1938: Aviation

Dominating the aeronautical scene in 1938 were two major factors — one military, the other civil. Realization of the weakness in our national defenses and the determination of the President to increase our air power gave promise of a more efficient utilization of the productive capacity of the industry and an opportunity for our air forces to develop to equality with those of other world powers. Creation of the long awaited Civil Aeronautics Authority, in compliance with the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between the Federal Government and the aviation industry. The story of aviation for 1938 therefore divides itself into two broad classifications, airplanes for defense and airplanes for commerce.

Airplanes for Defense in the United States.

Appraisal of the air-defense problem requires an international viewpoint, because the European armaments race has a direct influence on our military aircraft policy.

The flight of the Prime Minister of England to Munich in an American-built Lockheed airplane was an ironical indication of the relative air power of the major European nations. For the past three years England has been building military airplanes fast and furiously. She had thrown overboard her traditional 'buy British' policy; and in the spring the Air Ministry ordered 200 militarized versions of the Lockheed 14 Transport, at a price given as $17,000,000, and 200 North American NA-16s. Both types were alleged to be used for advanced training. But courageous efforts to build up her air forces in adequate numbers had been started too late to provide the necessary bargaining power at Munich. The British 'shadow plan,' which provides for the construction of airplanes in factories operated by automobile manufacturers, had taken a long time to get started. As 1938 closed, Fairey Battle Airplanes were not yet flowing smoothly out of the huge Austin shadow plant near Birmingham. Production there was only a small fraction of that of the parent Fairey plant at Stockport. Similarly, the Roots shadow plant at Speake was having a hard time getting into production on Bristol Blenheim bombers. Most reliable estimates place Britain's production rate at 200 airplanes per month with the prospect of rapid acceleration as the shadow scheme takes hold.

The air preparedness of France at the time of the Munich showdown was pathetic. Teetering precariously on the political fence, the French had nationalized their aircraft plants along with the rest of the munitions industry. Squabbles over the prices the Government was to pay for the factories occupied valuable time. Labor troubles were the order of the day. And it is a sad bit of advertising for nationalization that the entire French airplane industry, according to the best obtainable figures, at the time of the Munich conference was producing only about 75 planes per month.

In sharp contrast to the armament policies of the democracies are those of the Fascist nations. Germany has now passed the forced-draft stage of production. Her plants have been built, and her training is well under control. The new Heinkel factory at Oranienburg is probably the best equipped and most efficiently operated in the world. On one eight-hour shift per day, it is turning out leisurely about a dozen ships per week. And there are a half-dozen plants almost as large, and many smaller producing units. The German industry probably turned out 6,000 planes in 1938 and should be up to 8,000 units by 1940, with most of the plants working on a single shift. Personnel employed is estimated at 150,000 to 200,000, as compared with our 36,000.

But airplane production is not the only yardstick of air strength. There are many other contributing factors. A thoughtful and reliable appraisal of the position of the teams in the international armaments race was made by S. Paul Johnston, editor of Aviation, following a post-Munich tour of Europe.

At present, our Army and Navy together boast slightly under 3,000 modern airplanes. The Navy is already authorized by Congress to acquire up to 3,000 aircraft, but it has not modified the procurement policies under which an earlier program called for 2,000 planes by 1940. Even more confused is the present Army situation. Legislation resulting from the Baker Board report authorized expansion to 2,320 planes by July 1, 1940.

Shocked, by events at Munich, into a stern realization of the increasing fragility of our frontiers and the inadequacy of our air forces, the President called together his advisers to develop an armament program adequate to meet our needs. As the year closed, the Presidential request to Congress for military airplanes was set at 13,000.

Defense Appropriation.