pass the legislation and probably more. President Johnson, who embraced in full the Kennedy legislative requests, made it clear he would be breathing down the collective congressional neck without letup. For Johnson realizes that if he is to be elected in his own right in November 1964, he will have to run in large part on his record with Congress—on his ability to get Congress moving again. He will undoubtedly have his problems. With the White House at stake, Republican cooperation may be hard to come by.

Evidence that trouble might be ahead for him came in the final days of the 1963 session after Mr. Johnson's elevation to the presidency. Like his predecessor, the new chief executive failed in efforts to move along the two highest White House priorities—the tax reduction and civil rights bills. The best Congress would do was to promise action on both bills early in the Eighty-eighth's second session.

Anxious to win at least one victory before the first session quit, Mr. Johnson decided to put his prestige on the line in a fight over a provision in the foreign aid bill. The money battle was lost, with the administration suffering a $1.5 billion cut in foreign aid. But then Republicans tried to head off the proposed sale of wheat to the Soviet Union by attaching a rider to the aid bill barring any export-import bank credits to finance the sales. President Johnson fought hard on this one. He persuaded Democrats who had already reached the hearths back home for Christmas to turn around and come back to town. He put military planes at their disposal. A private plane, paid for out of Democratic Party funds, was chartered for other members. Enough Democrats struggled back to give Johnson his victory. Congress agreed to permit the financing arrangements if the president thought they were in the national interest. To the White House the grant of this discretionary authority was an important success.

It was clear that President Johnson's style with Congress would be personal and direct. Before his election as vice-president in 1960, he had served in Congress since 1937. In 1952, at the age of 44, he became the youngest senator ever to be elected majority leader. He was amazingly effective in that job, so much so that his friends wondered aloud why he left that powerful congressional post to run for an office that historically had thrust many of its tenants only into oblivion.

During his years in Congress Johnson made friends and learned well the ways of the legislative world. He learned the value of applying pressure at the right time at the right place.

From the day he moved into the oval White House office, he burned up the phone lines to Capitol Hill. He wandered up to his old haunts on surprise visits, having lunch one day with the Texas delegation, dropping in one evening for a chat with Senate Republican leader Everett Dirksen and House Republican leader Charles Halleck. He took members for a drive or had them in for breakfast. He took time out one day to call a senator simply to congratulate him on the quality of some document he had introduced in the Congressional Record.

In short, President Johnson likes to keep relations friendly with members in both parties. He can be tough, of course. But compromise and persuasion were the secrets of his success as majority leader. He undoubtedly will be using those same techniques as president.

Illustrative of his give and take was the way he handled the announced closings of some nonessential military installations toward the year's end. First he emphasized the need for economy in government in a series of public statements. He talked of holding down unnecessary spending by agencies in 1964. He talked of curbing federal employment. And just as the cheers went up from the economy-minded members of Congress at this presidential 'give,' President Johnson then began to 'take.' He announced the closing of the military installations, and many a member who a few days before was applauding economy in government found himself with the economizing beginning in his own backyard.

How effective a full session of the Johnson approach will be remains to be seen. He obviously will have to use all the charm and persuasion at his command in the election year. And he will have to do it without drawing a backlash of resentment, similar to the charge made by Republican Senator Barry Goldwater as the session ended that the president was trying 'to treat congressmen as his personal errand boys.'

Congress has left much undone, and Mr. Johnson will be giving it more to do. Unpassed besides taxes and civil rights bills are bills on Medicare, federal aid for urban and commuter transportation systems, a new youth training and employment program, a Cabinet department of urban affairs, a domestic peace corps, general school aid, unemployment compensation reform, area redevelopment, and civil defense fallout shelters.

Several factors contributed to the leisurely congressional pace in 1963. There was the apparent lack of enthusiasm in the country generally for the suggested bold new programs. There was the civil rights bill that came late in the session, clogging an already crowded legislative calendar and leading to what liberals charged was a deliberate slowdown on other legislation by anti-civil-rights committee chairman.

Some observers put the blame on archaic congressional machinery that permits irrelevant debate and repetitive hearings, among other questionable procedures. One advocate of congressional reform, Republican Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey, said, 'Congress is becoming the laughing-stock of this nation.' Moreover, some lawmakers criticized what they said was uninspired leadership by House Speaker John W. McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. For his part, McCormack thought that the session was cautious, not complacent, and that any judgment of the Eighty-eighth Congress should wait until the end of the second session in 1964. Mansfield said 'no senator need be ashamed' of the record.

Both leaders were working with relatively substantial majorities — 67 Democrats to 33 Republicans in the Senate, and 258 Democrats to 176 Republicans in the House. But the traditional coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats was working too. And Southern conservatives had the chairmanships of such important committees as the House Rules and Appropriations committees and the Senate Finance and Judiciary groups.

The most publicized congressional inquiries of the year involved Robert G. Baker, the resigned secretary to the Senate majority, who was forced to quit because of outside business interests; Joseph Valachi, the hoodlum who went on television to tell a Senate committee and the American people all about the secret gangster syndicate called Cosa Nostra; and the TFX fighter plane, subject of a $7 billion contract to develop a new tactical fighter plane adaptable to both the Air Force and Navy.

Foreign Affairs.

Test Ban.

Undoubtedly Congress' most historic decision came on September 24, when the Senate consented to ratification of the nuclear test-ban treaty. The vote was 80 to 19, or 14 more votes than the two thirds required for Senate approval. The treaty, signed the month before in Moscow, prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The debate on the Senate floor was spirited. Among the most vocal opponents of the treaty was Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, considered a front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination. After the Senate action President Kennedy ratified the treaty on October 7.

Foreign Aid.

The foreign aid fight in 1963 was one of the most vicious fought since the inception of the program in the early postwar years. Tempers flared time and again, and there were charges of broken promises. The bill was cut severely. The way the squabble was handled at the end of the session, preventing adjournment before Christmas, brought new demands in newspaper editorials across the country that Congress overhaul its lawmaking methods.

One obvious element in the long fight this year was evidence of continuing congressional disenchantment with the whole foreign aid program. Ironically, a committee to study President Kennedy's program simply added fuel to the fire. The study group, headed by General Lucius Clay, called the program 'essential' but said that 'we are indeed attempting too much for too many.' It added that savings were possible.

Seeing the writing on Capitol Hill walls, the Kennedy administration promptly cut its own aid request from $4.9 billion to $4.5 billion. But Congress responded by setting a $3.6 billion ceiling on spending in its authorization bill. Then in the subsequent bill actually appropriating the funds Congress allowed only $3 billion. The $1.5 billion cut was the deepest incision ever made in a foreign aid bill.

Trade with Communist Countries.

The issue of trade with Communist countries became entangled in 1963 with the foreign aid bill and was responsible in major part for prolonging the session. The trouble started when the Senate killed a House-passed bill aimed at curbing sales of wheat to the Soviet Union. The House measure would have prevented the Export-Import Bank from underwriting commercial loans to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries for the purchase of United States wheat or other surplus crops. Then the House turned to another tactic. It added the ban to the foreign aid bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee deleted it, and the aid measure went to the House without it. The House balked and the bill went back to a Senate-House conference for adjustment of differences.

President Johnson jumped into the fight, saying the question really was whether the president should have a free hand to exercise his constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs. A compromise was worked out. A ban was written into the bill, but the door was left ajar. The president could waive it—as he undoubtedly planned to do—if he felt such sales were in the 'national interest.' The foreign aid bill compromise was the last piece of major legislation for the first session of the Eighty-eighth Congress.

One provision in the earlier authorization bill on foreign aid gave the administration a victory with a little more ease. The earlier bill restored administration authority to extend to Yugoslavia and Poland any tariff concessions made to other countries. This 'most-favored nation' tariff treatment for the two Communist-controlled countries had been barred in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. During the year President Kennedy had urged that the authority be restored as a means of loosening the Soviet Union's economic ties with those two countries.

War Claims.

After charges of windfall gains by attorneys, Congress amended the 1962 Philippine War Claims Act. This was the $73 million economic rehabilitation bill for unpaid World War II damage awards to Philippine claimants. The amendment tightened payment provisions to head off exorbitant fees for lawyers who represented those presenting claims.

The Economy.

Taxes.

In his January 14 State of the Union message President Kennedy told Congress the 'overshadowing' domestic problem was the need for a tax cut to stimulate the growth of the nation's economy. Accordingly, the administration settled on an $11 billion tax reduction and reform bill. It called for across-the-board cuts in personal and corporate income taxes and a variety of reforms in the tax structure. The president had wanted the bill by midsummer so the cuts could go into effect beginning July 1.

Hearings by the House Ways and Means Committee went on through March. Closed deliberations began, and it was not until September 10 that the committee finally voted on its reworked version. House passage followed 15 days later by a vote of 271 to 155. The House version, differing from the original administration bill, would reduce personal income taxes by an average of almost 19 percent. Most of the revenue-raising reforms suggested by the administration were either altered drastically or dropped entirely. The administration nevertheless endorsed the House bill.

The Senate Finance Committee then took up the bill, but Virginia Democratic Senator Harry F. Byrd, committee chairman, decided to move slowly. He has long opposed tax cuts while the overall budget of government runs a deficit, and he indicated he wanted to see the following year's budget before he budged.

On assuming office, President Johnson urged Byrd to rush hearings. But the bill did not get out of the Virginian's committee to permit Senate action in 1963. When the session finally ended, more than 30 amendments were still to be disposed of by the Finance Committee.

Another measure falling short of passage was the so-called interest equalization tax bill. The proposal was made by President Kennedy to help reduce the nation's continuing balance-of-payments deficit with the resulting flow of dollars overseas. The proposed tax would apply to Americans supplying long-term capital for certain foreign investments. The purpose is to increase the cost of foreign long-term borrowing in the U.S. capital markets to reduce dollar exports. The House Ways and Means Committee approved the measure, but that is as far as it got.

Again in 1963 Congress extended the corporate and excise tax rates to prevent them from expiring at a $4.2 billion cost to government revenues. The bill extended the 52 percent corporate income tax and existing excise taxes on distilled spirits, beer, wine, cigarettes, passenger cars, and other items.

Debt.

One debt limit bill in 1963 was not enough. Congress ended up the session by passing a total of three. Two increased the ceiling and one extended it. As it stands now, the ceiling is $315 billion until June 30, 1964.

Silver.

A thirty-year-old policy ended when Congress voted gradual elimination of silver backing from U.S. paper currency. This stemmed from 1933 when the government began to subsidize silver miners. A bill approved in May authorized printing of gold-backed $1 and $2 Federal Reserve notes to replace the existing silver-backed treasury silver certificates. The silver, backing roughly $2 billion in bills, will gradually be used in coinage over the next 15 years.

Civil Rights.

Along with the tax cut bill, the Kennedy administration put the highest priority on the civil rights bill. It was, however, a relatively late starter. On February 28 President Kennedy sent Congress a small package of civil rights requests, dealing largely with voting rights. Liberals of both parties criticized it as 'too little.' Then came the demonstrations by Negroes throughout the South protesting discrimination. Shock waves reached the White House, and on June 11 President Kennedy told the country that Negroes cannot be told that the 'only way they are going to get their rights is to go into the streets and demonstrate.'

On June 19 President Kennedy sent a widened civil rights program to Congress. The measure would prohibit hotels, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation from refusing service to anyone because of his race. It also would provide new legal weapons against discrimination in housing, schools, voting, and employment.

Some congressional observers said the civil rights bill was one reason why the session dragged on so long. They said some Southern Democratic chairmen of legislative and appropriations committees and subcommittees seemed to mark time on pending business to strengthen their bargaining position on civil rights.

In any event, hearings were held in Senate and House committees. The Southern-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee took no action. But the Senate Commerce Committee, handling part of the bill, did vote out the public accommodations section of the administration bill.

More marked progress came in the House Judiciary Committee. That group reshaped a version proposed by one of its subcommittees that many of the supporters of the bill's objectives felt was too liberal and jeopardized final action. The measure approved by the full committee was the result of bipartisan negotiations. It came out of the committee on November 20, but the hurdle raised for floor consideration by the House Rules Committee proved to be too high in 1963. The committee's chairman, Democrat Howard W. Smith of Virginia, who has traditionally opposed such legislation, set hearings for early in 1964. House passage early in the new year appeared ensured.

Education.

For the first time in five years Congress surprisingly got around to passing some major education legislation. Delighted, President Johnson later said the first session might well be known as the 'Education Congress.'

Three education programs were approved. The most significant was the three-year $1.2 billion program of federal grants and loans for construction of classrooms and libraries by the country's 2,100 colleges and universities.

A second bill, the Health Professions Assistance Act, was the first new program proposed by President Kennedy to be cleared by the session. It authorized $175 million over three years in matching grants for construction of medical and dental schools and $30.7 million for medical student loans.

The third bill expanded the vocational education program. President Kennedy had urged this to meet new unemployment problems, particularly among Negroes. The bill also continued the National Defense Education Act and extended the impacted areas program of grants to public schools in communities with heavy concentration of federal workers.

The college aid and vocational education bills were broken out of President Kennedy's omnibus education package. He had requested a $1.5 billion four-year program of aid to states for urgent improvements in elementary and secondary education, including aid for teacher's salaries. No progress was made on those provisions or on the Kennedy suggestions for federal insurance for loans to college students, grants for new graduate centers, and a variety of teacher training and education improvement aid.

National Security and Space.

Defense Funds.